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
DHARMAKĪRTI'S PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKA

An annotated translation of the fourth chapter (parārthānumāna)

Volume 1
(k. 1–148)

By

TOM J. F. TILLEMANS



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
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Part I

Introductory Remarks, Bibliography and Abbreviations

Introductory Remarks

The present book constitutes the first volume of what will most likely be a two volume work aiming at a translation and an edition of the fourth and last chapter of Dharmakīrti's most important work, the *Pramāṇavārttika*. The *Pramāṇavārttika* was the first of a series of seven works by this Buddhist logician, in other words, the *tshad ma sde bdun* or "seven works on epistemology and logic" as they came to be known in the Tibetan accounts. The basic order of composition of five of these works can still be maintained as it was hypothesized in FRAUWALLNER 1954, i.e., the *Pramāṇavārttika* (possibly preceeded by an earlier work on logic with which it would be integrated), *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, *Nyāyabindu*, *Hetubindu*, *Vādanyāya*; the two minor works, the *Sambandhaparīkṣā* and the *Saṃtānāntarasiddhi*, are more difficult to place in this chronological sequence.[1]

On the other hand, the question of the dates of our author, Dharmakīrti, which has provoked some recent debate, is still unsettled and probably will remain so for quite some time to come. Although the implications of the supposedly new texts attibuted to Dharmakīrti will not be taken up in any detail here,[2] the heart

[1]For bibliographical details on the research on Dharmakīrti and the school of Buddhist logicians in India, see STEINKELLNER and MUCH 1995.

[2]See LINDTNER 1980 which discusses a *Tattvaniṣkarṣa* mentioned in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* and *Sākārasiddhiśāstra* and a *Laukikapramāṇaparīkṣā* mentioned in Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasiddhi*. See also LINDTNER 1984, 162:. "We have now found a place for depositing some of the quotations from Dharmakīrti occurring in later philosophical works but not to be traced in any of his extant treatises."—see ibid. n. 36 for some passages. STEINKELLNER 1991 a reinterprets the *Tattvasiddhi* passage, *ācāryadharmakīrtipādair api laukikapramāṇaparīkṣāyām* ..., as not referring to a specific text, the **Laukikapramāṇaparīkṣā*, but rather, as he puts it on p. 278, as being "a reference to the systematical frame within which the following statements have to be localized, and that frame is 'an examination of the worldly valid cognitions.' " The *Tattvaniṣkarṣa* remains more enigmatic and does not seem to be easily explained away. The implications for the dates of Dharmakīrti, however, are another matter. If, as Lindtner maintains, the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (in which the *Tattvaniṣkarṣa* is cited) were genuinely attributable to the sixth-century Bhāvaviveka / Bhavya (c. 500–570), it would follow that the dates of Dharmakīrti would have to be moved back significantly. See RUEGG 1982, 513 and especially RUEGG 1990 against the attri-

of the problem still remains the argument from Xuanzang's silence, an argument which in our opinion is somewhat over-valued. In particular, FRAUWALLNER 1961, "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic," had situated Dharmakīrti c. 600–660, dates which depended on the fact that the Chinese pilgrim Xuanzang, who was well-versed in Indian logic, did not mention Dharmakīrti, while a later pilgrim, Yijing, did. In spite of being framed in vigorous rhetoric, this argument from silence is, for some of us at least, much less significant than it was made out to be: it shows little more than that our understanding of the period is lacunary and leads to various anomalies which we are simply not in a position to solve. Frauwallner was surely right in discounting some of his contemporaries' attempts at explaining away Xuanzang's silence; he was, as far as we can see, less obviously correct in thinking that their failures were of any real importance. We seem to have several pieces of evidence of uncertain weight for an earlier dating—e.g., the possible mention of Dharmakīrti in Dharmapāla's commentary on the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* and the mention of Dharmakīrti by the Tibetan historian, Tāranātha—evidence which while not in itself hard cannot be just "talked away" and should be tallied against Xuanzang's silence.[3] The fact is that if we had some hard positive data for dating Dharmakīrti differently, Xuanzang's silence would soon be forgotten as an utterly minor quirk of history. And that such evidence is not yet available or is not yet as hard as we would like it to be does little to strengthen Frauwallner's argument: it shows as much the incomplete-

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bution of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* to this Bhāvaviveka; see also RUEGG1981, n. 339 on the tantric Bhavya as possible author of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*; as is fairly well known, Tibetan writers like lCaṅ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje (1717–1786) and Thu'u bkwan Chos kyi ñi ma (1737–1802) recognized a second and later Bhāvaviveka / Bhavya—see RUEGG 1990, 67. In all fairness to Lindtner, it has to be said, however, that one of Ruegg's arguments against the attribution to Bhāvaviveka, viz., that the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* cites Dharmakīrti, would be something of a *petitio principii* if the question at stake is indeed that of Dharmakīrti's dates, and if we grant that FRAUWALLNER 1961 has not definitively settled the matter. A much more telling consideration against attribution to the sixth-century Bhāvaviveka is the fact that the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* contains Vajrayāna allusions, notably, a reference to Saraha as well as a prediction of Nāgārjuna like that in the later *Manjuśrīmūlatantra*.

[3]Cf. FRAUWALLNER 1961 on the unreliability of Tāranātha. As for Dharmapāla's commentary, which is only extant in the Chinese translation of Yijing, we find there the phrase 然法稱不許 (T. 1625, 889c3). On a *natural* reading of the Chinese, not taking into account other potential factors, this reads "But Dharmakīrti did not accept it." LÜ CHENG 1928, p. 5, glosses this passage as:然今法云所緣稱不共許 "But, now, the *dharma*, i.e., the object (*ālambana*), is not commonly accepted," splitting 法稱 (=Dharmakīrti) into two, taking 法 as simply *dharma* and the 稱 as going with 許 to yield the rather unlikely compound 稱不許. My thanks to Tōru Funayama for sending me the article by Lü cheng. See also KIMURA 1999.

ness of our historical and philological data—if, for example, we had the Sanskrit of Dharmapāla's commentary, the question as to whether Dharmapāla had mentioned Dharmakīrti might be resolved in two minutes. Honesty would seem to demand an acknowledgment that, as things stand, we do not have any genuinely significant grounds for placing Dharmakīrti in the seventh century rather than earlier in the latter half of the sixth. Agnosticism may be unsatisfying, but it is, for the moment, the rational response here.

A brief introduction to the central idea of *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, the inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*), is in order. It should be stressed, first of all, that being composed of statements, the *parārthānumāna* is not, properly speaking, an "inference" (*anumāna*) in the Buddhist sense of the term; the latter must in fact be a cognition (*jñāna*) and thus must be a mental state and not a collection of statements. Following Dignāga, the inference-for-others is called an inference simply because it leads to a real inference: we apply the term for the effect to the cause. It is "for the other" in that it is destined for the opponent so that he will come to actually infer the truth of the proposition in question. Now, a *parārthānumāna*, as found in Dharmakīrti's later works and in post-Dharmakīrtian logic, is an argument form consisting of two statements which show the means of proof (*sādhana*) for a proposition in question (*sādhya*). The first statement shows that the reason (*hetu*) entails the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*), while the second shows that the "property-bearer"/"subject" (*dharmin*, *pakṣa*) of the argument, is indeed qualified by this reason. Thus, the classic illustration of this form is "Whatever is produced is impermanent, like a vase. Now, sound is produced." Hearing and understanding this verbal form serves to lead the opponent (*prativādin*) to the understanding that the reason, "being produced," possesses the three characteristics (*rūpa*) necessary to establish the proposition in question, viz., that sound is impermanent. Once the opponent has the understanding that the reason possesses the three characteristics, the actual inferential cognition will arise in the next moment.

This two-membered type of *parārthānumāna*, although it is the standard version in later Indo-Tibetan Buddhist logic, is nonetheless the result of an evolution in Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's thinking on logic. The version which one finds in Dignāga's early work, the *Nyāyamukha*, conspicuously contains a third member, viz., the thesis-statement (*pakṣavacana*). And this thesis-statement has just as much probative role in establishing a conclusion as the statements of reasons and examples. In other words, at this stage (and before) the thesis-statement *was* a member of a *parārthānumāna* and *was* also considered to be a means of proof (*sādhana*). The history of the gradual disappearance of the thesis-statement

from *parārthānumāna* in Dignāga and Dharmakīrti is a complex one and has been discussed in INAMI 1991, as well as in our article "More on *parārthānumāna*, Theses and Syllogisms," published in *Études Asiatiques* 1991. Suffice it to say here that there are probably three clear stages.

(a) The thesis-statement is obligatory in a *parārthānumāna* and has the status of a *sādhana*.

(b) The thesis-statement is optional, but does not have the status of a *sādhana*.

(c) The thesis-statement should not figure in a *parārthānumāna*, precisely because a *parārthānumāna* should only state means of proof (*sādhana*), and the thesis-statement can never be a means of proof which contributes in any way to establishing itself.

The first phase is what we find in the *Nyāyamukha* and earlier works, as well as in the *Nyāyapraveśa* of Śaṅkarasvāmin. In the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, however, Dignāga recognized that the thesis-statement was not a *sādhana*, but that it could be stated to show the goal of the reason (*hetvartha*)—it just clarified what was at issue but didn't do anything to prove it. In the *Pramāṇavārttika* and in the *Nyāyabindu*, Dharmakīrti seems to have held essentially the same position, but stressed that the thesis was implied by the two members of a *parārthānumāna*. True, the theoretical possibility of having a thesis-statement does not seem to have been of great practical importance: the *parārthānumāna* which Dharmakīrti actually uses in the *Pramāṇavārttika* and *Nyāyabindu* seems to be of the two-membered sort, and we don't find cases where Dharmakīrti actually availed himself of the option to present a statement of the thesis. Nonetheless, we can reasonably follow INAMI 1991 in arguing that the long discussion of the definition of the thesis and the possible fallacies of the thesis (*pakṣābhāsa*) in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV and the *Nyāyabindu* would certainly be difficult to explain if Dharmakīrti had an ironclad position which *definitively* banned thesis-statements in *parārthānumāna*. At any rate, subsequently, in the *Hetubindu* and especially in his last work, the *Vādanyāya*, we do clearly get the third phase of the evolution. The fact that the thesis is implied and that it is not a *sādhana* finally led Dharmakīrti to view the *pakṣavacana* as completely redundant and hence as having no place whatsoever in a *parārthānumāna*. In the *Vādanyāya* it is even said to be a "point of defeat" (*nigrahasthāna*) if one includes the thesis-statement. We shall not enter into further details here. The philosophical and logical issues, including the all too frequent and all too sloppy muddle that the *parārthānumāna* is a syllogism, have been discussed in TILLEMANS 1984a and 1991. These latter articles can be read in

conjunction with the present translation. For our purposes now we shall conclude with a few general remarks on the structure of *Pramāṇavārttika* IV taken in its ensemble.

First of all, it should be mentioned that although the *Pramāṇavārttika* is a commentary on Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (albeit a complex and circuitous one), *Pramāṇavārttika* IV does not comment on more than the first eight verses of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*'s *parārthānumāna* chapter (PS III), a fact which led E. Frauwallner to conclude that Dharmakīrti probably did not finish his work.[4] It may very well be, as Frauwallner hypothesizes, that Dharmakīrti cut the *Pramāṇavārttika* short because his initial project of a vast commentary on *Pramāṇasamuccaya* proved to be, in fact, overly ambitious—or perhaps he succumbed to a certain bitterness and cynicism as evidenced in the opening and closing verses. We have, again, no way of knowing.

As for the contents of the chapter, we can follow the examples of FRAUWALLNER 1957a and WATANABE 1976 and make a three-fold division, where each section is closely connected with verses of *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III.[5] Thus, *kārikā* 1–27 is a word by word analysis of PS III, k. 1, viz., Dignāga's specification of the definition and function of a *parārthānumāna*; k. 28–188 analyses Dignāga's definition of the thesis (*pakṣalakṣaṇa*), which had been given in PS III, k. 2; and k. 189–285 discusses the notion of a reason figuring in PS III, k. 8, where Dignāga had introduced his famous nine-fold schematization, the "wheel of reasons" (*hetucakra*). This classification of *Pramāṇavārttika* IV's contents, while certainly correct, can be supplemented by the Tibetan topical outlines (*sa bcad*) to be found in the numerous indigenous Tibetan commentaries on the *Pramāṇavārttika*. For our purposes, we shall rely upon those in the commentaries by rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364–1432) and the First Dalai Lama, dGe 'dun grub pa (1391–1474). There the major outlines are as follows (the Tibetan is that of dGe 'dun grub pa, but the differences from rGyal tshab are negligible):

1. "Explanation of the statement which serves to express" (*rjod byed ṅag*):[6] k. 1–27

[4]FRAUWALLNER 1954, 683–686.

[5]FRAUWALLNER 1957a, 885; WATANABE 1976, 974–975. What we count as PS III, k. 8, Watanabe counts as k. 9.

[6]dGe 284; rGyal 231, *rjod byed ṅag gi raṅ bźin. Kārikā*s 1–27 are said to describe the components and function of the proof-statement (*sādhanavākya, sgrub ṅag*).

2. Explanation of the things to be expressed [by a *parārthānumāna*] (*brjod bya'i don*):[7] k. 28–285

2.1. What is indirectly expressed, i.e., the *sādhya* (*śugs kyi brjod bya bsgrub bya*):[8] k. 28–188

2.2. What is directly expressed, i.e., the reason (*dṅos kyi brjod bya gtan tshigs*):[9] k. 189–285.

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Because *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) IV is a commentary on Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III and *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (PSV) III, it is necessary that one constantly bears in mind the parts of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and *Vṛtti* which are under discussion—if not, there is a very real danger that one becomes hopelessly lost in Dharmakīrti's own elaborations, losing track of what they were supposed to refer to. There is, however, something of a dilemma here. Editing, translating and annotating PS III and PSV III is a genuinely major project, involving, *inter alia*, the collection of all fragments, important paraphrases, quotations, etc., besides the task of explaining the interpretations of Dignāga's text by Dharmakīrti and his school. This work on Dignāga has been begun by S. Katsura in a seminar in Vienna and, with the discovery and editing of new materials, will hopefully come to a satisfactory development in the not too distant future. Above all, we will need a reliable edition of the text, using new material. Our contribution here can basically only be the Dharmakīrtian side of things. That said, the other side of the dilemma is that to carry through our contribution it is necessary to furnish at least a usable version of the initial section of PS III and PSV upon which Dharmakīrti comments in k. 1–148. We have done this in a few ways, conscious that much more needs to be done:[10]

[7]dGe 294; rGyal 252, *brjod bya don gi raṅ bźin*.

[8]dGe 294; rGyal 252, *śugs bstan bsgrub bya'i raṅ bźin*. Dharmakīrti makes it clear in PV IV, k. 22, 28 and in other works, like NB III, 34–36 and PVin, that the thesis can be understood "by implication" (*arthāt*). See TILLEMANS 1984a. Probably, we should understand the Tibetan commentators' statement that the thesis is *indirectly expressed* by a *parārthānumāna* as turning on the idea that it is logically implied by the other two statements.

[9]dGe 341; rGyal 343, *dṅos bstan gtan tshigs kyi rab dbye*. Dharmakīrti makes clear in k. 13–14 that, following Dignāga's PS III, k. 1, a *parārthānumāna* is destined to perspicuously show the triply characterized logical reason. In that sense, the reason is what is "directly expressed."

[10]In short, we are conscious not only that more needs to be done, but also that we cannot and should not attempt to do this work here. The philological situation on Dignāga is going to change, and we have to wait for that change.

(a) Preceeding the translation of k. 1–148, we have given a translation of these initial sections of PS III and PSV, i.e., PS III, k. 1–2 plus the *Vṛtti* to the end of the examples of the four sorts of opposition. In this way, the reader can form a synoptic view of the argumentation on which Dharmakīrti comments, and will not be condemned to piece things together from fragments scattered throughout 148 *kārikās* in PV IV. This translation is relatively lightly annotated as there are cross-references to the relevant PV passages where the questions of interpretation are treated. The basic texts used are the Tibetan found in KITAGAWA 1973, 470–472, the Sanskrit reconstructions of JAMBUVIJAYA 1966, plus Sanskrit fragments found largely in commentaries on PV. References are also systematically given to the Tibetan translation by Kanakavarman and Dad pa śes rab (i.e., PSVb) as found in the Peking edition of the Tibetan *Tripiṭaka*.

(b) In appropriate places in our explanatory remarks on the *kārikās* in PV IV, we present and discuss the corresponding text from Dignāga.

(c) The chapters and sub-sections follow the words in PS III, k. 1 and 2 upon which PV comments; the headers on the top of the pages serve as reminders as to where we are in Dignāga.

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Much of the translation of *Pramāṇavārttika* IV presented here (i.e., *kārikās* 1–108) is a considerably revised version of what had appeared in a five-part series of articles in the *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* and in the Swiss-Asia Society's journal, *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques*, under the title "*Pramāṇavārttika* IV." Although the editors of the journals had been very kind in allowing me to publish so many successive installments of a long running *feuilleton*, it was, I thought, high time to put the pieces together and try to add a few more, in order to at least be able to arrive at the halfway mark in this maddeningly time-consuming chapter. Hopefully, having the parts united in one book will be useful to the reader. When I first took up the translation of *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, this chapter, treating of inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*), had remained relatively unexplored by modern scholarship, the only attempts at translation being the Japanese versions of *kārikās* 1–14 by T. TANI 1981 and of k. 15–27 and 28–41 by S. WATANABE 1976 and 1977. In addition, the Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts of the *Pramāṇavārttika* had been edited in MIYASAKA 1971–72, but in this connection it was preferable to follow the example of TOSAKI 1979 and 1985, which had provided a revised edition of the Sanskrit text of *Pramāṇavārttika* III (*Pratyakṣa*) together with a translation. When starting this project, it was clear to me that a

greatly revised version of Miyasaka's edition of the Sanskrit of *Pramāṇavārttika* IV would constitute the bare minimum requirement for undertaking a translation. This is then what I have done. It should be clear, however, that a genuinely rigorous critical edition of all four chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, with a philological analysis of the manuscripts, a stemma, etc., remains to be done. This is a long-term project that is, alas, far beyond the scope of what can be attempted here. As for the research which has occurred in the last ten years on this chapter, we should mention articles by M. Ono, M. Inami and the ongoing translation of the *Parārthānumāna* chapter of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* by T. Iwata. Nevertheless things still seem to be considerably less developed in this area than in other areas of Dharmakīrti's philosophy. Although *Pramāṇavārttika* IV has something to say on most of the important and substantive questions in Dharmakīrtian philosophy of language, on logical reasons, on scripture, on the use of arguments from authority, etc., its highly technical aspect is probably not everyone's cup of tea.

As all who have struggled with the *Pramāṇavārttika* know, its terse style and dense argumentation is virtually unapproachable without the aid of commentaries and the parallel passages found in the other works of Dharmakīrti. Since *Pramāṇavārttika* IV is best read in conjunction with the third chapter of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, I have, for the sake of comparison, systematically given the parallel passages of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* in the notes to the translation. Passages from other works of Dharmakīrti are also given when helpful. It will be noticed that I, much like H. Tosaki in his Japanese translation of the *Pratyakṣa* chapter, have often translated passages of different commentaries on the *Pramāṇavārttika*, as well as from the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* of Dharmottara, endeavoring when needed to show the significant differences of interpretation so that in this comparative fashion the thought of Dharmakīrti might emerge. These commentarial passages were selected for translation in function of their clarity, brevity and explanatory power. Now, it might be thought that strictures on methodological purity would demand another approach, namely, that we translate one and only one commentator, who had only one angle on Dharmakīrti.[11] I suspect that, at

[11]Some would argue that it is Devendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* which must be the most reliable, as Devendrabuddhi was supposedly a personal disciple of Dharmakīrti. Perhaps such arguments would invoke FRAUWALLNER 1960, 843: "Devendrabuddhi's Kommentar is nun von allen Kommentaren der weitaus älteste und wir haben keinen Grund, die Überlieferung zu bezweifeln, dass er ein persönlicher Schüler Dharmakīrti's war." I doubt that we can deduce much in terms of concrete methodological guidelines from such proximity, nor, conversely, from the account in Tibetan histories to the effect that Dharmakīrti himself had serious reservations about Devendrabuddhi's penetrating the deeper sense. The proximity of Devendrabuddhi to Dharmakīrti

least at this stage in the research on PV IV, this kind of "purity" of approach, especially if we were to minimize the other Indian commentaries, would be more stultifying than profitable. Of the commentators on the *Pramāṇavārttika* and the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, Prajñākaragupta and Dharmottara are probably the best candidates for further independent studies and (partial) translations, along the lines of STEINKELLNER and KRASSER 1989, IWATA 1993 and FRANCO 1997a. Almost needless to add, such a type of book-length study on specific issues in Prajñākaragupta's commentary to *Pramāṇavārttika* IV is well out of the scope of the present work.

As for the various indigenous Tibetan commentaries, it is a curious fact that *Pramāṇavārttika* IV is a chapter which did not inspire the Tibetans and certainly did not stimulate anything like the interesting indigenous Tibetan debates which one finds centered around the other chapters. (Nowadays too, apparently, the fourth chapter is largely neglected among the dGe lugs pa.) Although dGe 'dun grub pa's word commentary on *Pramāṇavārttika* IV proved to be useful for our purposes, it would have made little sense to translate all the topical outlines (*sa bcad*) which figured there, or in any other Tibetan commentary, as they were too numerous and too little informative. We have preferred, instead, to compose a detailed analytical table of contents.

There are three appendices to the present book. The first consists in an extract from Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* which summarizes the extremely intricate argumentation in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, k. 109–130. The second consists in an earlier article on the problem of Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's respective understandings of the notions of *prasiddha* (what is commonly recognized) and *yogyatā* (fitness [of words to signify objects]), the two key ideas at the centre of k. 109–130. The article had been published in Warsaw in 1997 in a collection of Buddhist Studies papers in *Studia Indologiczne*—and, although I wouldn't want to intimate that *Studia Indologiczne* will somehow be unavailable in "better bookstores," it did seem potentially useful to reprint the article here.[12] The third appendix provides corrections to Miyasaka's edition of the Tibetan translation of *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, k. 1–148. This is largely a matter of

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is of little consolation when his commentary is too brief, unclear, or obscure in its Tibetan translation, all of which are frequent occurrences. In such a case, if a later commentary, such as that of Dharmottara on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, is clearer, more elegant and better in keeping with the internal coherence of the system, I see little virtue in sticking with Devendrabuddhi simply because of his dates. Conversely, when Devendrabuddhi seems to have a clear understanding of the original, it would be unfair to invoke the myth about his not understanding the deeper sense.

[12] My warm thanks to M. Mejor for kindly granting permission to reproduce the article.

detail. Clearly, however, much research still remains to be done on the historical and philological aspects of the Tibetan attempts at grappling with the *Pramāṇavārttika*.[13]

What remains is the pleasant duty of making acknowledgments. I have had the good fortune to have received considerable aid and advice from many helpful people who work on Dharmakīrti—especially from E. Steinkellner, S. Katsura and their students—although naturally I bear the responsibility for the shortcomings in my translations and interpretations. It was with Prof. Katsura that I first began to read *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, and it was he who suggested the format of articles which would subsequently be compiled in this book. I would like to take the occasion also to express my gratitude for the notes of his Vienna seminar on PS III, notes which have helped me significantly in translating the beginning passages of PS III and its *Vṛtti*. I can only hope that *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III will also one day come out in print. Among the many other people who have in one way or another been of assistance, two deserve special mention: Sara McClintock, who has been extremely helpful and patient in sorting out numerous editorial problems, and Toru Tomabechi, the genial Linux-lama without whom I would still be in the Stone Ages of word-processing. The *Fonds national suisse de la recherche scientifique* generously provided financial support during three of the years when I was preparing the articles "*Pramāṇavārttika* IV (1)–(5)." A semester at the University of Calgary gave me needed free time to advance in the task of putting things in book form. To all I offer heartfelt thanks.

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[13]See, e.g., FRANCO 1997b. See TILLEMANS 1998b, part 4, for some indications on the research on the philosophical issues in this area. We should especially mention in this context the comparative study in DREYFUS 1997 of the dGe lugs pa and Sa skya pa philosophical positions on Dharmakīrti.

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Note: Unless otherwise specified, references to texts in the Tibetan canon (bsTan 'gyur) are to the Peking Edition.

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D. — sDe dge edition of Tibetan canon. *sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka, bsTan 'gyur Tshad ma.* Tokyo 1981ff.

dGe — *Tshad ma rnam 'grel legs par bśad pa gźan don rjes dpag gi le'u'i rnam bśad* of the First Dalai Lama, rGyal ba dGe 'dun grub pa. Included in *Collected Works*, Vol. 5. Gangtok 1981.

DMP — *Dharmottarapradīpa* of Durvekamiśra. See NB.

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DS — Dvārikādās SHĀSTRĪ.

Ego
Our proposed emendation.

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HB — *Hetubindu* of Dharmakīrti [Sanskrit and Tibetan texts edited along with a German translation in STEINKELLNER 1967].

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JBORS — *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society.*

JIP — *Journal of Indian Philosophy.*

k. — *kārikā*(s).

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PV — *Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakīrti (PV I = *Svārthānumāna*; PV II = *Pramāṇasiddhi*; PV III = *Pratyakṣa*; PV IV = *Parārthānumāna*).

PV-k(I) — *Kārikā*s of PV, ed. R. SĀṄKṚTYĀYANA (RS) in appendices to *JBORS* 24, 1938, Parts I–II.

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Skt. — Sanskrit.

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Part II

Dignāga's Root Text: PSV *ad* PS III, k. 1–2

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PS III, k. 1–2

An inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*), however, elucidates the state of affairs (*artha*) which [the proponent] has understood himself (*svadṛṣṭa*). There, the presentation of the inferendum (*anumeyanirdeśa*) is held to have the goal of the reason as its object (*hetvarthaviṣaya*). **(1)** [For Skt., see our explanations to PV IV, k.1.]

[A valid thesis] is one which is intended (*iṣṭa*) by [the proponent] himself (*svayam*) as something to be stated (*nirdeśya*) in its proper form alone (*svarūpeṇaiva*) [i.e., as something to be proved (*sādhya*)]; [and] with regard to [the proponent's] own subject (*svadharmin*), it is not opposed (*anirākṛta*) by perceptible objects (*pratyakṣārtha*), by inference (*anumāna*), by authorities (*āpta*) or by what is commonly recognized (*prasiddha*). **(2)** [For Skt., see p. 47]

PSV *ad* PS III, k. 1–2

(1ab) An inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*), however, elucidates the state of affairs which [the proponent] has understood himself (*svadṛṣṭārthaprakāśana*).

[PSVa 42b8; PSVb 124b3] Suppose that [the proponent] wishes to generate in [the mind of] another, on the basis of a triply characterized reason (*liṅga*), an understanding of that which possesses the reason (*liṅgin*), [an understanding] just like the understanding of that which possesses the reason which arose, in his own

[mind], on the basis of the triply characterized reason.[14] Therefore the [proponent's] statement of the triply characterized reason is [known as] an inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*), in that [the term for] the effect, [i.e., "inference"] is metaphorically applied to the cause [i.e., the statement of the reason].

[124b4] Here [in saying that a statement of a triply characterized reason is an inference-for-others], it was also said [by implication] that incompleteness (*nyūnatā*) occurs when any one of the three characteristics (*rūpa*) is unstated.[15]

[124b4] [Objection:] How then is it that in [various] logic treatises a presentation of the inferendum (*anumeyanirdeśa*), i.e., the thesis (*pratijñā*), is made to figure in the inference-for-others?[16]

[124b5] [Reply:] You should ask just those people [who accept that the thesis must figure in a *parārthānumāna*]. [Don't ask us!] For us, on the other hand,

(1cd) There [in a *parārthānumāna*], the presentation of the inferendum (*anumeyanirdeśa*) is held to have the goal of the reason as its object (*hetvarthaviṣaya*).

[124b6] Among the members, the presentation of the inferendum is not held to be a means of proof (*sādhana*) by us, for doubt arises (*saṃśayotpatteḥ*) from it [as to whether the thesis is true or not].[17] But it is [considered] as having as its object the goal of the reason. That [goal of the reason] is what it shows.[18]

[124b7] Next,

(2ab) [A valid thesis] is one which is intended (*iṣṭa*) by [the proponent] himself (*svayam*) as something to be stated (*nirdeśya*) in its proper form alone (*svarūpeṇaiva*) [i.e., as something to be proved (*sādhya*)].

[124b7] "Its proper form" (*svarūpa*) means in the form of something to be proved (*sādhya*),[19] and not in the form of something established (*siddha*) or a means of proof (*sādhana*).[20] In this fashion, statements of unestablished reasons and

[14]See our remarks to PV, k. 1.

[15]See PV IV, k. 23.

[16]The terms *anumeyanirdeśa*, *pakṣavacana* and *sādhyanirdeśa* are synonymous. Note that *sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñā* is the *Nyāyasūtra*'s definition of the thesis—see our remarks to PV, k. 15 and 24; the equivalent formulation *sādhyābhidhānaṃ pratijñā* is also the thesis definition in Vasubandhu's *Vādavidhi*—see n. 145. Dignāga uses the same logic to refute both.

[17]See PV IV, k. 16.

[18]PSVa: *'on kyaṅ rtags kyi don du yul bstan pa'i phyir de ni des bsgrub par bya'o.* JAMBUVIJAYA 1966, 126: *api tu hetvarthaviṣayatvena sa tena prakāśyate.* See PV IV, k. 18 and n. 113.

[19]See especially PV IV, k. 28–29 and our remarks. Cf. also k. 78–79, 85, 88.

[20]"and not ... (*sādhana*)": The bsTan 'gyur text is corrupt. PSVa reads *grub pa las sgrub pa'i ṅo*

fallacious examples (*dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) [which are *sādhana*] are excluded. These two are not being stated in the form of things to be proved (*sādhya*).[21]

[125a1] This [phrase], "intended by [the proponent] himself" (*svayam iṣṭa*), shows a position (*abhyupagama*) which does not rely upon treatises (*śāstrānapekṣa*).[22]

[125a1] Next,

(2cd) with regard to [the proponent's] own subject (*svadharmin*), it is not opposed (*anirākṛta*) by perceptible objects (*pratyakṣārtha*), by inference (*anumāna*), by authorities (*āpta*) or by what is commonly recognized (*prasiddha*).

[125a2] The presentation of what is to be proved [i.e., the thesis] is irreproachable, providing that, with regard to that subject (*dharmin*)[23] which [the proponent] intends to prove to be qualified by the property, it [i.e., the thesis] is not opposed by some other property, that is to say, by something in contradiction with the property to be proved, i.e., by perception (*pratyakṣa*), by inference (*anumāna*), by scripture (*āgama*) or by what is commonly recognized (*prasiddha*). Otherwise, it is a fallacious thesis (*pakṣābhāsa*),[24] as in the following examples: [1] "sound is not audible"; [2] "a vase is permanent"; [3] because of simply accepting it, [a proposition like] "there are no means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) which have cognizable things (*prameya*) as their objects"; [4] and where, though there is no [valid] inference since [the latter] would be over-exclusive (*asādhāraṇatva*),

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bos ma yin no; PSVb has *sgrub byed ma grub pa'i ṅo bos ma yin no*. We follow Jinendrabuddhi PSṬ 156a6–7, which quotes *grub pa daṅ sgrub par byed pa'i ṅo bos ni ma yin no źes pa*; cf. JAMBUVIJAYA1966, 128 *na tu siddhasādhanarupeṇa*.

[21]The problem of unestablished *sādhana* (i.e., unestablished reasons and examples) becoming theses comes back again and again in PV IV in different ways. Cf. PV IV, k. 24–26, 28–29, 69–70, 85, 88. The basic argument in Dignāga is developed in PS III, k. 3 and PSV—see n. 145 for text and translation.

[22]See k. 28–29 and remarks; n. 175 for the Skt. fragment *śāstrānapekṣam abhyupagamaṃ darśayati* in PVBh; see also k. 42f., 69f. and 89 for elaborations of the idea of *śāstrānapekṣa*. Large sections in PV IV are devoted to *svayam* and *iṣṭa* treated individually.

[23]Cf. PV IV, k. 136 and 143. Elaboration of the notion of *svadharmin* in k. 136–148.

[24]Skt. fragment PVBh 551,30–31: *yo hi dharmī dharmaviśiṣṭas tatra yadi sādhyadharmaviruddhena pratyakṣānumānāgamaprasiddhena na bādhyate sa pakṣo 'nyathā tadābhāsa iti*. See our remarks to k. 92 for the four sorts of invalidation / opposition. See also the respective long sections in PV IV consecrated to *anirākṛta, āpta* (*āgama*), *prasiddha, pratyakṣārtha* and *svadharmin*.

[a proposition] is opposed by a contradicting proposition commonly recognized through verbal knowledge (*śābdaprasiddha*), as in [the reasoning] "that which has a rabbit (*śaśin*) is not the moon (*acandra*) because it exists."[25]

[25]For Skt. fragments and explanations, see our remarks introducing k. 109 and the section in PV IV on *prasiddha*. The first fallacious thesis is discussed in the short section on *pratyakṣārtha* / *pratyakṣabādhā* (k. 131–135), the third in the section on *āpta* (see k. 96–97 and n. 471), while the fourth is discussed at length in PV's section on *prasiddha*. Note that the third thesis is given slightly differently in PSVa (*tshad mas gźal bar bya'i don sgrub par mi byed do*) and would be translated as: "*Pramāṇa*s do not establish any states of affairs which are *prameya*s." The formulation in the Skt. fragments and in PVV and PVin is closer to that in PSVb.

Part III

PV IV, k. 1–148 *ad* PS III, k. 1–2. Text, Translation, Explanatory Notes

Chapter 1

On the nature of *parārthānumāna*: PV IV, k. 1–27 *ad* PS III, k. 1

1.1 *svadṛṣṭa*: refuting a Sāṃkhya view of *parārthānumāna*

As noted in the Introductory Remarks, Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, k. 1–27 comment on Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III, k. 1:

> *parārthānumānaṃ tu svadṛṣṭārthaprakāśanam* |
> *tatrānumeyanirdeśo hetvarthaviṣayo mataḥ* ||[26]
>
> An inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*), however, elucidates the state of affairs (*artha*) which [the proponent] has understood himself (*svadṛṣṭa*). There, the presentation of the inferendum (*anumeyanirdeśa*) is held to have the goal of the reason as its object (*hetvarthaviṣaya*).

*Kārikā*s 1–12 of PV IV analyse the phrase *svadṛṣṭa*, k. 13–14 discuss the word *artha* in *svadṛṣṭārtha*, while k. 15–27 deal with the third and fourth *pāda*s of PS III, k. 1.

(1) *parasya pratipādyatvād adṛṣṭo 'pi svayaṃ paraiḥ* |
dṛṣṭaḥ sādhanam[27] *ity eke tatkṣepāyātmadṛgvacaḥ* ||[28]

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[26]= PVBh 467, 5 and 488, 5 = PVV 413, 4 (cf. PVV-n, n. 2), PVV 420, 11. Cf. NB III, 1: *trirūpaliṅgākhyānaṃ parārthānumānam*: "An inference-for-others is a statement of a triply characterized reason."

[27]PV-k(II) *dṛṣṭasādhanam.*

[28]Cf. PVin 285a8–b2: *'dir raṅ gis mthoṅ don | źes smos pa ni | luṅ las gźan gyis mthoṅ ba ni || sgrub min don med las kyaṅ 'grub pa min || źes śes par byed pa'i phyir | ji ltar kha cig na re | gźan*

> Some [i.e., the Sāṃkhyas] say: 'It is the other who is to be instructed [through a *parārthānumāna*]. Thus, [a reason] which is understood by others, even if it is not understood by oneself, is [still] a means of proof (*sādhana*).' The words 'understood by oneself' are designed to eliminate this [erroneous view].

Dharmakīrti explains *svadṛṣṭa* as refuting a Sāṃkhya position on *parārthānumāna* in which the reason need not be ascertained or accepted by the proponent (*vādin*), but only by the other, i.e., the opponent (*prativādin*). The Sāṃkhya is said to give the following line of reasoning to his Buddhist opponent: "Pleasure (*sukha*), suffering (*duḥkha*) and bewilderment (*moha*) are not mental phenomena (*acetana*), because they come into being and are impermanent, just like form and the other subtle elements (*tanmātra*)."[29] Now, for the Sāṃkhya proponent, pleasure and so on (*sukhādi*) are inherent in the permanent Primordial Matter (*prakṛti*); hence, although he certainly does accept the proposition to be proved (*sādhya*) that pleasure and so on are nonmental, as is *prakṛti*, he does not agree that they causally come into being or that they are impermanent. The Buddhist, by contrast, accepts these latter two propositions—they are specified in his own scriptures.[30] Moreover, the Buddhist will accept, in keeping with his own scriptures, that the example, form (*rūpa*), is indeed qualified by the reason and the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*), as it causally comes into being, is impermanent and is nonmental. By means of this combination of argumentation from scripture and example, the Buddhist is thus lulled into embracing the Sāṃkhya's reason as valid and converts to the Sāṃkhya's *sādhya* of pleasure and so on being nonmental, a proposition which, however, runs directly counter to the usual Buddhist position and to Buddhist scriptures.[31] In short, the Sāṃkhya uses the Buddhist scriptures

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gyis rtogs par bya ba yin pa'i phyir | raṅ gis mthoṅ ba ma yin yaṅ | gźan gyis mthoṅ ba sgrub par byed pa yin te | dper na blo daṅ bde ba la sogs pa ni sems pa med pa yin te | skye ba can nam mi rtag[a] *pa yin pa'i phyir gzugs la sogs pa bźin no źes bya ba'o źes zer ba de ni mi rigs te ||* ([a] P. *rtags* [D. 187b1–3]).

[29] Cf. PVin in n. 28 above; PVV 413, 15–16: *te [sāṃkhyāḥ] hi sukhādīnām utpattimattvād anityād acetanatvaṃ rūpādīnām iva bauddhaṃ praty āhuḥ*. The Sāṃkhya's argument is also alluded to in PV II, k. 17; cf. also NB III, 60.

[30] Cf. PVBh 470, 19–20: *na svayaṃ sāṃkhyasya utpattimattvam anityatvaṃ vā prasiddham*. PVV 413, 16–414, 1: *na hy asata utpattimattvaṃ sataś ca niranvayavināśo 'nityatvaṃ hetuḥ sāṃkhyasiddhaḥ | bauddhasya punar āgamāt siddhaḥ |* "Indeed, the reason—viz., that something nonexistent comes into being or that an existent immediately perishes [and] is impermanent—is not established for the Sāṃkhya. For the Buddhist, however, it is established from scripture."

[31] See rGyal 234 for a clear explanation of how the reluctant Buddhist is tricked into accepting a proposition contrary to his philosophy: *log rtog gi sbyor ba ni | blo bde chos can | sems med*

against the Buddhist—he uses an "other-accepted" proposition, in which he, the Sāṃkhya, does not himself believe, in order to force his opponent to accept a Sāṃkhya philosophical tenet. It was to eliminate this seductive misconstrual of the notion of *parārthānumāna* that Dignāga required that the proponent must also accept and ascertain the reason which he presents; hence the phrase *svadṛṣṭa*.[32]

(2) *anumāviṣaye neṣṭaṃ parīkṣitaparigrahāt* |
vācaḥ[33] *prāmāṇyam asmin hi nānumānaṃ pravartate* ||[34]

One accepts what has been critically examined. Thus, speech is not held to be a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) with regard to the realm of an inference [which functions due to real entities (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*].[35] For, in such a case [if speech were to be a *pramāṇa*], inference would not occur.

Dharmakīrti now begins a systematic refutation of the Sāṃkhya's would-be *parārthānumāna*. The Sāṃkhya had maintained that the reason, "comes into be-

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bem po yin te | *skye 'jig can yin pa'i phyir* | *dper na gzugs la sogs pa de tsam lṅa po bźin no* || *de'i rtags chos gñis mthun dpe'i steṅ du saṅs rgyas pa'i luṅ las khas blaṅs pa daṅ* | *rtags sṅar med gsar du skye ba daṅ* | *sṅar yod gsar du 'jig pa yaṅ blo daṅ bde ba la grub par saṅs rgyas pa'i luṅ las khas blaṅs pa daṅ* | *sems pa can la skye 'jig mi byed pas khyab pa ni* | *graṅs can raṅ ñid kyis khas len te* | *sems pa can ni* | *bciṅs grol kun gyi gźir gyur ciṅ* | *de ñid lus 'dor len byed pa po'i bdag yin pas rtag pa'i dṅos por khas len pa'i phyir ro* || "The erroneous formal argument is as follows: Take as the subject, the intellect and pleasure; they are nomental and are material, because they come into being and perish, just like the five subtle elements consisting of form, etc. The reason and property [to be proved] in this [argument] are accepted, on the basis of Buddhist scripture, to qualify the homologous example. Also, the reason, i.e., that a thing previously nonexistent newly comes into being and that a thing previously existent newly persishes, is accepted on the basis of Buddhist scripture as being an established [quality] of the intellect and pleasure. As for the pervasion (*vyāpti*) between being mental and not coming into being or perishing, it is only the Sāṃkhya himself who accepts it, for he accepts that the mental is the exclusive basis for liberation and bondage and that because [the mental] constitutes the Self which takes on or casts off the body, it itself is a permanent entity."

[32]*svadṛṣṭa* guarantees that the reason is not just understood and recognized by the opponent, but also by the proponent; thus, by both debaters. *dṛṣṭa* implies ascertainment by means of a *pramāṇa* (means of valid cognition). Cf. PVṬ 310a7: *bdag ñid kyis źes bya ba ni rgol ba*[a] *gaṅ gis bsgrub pa dgod pa'o* | *mthoṅ ba ni rnam par ṅes pa ste tshad mas khoṅ du chud pa'o* ([a] P. *gol ba*). Cf. also PVV-n 413, n. 3: *vādiprativādibhyām iti prakaraṇāt.*

[33]PV-k(I): *vācya*. Cf. Tib. *tshig*.

[34]Cf. PVin 285b2–3: *rjes su dpag pa'i*[a] *yul la tshig tshad ma*[b] *ma yin pa'i phyir ro* || *tshad ma yin na ni rjes su dpag pa mi 'jug pa par 'gyur te* | *tshig tsam gyis don grub pas gtan tshigs la sogs pa don med pa'i phyir ro* ||([a] P. *par*—[b] D. *tshig gi tshad ma* [D. 187b3–4]).

[35]Cf. PVP 319b8–320a1: *dṅos po'i stobs kyis źugs pa yi* || *rjes su dpag pa'i yul la tshig* | *tshad ma ñid du mi 'dod ciṅ* |. Cf. also PVV 414, 8: *anumānasya vastubalapravṛttasya viṣaye...*

ing, etc." (*utpattimattvādi*), was to be established for the Buddhist by means of citations from the Buddhist's own scriptures. But, replies Dharmakīrti, arguing that propositions concerning impermanence and the like could ever be established by mere reliance on scriptures or speech runs completely counter to the Buddhist view of how inference functions: an inference concerning impermanence and other such rationally demonstrable properties must be *vastubalapravṛtta* in that it derives its truth from the existence of certain facts, or states of affairs in reality, and not because someone arbitrarily says or thinks that it is so. The same theme is taken up again in k. 13 and 14, and turns ultimately on a cardinal principle in Dharmakīrti's philosophy, the requirement that there be a real, or natural, connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*) between the terms in an inference.[36] It is surely in this vein that Manorathanandin comments that speech is not accepted as a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) "because it does not have a necessary connection (*pratibandha*) with the state of affairs (*artha*)."[37]

As for the fourth *pāda* in k. 2, the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* expresses the argument succinctly: "If [speech] were to be a *pramāṇa*, then inference would not occur, because when the proposition is established by mere speech, then reasons, etc. will be pointless."[38]

(3) *bādhanāyāgamasyokteḥ sādhanasya paraṃ prati* |
so 'pramāṇaṃ tadāsiddhaṃ tatsiddham akhilaṃ tataḥ ||[39]

Because [the Sāṃkhya] states the *sādhana* to the other [i.e., to the

[36]Cf. STEINKELLNER 1971. Note that later on in PV IV (k. 48–108) Dharmakīrti once again takes up *in extenso* the subject of proof and refutation by scripture and *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*, and in k. 48 he refers back to k. 2. It is important to note that in k. 50–51 and elsewhere Dharmakīrti does endorse certain kinds of inference which *can only* be based on scripture and which are not *vastubalapravṛtta*. But this type of scripturally based inference is only appropriate when what is being inferred is "radically inaccessible" (*atyantaparokṣa*), such as the details of the law of *karman* or a detailed description of heaven (*svarga*). A distinction is made between three sorts of objects: perceptible (*pratyakṣa*), imperceptible (*parokṣa*) (but rationally demonstrable), and radically inaccessible (*atyantaparokṣa*). The latter (but not the former two) is inaccessible to *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*, and it is there, and only there, that scripture must be relied on. See our remarks to PV IV, k. 48–51; see also our forthcoming article "How much of a proof is scripturally based inference (*āgamāśritānumāna*)?"

[37]PVV 414,9–10: *tatra pratipādye vāca āgamātmikāyāḥ prāmāṇyaṃ neṣṭam arthapratibandhābhāvād ity uktam.*

[38]See n. 34 above.

[39]Cf. PVin 285b5–6: *luṅ de la gnod par bya ba'i phyir gźan la sgrub par byed pa brjod pa'i phyir*[a] *de'i tshe 'di tshad ma ma yin pas de grub pa ni grub pa ma yin pa'i phyir de las 'grub pa ji ltar 'gyur* | ([a] P. om. *phyir* [D. 187b5–6]).

Buddhist] to invalidate [the Buddhist's own] scripture, then in that case [if the invalidation is successful], this [Buddhist scripture] will not be a means of valid cognition, and therefore all which is established by it will [in fact] be unestablished.

By citing the Buddhist scripture which specifies *utpattimattva* (coming into being), the Sāṃkhya hopes to refute another proposition in that very same scripture, viz., that pleasure, suffering and bewilderment *are* mental.[40] But if he succeeds in this refutation, then the Buddhist scripture will be invalidated, as one of its propositions will have been shown to be false. The conclusion in Manorathanandin's *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (PVV) is: "Hence, as the scripture is not a *pramāṇa*, whatever is directly or indirectly established by this scripture—be it the reason, 'coming into being, etc.', or the *sādhya*, 'is nonmental'—all this is [in fact] unestablished."[41]

(4) *tadāgamavataḥ siddhaṃ yadi kasya ka āgamaḥ* |
bādhyamānaḥ pramāṇena sa siddhaḥ katham āgamaḥ ||[42]

If [the Sāṃkhya replies that the reason *utpattimattvādi*] is established for one who 'has' this scripture, then [we would ask,] 'Which scripture, of whom?' This [Buddhist] scripture [which says that pleasure, etc., *are* mental] is being invalidated by a *pramāṇa*; how then could it be [regarded as] established?

The *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (PVP) and *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* (PVṬ) explain "having a scripture" in terms of the notion of a necessary connection (*'brel ba = sambandha*). Śākyabuddhi explicitly mentions the two types of connection which are so often invoked in Buddhist epistemology, viz., "one nature" (*de'i bdag ñid = tādātmya*) and causality (*de las byuṅ ba = tadutpatti*).[43] Manorathanandin distinguishes the following two types of connection (*sambandha*) which might apply between a person and a scripture: (a) a man might have an innate connection (*sahajasambandha*) with a text, and possess it in the same way as he posseses the parts of his body; (b) he might acquire the text due to a condition (*upādhi*), viz.,

[40]Cf. PVV 414, 21: *yadi cāgamasya sukhādicaitanyapratipādakasya bādhanāya...*

[41]PVV 414, 23–24: *tata āgamāprāmāṇyāt tenāgamena sākṣātpāraṃparyābhyāṃ siddham utpattimattvādi sādhyaṃ cācaitanyam akhilam idam asiddham.*

[42]Cf. PVin 285b6: *luṅ de daṅ ldan pa la des 'grub pa yin no źe na* | *gaṅ gi luṅ gaṅ yin* | *tshad mas gnod pa luṅ ñid du yaṅ ji ltar 'gyur* | (D. 187b6).

[43]Cf. PVP 320a6–7: *gaṅ źig gaṅ daṅ lhan cig 'di'i 'di yin no źes 'brel ba grub pa'i tshad ma yod pa ma yin te* |. PVṬ comments (312a1–2): *'brel ba bsgrub pa'i tshad ma yod pa ma yin te źes bya ba ni de'i bdag ñid daṅ de las byuṅ ba gñi ga dag kyaṅ med pa'i phyir ro* ||.

rational justification. One should note that Vibhūticandra glosses the first case as *tādātmya* and the second as *tadutpatti*.[44]

Now (a) is clearly impossible. But (b) will fare no better: "Indeed, the reason [in question] is a scripture which is being invalidated by a *pramāṇa*, i.e., by an inference arising from the reason *utpattimattvādi*, for there is invalidation of [the proposition] taught in the [Buddhist] scripture that pleasure, etc. are mental."[45] In short, the Sāṃkhya's argument, if successful, would show that there would be no rational justification for possessing the text; (b) is, in effect, a self-refuting hypothesis.

(5) *tadviruddhābhyupagamas tenaiva ca katham bhavet* |
tadanyopagame tasya tyāgāṅgasyāpramāṇatā ||[46]

Now, how could one accept what is in contradiction with that [Buddhist scripture] by means of this very same [scripture]? If one accepts what is contrary to it, then this [scripture], which deserves rejection,[47] is not a *pramāṇa*.

The Sāṃkhya's proposition that pleasure, etc. are nonmental is in contradiction with the Buddhist scriptural citation to the effect that they are mental; and yet the Sāṃkhya wants to use that very Buddhist scripture as the basis for the reason *utpattimattvādi*. Again the Sāṃkhya's strategy is self-defeating: when the Buddhist perceives that his scriptures lead to a contradiction, he will naturally reject them as not being a *pramāṇa*, and so will not accept *utpattimattvādi* nor anything that it implies.[48]

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[44]See PVV-n 415, n. 1 and 2.

[45]PVV 415, 2–3: *tathā hi pramāṇenotpattimattvādiliṅgajenānumānenāgamapratipāditasya sukhādicaitanyasya bādhanād bādhyamāna āgamo hetuḥ.*

[46]Cf. PVin 285b7–8: *luṅ de ñid kyis de daṅ 'gal ba khas len par yaṅ ji ltar 'gyur te* | *de khas blaṅs nas spaṅ ba'i*[a] *yan lag gi luṅ tshad ma ma yin pas rtogs par mi ruṅ ba'i phyir ro* || ([a] P. *spaṅs pa'i* [D. 187b7–188a1]).

[47]Cf. PVṬ 312a5 which glosses *tyāgāṅga* by *dor ba la brten* (*brten* = *bhāj* 'entitled to', 'possessing'... 'liable to', MMW). PVP has *dor ba'i rgyu* "which is a cause for a rejection."

[48]Cf. PVinṬ 5b7–8: *gaṅ gi phyir gaṅ gi tshe luṅ spaṅ ba'i yan lag tu 'gyur ba de ñid kyi tshe tshad ma ma yin la* | *tshad ma ma yin pas na de las rtogs par mi 'gyur ro* | "So, when the the scripture deserves rejection, it is not a *pramāṇa*, and as it is not a *pramāṇa*, there will be no understanding [of the fact of pleasure and so on being nonmental] based upon it."

(6) *tat kasmāt sādhanaṃ noktaṃ*[49] *svapratītir yadudbhavā*[50] |
yuktyā yayāgamo grāhyo grāhikāsyāpi[51] *sā na kim* ||

Why does [the Sāṃkhya] not state that *sādhana* from which stems his own understanding [that pleasure, etc. are nonmental]? [If his source is a Sāṃkhya scripture, then] why is it that the reasoning which justifies accepting [this] scripture is not persuasive for the [Buddhist] too?[52]

The Sāṃkhya might respond to Dharmakīrti's question by saying that his own understanding of the *sādhya* is based on citations from Sāṃkhya scriptures; hence, in his attempt to convince the Buddhist, he does not state an actual reasoning in which he himself believes, but rather resorts to what he considers a *parārthānumāna*.[53] In that case, according to Devendrabuddhi's commentary, a dilemma would supposedly ensue: Is the Sāṃkhya scriptural citation itself to be accepted (*gzuṅ bar bya ba = grāhya*) in virtue of some particular reasoning or just because of general agreement (*grags pa*)? If the former case, then why not state that reasoning outright, and forget about the stratagem of a dubious *parārthānumāna*? But in the latter case, when there is only agreement, but no reasoning, then the scripture will not be a *pramāṇa*, and what it says should not be accepted at all.[54]

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[49]PV-k(I) and (III): *tat kin na sādhanaṃ proktaṃ.* Tib. *sgrub byed de ni cis ma brjod* might be thought to support PV-k(II) in that one could think that *proktam* would have necessitated *rab tu brjod pa.* But this is a rather weak case, especially given the demands of Tibetan meter. Both readings seem possible.

[50]MIY.: *yad udbhavā.* A *bahuvrīhi* agreeing with *svapratītir.*

[51]PV-k(II): *grāhyaḥ parasyāpi ca.* But cf. Tib. *de ni 'dis kyaṅ cis mi 'dzin.* Cf. also PVP 321a3: *ci'i phyir 'dzin par byed pa po ma yin* |.

[52]More literally: "Why is that reasoning due to which the scripture is to be grasped not persuasive (*grāhikā*) for him too?" Cf. Monier-Monier Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, s.v. *grāhaka*: "*Grāhaka,* mf(*ikā*)n. one who seizes ... captivating, persuading."

[53]Cf. PVP 320b8–321a1: *gal te kho bos gźan la grub pa'i skye ba la sogs pas bde ba la sogs pa sems pa med pa ñid du khas len pa ma yin no* || *'o na ci yin źe na* | *raṅ gi luṅ la sogs pa las yin*[a] *de bas na rigs pa gźan la ma brjod pa yin no źe na* | ([a] D. *las de yin pa* [D. 270a2]) "[Objection:] But we [Sāṃkhyas] do not accept that pleasure, etc. are nonmental because of [reasons like] *utpattimattvādi*, which are [only] established for the other. Well then, why? It is [known] from our own scriptures, etc., and thus we do not state a reasoning [in which we ourselves believe] to the other."

[54]PVP 321a4–5: *ci ste rigs pas gzuṅ bar bya ba ma yin pa de'i tshe* | *de ñid tshad ma daṅ bcas pa ma yin pa de ltar na gzuṅ bar bya ñid ma yin no* || *de bas na des grub pa'i sems pa med pa ñid ma grub pa yin no* || (D. 270a5–6) "But if it [i.e., the scriptural citation] is not to be accepted in virtue of reasoning, then it itself lacks a *pramāṇa*, and accordingly, should not be accepted [at

Manorathanandin's PVV provides the following introduction to k. 7: "[The Sāṃkhya argues:] Now, the fact that pleasure, etc. are nonmental is understood by means of a perception coming from the force of *yoga*: it cannot be taught to the other [i.e., to the opponent] in any way other than this. And so we state a *sādhana* which is accepted by the other. [Dharmakīrti's rejoinder:] But surely, nonetheless, the certainty concerning the [supposed] fact that the intellect, pleasure, etc. are nonmental does not come randomly. Now, [the Sāṃkhya] must necessarily have ascertained a relationship of *sādhya* and *sādhana* between the perception which realizes that [pleasure, etc. are nonmental] and the yogic practice which is the *sādhana* for [attaining] that [perception]. For, without certainty concerning this, yogic practices are inappropriate. Accordingly:"[55]

(7) *prakṛtasya sataḥ prāg yaiḥ pratipattyakṣasaṃbhavau*[56] |
sādhanaiḥ sādhanāny arthaśaktijñāne 'sya tāny alam ||

Earlier, for him when he was an ordinary being, whatever were the yogic exercises (*sādhana*) on account of which there was a practice (*pratipatti*) and [a resultant] perception (*akṣa*), these exercises were [judged] adequate for this [which was being taught] when it had to be known whether they were effective for the purpose [at hand, i.e., for cultivating the method].[57]

Note that Dharmakīrti is now using the terms *sādhana* and *sādhya* in the sense of "yogic exercises" and "that [goal] which is to be realized [by such exercises]." In effect, his point is: Given that the Sāṃkhya admits that he has no logical *sādhana*, what then are his yogic *sādhana* for coming to realize that the intellect, pleasure and so forth are in fact nonmental? Before advancing on the path, he must himself have first ascertained that the exercises were adequate for what they were supposed to accomplish. Thus he should also be able to state to the Buddhist what these exercises are and why they are effective.

all]. And then, the proposition that [pleasure, etc.] are nonmental, which is established by that [scriptural citation], would [in fact] be unestablished."

[55]PVV 415, 24–416, 3: *atha yogabalajena pratyakṣeṇa sukhādīnām acaitanyaṃ pratītaṃ na tadanyathā pratipādayituṃ parasya śakyata iti paropagataṃ sādhanam ucyate* || *nanu tathāpi nākasmiko buddhisukhādyacaitanyaviṣayasya niścayaḥ* | *tatsākṣātkāripratyakṣatatsādhanayogānuṣṭhānayoḥ sādhyasādhanabhāvāvadhāraṇaṃ cāvaśyakartavyam* | *tanniścayam antareṇa yogānuṣṭhānāyogāt* | *tathā ca* |.

[56]PV-k(I): *pratipattyakṣasaṃbhavaiḥ*. MIY.: *pratipattyakṣasaṃ bhavau*.

[57]Cf. PVV 416, 8–10: *tāni sādhanāny arthasyopāyābhyāsasya śakter acaitanyagrāhipratyakṣajanikāyā jñāne kartavye 'sya pratipādyasyālaṃ samarthāni* |.

We have followed Manorathanandin's interpretation of *pratipatti* as "practice" (*pratipatti* = *anuṣṭhāna*) and *akṣa* as the perception (*akṣa* = *pratyakṣa*) which grasps facts such as something's being nonmental (*acaitanyādiviṣayagrāhin*).[58] PV Tib., however, translates the former by *rtogs pa* (understanding; realization) and the latter by *dbaṅ po* (organ), which yields quite a different understanding of k. 7, one which seems less likely.

PVV introduces k. 8 in the following way: "[The Sāṃkhya] might retort as follows: The *sādhya-sādhana* connection (*sambandha*) between the perception which has the fact of being nonmental, etc. as its object and the yogic practices and the like cannot be understood even in a general manner, for it is 'remote' (*viprakṛṣṭatva*). Therefore, it is not shown. [Dharmakīrti] replies:"[59]

(8) *vicchinnānugamā ye ca*[60] *sāmānyenāpy agocarāḥ* |
sādhyasādhanacintāsti na teṣv artheṣu kācana ||

> And those things whose relationship is disjoint [and which hence] are not [intelligible] objects even in a general sense, admit of no analyses whatsoever in terms of yogic goals (*sādhya*) and exercises (*sādhana*).

The phrase *vicchinnānugamāḥ* (= *'brel pa rnam chad can*), which literally means "whose connection is severed," is glossed by Śākyabuddhi by means of the term *śin tu lkog tu gyur pa* (= *atyantaparokṣa*, 'radically inaccessible')—the words *viprakṛṣṭatva* and *vicchinānugamā* thus convey the extreme inexplicability or inconceivability of the supposed relationship.[61] Predictably, Dharmakīrti replies to the Sāṃkhya that when the relationship between things is so unclear, the notion that one is a *sādhya* and the other a *sādhana* is then meaningless. PVV states:

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[58]PVV 416, 7–8: *...pratipattur*[a] *anuṣṭhānasya* | *tatphalasyākṣasya pratyakṣasyācaitanyādiviṣayagrāhiṇaḥ saṃbhavau bhavataḥ* ([a] *pratipatter*[?]).

[59]PVV 416, 12–13: *syād etat* | *pratyakṣasyācaitanyādiviṣayasya yogādyabhyāsena saha sādhyasādhanasambandho viprakṛṣṭatvāt sāmānyākāreṇāpi na pratīyate tato 'syānupadarśanam ity āha* |.

[60]PV-k(I), (II): *ye 'pi*. RS (cf. PV-k[I], n. 7) maintains that *ye 'pi* corresponds to Tib. *gaṅ yaṅ*. But *gaṅ yaṅ* = *ye ca* is also attested in Lokesh Chandra's *Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary*, Kyoto, 1976.

[61]PVṬ 312b2: *'brel pa chad pa can ni źes bya ba ni śin tu lkog tu gyur pa ste* | *de lta bur gyur pa'i sems med pa ñid ces bya bar dgoṅs so* ||. For the use of the term *śin tu lkog gyur* = *atyantaparokṣa* in Dharmakīrti's own philosophy, see n. 36 above. The term *viprakṛṣṭatva*, or *viprakṛṣṭārtha* (= *bskal don* 'remote / inaccessible things'), plays a frequent role in Dharmakīrti's discussion about entities, like spirits (*piśāca*), which are supposedly impossible to grasp empirically. See TILLEMANS 1995a, 132f.

"These things admit of no analyses whatsoever in terms of *sādhya* and *sādhana* such as, 'This is the *sādhana*, and this is the *sādhya*.' Therefore, how can one say of the method and goal, which are unintelligible natures for one who has not yet attained insight (*arvāgdarśana*), that by the practice of the one, the other will be attained?"[62]

(9) *puṃsām abhiprāyavaśāt tattvātattvavyavasthitau |*
luptau hetutadābhāsau tasya vastvasamāśrayāt[63] ||[64]

If [as the Sāṃkhya maintains] the distinction between being or not being so [viz., between being a valid reason or not] were in virtue of what people thought, then there would be no more valid or fallacious reasons, as that [i.e., what a person thinks] is not [necessarily[65]] based on real entities.

The Sāṃkhya now resorts to a subjectivist theory of truth to justify his use of the reason *utpattimatvādi* in his version of the *parārthānumāna*, a reason in which the Buddhist alone believes. Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* (PVBh) paraphrases the Sāṃkhya's view: "Now, insofar as [the Buddhist opponent] is ignorant, he does not know that the [logical] *sādhana* is fallacious. So, based on his thinking, it is indeed a *sādhana*. But when he understands that it is not a *sādhana*, then it will no longer be one. What fault is there here?"[66] Dharmakīrti, by way of reply, invokes his often iterated view that truth and necessity must be grounded in objectively existing states of affairs: *kārikā*s 10, 13 and 14 serve to develop this position.

[62]PVV 416, 17–19: *teṣv artheṣv idaṃ sādhanam idam sādhyam iti ca sādhyasādhanacintā kācana nāsti | tato 'rvāgdarśanasyābuddhiviṣayīkṛtayo rūpayor upāyopeyayor ekatrānuṣṭhānād aparatra niṣpādanam iti kutaḥ* ||.

[63]PV-k(III): *vastusamāśrayāt*. But cf. Tib. *de ni dṅos rten min phyir ro*. MIY.: *vastv asamāśrayāt*; however, the word must be a compound.

[64]Cf. PVin 286a1–2: *skyes bu'i*[a] *'dod pas gtan tshigs daṅ der snaṅ ba dag gi*[b] *de ñid rnam par 'jog pa na | da ni dṅos po la gtan tshigs daṅ gtan tshigs ma yin pa yaṅ ci yod de | de ni dṅos po la 'jug par yaṅ ma ṅes pa'i phyir ro* || ([a] D. *skyes bus*; cf. PV Tib. *skyes bu'i bsam pa'i dbaṅ gis*—[b] D. *gis* [D. 188a2]).

[65]Cf. PVin 286a2: *de ni dṅos po la 'jug par yaṅ ma ṅes pa'i phyir ro* ||.

[66]PVBh 474, 29–30: *atha yāvad asau na vyutpattimān tāvat sādhanābhāsatāṃ na jānāti | tatas tadabhiprāyāt sādhanam eva | yadā tu sādhanam etan na bhavatīti pratibudhyate tadā sādhanan na bhaviṣyatīti ka ivātra doṣaḥ* |.

(10) *sann artho jñānasāpekṣo nāsan jñānena sādhakaḥ |*
sato 'pi vastvasaṃśliṣṭāsaṃgatyā[67] *sadṛśī gatiḥ ||* [68]

An existent state of affairs which [also] relies on an [ascertaining[69]] cognition is [a *sādhaka*]; something nonexistent does not become a *sādhaka* due to [mere] cognition. An understanding which is unconnected with [a reason which is] a real entity,[70] even if it be of an existent [state of affairs] (*sato 'pi*), is like no understanding.

Dharmottara explains the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*'s analogue of the first half of *kārikā* 10 in terms of two requirements for a valid reason: (a) a reason must be a real state of affairs proving a *sādhya*; (b) the debaters must understand, or ascertain (*ṅes pa = niścaya, niścita*) that the reason has a necessary connection (*med na ni mi 'byuṅ ba = anantarīyaka, avinābhāva*) with the *sādhya*. The second requirement is needed, according to Dharmottara, because a valid reason, unlike a lamp, does not make something known automatically or simply through its power to illuminate. Rather, a conscious awareness, or ascertaiment, of the reason's probative capacity is indispensable: hence, the phrase *jñānasāpekṣa* "reliance on an [ascertaining] cognition."[71] The first requirement, though, rules out the possibility that a reason would be valid *just* because of subjective factors; that would mean falling into the same view as that of the opponent in *kārikā* 9.

Regarding the phrase *sato 'pi*: The Sāṃkhya might admit that the reason *utpattimattvādi* is fallacious. But he maintains that as the *sādhya* is in any case true in reality, he can then use a reason which is only acceptable to the Buddhist

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[67]PV-k(III): *vastusaṃśliṣṭā*. MIY.: *vastv asaṃśliṣṭā*.

[68]Cf. PVin 286a2–3: *yod pa'i don ni rtogs pa la ltos nas sgrub par byed par 'gyur ba yin gyi | gaṅ las gźan gyis khas blaṅs pa tsam gyis 'grub par 'gyur ba med pa*[a] *rtogs pa tsam gyis ni ma yin no || yod kyaṅ dṅos pos ma byas pa'i rtogs pa ni med par rtogs pa daṅ khyad par yod pa ma yin te*[b] *|| yid ches pa med pa'i phyir ro ||* ([a] P. *khas blaṅs pa tsam gyis 'grub pa | med par rtogs pa* ... D. *med par* [D. 188a2–4]; cf. PVinṬ 6b5: *khas blaṅs pa tsam gyi sgrub par byed pas grub par 'gyur ba | med pa rtogs pa tsam gyis ... med pa = asan* [PV]—[b] D. *yin no*; PVV 417, 10–11 gives PVin's Sanskrit for *yod kyaṅ ... med pa'i phyir ro: sato 'py avastukṛtā pratipattir asatpratipattiṃ nātiśete apratyayatvād*).

[69]Cf. PVinṬ 6b3: *rtogs pa ste ṅes pa la ltos nas so |*.

[70]Cf. PVV 417, 8: *vastvasaṃśliṣṭā vastubhūtaliṅgāpratibaddhā gatiḥ.*

[71]PVinṬ 6b4: *rtags ni sgron ma bźin du ruṅ ba ñid kyis go bar byed pa ni ma yin te | 'on kyaṅ yod pa kho na bsgrub par bya ba med na ni mi 'byuṅ bar ṅes pa ñid na | dṅos po'i sgrub par byed pa yin no |* "A [valid] reason does not bring understanding through its [own] ability, like a lamp. But rather, when an actually existent state of affairs is ascertained as necessarily connected with the *sādhya*, then it is a *sādhana* for [this] real entity." This cognitive dimension to the Buddhist notion of validity is explained in TILLEMANS 1984a. On Dharmakīrti's use of *niścaya / niścita* in his theory of valid reasons, see STEINKELLNER 1988.

in order to communicate this verity "in one way or another" (*yathākathaṃcit*)[72]; in other words, he can use an expedient untruth to get across a truth. Dharmakīrti, in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, dismisses such an understanding as similar to that of an unreality, "because there is no conviction" (*apratyayatvād*). To this Dharmottara adds: "because it is not a *pramāṇa*."[73] It is worth noting that the Tibetan translation of PV renders *asaṃgatyā* by *rtogs pa med* (no understanding), and we have also translated in this way. The related PVin passage survives in Sanskrit in Manorathanandin's commentary on PV, and the term used there is *asatpratipatti* (understanding of a nonexistent thing), which yields a slightly different interpretation.[74] Note also that PVV glosses *asaṃgatyā* by *asataḥ pratītyā*.

(11) *liṅgaṃ svabhāvaḥ kāryaṃ vā dṛśyādarśanam eva vā |*
sambaddhaṃ vastutaḥ[75] *siddhaṃ tad asiddhaṃ kim ātmanaḥ ||*[76]

A [valid] reason, which is necessarily connected [with the property to be proved], can only be an essential property (*svabhāva*) or an effect (*kārya*) or a nonperception of something perceptible (*dṛśyādarśana*). Why is this [reason, viz., *utpattimattvādi*,] which is established in reality, not established for oneself [i.e., for the Sāṃkhya]?

For the three types of valid reasons, see PV I, k. 1–3; NB II, 11–17; or KAJIYAMA 1966, 72–86. "Necessary connection" (*sambandha*, *pratibandha*), for Buddhist logicians, is of two and only two types: "one nature" (*tādātmya*) or causality (*tadutpatti*; see STEINKELLNER 1971, 201–204). It is a cardinal tenet of Dharmakīrti's philosophy that the universal implication, or "pervasion" (*vyāpti*), between the reason and the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*) can only be established when there is such a necessary connection between these terms; already in PV I's programmatic verse, k. 1, Dharmakīrti stressed that there were three and only three sorts of valid reasons because the three were the only cases where such a connection would obtain.

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[72]Cf. PVV 417, 6–7: *athācaitanyaṃ vastuto 'sty eve tad yathākathaṃcit parasmai pratipādanīyam | ataḥ parābhyupagato hetuḥ kriyata ity āha | sato 'py* ... etc.

[73]PVinṬ 7a2: *yid ches pa med pa'i phyir te | tshad ma ma yin pa'i phyir ro ||*.

[74]See n. 68 for the Sanskrit fragment of PVin.

[75]PV-k(I),(II): *vastutas*.

[76]Cf. PVin 286a3–4: *'bras bu daṅ raṅ bźin daṅ mi dmigs pa'i khyad par dag las rtogs pa'i yan lag gźan ni med do źes bśad zin to || de dṅos po la grub pa'i mtshan ñid yin na ji ltar bdag ñid la ma grub par 'gyur |* (D. 188a4).

Here, in k. 11 and in the first half of k. 12, Dharmakīrti presents a dilemma for the Sāṃkhya: (a) If the reason *utpattimattvādi* did indeed belong to one of the three types of valid reasons figuring in Buddhist epistemology, then this reason would be unproblematically valid; but then the Sāṃkhya would have no grounds for not accepting it himself. (b) If *utpattimattvādi* was not to be included among these three types of reasons, then the opponent, too, should not understand that pleasure and so on are nonmental on the basis of it (cf. k. 12); as already argued in k. 10, no one understands anything, even if it be true, by means of an invalid reason.

(12) *pareṇāpy anyato gantum ayuktaṃ parakalpitaiḥ |*
prasaṅgo[77] *dvayasambandhād ekābhāve*[78] *'nyahānaye ||*[79]

It is incoherent that the other [i.e., the Buddhist], too, would understand [that pleasure, etc. are nonmental] on the basis of another [type of reason, i.e., one which is not an essential property, an effect or a nonperception]. [To reply to the objection that if that were so, then the use of consequences (*prasaṅga*) would also be impossible:[80]] An [absurd] consequence is [drawn] by means of the other's conceptual constructs (*parakalpitaiḥ*); as the [consequence's] two terms are necessarily connected, it serves to negate the second term in the absence of the first.

The PVV *ad* k. 12 explains: "[Objection:] If what is established by the other's position were not a *sādhana*, then the reason which occurs in a consequence

[77]PV-k(III): *prasaṅge*.

[78]PV-k(II): *ekāpāye*. Cf. Tib. *gcig med na*.

[79]Cf. PVin 286a4–8 *et seq.*: *gźan gyis ni pha rol yaṅ rtogs par mi 'thad pa ñid do || gźan gyis kun brtags*[a] *pas thal ba bsgrub pa dper na du ma la yod pa'i gcig po ni yul la sogs pa'i khyad par gźan daṅ ldan pa ma yin te | yul daṅ dus daṅ gnas skabs kyi khyad par ṅes pa'i gsal ba gcig daṅ 'dres pas rnam par ma bcad pa raṅ bźin gźan gyis stoṅ pa'i phyir te | de lta bu'i raṅ bźin ni yul la sogs pa tha dad pa can daṅ ldan par 'gal ba'i phyir ro || źes bya ba lta bu gaṅ yin pa de ni chos gcig khas blaṅs na chos gźan khas blaṅs par bstan pa'i phyir yin te | de khas mi len na ni chos gñi ga ldog par 'gyur ro || rnam par dbye bar bya bar mi nus pa'i phyir te | de ni gźan du de lta yaṅ dṅos su 'brel ba'i phyir ro ||* ([a] P. *btags* [D. 188a5–7]).

[80]Cf. PVBh 475,27–28: *tasmān na paropagamamātreṇa sādhanaprayogo vidvatsu yuktaḥ | kathaṃ tarhi purvācāryair bhavatā ca paraprasiddhasādhanaiḥ sādhyasiddhiḥ samīhitā |*. "[Dharmakīrti:] So, for the learned, it is incoherent to use a *sādhana* just because it is accepted by the other. [Objection:] Well then, how is it that previous masters [e.g., Dignāga] as well as you yourself seek to establish *sādhyas* by means of *sādhanas* which are [only] recognized by the other?"

(*prasaṅga*) would not be a [valid] reason. [Dharmakīrti] replies: A consequence is drawn by means of *sādhana*s which are the other's conceptual constructs, as in the following case: 'It follows that a universal (*sāmānya*) is many [different things] (*anekatva*), because, as the other accepts, it is present in a multitude (*anekavṛtti*) [of particulars]'.[81] This, however, is not really a [valid] reason, because it lacks the triple characterization (*trairūpya*).

"[Objection:] If it is not a [valid] reason, then what is the point in presenting it? [Dharmakīrti] replies: The [consequence's] two terms, viz., its *sādhya* and *sādhana*, are necessarily connected, that is to say, between the two a relation of 'pervaded' and 'pervader' (*vyāpyavyāpakabhāva*) is set out. Thus, [the consequence] serves to negate the second term, the *sādhana*, in the absence of the first, viz., the *sādhya*. As follows: In the contrapositive argument (*viparyayaprayoga*),[82] 'A universal is not many [things] (*nāneka*),[83] and thus it is not present in a multitude (*nānekavṛtti*),' one asserts the absence of the [consequence's] *sādhana* [i.e., *anekavṛtti*] in the absence of its *sādhya* [i.e., *anekatva*].

"Here the contraposition of the consequence (*prasaṅgaviparyaya*) is the fundamental reason. The use of the consequence, however, serves to recall the *pramāṇa* which grasps the pervasion between the *sādhya* and the *sādhana*. What is present in many [particular] instances in different places, times, etc., is [itself] established as being many, for one can attribute [to it] contradictory qualities such as [being in both] that place and not that place. So, one should understand that the pervasion between 'presence in a multitude' and 'being many [different things]' is established."[84]

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[81] rGyal 240 specifies that the notion of a universal at stake is that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas: *bye brag pas ba laṅ gi spyi cha med gcig gsal ba thams cad la dus gcig tu 'phrod 'du 'brel bar 'dod pa la* | "With regard to what is accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas, namely, that an ox-universal, which is partlessly one, inheres simultaneously in all its [particular] instances ...."

[82] Cf. MIMAKI 1976, 55–59. "Contraposition," in Western logic, means the inference from "If *P* then *Q*" to "If *not-Q* then *not-P*." Or, in other terms, an inference from "*Q* because *P*" to "*not-P* because *not-Q*."

[83] Both RS and DS have *cānekaṃ*, which must be an error, judging from the argument in PVin (cf. n. 79), PVBh and PVinṬ. Cf. PVV-n 418, n. 1: *pakṣadharmopasaṃhāra eṣaḥ*.

[84] PVV 417, 24–418, 8: *yadi parābhyupagamasiddham asādhanaṃ tadā prasaṅgahetur ahetuḥ syād ity āha* | *parakalpitaiḥ sādhanaiḥ prasaṅgaḥ kriyate yathā sāmānyasya paropagatānekavṛttitvād anekatvam āpādyate na tv ayaṃ pāramārthiko hetus trairūpyābhāvāt* | *yady ayaṃ na hetuḥ tadā kim artham ucyata ity āha* | *dvayoḥ sādhyasādhanayoḥ saṃbandhād vyāpyavyāpakabhāvāt sphāritād ekasya sādhyasyāpāye 'nyasya sādhanasya hānaye* | *yathā nānekaṃ*[a] *sāmānyaṃ tasmān nānekavṛttīti viparyayaprayoge sādhyābhāve sādhanābhāvaḥ kathyate* | *prasaṅgaviparyayo 'tra maulo hetuḥ sādhyasādhanavyāptigrāhakapramāṇasmārakas tu prasaṅge prayoga ity arthaḥ* | *bhinnadeśakālādiṣv anekāsu vyaktiṣu vṛttasya tadatad-*

The Sāṃkhya's objection is that proofs by *reductio ad absurdum*, or by absurd consequences derived from the opponent's position, would inevitably involve a reason which is accepted by the opponent alone, and not by the proponent. So how could Buddhists engage in *reductio ad absurdum*—as they obviously do—if Dharmakīrti is correct in ruling out reasons that are accepted by only the opponent?

The answer, as PVV and PVBh clearly point out, is that the "reason" in a consequence is not really (*pāramārthika*) a valid reason at all, as it does not satisfy the three characteristics which constitute the criterion of validity. The Sāṃkhya cannot appeal to considerations about consequences to justify his use of *utpattimattvādi*, because *reductio ad absurdum*-style arguments and direct proofs by means of valid reasons have completely different logical structures. In effect, in a *reductio* one premises, or postulates for the sake of the deduction, an unreal property or entity, only to eliminate this premise when an absurdity is reached.[85] Nothing of that type of procedure occurs when one simply presents a valid reason. Turning to the consequence discussed in PVV, PVin, PVBh, and other commentaries, we can see that the "reason" is indeed an absurd hypothesis, or a "conceptual construct of the opponent" (*parakalpita*), because the universal is nonexistent for the Buddhist and hence cannot be present in anything at all. Clearly then, *anekavṛttitva* cannot be a valid reason, because the *pakṣadharmatva* (the fact that [the reason] qualifies the subject) does not hold.

A consequence can, however, be contraposed to yield a valid reason, much in the same way as *modus tollens* is used in Western *reductio ad absurdum* arguments. The procedure can be generalized:

(a) Consequence: It follows that *A* is *B* because of *C*.

(b) Contraposition (given that *A* is not *B*): *A* is not *C* because of not being *B*.

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deśatvādiviruddhadharmādhyāsād anekatvasiddher anekavṛttitvānekatvayor[b] *vyāptisiddhir boddhavyā* | ([a] Cf. n. 83—[b] PVV reads *anekavṛttatva°*). On Prajñākaragupta and other Indian commentators' explanations of the argument in k. 12 and PVin, see the detailed study in IWATA 1993.

[85] In a *reductio ad absurdum* proof in a natural deduction system, for example, one premises *P* with premise number *n*; from *P* and *m*-other premises one deduces *Q*; one then conditionalizes to get "If *P* then *Q*" and deletes the premise number *n*. The next step is of course to apply *modus tollens* from "If *P* then *Q*" and "*not-Q*" to arrive at "*not-P*." The fact that *n* has been eliminated shows that the deduction of "If *P* then *Q*" and the subsequent steps do not suppose actual acceptance of the premise *P*. In effect, we can understand the so-called "conceptually constructed *sādhana*" in a *prasaṅga* as functioning similarly to this premise *P*: it is accepted provisionally just until the absurdity is reached.

Note that this contraposition will give a valid reason only when *A* is in fact not *B* (otherwise the *pakṣadharmatva* would not hold, and also the consequence itself would not be absurd), and when there is a universal implication, or pervasion (*vyāpti*), between *C* and *B*, a pervasion which must be grounded on a necessary connection (*sambandha*) between the terms. If the pervasion between *C* and *B* does hold, then that between *not-B* and *not-C* will hold automatically: the two are formally equivalent.[86]

1.2 The word *artha* in Dignāga's phrase *svadṛṣṭārtha*.

(13) *tad arthagrahaṇaṃ*[87] *śabdakalpanāropitātmanām*[88] |
aliṅgatvaprasiddhyartham arthād arthaprasiddhitaḥ[89] ||[90]

This word 'state of affairs' (*artha*) [in Dignāga's definition of an inference-for-others, i.e., *svadṛṣṭārthaprakāśana*] is designed to establish that things whose natures are verbally and conceptually

[86]Tibetan writers often give concise and elegant accounts of this process. See rGyal 241: *de la raṅ rgyud 'phen pa'i thal 'gyur yin na | dam bca' la tshad mas*[a] *bsal ba bstan dgos te | de lta min na raṅ rgyud kyi phyogs chos mi 'grub pa'i phyir ro | rtags pha rol pos khas blaṅs pa dgos te | de lta min par tshad mas grub na | raṅ rgyud rtags kyi dam bca' tshad mas bsal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro || de bźin du khyab pa yaṅ tshad mas grub pa dgos so ||* ([a] The text has *tshad ma'i*) "In the case of a consequence which implies an 'autonomous argument' (*raṅ rgyud* = *svatantra*), one should state a thesis (*dam bca'* = *pratijñā*) which is negated by a *pramāṇa*; otherwise, the *pakṣadharma* of the *svatantra* will not be established. The reason [in the consequence] must be [only] accepted by the opponent, for otherwise, if it were [in fact] established by a *pramāṇa*, then the thesis of the 'autonomous reason' (*raṅ rgyud rtags* = *svatantraliṅga*) would end up being negated by a *pramāṇa*. Accordingly, the pervasion, though, should be established by a *pramāṇa*." This explanation also figures routinely in the *bsDus grwa* texts of the dGe lugs pa school.

[87]MIY.: *tadarthagrahaṇaṃ*. But cf. Tib. *don smos de*.

[88]PV-k(I): *śabdavikalpāropitātmanām*.

[89]PV-k(II): *arthasya siddhitaḥ*.

[90]Cf. PVin 287a5: *don med par*[a] *rtog pas*[b] *sgro btags pa yaṅ rtags*[c] *ma yin te | dper na sgra ni rtag pa'am | mi rtag pa yin te | phyogs daṅ mthun pa'i phyogs dag las gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba yin pa'i phyir ro źes bya ba lta bu'o ||* ([a] P. *don med pa*—[b] D. *rtog pa*—[c] D. *rtag pa* [D. 189a5]). From *dper na* ... to *lta bu'o* constitutes an example of a conceptually superimposed reason. It is discussed quite extensively in PVin, PVinṬ (P. 14b7–15b4), and is alluded to in PVBh 483, 31, PVV 418, 14–15 and PVV-n, n. 3. Essentially, the point seems to be that when one proves that sound is either permanent or impermanent because it is either a *pakṣa* (= *dharmin*) or a *sapakṣa*, then the choice as to whether one is proving permanence or its opposite depends on the proponent's intention (*smra ba po'i brjod par 'dod pas byas pa* [PVin 287a6]); hence, the question as to which *sapakṣa*, the permanent or the impermanent ones, are at stake also depends on the speaker and not on reality (*dṅos po'i raṅ bźin gyi rjes [su] byed pa ni ma yin* [PVin 287a8]).

superimposed (*āropita*) are not [valid] reasons, for [one] state of affairs [viz., the *sādhya*] is established from [another] state of affairs [viz., the reason].

(14) *kalpanāgamayoḥ kartur icchāmātrānurodhataḥ*[91] |
vastunaś cānyathābhāvāt[92] *kalpitā*[93] *vyabhicāriṇaḥ* ||[94]

Concepts and scripture conform to the mere wishes of [their] author and so can be different from the real entity. Therefore, [reasons which are] conceptual constructs are deviant (*vyabhicārin*).

The term *artha* (state of affairs), in the context of Dignāga's definition of an inference-for-others as *svadṛṣṭārthaprakāśana* (cf. our commentary to k. 1), refers to *only* the triply characterized reason (*trirūpaliṅga*): the commentators are clear on this point.[95] Moreover, this *artha* must, in PVV's words, be a "reason which is a real entity" (*vastubhūta*).[96] It cannot be something constructed or imagined, for there is no guarantee that such a reason, which lacks grounding in reality, would imply its *sādhya*; it is "deviant" or "inconclusive" (*anaikāntika*) in that the pervasion may not hold.

1.3 On PS III, k. 1cd: The thesis-statement is not a means of proof (*sādhana*)

(15) *arthād arthagateḥ śaktiḥ pakṣahetvabhidhānayoḥ* |
nārthe tena tayor nāsti svataḥ sādhanasaṃsthitiḥ ||[97]

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[91]PV-k(I),(II): *anuvṛttitaḥ*.

[92]MIY.: *cânyathâbhāvāt*. MIYASAKA 1974 corrects to *cânyathā bhāvāt*, but the word should be a compound.

[93]PV-(I),(II),(III): *tatkṛtā*. PVBh (Dānaśīla's copy, i.e., B.): *kalpitā* = PV Tib. *brtags pa*. Note that MIY. follows D. *btags*, but P. and N. have *brtags*, which is preferable. Confusion between these two forms is notoriously frequent. Finally, we should mention that *tatkṛtā* is also supported by a Tibetan translation, in that PVin III, k. 3 (= PV IV, k. 14) has *des byas pa*. Cf. n. 94.

[94]= PVin III, k. 3; : *rtog daṅ luṅ dag byed pa po'i* || *'dod pa tsam daṅ rjes 'brel daṅ* || *dṅos po'aṅ gźan du srid pa'i phyir*[a] || *des byas pa ni 'khrul pa yin* || *źes bya ba ni bsdu ba'i tshigs su bcad pa'o* || [b] ([a] D. *dṅos po la yaṅ srid pa'i phyir*—[b] P. *bsdu ba'i tshigs su bcad pa'i tshul gsum* ... [D. 189b4–5]).

[95]Cf. PVṬ 310a7–8: *don ni tshul gsum pa'i rtags yin no* ||. Cf. also PVBh 467, 8: *tatra svadṛṣṭo 'rthas trirūpaṃ liṅgaṃ* |.

[96]PVV 418, 16 (*ad* k. 13): *arthād vastubhūtāl liṅgād.*

[97]= PVin III, k. 4; 287b6–8: *ji ltar sgrub par byed pa ma yin no źe na* | *dṅos sam brgyud pas de grub pa mi skye ba'i phyir ro* || *re źig dṅos su ni* | *don gyis*[a] *don rtogs*[b] *phyir don la* || *phyogs daṅ*

> One understands one state of affairs from another. Thus, the statements of the thesis and reason have no power with regard to the state of affairs [in question, i.e., the *sādhya*]. Hence, these two [statements] do not, in themselves, constitute means of proof (*sādhana*).

Dharmakīrti now devotes the next thirteen verses to demonstrating that the statement of the thesis (*pakṣavacana* = *anumeyanirdeśa*, 'presentation of the inferendum') cannot be considered as a means of proof (*sādhana*) and thus cannot also be a member of an inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*). His initial strategy is twofold: to examine whether a thesis-statement could directly (*sākṣāt*, k. 15–16) or indirectly (*pāraṃparyeṇa*, k.17) prove, or contribute to proving, a proposition in question (*sādhya*), and in that sense be a means of proof.[98]

In k. 15 he argues that no statements whatsoever can directly prove a *sādhya*, be they of the thesis or *even of the reason*. (Note that 'statement of the reason' [*hetuvacas; hetuvacana*] in what follows refers to a two-membered *parārthānumāna*, which is, according to Dignāga's definition, supposed to elucidate the triply characterized reason [*trirūpaliṅga*].) For, as had been argued in the previous two *kārikās*, it is not statements or concepts which prove states of affairs (*artha*), but rather other states of affairs in the world. As the PVin puts it, statements would lack the required necessary connection (*'brel ba* = *pratibandha*) with what is to be proved: "It is only a state of affairs which makes understood [another] state of affairs, for it does not deviate (*'khrul pa med pa* = *avyabhicārin*). Statements do not [make states of affairs understood], because there is no certainty coming from a necessary connection."[99] The words "directly," or equivalently, "in themselves" (*svataḥ*), in effect then indicate that statements, *qua* verbal entities,

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gtan tshigs brjod nus med || *des*[c] *na de dag raṅ ñid las* || *sgrub par byed pa*[d] *gnas ma yin* || *don ñid kyis don go bar byed de* | *'khrul pa med pa'i phyir ro*[e] || *brjod pa ni ma yin te*[f] | *'brel ba ṅes pa med pa'i phyir ro* || *des na phyogs daṅ gtan tshigs kyi tshig raṅ ñid kyis don grub pa'i phyir ni sgrub par byed pa ma yin no* || ([a] D. *gyi*—[b] D. *rtog*—[c] P. *das*—[d] P. *byas pa*—[e] P. *'khrul pa'i phyir ro*—[f] D. *no* [D. 189b6–190a1]).

[98]Cf. PVV 419,4–5 and PVin quoted in n. 97. It should be mentioned that Dharmakīrti's argumentation throughout k. 15–27, with the exception of some discussion of Dignāga, is largely directed against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, who professed a *parārthānumāna* with five members: the thesis (*pratijñā*), reason (*hetu*), example (*udāharaṇa*), application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigamana*). Cf. POTTER 1977, 180–1. For a summary of the Buddhist-Naiyāyika debate on the five-membered proof, see MOOKERJEE 1935, chapter XXIII. Cf. also KAJIYAMA 1966, 72–73.

[99]Cf. n. 97. Note that PVinṬ 16b4 glosses *'brel ba ṅes pa med pa'i phyir* as *'brel bas ṅes pa mi 'khrul pa de med pa'i phyir*.

do not have any intrinsic properties[100] which restrict them to one object and not another. In this respect statements of theses or reasons are on the same footing and are both incapable of being actual *sādhana*.

(16) *tat pakṣavacanaṃ vaktur abhiprāyanivedane |*
pramāṇaṃ saṃśayotpattes tataḥ sākṣān na sādhanam ||[101]

So[102] the thesis-statement is a means of valid cognion (*pramāṇa*) for revealing the speaker's intention. [But] as doubt arises from it [as to whether the thesis is true or not], it is not directly (*sākṣāt*) a means of proof (*sādhana*).

Following Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi and Manorathanandin, we can construe the first two *pāda*s of k. 16 as a reply to a possible objection that Dharmakīrti, in rejecting that the statement of the thesis can be considered to be a means of proof (*sādhana*), would come into contradiction with Dignāga's thought. The latter two *pāda*s, which constitute a reply to this objection, allude to Dignāga's own explanations in PSV III.[103]

Devendrabuddhi summarizes the interpretation as follows: "[Objection:] If the Master [Dignāga] asserts that verbal knowledge (*sgra las byuṅ ba* = *śābda*) is a *pramāṇa*, then how is it that the state of affairs [to be proved] is not established by this [statement of the thesis]? Why would that which is superimposed by words not be a [valid] reason? It would be correct for it to be a [valid] reason. Thus, the words 'impermanence', etc., which have the character of expressing the *sādhya*, would establish [the properties] impermanence, etc.; and hence, formulating the other members of [an inference-for-others] would be unnecessary. [Reply:] It [i.e., the thesis-statement] is not a *pramāṇa* with regard to the state of affairs [to be proved] so that such [consequences] would ensue. [Objection:] Well then, what [sort of *pramāṇa*] is it? [Reply:] The thesis-statement is a *pramāṇa* for showing

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[100]PVV 419, 11 glosses *svataḥ* by *svarūpeṇa*. Cf. also PVinṬ 16b3: *raṅ ñid las te* | *raṅ gi ṅo bo las*. The argument alludes to one of the major themes of Dharmakīrti's philosophy of language, viz., that words have no inherent *yogyatā* (fitness) to designate one specific thing rather than another; rather, words are used purely according to the speaker's intention (*vivakṣā*) and are thus, in themselves, subject to no restrictions (*niyama*). See k. 109 *et sq.* (*prasiddha*) and Appendix B.

[101]Cf. PVin 287b8–288a1: *phyogs kyi tshig las ni don la the tshom za bar mthoṅ gi* | *ṅes pa ni ma yin pa'i phyir*[a] *dṅos su sgrub par byed pa ma yin no* || ([a] D. *phyir ro* [D. 190a1]).

[102]PVV 419, 16: *tat tasmāt*. WATANABE 1976, 976 also translates in this way.

[103]Cf. PSVa III, 43a3; PSVb III, 124b6: *yan lag rnams nas gaṅ rjes su dpag par bya ba bstan pa ni kho bo cag gi sgrub byed ñid du mi 'dod de* | *de ñid the tshom skyed par byed pa'i phyir* |. See p. 4 for translation.

the intention of the speaker, and as such there is no fault. Because doubts arise from it, [or, in other words,] as it is seen that from the statement of the thesis one feels doubt with regard to the state of affairs to be proved, therefore the statement of the thesis is not directly a *sādhana*."[104]

Śākyabuddhi gives the full quotation to which Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin allude: it can be identified as the opening verse of PS V (*Anyāpohaparīkṣā*), where Dignāga asserts that verbal knowledge is also a case of inference and is hence not a separate type of *pramāṇa*.[105] The reply that the thesis-statement is only a *pramāṇa* in the sense that it shows the speaker's intention, but not the truth or falsity of what is being proved, is an echo of what Dharmakīrti had already stated in PV I, k. 213 and PV II, k. 1–2.[106] Finally, it should be pointed out that, according to Jinendrabuddhi, this is also what Dignāga meant in classifying verbal knowledge among inferential *pramāṇa*s. The *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (PSṬ) specifies that a set of words can serve as a triply characterized reason (*trirūpaliṅga*) to prove, as its *sādhya*, a speaker's intention. Taken in this rather special fashion, then, verbal knowledge would indeed be no different from any other inferential *pramāṇa* which must depend on a triply characterized reason.[107]

(17) *sādhyasyaivābhidhānena pāraṃparyeṇa nāpy alam |*
śaktasya sūcakaṃ hetuvaco 'śaktam api svayam ||[108]

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[104]PVP 323b8–324a4: *gal te slob dpon gyis sgra las byuṅ ba tshad ma ñid du bźed pa yin na*[a] *ji ltar na des don grub pa ma yin | gaṅ gis*[b] *sgras sgro btags pa rtags ma yin | de ni rtags ñid*[c] *yin par rigs pa yin*[d] *no || de bas na bsgrub par bya ba rjod*[e] *par byed pa'i mtshan ñid can gyi mi rtag pa la sogs pa'i sgra las mi rtag pa la sogs pa grub pa'i phyir | yan lag gźan sbyor ba la*[f] *don med pa can du 'gyur ro źe na | de don la tshad ma ma yin pa gaṅ gis na de ltar na 'gyur | 'o na ci yin źe na | phyogs kyi tshig de 'chad pa po'i*[g] *bsam pa ston par byed pa la | tshad ma yin pa de ltar na skyon yod pa ma yin no || de las the tshom dag skye phyir | phyogs kyi tshig las bsgrub*[h] *par bya ba'i don la the tshom za ba mthoṅ ba de ltar na phyogs kyi tshig dṅos su sgrub byed min no* || ([a] D. lacks *na*—[b] D. *gaṅ gi*—[c] P. *ñid na*—[d] P. *ma yin no*—[e] P. *brjod*—[f] P. *yaṅ*—[g] P. *'chad pa po'am*—[h] P. *sgrub* [D. 272a7–b3]).

[105]PVṬ 312b5–6: *sgra las byuṅ ba tshad ma ñid du bźed pa yin na*[a] *źes bya ba ni sgra las byuṅ ba ni rjes su dpag pa las tshad ma gźan ma yin no źes bya ba la sogs pa'o* || ([a] P. has *bźed pa med pa yin na*). Cf. PS V, k. 1: *na pramāṇāntaraṃ śābdam anumānāt tathā hi tat | kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate* || (Sanskrit found in the TSP of Kamalaśīla 539, 17–18; see HATTORI 1982, 107).

[106]PV I, k. 213: *nāntarīyakatābhāvāc*[a] *chabdānāṃ vastubhiḥ saha | nārthasiddhis tatas te hi vaktrabhiprāyasūcakāḥ* || ([a] MIY.: *'bhāvāc*) "Because words have no necessary relation (*nāntarīyakatā*) with real entities, they [cannot] establish states of affairs, for they [just] show the speaker's intention."

[107]See PSṬ, ed. HATTORI 1982, 151, 11–21.

[108]= PVin III, k. 5; 288a1–3: *bsgrub bya brjod*[a] *phyir phyogs kyi tshig || brgyud pa yis kyaṅ nus pa med || gtan tshigs brjod pa raṅ ñid la || nus pa med kyaṅ nus ston byed || brgyud pas kyaṅ ma*

> In stating merely that which is to be proved (*sādhya*), [the thesis-statement] cannot, even indirectly, [establish it].[109] The statement of the reason [however], although it cannot itself [establish the *sādhya*], does show what is capable.

It had been argued in k. 15 that the statement of the thesis and the statement of the reason are similar in not *directly* being means of proof (*sādhana*). But here the parallel stops: the statement of the thesis is not even indirectly (*pāraṃparyeṇa*) a *sādhana*, while that of the reason is. The criterion for indirectly being or not being a *sādhana* is in terms of what the linguistic symbols indicate; that is, a statement is *indirectly* a *sādhana* if its designatum establishes the thesis in question. Now, in the case of the thesis-statement, the object which it indicates, i.e., the thesis or *sādhya*, cannot prove itself.[110] However, the statement of the reason indicates the triply characterized reason (*trirūpaliṅga*), and this of course does prove the *sādhya*. Hence, statements of theses and reasons, *qua* linguistic expressions, are alike in both being unable to establish states of affairs, but they differ in that one refers to a "prover" and the other does not.

Finally, PVin and PVinṬ specify that because the statement of the reason refers to something which is capable of proving the *sādhya*, then although the *statement itself* is not properly speaking a *sādhana*, it can metaphorically (*ñe bar btags nas = upacārāt*) be called one, in that it is the cause for a person to remember the actual *sādhana*, viz., the triply characterized reason.[111] In this way, then, Dharmakīrti can account for a frequently found use of term *sādhana*, whereby it covers not just actual reasons and examples, but also (by metaphorical extension) proof-statements (*vākya*).

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yin te | bsgrub par bya ba brjod pa'i phyir ro || gtan tshigs kyi[b] *tshig ni raṅ ñid nus pa med kyaṅ nus pa brjod par byed pa*[c] *yin pa'i phyir ñe bar btags nas sgrub par byed pa 'dod pa yin no* || ([a] P. *bjod*—[b] D. *kyis*—[c] D. *brjod par bya ba* [D. 190a2–3]).

[109]Cf. PVinṬ 16b6: *bsgrub par bya ba brjod pa'i phyir brgyud pas kyaṅ rtog(s) par byed pa'i nus pa med de* |...

[110]Prajñākaragupta gives a rather backhanded explanation of a type of circularity which he perceives to be at stake here: the thesis or *sādhya*, at the time of presenting a *parārthānumāna*, is not yet established by a *pramāṇa*, and is for that reason ineffectual. See PVBh 486, 6–8: *yathā sādhanavacanaṃ sādhanaṃ tathā pakṣavacanam api bhavet* | *yadi śaktasya sūcakaṃ bhavet pramāṇasiddhasya* | *asiddhasya tu sūcanaṃ kathaṃ sādhanam* | *na hi svayam aśaktam aśaktam āśritya śaktimat* |.

[111]For PVin, see n. 108. PVinṬ 17a1–2: *sgrub par byed pa dran pa'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir tshig la sgrub par byed pa ñid du gdags so* ||. Recall also the reasoning which Dignāga himself used for metaphorically terming an inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*) an inference (*anumāna*): it is the cause for a real inference; see PSVb 124b3, translated in Part II above.

1.3.1 The thesis-statement only shows the goal of the reason (*hetvartha*)

(18) *hetvarthaviṣayatvena tadaśaktoktir īritā |*
śaktis tasyāpi ced dhetuvacanasya pravartanāt ||[112]

The statement of that [viz., the *sādhya*] which is powerless is explained as having the goal of the reason (*hetvartha*) as its object.[113] But suppose [it is argued] that the [thesis-statement] too must have [such a] capacity, because it brings forth the statement of the reason.

The second half of this verse will be discussed in connection with k. 19. The first two *pāda*s of k. 18 allude to PS III, k. 1cd as showing that Dignāga held that the statement of the thesis only had a place in a *parārthānumāna* in an "orientational" role, i.e., to show why the reason was stated. Although the thesis-statement shows what is being proved, it does not itself actually have probative power, and is not, in that sense, a *sādhana*. This interpretation of PS III, k. 1 is corroborated by passages in PSV III.[114] In PV IV, PVin and NB, Dharmakīrti probably takes the view that the thesis-statement is dispensable because known by implication, but that it *can* be used and *can* have *pakṣābhāsa* (faults of the thesis). Later, from the *Hetubindu* (HB) onward (see n. 115), it is the same fact of implication which leads Dharmakīrti to view thesis-statements as completely redundant and to abandon talk of them (and of *pakṣābhāsa*) altogether. By the time we arrive at what was probably his last work, the *Vādanyāya* (VN), Dharmakīrti has become even more categorical: he argues that the thesis-statement is not a *sādhana*, and precisely because it is not a *sādhana*, stating it in a *parārthānumāna* is a point of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*) for the proponent, in that the proponent has stated something

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[112]Cf. PVin 288a3: *de las gtan tshigs kyi tshig*[a] *'jug pa'i phyir | de yaṅ nus pa ñid do źe na |* ([a] D. *tshigs su* [D. 190a3]).

[113]PVBh 488, 5–6: *asmākaṃ tu yo 'numeyanirdeśaḥ sa hetvarthaviṣayatvena na sādhanatvena (|) ataḥ sākṣāt sādhanatvapratikṣepāt tasya sādhyasyokter aśaktatā kathitā |* "But for us, the presentation of the inferendum is [regarded] as having as [its] object the goal of the reason and is not [regarded] as being a *sādhana*.[a] Thus, because [this] directly eliminates that the [thesis-statement] might be a *sādhana*, the statement of this, the *sādhya*, is said to be powerless." ([a] Cf. PVBh Tib. 167b8: *...de gtan tshigs kyi don gyi yul ñid du yin gyi | sgrub par byed pa ni ma yin no ||*). PVV 420, 10: ... *tasya pakṣavacanasya sādhyasādhanaṃ praty aśaktasyoktir īritā.* Note that the compound *tadaśaktokti* is interpreted slightly differently by PVBh and PVV, with the former understanding *tad* as *tasya sādhyasya* and the latter taking *tad* as *tasya pakṣavacanasya.*

[114]Cf. PSVa 43a3–4; PSVb 124b6. See Part II above for translation.

which is useless for the proof at hand.[115]

We should, however, mention that Prajñākaragupta, in PVBh *ad* k. 18, introduces PV IV, k. 18ab as an answer to an objection where an opponent finds Dharmakīrti's position on the thesis-statement not being a *sādhana* to be incompatible with Dignāga's PS IV, k. 6 (= *Nyāyamukha*, k. 13). PVBh formulates the objection as follows: "But did not the Master [Dignāga] in fact admit the thesis-statement when he said [in PS IV and NM], 'As one wishes to generate a certainty for others just like one's own certainty, then anything other than the statements of the *pakṣadharmatva*, the necessary connection (*sambandha*) and the *sādhya* is excluded'? [Reply:] No, this is not so. For...[k. 18ab]."[116] The position held by Prajñākaragupta and others (whose views would become the received interpretation in later Indian and Tibetan Buddhism) was, in essence, to maintain that Dharmakīrti's position did *not* evolve at all from PV to HB to VN: the thesis-statement was completely inadmissable *dès le début* for Dharmakīrti. Moreover, as Dharmakīrti was held to give a faithful representation of Dignāga's position in PS, commentators like Prajñākaragupta were forced to maintain that Dignāga in PS IV, k. 6 could not have allowed any role at all for the thesis-statement either.

Prajñākaragupta is thus forced to give a resolution of the apparent contradiction with what Dignāga said in PS IV, k. 6. He maintains that the words "statement of the *sādhya*" in the problematic verse from Dignāga's PS IV and NM must be interpreted as referring only to the statement of the property to be proved which occurs in the pervasion (*vyāpti*) of a two-membered *parārthānumāna*. It does not mean the statement of the thesis. This ambiguity in the word *sādhya* is not uncommon, but it can be shown that this "resolution" is quite unconvincing. In TILLEMANS 1991a we have argued in detail against this "Dharmakīrtian commentators' interpretation" of PS IV, k. 6:

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[115]Cf. NB III, 34, 35, 36 and especially Dharmottara's NBṬ *ad* NB 35, pp. 174–5. HB 5, 23–24: *atra sāmarthyād eva pratijñārthasya pratīter na pratijñāyāḥ prayogaḥ* | "Here, because the thesis-proposition is known just simply by implication there is no need for the thesis." VN 17, 9–11: *atha vā tasyaiva sādhanasya yan nāṅgaṃ pratijñopanayanigamanādi tasyāsādhanāṅgasya sādhanavākye upādānaṃ vādino nigrahasthānaṃ vyarthābhidhānāt* |. For translation, see MUCH 1991 (Teil II), 40.

[116]PVBh 487, 30–488, 1: *nanv ācāryasya pakṣavacanam abhimatam eva* | *yad āha* | *svaniścayavad anyeṣāṃ niścayotpādanecchayā* | *pakṣadharmatvasaṃbandhasādhyokter anyavarjanam* || *naitad asti* | *yataḥ* |. The verse is PS IV, k. 6 = NM, k. 13. Cf. HATTORI 1958, fragment 10 and KATSURA 1981, 73–74. Cf. also PSVa 65b4–6 and PSVb 150b7–151a1 for Dignāga's interpretation of the compound *pakṣadharmatvasaṃbandhasādhyokti*.

(a) When commentators maintain that PS IV, k. 6 does *not* show that Dignāga condoned stating a thesis in a *parārthānumāna* at all, they will have serious difficulties in explaining the fact that PS IV, k. 6 is exactly the same as k. 13 in Dignāga's earlier work, the NM, and that in the NM the thesis-statement *was* condoned and was even considered indispensable because it was a *sādhana* like the other members (see our n. 142 below);

(b) The commentators' position is also seriously weakened when we discern an evolution in the notions of fallacious theses (*pakṣābhāsa*) and incompleteness (*nyūnatā*) as it is described in INAMI 1991. Cf. also our remarks to k. 22, 23 and our Introductory Remarks.

Finally, note that the syntax of k. 18ab presents certain problems. The revised Tibetan translation of Sa skya Paṇḍita can yield quite a different understanding: "By means of the property 'having the goal of the reason as its object', it was explained that [the thesis-statement] states that which is incapable [of proving the *sādhya*]."[117] The principal differences here are that Sa paṇ, or if not him personally, then certainly many of his educated Tibetan readers, seems to have taken the instrumental of *hetvarthaviṣayatvena* (*gtan tshigs don gyi yul ñid kyis*) as showing a reason or means, and has implausibly rendered *ukti* (*brjod par*) as the verb "to state" rather than the noun "statement" (*brjod pa*). It seems to us that here Sa paṇ's revised translation probably does not yield a very reliable comprehension of the Sanskrit original. Nor does Subhūtiśrīśānti and dGe ba'i blo gros' previous Tibetan translation (as found in PVP) fare all that much better.[118] As such, we have chosen to follow an interpretation of k.18ab's syntax which, in the main, is closer to PVBh and PVV.[119]

[117]PV Tib. reads: *gtan tshigs don gyi yul ñid kyis* || *nus med de ni brjod par bśad* ||. Cf. the usual Tibetan understanding of the syntax as found in dGe 290, 5: *...de la dpag bya bstan pa ni* | *gtan tshigs don kyi yul du 'dod* | *ces gsuṅs pa ñid kyis* | *phyogs tshig gis phyogs sgrub pa'i nus pa med pa'i phyogs de ni rjod par bśad pa'i phyir* | "[Dignāga did hold that the thesis-statement is not a *sādhana*] because by saying *tatrānumeyanirdeśo hetvarthaviṣayo mataḥ*, he explained that the thesis-statement states that, i.e., the thesis, which is powerless to establish the thesis." Cf. rGyal 247, 6–10, which is virtually identical. WATANABE 1976, 977, by translating the instrumental ending of *hetvarthaviṣayatvena* by *kara*, seems to lean more towards a Tibetan-style version of k. 18ab.

[118]PVP 324a8, D. 272b6: *gtan tshigs don gyi yul ñid kyis* | *nus med des brjod bstan pa yin* |. Note that dGe ba'i blo gros and Subhūtiśrīśānti have rendered *tad* by the instrumental *des* (which is more or less incomprehensible) and have translated *ukti* more literally as *brjod.*

[119]See n. 113.

1.3.2 The fact that the thesis-statement shows the goal of the reason does not mean that it is also a *sādhana*

(19) *tatsaṃśayena jijñāsor bhavet prakaraṇāśrayaḥ |*
vipakṣopagame 'py etat tulyam iti anavasthitiḥ ||[120]

[Reply:] [In that case] for him who, by doubting the [state of affairs in question], wishes to know [whether it is so or not], there might be grounds for an occasion [to state a reason].[121] Also, if he accepts what is contrary to what is to be proved, this would be similar [in leading to a statement of a reason]. Thus there would be no end [to the members of a proof].

The objection in k. 18cd had been that if the thesis were not stated in a *parārthānumāna*, then there would be no point in stating the reason, for the reason is stated for a particular purpose, namely, to prove the thesis. Hence, the reason would not be stated at all.[122] To this Dharmakīrti replies, in effect, that there are many other necessary conditions for a reason's being stated, but that these conditions, such as the opponent's doubt and desire to know, do not also become *sādhana* included as members in a *parārthānumāna*. So why should the thesis-statement be any different in this regard? Vibhūticandra explains "doubt" and "the desire to know" as alluding to the ten-membered type of reasoning which one finds

[120]Cf. PVin 288a3–4: *the tshom las śes par 'dod pa daṅ | skabs 'jug pa'i phyir de dag las thal bar 'gyur ro || mi mthun pa'i phyogs*[a] *tsam las kyaṅ the tshom za bas gñen po gtan tshigs kyi tshig 'jug pa*[b] *srid pa'i phyir de yaṅ de daṅ lhan cig sgrub par byed par 'gyur ro ||* ([D. 190a3–4]. [a] D. *mi mthun pa'i tshig*, which is somewhat supported by PVinṬ 17a7–8: *de'i phyir mi mthun pa'i tshig de yaṅ...*—[b] D. *'jug pas* makes little sense and is not supported by PVinṬ 17a7: *...gñen por mi rtag pa ñid kyi gtan tshigs kyi tshig 'god pa srid pa yin te |*).

[121]For *tatsaṃśayena*, cf. PVP 324b4–5: *don de la the tshom gyis śes 'dod |*. Note that PV Tib. takes *prakaraṇāśraya* (= *skabs la brten pa*) as a *bahuvrīhi* compound and *jijñāsoḥ* as an ablative rather than a genitive: *de ni the tshom gyis śes par || 'dod pas skabs la brten pa yin |*. Cf. also PVinṬ 17a3–4: *the tshom las ni śes par 'dod par gyur la | śes par 'dod pa 'di las ni gtan tshigs kyi sbyor ba'i skabs mṅon par 'dod pa'i bdag ñid can 'jug ciṅ |...* Manorathanandin, for whose interpretation we have in the main opted, understands k. 19ab quite differently, taking *jijñāsoḥ* as a genitive. Cf. PVV 420, 17–19: *tasya sādhyasaṃśayena jijñāsā tasyāṃ ca satyāṃ sādhanam ucyata iti jijñāsoḥ puṃsaḥ saṃśayo jijñāsā ca prakaraṇasya sādhanaprastāvasyāśrayo nimittam iti bhavet sādhanaṃ pakṣavacanavat |* "Due to his doubting the *sādhya*, he has a desire to know, and in such a case, a *sādhana* is stated. Thus, for the person who wishes to know, the doubt and the desire to know would be a ground or cause for an occasion, i.e., for stating a *sādhana*, and so they would be *sādhana*, just like the thesis-statement."

[122]Cf. PVV 420, 14–15: *na hy anuddiṣṭe 'rthe sādhanaprastāvaḥ | tataḥ sādhanaprastāvanāhetutvena pakṣavacanasya sādhakatvam astīti cet |*.

discussed, and rejected, in such Naiyāyika texts as Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya*. In other words, if one maintained that all the necessary conditions for the reason to be stated must also be included as members, then one would be forced to agree to a ten-membered argument form, which would be unacceptable to both the Naiyāyika and the Buddhist.[123]

As for the second half of the *kārikā*, it is, according to Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, a reply to the objection that the way in which doubt and the like condition the statement of the reason is not the same as that of the thesis-statement. For, "doubt, the desire to know, etc. are [all] states of affairs (*don* = *artha*) by nature, and statements are not of that [same] nature [i.e., are not states of affairs]. Hence, the bringing forth [of the reason] is not similar."[124] To resolve this possible asymmetry between statements and states of affairs, Dharmakīrti proposes that the *statements* expressing theses contrary to what is to be proved[125] would also have to be included among the members of a *parārthānumāna* in that they too condition the occurence of the statement of the reason, just as does the statement of the thesis. In that case there would be no limit to the members, and hence the opponent's argument in k. 18 that the thesis-statement must be included because it conditions that of the reason remains invalid.[126]

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[123]PVV-n 420, n. 2. The five extra members, besides the usual set of five of a Naiyāyika *parārthānumāna* (see n. 98), are doubt (*saṃśaya*), the desire to know (*jijñāsā*), the possibility of a solution (*śakyaprāpti*), the utility or goal (*prayojana*) and the resolution of doubt (*saṃśayavyudāsa*). See *Nyāyabhāṣya ad Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.32, eds. P. ŚĀSTRĪ and H. ŚUKLA, p. 80. Note that Prajñākaragupta (PVBh 488, 17 *et sq.*) presents a different set of ten members. See TILLEMANS 1984a, n. 9.

[124]PVṬ 312b7–8: *the tshom daṅ śes par 'dod pa la sogs pa ni don gyi bdag ñid yin pa'i phyir daṅ | tshig ni de'i raṅ bźin ñid ma yin pa'i phyir 'jug pa mtshuṅs pa ma yin no |*. Note that Manorathanandin has a different understanding of the objection at stake here, arguing that "doubt and the desire to know originate from the opponent, while the thesis-statement originates from the proponent. So how could the proponent state a *sādhana* which is the combination of those?" PVV 420, 20–21: *nanu saṃśayajijñāse pratipādyapravartite pakṣavacanaṃ tu vādipravartitaṃ tat kathaṃ tatsamudāyasya vādinā nirdeśasaṃbhava ity āha |*.

[125]Cf. PVV 421, 2: *evaṃ tarhi vipakṣasya sādhyaviruddhasya dharmasyopagame* ... Hence our tentative interpretation of *vipakṣa* in this context as being a property which is contrary to what is to be proved.

[126]PVP 324b7–325a2: *ci ste de lta yin pa de'i tshe mi mthun pa'i phyogs khas len na yaṅ mi mthun pa'i phyogs khas len pa'i tshig la yaṅ | de mtshuṅs 'ga' źig gis sgra rtag pa yin no źes brjod pa na | gźan gyis sgra ni byas pa yin la | byas pa ñid kyi phyir mi rtag pa yin te | dper na bum pa lta bu'o źes smras pa de ltar | gtan tshigs kyi tshig 'jug pa yod pa'i phyir | mi mthun pa'i phyogs kyi tshig kyaṅ byas pa ñid kyi tshig de daṅ lhan cig sgrub par byed par 'gyur na | de ltar thug med 'gyur na de ltar yaṅ ma yin pa de'i phyir gtan tshigs kyi tshig*[a] *'jug pa'i rgyu ñid kyis dam bca' ba sgrub par byed pa ñid rigs pa ma yin no |* "Now, in that case, if one propounds a

(20) *antaraṅgaṃ tu sāmarthyaṃ triṣu rūpeṣu saṃsthitam |*
tatra smṛtisamādhānaṃ tadvacasy eva[127] *saṃsthitam ||*[128]

The intrinsic capability [to prove the thesis], however, is really in the three characteristics (*rūpa*). Only the statement of the [triply characterized reason (*trirūpaliṅga*)] can really kindle the memory of that [viz., of the *trirūpaliṅga*'s capacity to prove the *sādhya*].[129]

Kārikā 20 summarizes the previous argumentation that the thesis-statement cannot directly or indirectly be a *sādhana*. The reason-statement, by contrast, reminds one of the triply characterized reason (*trirūpaliṅga*), and is thus indirectly a *sādhana*.

(21) *akhyāpite hi viṣaye hetuvṛtter asaṃbhavāt |*
viṣayakhyāpanād eva siddhau cet tasya śaktatā[130] *||*[131]

[Objection:] If the aim (*viṣaya*) [of the reason] were not stated, then indeed the reason could not occur. Thus, as it does in fact make the aim known, the [thesis-statement] is [indirectly] capable of establishing [the *sādhya*].[132]

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contrary-thesis, then the statement propounding [that] contrary-thesis will also be similar to the [thesis-statement]: when one person says 'Sound is permanent,' then the other will say, 'Sound is produced, and because it is produced it is impermanent, just as, for example, a vase.' And in this way, if the statement of the contrary-thesis is also a *sādhana*, along with the statement of producthood, because it brings forth the reason-statement, then there would accordingly be no end. But this [can] not be so, and therefore, it is illogical [to prove] that the thesis is a *sādhana* in virtue of the *hetu* that it brings forth the statement of the reason." ([a] D. lacks *kyi tshig* [D. 273a4–6]).

[127] MIY.: *tadvacasyêva.*

[128] Cf. PVin 288a4–5: *de'i phyir naṅ gi yan lag gi don 'grub pa'i nus pa ni tshul gsum ñid la gnas pa yin la | de la dran pa 'jog par byed pa ni de'i tshig la gnas pa'i phyir | de ñid sgrub par byed pa yin no |* (D. 190a4–5).

[129] Cf. PVV 421, 11: *tatra trirūpaliṅge sādhyasādhanaśaktismṛteḥ samādhānam ...*

[130] PV-k(I): *viṣayakhyāpanād eva siddhā cet [iti (syāt) matam]*; PV-k(III): *viṣayakhyāpanād eva sāmarthyam iti cen matam.* We have followed MIY. in opting for PV-k(II)'s reading, although it seems to us that Sa paṇ's Tibetan (*yul bstan pa dag ñid las ni || nus pa [s]grub par 'dod ce na*), which Miyasaka cites (cf. Appendix C), does not decisively justify any one of the three readings. Evidence for PV-k(II)'s reading, however, can be found in PVP's Tibetan (325a8): *de'i phyir | yul dag bśad pa ñid las ni || de'i phyogs kyi tshig gi nus pa ñid | bsgrub par bya ba 'grub pa la yin no że na |* (D. 273b3). Stripping away Devendrabuddhi's commentarial additions, we see that *de'i = tasya, nus pa ñid = śaktatā* and *'grub pa la = siddhau.*

[131] Cf. PVin 288a5: *yul ma bstan na gtan tshigs 'jug pa mi srid pas yul ston pa ñid kyis nus pa yin no że na |* (D. 190a5).

[132] Cf. PVV 421, 18–19: *tasya pakṣavacanasya viṣayakhyāpanād eva sādhyasya siddhau pāramparyeṇa śaktateti cet |.*

(22) *uktam atra*[133] *vināpy asmāt kṛtakaḥ śabda īdṛśaḥ* |
sarve 'nityā iti prokte 'py arthāt tannāśadhīr[134] *bhavet* ||[135]

[Reply:] This has already been answered [i.e., it would again follow absurdly that doubt and the desire to know would also be *sādhana*s because they bring forth *sādhana*s].[136] Even without the [thesis-statement], still, if one says, 'Sound is a product; all which is like it is impermanent,' then one would understand by implication (*arthāt*) that this [sound] perishes.

Kārikā 21 constitutes essentially a restatement of the objection in k. 18, and Dharmakīrti's answer, as presented in the opening words of k. 22, refers us back to what he had said in k. 19. After this, Dharmakīrti introduces a new argument, also found in the NB and in the PVin (see n. 115, 135), to show the dispensability of a thesis-statement in a *parārthānumāna*. His basic reasoning in PV IV and elsewhere is that a statement of the general principle, or pervasion (*vyāpti*), such as "Everything produced is impermanent," coupled with a statement of the *pakṣadharmatva*, such as "Sound is a product," *implies* the thesis. All the probative force for the thesis, then, will be expressed by these two statements, with the result that a separate statement of the thesis, "Sound is impermanent," is not logically needed.

In the PV, NB and HB, Dharmakīrti uses the terms *arthāt* / *sāmarthyāt* to indicate the implication of the thesis. In PVin III (cf. n. 135), however, we find him using the term *arthāpattyā* (Tib. *don gyis go bas*). And indeed, we can understand the implication at stake in terms of "presumption" (*arthāpatti*)—the conclusion is "presumed" from the two statements in the *parārthānumāna* in that these two statements could not both be true unless the conclusion were also.[137]

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[133]PV-k(I), (III), MIY.: *vyāptipūrve*, which is supported by Sa paṇ's Tibetan, *khyab sṅon can la*. However, PVin (cf. n. 135) has *'di la bśad zin to* = *uktam atra*, which is also the reading commented upon in PVP.

[134]MIY.: *tan nāśadhīr*.

[135]Cf. PVin 288a6–7: *'di la bśad zin to* || *gźan yaṅ de med kyaṅ gaṅ cuṅ zad byas pa de thams cad ni mi rtag pa yin la* | *sgra yaṅ byas pa yin no źes brjod pas kyaṅ sgra mi rtag pa'o źes don gyis go ba ñid do*[a] | *de'i phyir 'di ni*[b] *gdon mi za bar bstan par bya ba ma yin no*[c] | ([a] P. *don gyi go bar ñid do*—[b] P. lacks *'di ni*—[c] D. *bstan par bya ba yin no* [D. 190a5–6]).

[136]PVV 421, 20: *uktam atra saṃśayajijñāsayor api sādhanapravartakatvāt sādhanatvaprasaṅga iti* |.

[137]On *arthāpatti*, see MIMAKI 1976, 42: "...[L]a présomption est la façon dont le fait 'B' est déduit à partir de l'expérience réelle du fait 'A' et du jugement que le fait 'A' n'est pas possible autrement (*anyathānupapatti*) qu'en présumant un fait tel que 'B'." Compare Dharmottara's gloss on NB's *sāmarthyāt* (NBṬ 175, 2–3): *yadi ca sādhyadharmas tatra sādhyadharmiṇi na bhavet*

1.4 Against the Naiyāyika position on the thesis-statement

1.4.1 A reinterpretation of the fallacy of incompleteness (*nyūnatā*)

(23) *anuktāv api pakṣasya siddher apratibandhataḥ* |
triṣv anyatamarūpasyaivānuktir[138] *nyūnatoditā* ||[139]

Even though the thesis is not stated, [this] is no obstacle to establishing [the *sādhya*]. Therefore, it is not stating just any one characteristic (*rūpa*) from among the three which is said to constitute incompleteness (*nyūnatā*).

In this and what follows until k. 27, Dharmakīrti argues specifically against aspects of the Nyāya position on the necessity to include thesis-statements in proofs. The discussion after k. 23 is not found in the PVin, which moves immediately to Dignāga's definition of the thesis (cf. PV IV, k. 28 *et seq.*). Dharmakīrti opens his refutation of the Naiyāyikas by invoking their notion of "incompleteness," a point of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*) which, following the *Nyāyasūtra* (NS), occurs when one or more of the five members in a proof are missing.[140] Dharmakīrti, in k. 23, is in effect virtually reproducing a line from Dignāga's PSV where the latter invokes the fault of incompleteness, but redefines it as meaning not stating any one of the three characteristics of the logical reason.[141] Dignāga's own position on the question of incompleteness exhibits an evolution in PSV, for in his earlier work, the *Nyāyamukha* (NM), he had argued in favour of a three-membered proof which would include a thesis-statement and which would be incomplete without it.[142]

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sādhanadharmo na bhavet | *sādhyaniyatatvāt tasya sādhanadharmasyeti sāmarthyam* || "If the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*) did not exist there in the subject to be proved, then the property which is the prover (*sādhanadharma*) [i.e., the reason] would not exist there [either], since this property which is the prover is necessarily restricted to that which is to be proved. We thus speak of 'implication' (*sāmarthya*)." Cf. also the uses of *arthāpatti* to explain how the *anvaya* and *vyatirekavyāpti* are equivalent. PV I, k. 28cd: *arthāpattyā dvitīye 'pi smṛtiḥ samupajāyate*. On rGyal tshab rje's understanding of *arthāt* in k. 22, see TILLEMANS 1984a, 93.

[138]MIY.: *anyatam arūpasyaivānuktir.*

[139]Cf. PVin 288a7: *des na phyogs ni ma brjod kyaṅ 'grub pa la gegs med pa'i phyir* | *gsum las tshul gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba źig ma smras na sgrub pa ma tshaṅ ba'i skyon du 'gyur ro źes bśad par rig par bya'o* | (D. 190a6–7).

[140]Cf. NS 5.2.12: *hīnam anyatamenāpy avayavena nyūnam.*

[141]PSVa 43a1, PSVb 124b4, translated in Part II above.

[142]For the NM on the members of a proof and incompleteness, see NM 1 and 1.1 in the edition of S. KATSURA 1977: 宗等多言說能立 "The thesis (*pakṣa*) and other terms are called *sādhana*"; 由此應知隨有所闕名能立過 "Thus it should be understood that lack [of any of these terms] is

1.4.2 Critique of the Naiyāyika definition of a thesis

PVV introduces k. 24 as follows: "Now, if one held that the thesis was a *sādhana*, then the [Nyāya] definition of the thesis, viz., 'a statement of a *sādhya* (*sādhyanirdeśa*) is a thesis,' would be overly extensive (*ativyāpin*). [For,] unestablished (*asiddha*) reasons and examples are both *sādhya* (i.e., 'to be established') and *sādhana* ('establishers'), and would, therefore, be thesis-objects. But for him who holds that a thesis is not a *sādhana*..."[143]

(24) *sādhyoktiṃ vā pratijñāṃ sa vadan doṣair na yujyate* |
sādhanādhikṛter eva hetvābhāsāprasaṅgataḥ ||

If he says that a statement of a *sādhya* constitutes a thesis, he will [still] commit no faults: it does not follow that fallacious reasons (*hetvābhāsa*) [will be theses], for [in the case of such reasons] one is only concerned with *sādhanas* [and not *sādhyas*].

Note that here and in what follows *pratijñā*, i.e., "thesis," is the Naiyāyika's own term, but is not significantly different from what Dharmakīrti had earlier on been calling the *pakṣavacana*, or "thesis-statement." The argument, in brief, is that if one accepts the Naiyāyika definition of the thesis, i.e., "a statement of a *sādhya*" (cf. *Nyāyasūtra*: *sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñā*), *and* one holds that a statement of a *sādhya*, or thesis, can also be a *sādhana*, then it will follow that unestablished reasons and examples (or probably more accurately, *statements* of unestablished reasons and examples[144]) will also become theses. Indeed, for the Naiyāyika, statements of unestablished reasons will fulfill the definition which he accepts: being unestablished, such statements present *sādhya*, i.e., "something to be established," and thus satisfy the definition *sādhyanirdeśa*. The Naiyāyika and Buddhist alike recognize that statements of reasons and examples are *sādhana*, but for the Naiyāyika their being *sādhana* does not preclude them from also being *sādhya*.

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called a fault of the *sādhana*" (Taishō XXXII, 1628, 1a 7 & 10; see KATSURA 1977, 109–111 for commentary).

[143] PVV 422, 9–11: *yadi ca pratijñā sādhanam iṣyate tadā sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñeti pratijñālakṣaṇam ativyāpi syāt* | *asiddhasya hetor dṛṣṭāntasya cāsiddhasya sādhyatvaṃ sādhanatvaṃ cāstīti pratijñārthaṃ syāt* | *yasya tu mate pratijñā na sādhanam* (|).

[144] Although Dharmakīrti and Manorathanandin speak of unestablished reasons and examples, there may be a confusion between use and mention, a not uncommon imprecision in older logics be they Indian or Aristotelian. What is probably at stake are not the reasons themselves, but rather the *statements* of unestablished reasons and examples. PSV speaks of statements of unestablished reasons and examples (see n. 145) as does PVṬ 313a6: *gtan tshigs daṅ dpe ma grub pa* brjod pa *yaṅ dam bca' bar 'gyur ro* |.

However, if one thinks, as does Dharmakīrti, that *sādhya* and *sādhana* must be completely different things, then what is clearly a statement of a *sādhana*, such as a statement of an unestablished reason, cannot be a statement of a *sādhya*, i.e., a thesis. The key logical step is that, for Dharmakīrti, contrary to the Naiyāyika, considering something as a *sādhya*, or thesis, in a specific debate context, implies that we do *not* also consider it to be a *sādhana* in that context. Once such a Buddhist principle is accepted, then it follows that if we *do* consider a statement of an unestablished reason to be a *sādhana*, as we should in debates, then it cannot also be considered to state a *sādhya*. The result is that, for Dharmakīrti, there is no risk that such statements of *sādhana* will become theses by satisfying the definition *sādhyanirdeśa*—they simply will not satisfy this definition. Note that the argument comments on PS III, k. 3 and recurs frequently in the long section of PV IV (k. 28 *et seq.*) discussing Dignāga's definition of the thesis.[145]

(25) *aviśeṣoktir apy ekajātīye saṃśayāvahā |*
anyathā sarvasādhyokteḥ pratijñātvaṃ prasajyate ||

A [general] statement with no specification also leads to doubt

[145]PS III, k. 3: *bsgrub bya bstan pa źes bya 'dir || grub pa med la don byas ñid || de lta na yaṅ dpe daṅ rtags || ma grub brjod pa thal bar 'gyur ||*. Cf. *Nyāyavārttika* 110, 14ff. cited in KITAGAWA 1973, 134. See JAMBUVIJAYA 1976 *Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakram* part 2, 614, which gives PSV *ad* k. 3 (Skt. of k. 3 itself is presented in bold): *Naiyāyikas tu* ***sādhyanirdeśa ity atra siddhyabhāve kṛtārthatā*** *| sādhyavacanaṃ hy atra siddhinivṛttau caritārthatvāt sādhyaviśeṣe nāvatiṣṭhate |* ***tathā cāsiddhadṛṣṭāntahetuvādaḥ prasajyate*** *|| yathā śabdo nityo 'sparśatvāt buddhivat | evaṃ cākṣuṣatvād anitya iti | idam api sādhyanirdeśāt pratijñā prasajyate |* "The Naiyāyikas, however, state *sādhyanirdeśa* [as the definition]. Here [i.e., in this definition] [*sādhya*] served the purpose of negating establishment (*siddhi*). Indeed, here [in this definition] the word *sādhya* served the purpose of negating establishment, and therefore, it does not pertain to any specific type of thing to be established (*sādhyaviśeṣa*). If that is so, then it would follow absurdly that a statement of an unestablished example or reason [would also have to a thesis]. For example, when it is said that sound is permanent because it is a something intangible, like cognition, or similarly that [sound] is impermanent because it is something visual, it would follow absurdly that these [statements of reasons and examples] would also be the thesis, for they are statements of things to be established (*sādhyanirdeśa*)." I am especially indebted to S. Katsura's clarifications here, although the wording of the translation is my own. Cf. Japanese translation in KITAGAWA 1973, 134. Cf. also *Nyāyavārttika* 110, 14ff. (KITAGAWA 1973, n. 184): *nanu sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñety ukte sādhyayor hetudṛṣṭāntayor api prasaṅgo yathā nityaḥ*[a] *śabdas cākṣuṣatvāt nityaḥ śabdo 'sparśatvād buddhivac ceti* | ([a] Read *'nityaḥ*). For the Skt. fragment of k. 3cd (*tathā cāsiddhadṛṣṭāntahetuvādaḥ prasajyate*), a translation and explanatory notes, see KATSURA 1975, 68–69. Finally, note that in PS III, k. 5 Dignāga applies the same logic to refute the similar definition of the thesis in the *Vādavidhi* of Vasubandhu, viz., *sādhyābhidhānaṃ pratijñā*.

concerning things of the same kind. Otherwise [i.e., if one said, without any specification, that any statement of a *sādhya* was a thesis],[146] it would follow absurdly that every time one said that something was 'to be established,' this would be a thesis.

In k. 28 we shall see that Dharmakīrti and Dignāga do not in fact accept *sādhyanirdeśa* as a definition of the thesis, and that, moreover, they seek to exclude the confusion between unestablished reasons, etc. and *sādhya* by using the particle *eva* to specify that a thesis is *only* a *sādhya*, and not a *sādhana*. However, if one says *sādhyanirdeśa* without making any differences whatsoever, such as between *sādhana* and non-*sādhana*,[147] then doubt as to whether statements of unestablished reasons, etc. are theses is unavoidable. To go further: if one makes no differentiation between senses at all and takes *sādhya* in a completely uncritical fashion as whatever is "something to be established," or "something to be made," then each time one said that a certain thing was to be established, this statement would then become a thesis. As Devendrabuddhi explains: "When one says, 'the potter makes a vase,' one says that the vase is what is to be established [i.e., is to be made]. So, in this fashion, it would follow absurdly that all statements of things to be established would become theses."[148]

(26) *siddhokteḥ sādhanatvāc cet*[149] *parasyāpi na duṣyati*[150] |
idānīṃ sādhyanirdeśaḥ sādhanāvayavaḥ katham ||

Suppose it is claimed that the other [i.e., the Naiyāyika, who holds that the thesis is a *sādhana*,] does not commit the fault either [that statements of unestablished reasons, etc. become theses], because [for him] it is [only] statements of something established (*siddhokti*) which are *sādhana*.[151] [Reply:] Then, in that case,

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[146]Cf. PVP 326a5–6: *gźan du gal te bye brag med par bsgrub par bya ba brjod pa dam bca' ba yin no źes | dam bca' ba'i tshig ñid bstan pas de dag la yaṅ dogs par*[a] *byed pa de'i tshe ...* ([a] D. *dgos par* [D. 274a5]). PV IV, k. 25 is interpreting the phrase *sādhyaviśeṣe nāvatiṣṭate* in PSV, see n. 145.

[147]Cf. PVV-n 422, n. 4: *sādhanāsādhanavibhāgaṃ vinoktiḥ* |.

[148]PVP 326a6–7: *rdza*[a] *mkhan bum pa byed do źes bya ba'i bum pa bsgrub par bya ba yin par brjod pa de ltar | bsgrub bya thams cad ni bstan pa dam bca' ñid du thal bar 'gyur* | ([a] P. *rja* [D. 274a5–6]).

[149]PV-k(II): *sādhanatvāc ca*. Cf. Tib. *gal te*.

[150]MIY.: *na duṣyate*.

[151]Manorathanandin seems to read *siddhokteḥ* as an ablative, and understands the first *pāda* of the *kārikā* as presenting two reasons joined by the conjunction *ca*. We, however, prefer to read *siddhokteḥ* as a genitive, which seems supported by PVP and Sa paṇ's Tibetan.

> how could a statement of something which is to be established (*sādhyanirdeśa*) [and which is, hence, unestablished,] be a member of a proof (*sādhanāvayava*)?

As Devendrabuddhi explains it, the objector seeks to avoid the unwelcome consequence that statements of unestablished reasons become theses by arguing that "theses are *sādhana*, but statements of fallacious reasons are not, for they express unestablished states of affairs. It is statements of established states of affairs which are *sādhana*."[152] Now, it is true that from the Naiyāyika's premises, viz., (a) that all *sādhana* must be established and (b) that theses are *sādhana*, one can logically deduce that anything which is unestablished (such as fallacious reasons and examples) cannot be a thesis. But the problem then arises that a thesis, which states a *sādhya* and is hence not established, could not be a *sādhana* either.[153] So the very same premise (a) that the Naiyāyika wants to use to rule out that statements of unestablished reasons are *sādhana* would also lead to the unwanted consequence that the thesis is also not a *sādhana*, and hence should not figure as a member in a proof, i.e., as a member in a *parārthānumāna*. (Recall that the Naiyāyika position is that theses, indeed all the members of a proof, *are sādhana*.)

1.4.3 Critique of other Buddhists' attempts at refuting the Naiyāyikas

(27) *sābhāsoktyādy upakṣepaparihārau viḍambanā*[154] |
asambaddhā tathā hy eṣa na nyāyya[155] *iti sūcitam* ||

> The presentation and reply, 'statement which has fallacies' and so forth, constitute an irrelevant farce. Indeed, it has [already] been explained that this [type of argumentation] is incoherent.

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[152]PVP 326b2–3: *de ltar na dam bca' ba sgrub par byed pa yin gyi gtan tshigs ltar snaṅ ba brjod pa ni ma*[a] *yin te | ma grub pa'i don brjod pa'i phyir ro || grub pa'i don brjod pa yaṅ sgrub pa'i byed pa yin no* | ([a] P. *ma* missing [D. 274b1]).

[153]Cf. PVV 423,7–8: *na hi pratijñārthaḥ siddhaḥ | tadartham eva sādhanopanyāsāt | asiddhaś ca na sādhanaṃ hetvābhāsavat* || "Indeed, the state of affairs [described by] the thesis is not established, as it is for just that purpose that a *sādhana* is presented. But what is unestablished is not a *sādhana*, as in the case of a fallacious reason."

[154]PV-k(III), MIY.: °*upekṣapa*°. PV-k(I–III) and MIY. read *sābhāsoktyādyupakṣepaparihāraviḍambanā* as one long compound. Our amendment, however, is based on PVV *ad* k. 27 (cf. n. 163), where Manorathanandin glosses *sābhāsoktyādī* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound qualifying *upakṣepaparihārau*. This rendition also corresponds to PV Tib., *ltar snaṅ bcas sogs bkod pa daṅ* || *lan*[a] *ni 'brel med bźad gad de* ([a] Read *lan* instead of *gźan* [cf. Appendix C]). The Tibetan clearly indicates that the dual, *upakṣepaparihārau*, is the subject of the predicate *viḍambanā asaṃbaddhā*.

[155]PV-k(I), (III), MIY.: *nyāya*.

Manorthanandin gives the following explanation of k. 27 in the PVV: "Now our co-religionists [viz., the author of the *Nyāyamukhaṭīkā* and others][156] state the following opposing position and reply:

"Suppose that a [Naiyāyika] says that the thesis-statement is a *sādhana*, because it is something which can have fallacies (*sābhāsārthatva*).[157] This is not correct, as [the reason] is inconclusive (*anekānta*) in virtue of [the counterexample] 'perception' (*pratyakṣa*). Even though perception can have fallacies,[158] it is not a *sādhana* for any *pramāṇa* whatsoever. Now if [the Naiyāyika] retorts that [the thesis-statement] is [nonetheless] a *sādhana*, because it is something which can have fallacies but is *verbal in nature* (*vacanātmatva*), this is [also] not correct: [the reason] will be inconclusive in virtue of [the counterexample] 'refutations' (*dūṣaṇa*). A refutation, although it is something verbal and can have fallacies, is not a *sādhana*. But these, that is to say, both the presentation and the reply, 'statement which can have fallacies' and so forth, are a farce in their incoherence. [Here, *sābhāsoktyādī* is explained as being a *bahuvrīhi* compound qualifying *upakṣepaparihārau*.] Thus [Dharmakīrti] says, 'irrelevant.' The point is that the opposing position is irrelevant in that 'can have fallacies' is not a valid reason, for there is no *pramāṇa* which invalidates it when [the *sādhya*] is negated

[156]PVV-n 423, n. 4: *nyāyamukhaṭīkākārādeḥ*. The "author of the *Nyāyamukhaṭīkā*, and others" (*nyāyamukhaṭīkākārādi*) are alluded to by Dharmakīrti and explicitly mentioned by Vibhūticandra and Śākyabuddhi. Watanabe has dealt with this subject in his 1976 article, and attempts to reconstruct the name of the author of this *Ṭīkā* as "Bāhuleya" on the basis of the name's Tibetan translation, "Maṅ po len pa'i bu," found in Śākyabuddhi's PVṬ 313b2–3: *maṅ po len pa'i bu la sogs pa rigs pa'i sgo'i ṭī kā byed pa dag gis....* See WATANABE 1976, n. 28 and TILLEMANS 1991b and 1994, 297f. on this mysterious commentator. While virtually nothing is known about this supposed individual, Bāhuleya, or about his commentary on the *Nyāyamukha*, Vibhūticandra's notes to the PVV do refer twice to the Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra, the first time in connection with PV IV, k. 27, and the second time in connection with k. 122. In each case this *Nyāyamukhaṭīkā* is represented as espousing an opposing position against which Dharmakīrti directs his argumentation.

[157]PVṬ 313b3–4 gives a more elaborate presentation of the Naiyāyika's argument: *...phyogs kyi*[a] *tshig sgrub par byed pa yin te | ltar snaṅ daṅ bcas pa brjod pa sgrub par byed pa'i dus su brjod pa'i phyir gtan tshigs daṅ dpe'i tshig bźin no* | ([a] P. *kyis*) "The thesis-statement is a *sādhana*, because it is a statement which can have fallacies and which is stated at the time [one presents] a proof, just like the statements of the reason and example."

[158]See PS I (*Pratyakṣa*), k. 7cd–8ab for *pratyakṣābhāsa*: *bhrāntisaṃvṛtisajjñānam anumānānumānikam || smārtābhilāṣikaṃ ceti pratyakṣābhaṃ sataimiram* ||, trans. HATTORI 1968, 28: "Erroneous cognition, cognition of empirical reality, inference, its result, recollection, and desire are not true perceptions and are accompanied by obscurity (*sataimira*)." On Dharmakīrti's interpretation of the verse, according to which *sataimira* is to be taken as showing a nonconceptual fallacious perception, cf. PV III, k. 288–300, TOSAKI 1979, 382 *et seq.*, and HATTORI 1968, n. I.53.

(*viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa*).[159] Therefore, it is inappropriate to render [the reason] inconclusive by [the counterexample] 'perception' when one has granted this [point].

"And, when one does not reject the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) which the adversary states, i.e., [that the reason concerns only what is] 'verbal in nature,' but then renders [the reason] inconclusive by [the counterexample] 'fallacious refutations,' [this] is also incoherent. For, the only qualifier of a reason which is justified is one which excludes the reason from the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*). Now, between 'being verbal' and 'not being a *sādhana*,' there is absolutely no contradiction, which would make the qualifier meaningful in that 'not being a *sādhana*' would imply the negation of 'being verbal.'

"Indeed, it had been explained earlier that this [type of argumentation]—where one presents a qualifier of the reason which does not exclude it from the dissimilar instances—is incoherent.[160] [The argument in PV I and the PVSV was as follows:] To prove that the *Veda*s are permanent, [a Mīmāṃsaka] said that [every recitation] has [another] recitation as antecedent (*adhyayanapūrvaka*). Then, to counter a charge of inconclusiveness with regard to the recitation of the *Mahābhārata*, [a text which is recited now, but which is supposed to have been composed by the *ṛṣi*, Vyāsa, and hence does not have an infinite series of anterior recitations,][161] the Mīmāṃsaka then profers the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) 'being a recitation of the *Veda*s' (*vedādhyayanatva*). But it is possible that [a recitation of the *Veda*s] could have as antecedent the creative act of an author, just as is the case for the recitation of the *Mahābhārata*. There is no contradiction whatsoever here. Therefore, it had been stated earlier on [in the PVSV][162] that a qualifier which

[159]*viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* = *sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇa*. Note, however, that in this context, *sādhya* means the *sādhyadharma*, the property to be proved, and not the proposition to be proved. The point is that this *pramāṇa* assures that the reason is refuted / invalidated when the property to be proved is negated, and thus the *bādhakapramāṇa* guarantees that if non-*sādhyadharma* then non-*hetu*, or, in other terms, such a *pramāṇa* justifies the *vyatirekavyāpti*. (In the case at hand, this would mean that when *X* is not a *sādhana*, *X* is not something which can have fallacies. But, as Manorathanandin shows, such a *pramāṇa* is not to be found.) Cf. Śāntarakṣita's VNṬ (ed. D. SHĀSTRĪ) 8, 32–33: *bādhakaṃ pramāṇam | yena sādhyaviparyaye vartamāno hetur bādhyate, tasya kathanaṃ yat tad vyāptisādhanam ity arthaḥ* |. On *bādhakapramāṇa* see also STEINKELLNER 1991b, 314ff. and MUCH 1991, n. 33.

[160]See PV I, k. 240–243 and PVSV, especially *ad* k. 243 (cf. n. 162).

[161]See n. 162. Karṇakagomin's PVSV-Ṭīkā 447, 30 speaks of *vyāsādi*.

[162]Cf. PVSV *ad* k. 243 (ed. GNOLI, 124, 27–31): *tasmād adhyayanam adhyayanāntarapūrvakam adhyayanād iti bhāratādhyayane 'pi bhāvād vyabhicāri | nanu vedena viśeṣaṇād adoṣaḥ | kaḥ punar atiśayo vedādhyayanasya yad anyathādhyetuṃ na śakyate | na hi viśeṣaṇam aviruddhaṃ vipakṣeṇāsmād dhetuṃ vyāvartayati | aviruddhayor ekatra saṃbhavāt* | "Thus, when

does not exclude [the reason] from the dissimilar instances is incoherent."[163]

A certain amount of explanation is necessary for the understanding of k. 27 and PVV, as they refer back to a rather involved argument in PV I and PVSV. In k. 27, Dharmakīrti is basically stressing the irrelevance and ineffectuality of the *Nyāyamukhaṭīkā*'s refutation of a Naiyāyika argument for including the thesis-statement in a proof. The Naiyāyika had argued that a thesis-statement was a *sādhana*, just like the reason, etc., because it could be fallacious. To this the "author of the *Nyāyamukhaṭīkā*" (*nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra*) (see n. 156) systematically offered numerous counterexamples, all of which the Naiyāyika parried by adding further and further qualifying provisos to the reason, each proviso serving as an *ad hoc* device to exclude the proferred counterexample.[164]

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one says that a recitation must be preceded by another recitation because it is a recitation, then because [the reason] also applies to recitations of the *Mahābhārata*, it is deviant (*vyabhicārin*). [Objection:] But surely [the reason, viz., being a recitation] is qualified by [being a recitation of] the *Veda*s, and thus there is no fault. [Reply:] But what is special about a recitation of the *Veda*s so that otherwise one could not recite them? Indeed, a qualifier which is not contradictory with the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*) does not exclude the reason from those [dissimilar instances], for two non-contradictory [properties, e.g., being a *Veda* and not having another preceding recitation[a]] could apply to one and the same thing [viz., the statements of the *Veda*s]." ([a] PVSV-Ṭīkā 454, 19–20: *aviruddhayor vedatvānadhyayanāntarapūrvakatvayor ekatra vedavākye saṃbhavāt*).

[163]PVV 423, 9–424, 11: *yā ca svayūthyānāṃ pūrvapakṣaparihāroktiḥ pakṣavacanaṃ sādhanaṃ sābhās(ārtha)tvād iti cet (|) na pratyakṣeṇānekāntāt | pratyakṣaṃ sābhāsam api na kasyacit pramāṇasya sādhanam | vacanātmatve sati sābhāsatvāt sādhanatvam iti cet | na dūṣaṇenānekāntāt | dūṣaṇaṃ sābhāsavacanātmatve 'pi na sādhanam iti sāpi sābhāsoktir ādir yasya tau sābhāsoktyādī upakṣepaparihārau | tāv eva viḍambanāyuktatayā | ata evāhā asambaddhā | tathā hi sābhāsatvasya viparyaye bādhakapramāṇābhāvād*[a] *evāhetutvād asambandhaḥ*[b] *pūrvapakṣaḥ | tatas tam anumatya pratyakṣeṇānekāntatāpādanam aśobhanam | punar vacanātmatvaṃ viśeṣaṇaṃ paroktam apratikṣipya dūṣaṇābhāsenānekāntatāpādanaṃ cāyuktam | tad eva hi hetor viśeṣaṇam upayuktaṃ yad vipakṣād dhetuṃ vyāvarttayati | na ca vacanātmatvāsādhanatvayoḥ kaścid virodho*[c] *yenāsādhanād vacanātmatvanivṛtter viśeṣaṇasāphalyaṃ syāt | tathā hy eṣa vipakṣād avyāvarttakahetuviśeṣaṇopanyāso na nyāyya iti varṇitaṃ*[d] *prāk | vedanityatāsiddhyartham adhyayanapūrvakam ity ukte bhāratādhyayanenānekāntatām āpāditāṃ pratiṣeddhuṃ vedādhyayanatve satīti viśeṣaṇaṃ mīmāṃsakenopanyastaṃ tad api karaṇa(kṛti)pūrvakaṃ bhāratādhyayanavat syān na kaścid virodhaḥ | tato vipakṣād avyāvarttakaṃ viśeṣaṇam ayuktam ity uktam prāk ||* ([a] RS as well as DS read *bādhakapramāṇabhāvād*, but cf. WATANABE 1976, n. 19, PVṬ 314a1; cf. also PVP 327a3 [which PVV mirrors]: *ltar snaṅ ba daṅ bcas pa brjod pa la sogs pa la bzlog na gnod pa can gyi tshad ma med pas khyab pa med pa'i phyir gtan tshigs ñid ma yin pas na...*—[b] DS: °*ahetutvasaṃbandhaḥ*—[c] DS: *virodhaḥ*—[d] Following DS, *varṇitam* is also to be read in PV-k[II]).

[164]Śākyabuddhi suggests that the Naiyāyika's next move might have been to change the reason to *adūṣaṇatve sati sābhāsoktiḥ* (a statement which can have fallacies but which is not a refutation) and so on and so forth. He also suggests that following such a strategy one

Now, in PV I, k. 243 and PVSV (see n. 162), Dharmakīrti had been faced with a similar situation when arguing against the Mīmāṃsakas, who maintained that the *Vedas* were permanent because they were not made by man (*apauruṣeyatva*). To establish this reason, the Mīmāṃsaka had argued that the *Vedas* could not be manmade as every recitation had to have one which was anterior to it, and so on *ad infinitum*. The Mīmāṃsaka's point, as found in the *Ślokavārttika* (SV) as well as the PVSV, was that the *Vedas* were too difficult to be composed by man; instead they could only be learned from a master, who of course had to learn them from his master, and so on and so forth.[165] Dharmakīrti then replied that the simple reason "being a recitation" could not establish that there was an anterior recitation, for the *Mahābhārata* was recited, but did not have an infinite series of anterior recitations. The Mīmāṃsaka then insisted that it was "being a recitation *of the Vedas*" which was the real reason and not just simply "being a recitation." In such an *ad hoc* way, of course, the Mīmāṃsaka could avoid the counterexample "recitation of *Mahābhārata*." But, argued Dharmakīrti, the opponent's qualifier of the reason was faulty in that it in no way definitively guaranteed that the reason implied the property to be proved: one could not parry the counterexample, *Mahābhārata*, by just quibbling that the recitation at stake must be *of the Vedas*. That restriction on the reason, to be legitimate, should have ensured the implication of the property "having an anterior recitation," but in fact there is nothing at all contradictory in some or another recitation of the *Veda not* having an anterior recitation.

It is this same logic, then, which Dharmakīrti invokes to break out of the tit-for-tat style of argumentation in which the author of the *Nyāyamukhaṭīkā* is mired. If the Naiyāyika further and further qualifies the reason so as to avoid the various individual counterexamples which are proffered, then what is necessary is not that we continue to give further counterexamples to each new qualification, but rather that we point out that these qualifiers, to be legitimate, must *definitively* exclude the reason from all the dissimilar instances.

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could just as easily end up proving the contrary of what the Naiyāyika wishes. See PVV-n 423, n. 10: *atra yadi paraḥ pradūṣayati adūṣaṇatve sati sābhāsoktir hetus tadā naivānekānta evaṃ yatra yatra nyāyamukhaṭīkākṛtā vyabhicārā ucyate tatra tatra pareṇa viśeṣaṇam ucyata iti paraṃparā | viruddhāvyabhicāryupakṣepe ca pakṣavacanaṃ na sādhanam asiddhokter asiddhadṛṣṭāntavacanavat | ity ukta eva bādhitaḥ syāt.* Vibhūticandra's *adūṣaṇatve sati* ... °*vacanavat* = PVṬ 314a4–6. For a more detailed discussion of this argument, see TILLEMANS 1991b.

[165]Cf. SV (*Vākyādhikaraṇa*), k. 366: *vedasyādhyayanaṃ sarvaṃ gurvadhyayanapūrvakam | vedādhyayanavācyatvād adhunādhyayanaṃ yathā ||*. Note that this same *kārikā* and others are cited in PVSV-Ṭīkā *ad* PV I, k. 246 (= MIY. k. 243).

Chapter 2

The first half of the definition of the thesis: PV IV, k. 28–90 *ad* PS III, k. 2ab

2.1 The purpose of the definition and the four characteristics of the thesis

From PV IV, k. 28 until k. 163, Dharmakīrti will discuss the second verse in PS III. The Sanskrit of this verse can be restored on the basis of texts such as the *Nyāyabindu*, the Tibetan of PS and Dharmakīrti's word by word commentary in PV IV:

> *svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ* |
> *pratyakṣārthānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharmiṇi* ||[166]
>
> [A valid thesis] is one which is intended (*iṣṭa*) by [the proponent] himself (*svayam*) as something to be stated (*nirdeśya*) in its proper form alone (*svarūpeṇaiva*) [i.e., as a *sādhya*]; [and] with regard to [the proponent's] own subject (*svadharmin*), it is not opposed (*anirākṛta*) by perceptible objects (*pratyakṣārtha*), by inference (*anumāna*), by authorities (*āpta*) or by what is commonly recognized (*prasiddha*).

Manorathanandin introduces PV IV, k. 28 and 29 in the PVV as follows: "[Objection:] But if the thesis-statement is not a means of proof (*sādhana*) and has as

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[166]PS Tib.: *raṅ gi ṅo bo kho nar bstan* || *bdag 'dod raṅ gi chos can la* || *mṅon sum don daṅ rjes dpag daṅ* || *yid ches grags pas ma bsal ba'o* ||. Skt. of *svarūpeṇaiva ... 'nirākṛtaḥ* is found in NB III, 38. The restoration of PS III, k. 2 follows FRAUWALLNER 1957a, 60; see also VAN BIJLERT 1989, 72.

content something which is to be understood by implication, then what was the point when the Master [Dignāga] formulated the [defining] characteristic of the thesis (*pakṣalakṣaṇa*)? [Dharmakīrti] replies:"[167]

(28) *gamyārthatve 'pi sādhyokter asaṃmohāya lakṣaṇam* |
tac caturlakṣaṇaṃ rūpanipāteṣṭasvayaṃpadaiḥ[168] ||
(29) *asiddhāsādhanārthoktavādyabhyupagatagrahaḥ*[169] |
anukto 'pīcchayā vyāptaḥ sādhya ātmārthavan mataḥ ||[170]

Although the statement of what is to be proved (*sādhya* = *pakṣa*) is something which can be understood [by implication], the [defining] characteristic [of the thesis] was [stated] to dispel confusion. This [*sādhya*] has four characteristics: By means of the words 'proper form' (*rūpa*), 'alone' (*nipāta* 'particle' = *eva*), 'intended' (*iṣṭa*) and 'himself' (*svayam*), one understands that [the thesis] is unestablished [for the opponent], is not a *sādhana*, is stated according to the [real] sense and is what is accepted by the proponent (*vādin*). Even though not [explicitly] stated, what is pervaded by the [proponent's] intention is held to be the *sādhya*, as in [the Sāṃkhya's argument that the eyes, etc. are] for the benefit of the Self (*ātman*).

In keeping with what we have seen earlier, Dharmakīrti maintains that the definition of the thesis was given in PS III to dispel confusion about what theses are, and not because the thesis is itself a *sādhana* and hence an indispensable

[167]PVV 424, 13–14: *nanu yadi pakṣavacanam asādhanaṃ sāmarthyagamyābhidheyaṃ ca tadācāryeṇa pakṣalakṣaṇaṃ kṛtaṃ kim artham ity āha.*

[168]Ego *rūpanipāteṣṭasvayaṃpadaiḥ*: PV-k(I) *rūpaṃ nipāteṣu svayaṃ padaiḥ*; PV-k(II), (III), MIY. *rūpanipāteṣu svayaṃ padaiḥ.* See FRAUWALLNER 1957a, 59: "However, the correct reading is *rūpanipāteṣṭasvayaṃpadaiḥ.*" Clearly, what is at stake is not a locative plural °*eṣu*, but the word *iṣṭa* in Dignāga's definition, and °*padaiḥ* must be one long compound.

[169]PV-k(I) °*oktaṃ vādyabhyupagamagrahaḥ*; PV-k(III), MIY. °*abhyupagamagrahaḥ*. PV Tib. has *khas blaṅs pa*, which is in keeping with PV-k(II)'s reading *abhyupagata*; *abhyupagama* would most likely have been translated by *khas len pa*.

[170]Cf. PVin 288a8–b2: *'o na sgrub par byed pa de bstan pa med na med pa ma yin pa'i phyir*[a] *phyogs kyi mtshan ñid brjod par mi bya'o że na | brjod par bya ba yin*[b] *te | bsgrub par bya ba daṅ bsgrub par bya ba ma yin pa la phyin ci log tu log par rtogs pa mthoṅ ba'i phyir | de bzlog pa'i don du yin no || rjes su dpag par bya ba de yaṅ | ṅo bo kho nar bstan par bya | raṅ ñid 'dod daṅ ma bsal ba'o || 'dir raṅ gi ṅo bo daṅ | tshig phrad daṅ | 'dod pa daṅ | raṅ ñid kyi tshig bżis | ma grub sgrub byed min don brjod || rgol bas khas blaṅs pa bzuṅ*[c] *ṅo || żes rig*[d] *par bya'o ||* ([a] P. *bstan pa med pa ma yin pa'i phyir*—[b] P. *ma yin*—[c] P. *gzuṅ*—[d] P. *rigs* [D. 190a7–b2]). PV IV, k. 29ab = PVin III, k. 6cd.

member of a *parārthānumāna*. Here, Dharmakīrti harkens back to k. 22, where it had been argued that the thesis is, in any case, implied by the two members of a *parārthānumāna* and need not be explicitly stated.[171] Now Dharmakīrti considers the four characteristics of the thesis corresponding to Dignāga's words *svarūpeṇaiva ... svayam iṣṭo* in PS III, k. 2ab:

(a) The word *svarūpa / svarūpeṇa* (in its proper form) ensures that the thesis is indeed something which needs to be proved, i.e., a *sādhya*, and is not already established for the opponent, as, for example, the obviously true proposition that sound is audible.[172]

(b) The particle *eva* (only or alone) eliminates the possibility that any *sādhana* in an inference-for-others, such as unestablished reasons and examples, would also be counted as the thesis, for the thesis is *only a sādhya*. The point, which turns on Dignāga's refutation of the *Nyāyasūtra*'s definition of the thesis, was discussed earlier in Dharmakīrti's k. 24–26.

(c) The word *iṣṭa* (intended) was destined to guarantee *arthokta*, that the thesis is indeed the intended proposition, stated as the proponent meant it, and not some potentially seductive proposition which might seem to fit the words but is not what the proponent actually meant.

(d) *svayam* (himself) shows that the thesis is *vādyabhyupagata*, what the proponent himself accepts and wishes to prove, rather than the various related or unrelated statements which might be found in the treatises of the proponent's school.[173] (The specification *anirākṛta* and the four types of refutation—viz., *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *āpta* and *prasiddha*—will be treated later in k. 91–135; *svadharmin* is discussed in k. 136–148.)

Dharmakīrti seems to have innovated somewhat upon Dignāga's own explanations in the PS by introducing four different functions for *svarūpeṇa*, *eva*, *svayaṁ* and *iṣṭa*; Dignāga himself, in his PSV on k. 2, spoke of only two. In PSV, *svarūpeṇaiva* served to eliminate unestablished reasons and examples from being theses, and *svayam iṣṭa* eliminated theses which were just positions of a treatise, but not those of the proponent.[174] While PSV took *svayam iṣṭa* together,[175] Dhar-

[171] See our remarks to k. 22 and Introductory Remarks pp. xv–xvi.

[172] See PVin 288b2: *des na grub pa dper na sgra ni mñan par bya'o źes bya ba lta bu daṅ* | (D. 190b2–3).

[173] Cf. NB III, 39–43.

[174] See ONO 1986, which discusses Dharmakīrti's development of Dignāga's definition of the thesis.

[175] PSVb 125a1, KITAGAWA 471: *bdag ñid 'dod pa źes bya ba ni 'dis ni bstan bcos la mi bltos pa'i khas blaṅs pa bstan pa yin no* | "This [phrase], 'intended by [the proponent]

makīrti made a split between *svayam* and *iṣṭa*, and assigned *vādyabhyupagata* as the point of the former and *arthokta* as that of the latter. As we shall see, such a separate treatment of the two provisos enabled Dharmakīrti to use *iṣṭa* to refute the sophistical arguments given by the Sāṃkhyas and Cārvākas (see k. 34 *et sq.* below), while using *svayam* to expand upon Dignāga's idea that logical theses are independent of what is stated in treatises.

The phrase *ātmārthavat* ("as in ... for the benefit of the Self") in PV IV, k. 29cd alludes to the Sāṃkhya's equivocal proof for the existence of the Self (*ātman*). The Sāṃkhya argues that the eyes and other sense organs are for the "benefit of another" (*parārtha*): "The eyes and other [faculties] are for the benefit of another, because they are composite, like accessories such as a bed or seat."[176] However, what the Sāṃkhya actually intends by *parārtha* in this case, but does not say, is that derivatives of Primordial Matter (*prakṛti*) are for the use of the *ātman*, i.e., the Spirit (*puruṣa*),[177] and it is this intended proposition which is his actual thesis. Dharmakīrti will consider this argument again in k. 31–33.

2.2 *iṣṭa* (intended): some general considerations

2.2.1 Does the word *iṣṭa* make the word *svayam* (himself) redundant?

PVV introduces k. 30 as follows: "[Objection:] But since all [propositions] which are unintended (*aniṣṭa*) are eliminated by the word *iṣṭa*, then it is established that [propositions] accepted in treatises, but unintended by the proponent, are not the *sādhya* either. Thus the word *svayam* (himself) is ineffectual. [Dharmakīrti] replies that words have the effect of excluding [their contraries], and therefore, on account of the word *iṣṭa*,"[178]

himself' (*svayam iṣṭa*), shows a position (*abhyupagama*) which does not rely upon treatises (*śāstrānapekṣa*)." Cf. the fragment in PVBh 495, 2, KITAGAWA 1973, 129, n. 166: *svayam iti śāstrānapekṣam abhyupagamaṃ darśayati*; FRAUWALLNER1933, 304: *svayaṃśabdena śāstrānapekṣam abhyupagamaṃ darśayati.*

[176] *parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṃghātatvāc chayanāsanādyaṅgavad.* Skt. in NB III, 87 and PVV *ad* k. 29. For *aṅga* in this context, see NBṬ *ad* 87: *tad evāṅgaṃ puruṣopabhogāṅgatvāt* | "The [bed, etc.] are *aṅga* in that they are factors for human enjoyment."

[177] See PVV 425, 6–8: *yathātmāsti na veti vivāde tatsādhanārthaṃ sāṃkhyena parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṃghātatvāc chayanāsanādyaṅgavat* | *ity uktasya sādhanasyātmārthatvam anuktam api sādhyam icchāviṣayatvāt* ||. Note that "composite things being for the benefit of another" (*saṃghātaparārthatva*) is one of the five reasons used by the Sāṃkhyas to establish the existence of the Spirit (*puruṣa*); see *Sāṃkhyakārikā*s k. 17.

[178] PVV 425, 9–11: *nanv iṣṭaśabdenāniṣṭasya sarvasya nirāsāt* | *śāstropagatasyāpi vādyaniṣṭasyāsādhyatvaṃ siddham* | *tan niṣphalaṃ svayaṃpadam ity āha* | *vyavacchedaphalatvāc chabdānām iṣṭaśabdāt...*

(30) *sarvānyeṣṭanivṛttāv apy āśaṅkāsthānavāraṇam* |
vṛttau svayaṃśruteḥ[179] *prāha kṛtā caiṣā tadarthikā* ||

Although all which is intended by anyone other [than the proponent] is excluded, nonetheless, in the [*Pramāṇasamuccaya*]*vṛtti*, [Dignāga] explained the elimination of the persistence of doubt [as the need] for the word *svayam*.[180] And this [word *svayam*] was devised [by him] for that purpose [i.e., for refuting wrong conceptions].[181]

Dharmakīrti's k. 30 is a reply to an objection broadly similar to Uddyotakara's attack on the explanation of *svayam* in Dignāga's *Vādavidhānaṭīkā* (VVṬ). Uddyotakara argued, in the *Nyāyavārttika* (NV), that it was absurd to say "himself" when the rest of the sentence made this redundant.[182] Dharmakīrti replies that strictly speaking *iṣṭa* (intended) does also ensure that it is the proponent himself; *svayam* is thus not needed for the logical equivalence between the definiens and definiendum, but rather serves to eliminate a seductive misunderstanding, namely, that the school's tenets as found in treatises are also being proved. This understanding of *svayam* will be taken up again in k. 42 *et seq.*, and will form a key element in Dharmakīrti's views on inference as being independent of scripture.

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[179] PV-k(II) *svayaṃśrutenāha*; PV-k(III), MIY. *svayaṃ śruteḥ*.

[180] Cf. PVBh 495, 8–9: *ata eva svayaṃgrahaṇasya śāstranivṛttir eva prajoyanam uktam* |.

[181] PVV 425, 16–17: *eṣā svayaṃśrutis tadarthikā vipratipattinirākaraṇārthā kṛtā*.

[182] Note that Dignāga gave two explanations for the term *svayam* in his definitions of the thesis: In the NM and the PSV versions (both of which Dharmakīrti comments upon in PV IV), Dignāga took *svayam* as qualifying *iṣṭa* | *īpsita* and thus maintained that *svayam* guaranteed that the thesis was *intended* by the proponent himself, independent of treatises (*śāstrānapekṣa*); in the VVṬ, however, *svayam* was joined to *sādhayitum iṣṭaḥ* to ensure that it is indeed the proponent, and not someone else, who will *establish* the thesis. For the VVṬ's position, see NV 281, 16–17; FRAUWALLNER 1933, 302: *yad api vādavidhānaṭīkāyāṃ sādhayatīti śabdasya svayaṃ pareṇa ca tulyatvāt svayam iti viśeṣaṇam* | "In the *Vādavidhānaṭīkā* there is also the following: 'The word *sādhayati* is indifferent with regard to oneself and another, and hence the qualifier, *svayam*." Uddyotakara, in NV *ad* 1.1.33 (281, 12 *et seq.*), criticized both Dignāga's versions of *svayam* separately, and in particular argued that the VVṬ's use was redundant, as absurd as saying "I am myself going to bathe," when "I am going to bathe" would suffice. On Dignāga's authorship of the VVṬ, see HATTORI 1968, 9–10. For the NM's definition of the thesis, see pp. 117–118 below.

2.2.2 If the *sādhya* is just what is intended (*iṣṭa*), will Dignāga's fourfold classification of contradictory reasons become impossible?

(31) *viśeṣas tad vyapekṣātaḥ*[183] *kathito dharmadharmiṇoḥ* |
anuktāv api vāñchāyā bhavet prakaraṇād gatiḥ ||[184]

That [which is intended] is said to be a quality (*viśeṣa*) of the property [to be proved] (*dharma*) or to the subject (*dharmin*) according to how one regards [it]. Although the intention might not be [explicitly] stated, it would be understood from the context of the discussion (*prakaraṇa*).

The general philosophical background for k. 31ab is as follows: Dignāga, in PS III and the NM, had spoken of four sorts of contradictory reasons (*viruddhahetu*), viz., (i) those which prove the opposite of the *dharma* itself (*dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana*), (ii) those proving the opposite of a quality of the *dharma* (*dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhana*), (iii) those proving the opposite of the *dharmin* itself (*dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*) and (iv) those proving the opposite of a quality of the *dharmin* (*dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana*).[185] Recall that in

[183]PV-k(II) *tad vyapekṣatvāt*. We have not followed Miyasaka, who read *tad vyapekṣātaḥ* as a compound (i.e., *tadvyapekṣātaḥ*). We also differ from WATANABE 1977 on this point and in *not* taking *viśeṣaḥ*, but rather *tad*, as the subject of *kathitaḥ* (*kathito*). In spite of the *prima facie* normalcy of reading *tadvyapekṣātaḥ*, this and Watanabe's Japanese translation cannot be adopted for the following reasons: (a) They do not concord with the Tibetan of PV, *de ni ltos nas chos dag daṅ || chos can khyad par yin par brjod*, which clearly takes *de* = *tad* as the subject of *brjod* = *kathitaḥ*; PVin is analogous to PV Tib. in this respect. (b) The commentators on both PV and PVin do not explain the compound *tadvyapekṣātaḥ*, but rather simply *vyapekṣātaḥ*. (c) In fact, it is syntactically quite possible that *tad* is the subject, but that *kathitaḥ* becomes masculine due to *attraction de genre*, i.e., its gender was influenced by the masculine noun, *viśeṣaḥ*, figuring in the predicate. For examples of this phenomenon, see RENOU 1975, 500: "L'accord grammatical attendu est souvent rompu par attraction de forme, de contiguité, ou par quelque influence de sens ... a) Accord contigu du verbal avec le prédicat, *tvaṃ me mitraṃ jātam* Pañc[atantra] IV 7 14."

[184]Cf. PVin 288b3–6: *da ni ji ltar ma thos na bsgrub par bya ba ñid du 'dod pa yin no źes rtogs śe na | skabs kyis so || dper na 'dus pa rnams gźan gyi don yin par grub pa ni bdag gi don ñid bźin no || de ni ma smras su zin kyaṅ 'dod pas khyab pa'i bsgrub par bya ba yin no źes bstan pa'i phyir 'dod pa smos so || de*[a] *ñid ltos pa las chos daṅ chos can gyi khyad par du bśad pa yin te | 'di dag ni 'dus pa ma*[b] *yin pa'i yul can gźan gyi don yin no źes brjod pas na chos kyi khyad par du ñe bar gzuṅ ba'i phyir*[c] *de*[d] *de'i khyad par yin la*[e] *| mig la sogs pa 'dus pa ma yin pa'i don dag ni | gźan gyi don du 'gyur ba yin no źes bya ba ni chos can gyi khyad par yin no* || ([a] P. *'di*—[b] P. om. *ma*—[c] P. om. *phyir*—[d] P. om. *de*—[e] D. *no* [D. 190b4–6]).

[185]See PS III, k. 27: *chos daṅ chos can raṅ ṅo bo || yaṅ na de yi khyad par rnams || phyin ci log tu sgrub pa'i phyir || gnod pa med la 'gal ba yin* || (= NM, k. 9). See also NP §3.2.3; TACHIKAWA 1971, 125–126; KATSURA 1979, 78f.; KITAGAWA 1973, 205f.

the Sāṃkhya argument under discussion, the proponent speaks of the eyes being for the benefit of another (*parārtha*). However, for him "another" refers specifically to the *ātman* and hence it has the quality (*viśeṣa*) that it is one "who is not composed (*asaṃhata*)." The reason, "being a composite" (*saṃghātatva*), then becomes contradictory in that does not prove *parārthatva* qualified in this way: instead, it proves the opposite, viz., that the eyes and other faculties are for the benefit of another who *is* composed—for the Buddhist, consciousness must be composed in that it is made up of temporal parts.

There are various ways of formulating the Sāṃkhya's argument depending upon whether we take the quality (*viśeṣa*), *asaṃhatatva*, as pertaining to the property to be proved (*dharma*) or of the subject (*dharmin*): nonetheless the Sāṃkhya's intended proposition remains the same. According to Devendrabuddhi, the fact that the intention is the *sādhya*, and that this intention does not vary, leads to the following objection, which k. 31 seeks to answer: "If the *sādhya* is just what the proponent intends, then there would no longer be [different sorts of] contradictory [reasons] such as *dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhana*, etc. If one and the same combination [of *dharmin* and *dharma*] were the *sādhya*, then the *sādhana* which prove the opposite of those [*sādhya*] would, therefore, also be the same."[186] Faced with this objection, Dharmakīrti seems to nuance the principle that the intention is the *sādhya*: it is in reality the *sādhya* and remains the same, but admits of differences in verbal expression; the distinction between *dharmaviśeṣa* and *dharmiviśeṣa* here stems from our verbal formulation.[187] The quality *asaṃhatatva*

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[186]PVP 328a7–8: *gal te rgol bas 'dod pa ñid bsgrub par bya ba yin pa de'i tshe | chos kyi khyad par phyin ci log tu sgrub par byed pa la sogs pa 'gal ba rnams yod pa ñid ma yin no || gal te tshogs pa gcig bsgrub par bya ba yin pa*[a] *de bas na de las bzlog pa'i sgrub*[b] *par byed pa yaṅ gcig ñid yin no źe na* || ([a] P. *yin*—[b] P. *bsgrub* [D. 275b6–7]). The Skt. of *gal te rgol bas ... yod pa ñid ma yin no* is found in PVV-n *ad* k. 31, n. 1: *yadi vādineṣṭa eva sādhyas tadā dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhanādīnāṃ viruddhānām asambhava evety āha*. Cf. the explanations in PVBh 495, 13–14: *nanu sa viśeṣo dharmadharmiṇor na sādhyo sādhyatve viśeṣatā katham | na sādhyaviśeṣayor ekatā | uktaṃ cācāryeṇa "dharmaviśeṣaviparyayasādhanād dhi viruddha" ityādi* | "[Objection:] But surely this is a quality of the *dharmin* or *dharma*, but is not the *sādhya*. If it were the *sādhya*, how could it be a quality? The *sādhya* and the quality are not the same. Now, the Master [Dignāga] did say, 'it is contradictory because it establishes the opposite of the quality of the *dharma*, etc.' " Note that in this passage Prajñākaragupta cites part of PS III, k. 27 = NM, k. 9.

[187]PVin 288b6–7: *de ltar rnam par bźag pa tsam źig tha dad par zad kyi don ni ma yin no* || "In this way there is nothing but the mere presentation which differs, but not the proposition (*don* = *artha*)." If we follow Dharmottara, what seems to be invoked here is the general Dharmakīrtian principle that making connections between qualities and quality-possessors is never based on anything other than words. The *artha* itself is indivisible and admits of no such distinctions. Cf.

can be regarded as pertaining to the *dharma* or to the *dharmin*: if one construes the argument as "the eyes, etc. are for the benefit of 'another' which refers to something uncomposed (*cakṣurādīnām asaṃhataviṣayaṃ pārārthyam*)," this will be a case of *dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhana*, and *asaṃhataviṣaya* will be a quality (*viśeṣa*) of the *dharma*, *pārārthya*. However, if one interprets the argument as "the eyes, etc., which are for the benefit of another, are for the benefit of something uncomposed (*parārthāḥ santaś cakṣurādayo 'saṃhatārthāḥ*)," this would be *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana* in that *asaṃhatārthāḥ* would be a quality of the *dharmin*, i.e., *parārthās santaś cakṣurādayaḥ*.[188]

2.3 *iṣṭa*: critique of the Sāṃkhya's proof of the uncomposed *ātman*

2.3.1 Vasubandhu's analysis of the proof of the actually intended thesis

PVV introduces k. 32 as follows: "What fault is there in the debate about [the eyes, etc.] being for the benefit of the *ātman* (*ātmārthatva*)? [Reply:]"[189]

(32) *ananvayo 'pi dṛṣṭānte doṣas tasya yathoditam*[190] |
ātmā paraś cet so[191] *'siddha iti tatreṣṭaghātakṛt*[192] ||[193]

PVinṬ 18b5–8: *skabs kyi rten du gyur pa'i bsgrub par bya'i chos 'di ñid ni bltos pa las chos daṅ chos can gyi khyad par yin no || dṅos po las khyad par daṅ khyad par can gyi 'brel ba yod pa ni ma yin gyi | 'on kyaṅ sgra'i yul ñid do || des na ma ẓin pa'i don ñid ni 'ga' yaṅ khyad par ma yin no || gaṅ gi tshe sgras chos kyi yul du ñe bar 'god pa de'i tshe ni chos kyi khyad par yin la | gaṅ gi tshe chos can gyi yul du 'god pa de'i tshe chos can gyi khyad par yin pa'i phyir sgras ñe bar bkod pa la bltos te gñi ga'i khyad par du 'gyur ba yin no* || "This very *sādhyadharma* which is the basis of the discussion [i.e., *asaṃhatatva*] is a quality of the *dharma* or of the *dharmin* according to how one regards [it]. There are no connections between qualities and quality-possessors which are due to [real] entities, but rather they only concern words. Consequently, the same unexpressed meaning [i.e., *asaṃhatatva*] admits of no differences whatsoever. When one verbally presents it as concerning the *dharma* it is then a quality of the *dharma*; when one presents it as a quality of the *dharmin* it is then a quality of the *dharmin*. Thus, it becomes a quality of either in regard to (*bltos*) its verbal presentation."

188 See PVV 425, 23–25. Cf. PVṬ 315a2–3, which gives a similar explanation of the two *vyapekṣā* (*bltos pa*): *bltos pas ẓes bya ba ni de ltar gẓan gyi don ñid yin na | de dag ni gẓan gyi don byed pa ñid 'dus pa'i yul can ma yin no ẓes bya ba'i bltos pa 'di la chos kyi bye brag ste | mig la sogs pa gẓan gyi don du gyur pa 'dus pa'i don can ma yin no | chos can gyi tshig gi sgras don bstan pa la bltos pa la chos can gyi bye brag yin no* ||.

189 PVV 426, 6: *ātmārthatvasya vivāde ko doṣa ity āha* |.

190 PV-k(III), MIY. *yathoditaḥ*.

191 MIY. *cetso*.

192 PV-k(II) *iṣṭaghātavat*.

193 Cf. PVin 289a2–3: *ji skad bśad pa'i chos daṅ chos can gyi khyad par la ni rjes su 'gro ba*

> This [viz., being for the benefit of the *ātman*] also has the fault that there is no co-presence (*anvaya*) [of the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*) and the reason] in the example. As [Vasubandhu] had explained: 'If the *ātman* is [what is meant by] "another" (*para*), then this [*ātman*] is not established [in the example].' In that case [the reason] would refute what is intended (*iṣṭaghātakṛt*).

Dharmakīrti now takes up the critique of the argument as it was actually intended by the Sāṃkhya, i.e., with "being for the benefit of the *ātman*" (*ātmārthatva*) as the real meaning of *pārārthya*. There are two faults:

(a) There is no co-presence (*ananvaya*). This critique had been put forward earlier by Vasubandhu, and indeed Dharmakīrti actually cites a passage from what is presumably Vasubandhu's *Vādavidhi* or, less probably, his *Vādavidhāna*: *ātmā paraś cet so 'siddhaḥ.*[194] The problem turns on the two sorts of concomitance, *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, figuring in the Buddhist account of valid logical reasons; *anvaya* between the reason and property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*) means that wherever the former occurs so does the latter. (The terms *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are sometimes translated by the rather cumbersome "positive concomitance" and "negative concomitance" respectively. It would seem to us that "co-presence" and "co-absence" captures the essential idea, and this is accordingly the translation which we shall adopt for these two technical terms.[195]) Dharmakīrti's point is that while the pervasion (*vyāpti*) is to be established on the basis of particular examples, in the Sāṃkhya's argument there will not in fact be any co-presence (*anvaya*) of the reason and property to be proved in the example, because the property to be proved will not occur in, or qualify, the example: seats, etc. are not

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med pa'i skyon 'dod pa ñid de | ji skad du bdag gźan yin no źe na ni de ma grub pa'o źes bśad pa yin no || 'gal ba'i chos kyaṅ 'dod pa de ñid la gnod par byas pa yin no || (D. 191a2–3).

[194]See PVBh 494, 23 and 496, 6. Cf. PVin n. 193. This fragment is not found in the fragments given in FRAUWALLNER 1933 and 1957b. Note that Manorathanandin mixes his own commentary with the actual quotation; Dharmottara does likewise, as is apparent from the fact that their commentarial additions differ. PVV 426, 11–12: *yathoditam ācāryavasubandhunā | parārthāś cakṣurādaya ity atra paraś ced ātmā vivakṣitaḥ so 'siddho dṛṣṭānta iti.* "As Ācārya Vasubandhu had explained: When it is said that the eyes, etc. are for the benefit of another, then if the *ātman* is what is meant by 'another', this [*ātman*] is not established in the example [i.e., seats, beds, etc.]." Dharmottara's comment makes it clear that *so 'siddhaḥ* is to be taken as meaning *ātmā 'siddho dṛṣṭānte*. PVinṬ 20a2–3: *slob dpon dbyig gñen gyis ci skad du gźan gyi don ces bya ba 'dir gal te pha rol po bdag gźan gyi sgras brjod par 'dod na bdag de ni ma grub pa'o źes bśad pa yin no |*.

[195]Cf. KATSURA 1983, 541: "In Indian philosophy *anvaya* and *vyatireka* jointly make up a sort of method of induction. They may be formulated as follows: 'When *x* occurs, *y* occurs (*anvaya*), and when *x* is absent, *y* is absent (*vyatireka*).'" See OBERHAMMER *et al.* 1991, s.v. *anvaya*, for the evolution of the two terms from a grammatical to a logical usage.

established as being for the benefit of another, if "another" is construed to mean the *ātman*.

(b) The reason, "because they are composite" would be a contradictory reason (*viruddhahetu*) in that it would prove the opposite of the intended *sādhya*. In other words, "being composite" would prove that the eyes, etc. are *not* for the benefit of another—the so-called "other" (*para*) of the *sādhya* simply does not exist if it is taken as being the *ātman*.

The latter refutation had already been developed in Dignāga's PSV *ad* PS III, and Dharmakīrti, in what seems to have been a deliberate echo of Dignāga, used a slight variation on the Dignāgean terminology *iṣṭavighātakṛt* ([reason] which refutes what is intended). Dignāga had mentioned *iṣṭavighātakṛt* as a separate category of *viruddhahetu*, and in PSV *ad* PS III k. 22 and 26 he had given the Sāṃkhya argument as an example: subsequently, in NB III, however, Dharmakīrti explicitly took the position that there was no point in taking *iṣṭavighātakṛt* as a separate sort of *viruddhahetu* as it was the same as the other two sorts in proving the opposite of the *sādhya*.[196]

2.3.2 Absurd consequences of the thesis being just what the Sāṃkhya explicitly said, rather than what he intended

PVV introduces k. 33 as follows: "[Objection:] Being for the benefit of the *ātman* is not the *sādhya*. [Dharmakīrti] replies:"[197]

(33) *sādhanaṃ yadvivādena*[198] *nyastaṃ tac cen na sādhyate* |
kiṃ sādhyam anyathāniṣṭaṃ bhaved vaiphalyam eva vā ||[199]

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[196]See PSVb 131b7–132a1, 133a8–133b8, KITAGAWA 494, 499–500; NB III, 89–91.

[197]PVV 426, 13: *ātmārthatvaṃ na sādhyam ity āha.*

[198]Ego *yadvivādena*: MIY. *yad vivāde na.* The readings *yadvivādena* and *yadvivāde na* both find some commentarial support. Manorathanandin's PVV clearly commented upon *yadvivāde na nyastam*, but Devendrabuddhi suggests the instrumental *yadvivādena*. See PVV 426, 16–17: *yasyātmano 'rthasya vivāde 'sti nāstīti sandehe na sādhanaṃ nyastam upanyastaṃ tac cen na sādhyate kim idānīṃ sādhyaṃ syāt* |. But cf. PVP 328b6: *gźan yaṅ | gal te gaṅ la rtsod*[a] *pa yis | don gaṅ la rtsod pas te* |... ([a] P. *btsad* [D. 276a 3]). See n. 199 for PVin, which is in keeping with PVP rather than PVV. As for PV Tib., note that Miyasaka opted for D. *rtsod pa yin*, but P. N. *do* read the instrumental *yis*. At any rate, P. D. N. do not support *na nyastam* at all. Watanabe also seems to have read *yadvivādena*, which makes better philosophical sense than Manorathanandin's interpretation.

[199]Cf. PVin 289a2–3: *ma brjod pa'i phyir de yaṅ bsgrub par bya ba ma yin no źe na | gal te gaṅ la rtsod pas*[a] *sgrub par byed pa bkod pa de bsgrub par bya ba ma yin na bsgrub par bya ba ci yin | de ltar yin na phyin ci log tu grub pa'am don med par 'gyur te* | ([a] P. *rtsod pa* [D. 191a3–4]).

> Suppose that when a *sādhana* is presented because of a dispute about a certain [proposition],[200] that [proposition] is [nonetheless] not being proved. Then what is being proved (*sādhya*)? Otherwise [if the proposition in dispute were not the *sādhya*], then either [the *sādhya*] would be something unintended, or [the *sādhana*] would be completely superfluous.[201]

The opponent now argues that "being for the benefit of the *ātman*" (*ātmārthatva*) is not the *sādhya* because it is not stated. Dharmakīrti replies that in that case there is the following dilemma: (a) The Sāṃkhya's argument actually proves something which he does not intend, viz., the contrary of *ātmārthatva / asaṃhatapārārthya*; (b) If the *sādhana*, "being composite," really did prove *pārārthya* as it is literally stated, i.e., without any qualifications, there would ensue the fault of redundancy, or *siddhasādhana*, "proving what is already established": the Buddhist himself would accept that version of *pārārthya*—one which is not taken as meaning *ātmārthatva / asaṃhatapārārthya*. As Dharmakīrti himself put it in the PVin, "They [i.e., the Buddhists] accept that composites accomplish the benefit of another, and thus the *sādhana* is superfluous."[202]

2.4 *iṣṭa*: refutation of the Cārvāka's reasoning concerning "having a companion" (*sadvitīyaprayoga*)

(34) *sadvitīyaprayogeṣu niranvayaviruddhate*[203] |
etena kathite sādhyaṃ sāmānyenātha sammatam ||[204]

> In the case of the reasonings concerning 'having a companion' (*sadvitīyaprayoga*), [the faults of] no co-presence (*niranvaya*) and

[200]PVP *don gaṅ la*. See n. 198.

[201]PVV 426, 17–18: *anyathā vivādaviṣayo yadi na sādhyaṃ tadāniṣṭaṃ viparyayasiddhiḥ syāt* |. PVV 427, 2–3: *sādhanavaiphalyam eva vā syāt* |.

[202]PVin 289a7: *de dag 'dus pa gźan gyi don byed par ni khas blaṅs pa'i phyir* | *sgrub par byed pa 'bras bu med pa yin no* || (D. 191a6–7).

[203]PV-k(I) *niranvayo virudhyate*.

[204]Cf. PVin 289a8–b3: *'dis ni gñis pa daṅ bcas pa'i sbyor ba rnams la yaṅ rjes su 'gro ba med pa'i ñes pa bśad pa yin te* | *dper na bum pa ni mṅon par gsal*[a] *ba'i sems pa can*[b] *lus kyi mtshan ñid kyi skyes bu daṅ bum pa gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ bas gñis pa daṅ bcas pa*[c] *yin te* | *ut pa la ma yin pa'i phyir rtsig pa bźin no źes bya ba la* | *rtsig pa ni de lta bur gyur pa'i skyes bus gñis pa daṅ bcas par*[d] *ma grub pa bźin no* || *'on te spyi bsgrub par bya bar*[e] *'dod pa'i phyir khyad par 'phen pa ma yin no źe na* | *'di la ni de mi 'phen na sgrub par byed pa'i 'bras bu ci yin* | *yaṅ na ni mi 'dod par 'gyur ro źes bśad zin to* || ([a] P. *bsal*—[b] P. *sems can*—[c] D. *pas*—[d] D. *pa*—[e] D. *ba* [D. 191a7–b3]).

contradictoriness have been pointed out by means of the above [remarks]. But suppose that the *sādhya* [i.e., *sadvitīyatva*] were held generally (*sāmānyena*).

(35) *tad evārthāntarābhāvād dehānāptau na sidhyati*[205] |
vācyaṃ śūnyaṃ[206] *pralapatāṃ tad etaj jāḍyacintitam*[207] ||[208]

This very [*sadvitīyatva*] is not established, for since the body [taken in the materialist way] does not obtain there is no other object (*arthāntara*). This [*sadvitīyatva*] of those who prattle vacuities was invented because of stupidity.

This section of PV IV (k. 34–41), still centered on the word *iṣṭa* in Dignāga's definition of the thesis, is specifically directed against the Cārvāka's use of a sophistical type of argumentation known as the *sadvitīyaprayoga*, "a reasoning concerning 'having a companion.'"[209] Relying on the presentation of the argument in the parallel passages from the PVin and the commentaries to the PV, we can ascertain that the Cārvāka's reasoning was as follows: "A vase has a companion in the form of either *(a)* a vase or *(b)* a person characterized as a body having a consciousness which is manifested [by the elements], because it [i.e., the vase] is not an *utpala* [flower], like a wall."[210]

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[205] MIY. *sidhyate*.

[206] PV-k(II) *vācyaśūnyaṃ*.

[207] PV-k(I),(II) *varṇitam*.

[208] Cf. PVin 289b5–6: *rnam pa de lta bu'i lus bum pa las don gźan gyi ṅo bor khas mi len na spyi sgrub pa yaṅ mi srid de* | *gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba'i don gźan gyi ṅo bo med pa'i phyir ro* | (D. 191b5). PVin 290b1: *de'i phyir tshig gi tshul ni gsog yin no* || (D. 192b1).

[209] Literally, *sadvitīya* = "having a second." Commentators gloss *dvitīya*, however, as meaning "a companion." Cf. PVinṬ 21a4: *gñis pa daṅ bcas pa ste zla bo daṅ bcas pa'o* ||. WATANABE 1977 is a study on this argument in Dharmakīrti and elsewhere; we have also discussed it in some detail in TILLEMANS 1991b. STEINKELLNER 1981, 292–294 gives two Sanskrit fragments from Śākyabuddhi's PVṬ explaining the *sadvitīyaprayoga*, one of which has been translated in our article.

[210] *abhivyaktacaitanyaśarīralakṣaṇapuruṣaghaṭayor anyatareṇa sadvitīyo ghaṭaḥ* | *anutpalatvāt* | *kuḍyavat* |. Sanskrit given in STEINKELLNER 1981, 292–293. PVV's and PVBh's versions contain a number of obvious errors. For the details see Appendix II in TILLEMANS 1991b. On the Cārvāka or Lokāyata / Bārhaspatya positions and their arguments with Buddhist logicians, see NAMAI 1996, 561ff; Namai enumerates seven basic Bārhaspatya tenets: (i) only perception is a *pramāṇa* (*pratyakṣaikapramāṇavāda*); (ii) only the four elements (earth, air, etc.) are real (*bhūtamātravāda*); (iii) mental functions belong to the four elements (*bhūtacaitanyavāda*); (iv) phenomena are spontaneously diverse, there being no intervention of destiny or divine will (*svabhāvavāda*); (v) human existence consists in that of the body (*dehātmavāda*); (vi) rebirth, or "other worlds," are rejected (*paralokāpavāda*); (vii) pleasure and profit are the only aims of life

Before proceeding further with the Cārvāka argumentation, however, it is worthwhile to make it clear that *sadvitīya*-style reasonings were by no means restricted to that materialist school. We see that Dharmakīrti, in the VN, also argued against a Mīmāṃsaka who tried to prove that sound is permanent by using a *sadvitīya*-style reasoning: "The vase has a companion in the form of either *(a)* a vase or *(b)* a sound which is accepted by Jaimini as being a locus for [its] true nature, permanence."[211] Indeed, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī*, and especially Cakradhara's *Nyāyamañjarīgranthībhaṅga* (NMG), also show the *sadvitīyaprayoga* being used by an adversary who sought to argue against sound's impermanence; and in Kamalaśīla's TSP, we find it being used (in a slightly different manner) by the Naiyāyika, Aviddhakarṇa, to argue against Dignāga's twofold division of means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) and cognizable things (*prameya*).[212] In the PV, VN and the NMG, the conclusions argued for are different, but the logical strategy is essentially the same: a kind of bogus dilemma—expressed by *anyatarasadvitīyatva*—is set up, where the alternative that the *dharmin*, the vase, has itself as its own companion is quickly ruled out in favor of the other alternative, which conveniently contains the proposition that the proponent actually wants us to believe.

Let us now try to summarize how the Cārvāka uses this (pseudo-)dilemma to arrive at his desired conclusion. For the sake of simplicity we shall speak of "being accompanied by ..." instead of the more literal "having a companion in the form of ...."

(a) Obviously, a vase is not an *utpala* flower. Hence the *pakṣadharmatva* holds: the reason, *anutpalatva*, qualifies the *dharmin*, the vase.

(b) The Cārvāka then uses various tricks and pseudo-parallels with Buddhist logic, first to establish the general principle, or "pervasion" (*vyāpti*), and later to show that for Cārvāka and Buddhist alike the demand for such a pervasion in inferences can in fact never be satisfied. This will be explained more fully below.

(c) A vase cannot be accompanied by itself—*sadvitīyatva* necessitates difference—and therefore it must be accompanied by the person.

(*kāmārthavāda*). See STEINKELLNER 1986, 8–12 on earlier and later Cārvāka positions; HAYES 1993 on Dharmakīrti's arguments in PV II for rebirth and contra Cārvāka; FRANCO 1987, 4ff on the move from Lokāyata materialism to skepticism in Jayarāśi.

[211] See VN (ed. MUCH) 20, 10–13: *nityaḥ śabdo 'nityo veti vāde dvādaśalakṣaṇaprapañcaprakāśanaśāstrapraṇetur jaiminipratijñātatattvanityatādhikaraṇaśabdaghaṭānyatarasadvitīyo ghaṭa iti pratijñām uparacayya dvādaśalakṣaṇārthavyākhyānam.* Trans. MUCH 1991, vol. 2, 470.

[212] See NMG (ed. N.J. SHAH) 64, 12–14; TSP *ad* k. 1583–1585, pp. 556–557 (ed. D. SHĀSTRĪ). For details see TILLEMANS 1991b, 410–412.

(d) If the vase is accompanied by a person whose mind is just a manifestation of the elements, then the materialist view on what people are is correct, with the result that rebirth is impossible, for such a person (who is not different from his body) would be destroyed at the time of death.

Dharmakīrti's first line of attack (i.e., in k. 34bc) is to invoke the same twofold critique which he had just applied to the Sāṃkhya's argument.

(i) There is the fault of no co-presence (*niranvaya*) in the example. The actual *sādhya* which the Cārvāka intends is "having a companion in the form of a person characterized as a body having a consciousness which is manifested [by the elements]." However, just as in the Sāṃkhya reasoning, the really intended *sādhya* has no co-presence (*anvaya*) with the reason in the example. The wall cannot be accompanied by the Cārvāka's version of the "person", since for a Buddhist, this materialist version of the person simply does not exist.

(ii) There is the fault of contradictoriness (*viruddhatā*), or *viruddhahetu*, i.e., the fault that the reason proves the opposite of the intended *sādhya*. The Buddhist will admit that a wall can be accompanied by a vase. But if *ghaṭena sadvitīyatva* (being accompanied by a vase) was in fact co-present in the example, the reason would prove the contrary of what the Cārvāka actually intended. In effect, if it were established that the vase was accompanied by itself, the Cārvāka could not exploit the disjunction conveyed by *anyatara* (one of ...; either ... or) to prove the materialist version of the person, i.e., his actual *sādhya*. The logic can be presented as follows: *anyatara* means one—but not both—of *A* or *B*. Hence, in the *sadvitīyaprayoga*, if we established that the vase was the "companion," *ipso facto* it would be proven that the person is not. As in the Sāṃkhya's argument, which was criticized in k. 32 as leading to *iṣṭavighātakṛt*, here too the reason would be a *viruddhahetu*, proving the opposite of what is intended.[213]

We now come to k. 34d: "But suppose that the *sādhya* [i.e., *sadvitīyatva*] is held generally." This begins what we, in point *(b)* of our summary above,

[213]See PVV 427, 9–12: *tatra ca niranvayaviruddhate kathite | tathā hy abhivyaktacaitanyadehalakṣaṇapuruṣeṇa sadvitīyatvaṃ sādhyam | tena ca kuḍye 'nvayo na dṛṣṭa iti niranvayatā | ghaṭasya tu kuḍye 'nvayo dṛṣṭa iti tena sadvitīyatvasādhanāt viruddhatā syāt* | "Now, here the lack of co-presence and the contradictoriness [of the reason] have been pointed out. As follows: 'having a companion in the form of a person characterized as a body with a manifested consciousness' is the *sādhya*. And thus co-presence [of the reason and this *sādhya*] in [the example,] the wall, is not observed: hence there is a lack of co-presence (*niranvayatā*). For the vase, however, the co-presence in [the example,] the wall, is observed: thus, because [the reason] would prove 'having a companion in the form of the latter [i.e., the vase]' it would be contradictory."

have termed the use of "tricks and pseudo-parallels with Buddhist logic" to establish pervasion (*vyāpti*). The Cārvāka argues that the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*) is simply *sadvitīyatva*, "having a companion," rather than "having a companion in the form of either a vase or a person, etc."[214] Even so, how would pervasion hold between the reason, *anutpalatva*, and the *dharma*, *sadvitīyatva*? Probably the Cārvāka's initial strategy, depicted in k. 34, is to argue that there is such a pervasion because all things which are not *utpala* flowers, such as walls and vases, etc., do "have a companion" in the sense that they are generally accompanied by something; they are not absolutely alone.[215] Subsequently, in k. 37cd–40, however, the Cārvāka is depicted as giving a variety of arguments to show that the Buddhist logician is equally vulnerable to the charges of no *anvaya* and *viruddhahetu*, and that *vyāpti* is never really established in any inference; no doubt, *en filigrane* in this discussion is the Cārvāka's well-known tenet that inference is not a *pramāṇa* (see n. 210).

The Cārvāka justifies taking the *sādhya* as simply "having a companion" (*sadvitīyatva*) by saying that for him, just as for a Buddhist logician, the *sādhyadharma* must be taken generally (*sāmānyena*), free from all qualifications

[214]There are some differences amongst the commentators in their phrasing of this *sādhya*. Cf. PVV 427, 17–18: *atha sāmānyena viśeṣam anulikhya sadvitīyatvaṃ sādhyaṃ kuḍye sadvitīyatvamātreṇānvayāt* | "But suppose that *sadvitīyatva*, taken generally, without specifying any particular cases, is the *sādhya*, because there is *anvaya* [of the reason] with mere *sadvitīyatva* in [the example], the wall." PVinṬ 21b1: *'on te spyir spyi daṅ ldan pa'i gñis pa ñid bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi | skyes bur gyur pa'i gñis pa daṅ bcas pa źes khyad par 'phen pa min*[a] *no źe na* | ([a] P. *yin*) "[Objection:] 'Being a companion' (*dvitīyatva*), taken generally (*spyir = spyi daṅ ldan pa'i*), is the *sādhya*, but one does not specify the particular case, 'companion (*dvitīya*) in the form of a person." While Manorathanandin and Dharmottara speak of *sadvitīyatva* / *dvitīyatva*, Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi speak of *anyatarārthāntaratva* (being another object which is one of [two]). PVP 329a5–6: *don gźan gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba spyir bsgrub par bya bar 'dod pa des khyad par can 'phen*[a] *par byed pa ma yin phyir skyon yod pa ma yin no źe na* | ([a] D. *'phel* [D. 276b1]). Cf. PVṬ fragment 2 in STEINKELLNER 1981, 293: *anyatarārthāntaratvaṃ sāmānyaṃ ghaṭe sādhyadharmiṇi kuḍye ca dṛṣṭāntadharmiṇy upanītam iti.* This *arthāntaratva* seems to be simply another way of saying *dvitīyatva*.

[215]Cf. PVinṬ 21a6–8: *rtsig pa la ni gñis ka yaṅ yod pa'i phyir rjes su 'gro ba daṅ ldog pa dag grub pa yin la | ut pa la ma yin pa ñid ni phyogs kyi chos yin no || spyir gñis pa daṅ bcas pas ni khyab pa yin te | des na rjes su 'gro ba med pa'i ñes pa med ciṅ bum pa ñid ni bum pa gñis pa daṅ bcas pa ma*[a] *yin pa'i phyir śugs kyis de lta bur gyur pa'i skyes bur 'gyur ba yin no źes bya ba de la* |... ([a] P. om. *ma*). "Because the wall also has a companion, the *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are established. Not being an *utpala* is the *pakṣadharma*. It [i.e., not being an *utpala*] is pervaded by having a companion, taken generally. So therefore, the fault of no *anvaya* does not occur, and since the vase itself does not have a second vase [i.e., a companion-vase], then indirectly there would be a person of the sort [which the Cārvāka describes]." For PVV see the previous note.

concerning particular cases: the universal (*sāmānya*) at stake here is best understood as *dvitīyatva* (being a companion), or equivalently, *arthāntaratva* ("being another object"; see n. 214). In k. 35ab, Dharmakīrti then replies that the body, as understood by the materialist Cārvākas, is nonexistent, and thus there is no other object (*arthāntara*) separate from a vase which could serve as the companion so that we could then speak of there being a universal, "having a companion" (*sadvitīyatva*). The PVin and the PVBh explain that the point turns on the Buddhist logicians' repudiation of real, independently existing universals: universals can never exist anywhere apart from their instantiations (*vyakti*), and thus the universal, "being a companion" (*dvitīyatva*), cannot exist here if neither the vase nor the person are instantiations of it.[216] The conclusion is that *sadvitīyatva*, as it presupposes the universal *dvitīyatva*, would be nonsensical.

(36) *tulyaṃ nāśe*[217] *'pi cec chabdaghaṭabhedena kalpane |*
na siddhena vināśena tadvataḥ sādhanād dhvaneḥ ||[218]

[Objection:] But it is analogous for the [*sādhya*] 'perishability' too, if one conceives of it in terms of the particular cases, sound and vase. [Reply:] No, it is not [analogous], for through an established perishability there is a proof that sound has this [property, perishability].

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[216]PVin 290a2–3: *'di'i phyir spyi la brten pa ma yin te | gsal ba thams cad yod par mi srid na de'i spyi mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro || dper na bram ze la sogs pa ma yin pa ñid la rigs*[a] *ñid dam | rtog pa'i śes pa la dbaṅ po la brten pa ñid bźin no ||* ([a] D. *rig* [D. 192a2–3]) "So too, [the *sādhya*] does not partake of (*brten pa* = °*bhāj*?) the universal [*dvitīyatva*], for when none of the instantiations can exist, their universal is absurd, as for example 'caste' with regard to those who are not Brahmins and so on, or 'partaking of the sense organs' with regard to conceptual cognitions." Cf. Dharmottara's gloss on this passage showing that *spyi* (*sāmānya*) here means *gñis pa ñid* (*dvitīyatva*). PVinṬ 23b1: *'di la bum par gyur pa daṅ skyes bur gyur pa gñis (pa) ñid kyi khyad par med pa'i phyir gñis pa ñid kyi spyi mi 'thad pa yin no |* "Because the particular cases of *dvitīyatva*, viz., the vase and the person, do not exist here, the universal, *dvitīyatva*, is absurd." Finally, see PVBh 497, 9–10: *nanu nātra viśeṣākṣepaḥ | tad asat | yato dehasyāsiddhau vyaktyabhāvāt kutaḥ sāmānyam | na hi govyaktyabhāve sāmānyam |* "[Objection:] But surely particular cases are not implied here. [Reply:] This is not correct. Since the instantiations do not exist when the body is not established, how could the universal be? Indeed there is no [cow-]universal in the absence of cow-instantiations."

[217]PV-k(III) *nāśo*.

[218]Cf. PVin 290b6: *sgra daṅ bum pa'i khyad par gyis rtogs na ni mi rtag pa la yaṅ mtshuṅs so że na | ma yin te | mi rtag pa ñid grub pas na sgra de daṅ ldan par sgrub pa'i phyir ro ||* (D. 192b5–6).

The Cārvāka now invokes another pseudo-parallel with Buddhist logic in order to justify taking *sadvitīyatva* without the particularities, vase (*ghaṭa*) and person (*puruṣa*). When a Buddhist proves that sound is perishable because it is produced, like a vase, it is a cardinal principle of his logic that perishability must be taken *simpliciter* as the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*), and that one should not speak of particular cases. Otherwise, so the Buddhist maintains, if it were sound's perishability which was being proved, there would be the problem of no co-presence (*anvaya*) in the example: the example, the vase, has perishability taken generally, but not sound's perishability.[219] Dharmakīrti replies that the analogy does not hold: the universal, perishability, is established in sound, but *dvitīyatva* / *arthāntaratva* is established in neither the vase (*ghaṭa*) nor in the person (*puruṣa*) understood in the materialist way.

(37) *tathārthāntarabhāve syāt tadvān kumbho 'py anityatā* |
viśiṣṭā[220] *dhvaninānveti no cen nāyogavāraṇāt* ||[221]

Similarly, if another object existed [i.e., if one from among the body and the vase were accepted as being the other object],[222] then the vase would also have this [property, *sadvitīyatva*]. [Objection:] Impermanence qualified by sound is not co-present [in the example]. [Reply:] No, [there is no such fault of no co-presence,] since we are [just] excluding [sound's] non-connection (*ayogavāraṇa*) [with the qualifier, impermanence].[223]

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[219]PVV 428, 3–5: *nāśe 'pi sādhye śabdaghaṭayoḥ sādhyadṛṣṭāntadharmiṇoḥ sambandhitayā bhedena kalpane śabdasambandhino nāśasya ghaṭe 'nvayābhāvād asādhyatvam* | *ghaṭasambandhinaś ca śabde 'sambhavād asādhyateti tulyam idam iti cet* | "[Objection:] In the case of the *sādhya* 'perishability' as well, if one conceives of it in terms of particular cases, i.e., as connected with the subjects of the *sādhya* and of the example, sound and vase [respectively], then perishability connected with sound would not be the *sādhya*, as there is no co-presence [of the reason and sound's perishability] in the vase. Nor would [perishability] connected with a vase be the *sādhya*, for it could not occur in sound. Thus this is analogous."

[220]PV-k(I) *viśiṣṭo*.

[221]Cf. PVin 290b6–7: *de bźin du 'ga' źig don gźan du gyur par*[a] *khas len na gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba don gźan gyi ṅo bor 'gyur ba yin no* || ([a] D. *pas* [D.192b6]). WATANABE 1977, n. 17 cites P. 290a1–2 in connection with k. 37, which certainly seems wrong.

[222]Cf. PVin n. 221 and PVinṬ 28a3: *gal te lus daṅ bum pa dag las 'ga' źig don gźan du 'gyur bar khas len yin na ni* |.

[223]Cf. PVV 428, 17–18: *atha dhvaninā svasambandhitayā viśiṣṭānityatā dṛṣṭāntaṃ nānvetīti cet* | *nānanvayadoṣo viśeṣeṇāyogasyāsambandhasya vāraṇāt* ||.

(38) *dvividho hi vyavacchedo viyogāparayogayoḥ* |
vyavacchedād ayoge tu vārye nānanvayāgamaḥ[224] ||

Indeed, there are two kinds of exclusion (*vyavaccheda*), as there is exclusion of nonconnection and there is exclusion of connection with anything other. But when nonconnection is to be excluded, [the fault of] no co-presence (*ananvaya*) [in the example] does not ensue.

First, in *kārikā* 37ab, Dharmakīrti explains that if either the vase or the person (taken materialistically) existed as another object, i.e., as a companion to the vase, then *sadvitīyatva* would be established, and the vase would possess this property, just as it possesses perishability. But the vase is not other than itself, and a "body with a consciousness consisting in a manifestation of the elements" is nonexistent from the point of view of the Cārvāka's (nonmaterialist, Buddhist) adversary, who holds that consciousness exists as a mental entity distinct from the physical elements making up the body. Manorathanandin points out that if the body were simply without consciousness, then *sadvitīyatva* could be established: but then, the Cārvāka would fail to prove his materialistic thesis of mind-body identity.[225]

Next, in k. 37cd–38, we have an objection involving the Buddhist theory of the three types of exclusion (*vāraṇa* = *vyavaccheda*), one of which must figure explicitly (via the word *eva*) or implicitly (without *eva*) in any relationship between a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and qualificand (*viśeṣya*).[226] The opponent in k. 37cd argues as follows: The Buddhist also incurs the fault of no co-presence of the

[224]PV-k(II/III) *ayoge tu vārye nānanvayāgamaḥ*: PV-k(I), MIY. *ayoge tu nānyenānanvayāgamaḥ*. Although PV-k(I) is supported by PV Tib. (*gźan daṅ ni rjes 'gro med par 'gyur ma yin*), Devendrabuddhi supports our reading. PVP 330a6–7: *de la mi ldan pa* | *bzlog la ... rjes 'gro med pa min*[a] | *bsgrub par bya bas stoṅ pa ma yin no źes bya ba'i tha tshig go* || ([a] Ego *min*: P. and D. *yin* [D. 277a5]).

[225]PVV 428, 12–14: *yadi punar acetanasvabhāvatayā ghaṭajātīyenaiva dehena sadvitīyatvaṃ ghaṭasya sādhyate tadā sidhyaty eva* | *tathāvidhasya sadvitīyatvasya siddhatvād vināśavat* | *kiṃ tu vādino neṣṭasiddhiḥ* | *dehasya cetanasvabhāvatayā 'siddheḥ* | "Suppose, however, that it were established that the vase had a companion in the form of a body of the very same natural kind as the vase, that is, naturally unconscious. Then [*sadvitīyatva*] would indeed be established, for such a type of *sadvitīyatva* is established just like perishability. But then, for the proponent, there would be no proof of the intended [proposition], since the body would not be established as being naturally conscious."

[226]On the theory of *vyavaccheda*, see KAJIYAMA 1973, as well as GILLON and HAYES 1982. To take the classic examples of "exclusion of nonconnection" (*ayogavyavaccheda*) and "exclusion of connection with anything other" (*anyayogavyavaccheda*) mentioned in PVV *ad* k. 38, the usual intention in uttering the sentence *caitro dhanurdharaḥ* is simply to assert that Caitra is not a nonarcher: there can be other archers too. Thus, "Caitra is an archer." On the other hand, a speaker

sādhyadharma and reason in the example when he proves that sound is impermanent. He establishes the property impermanence as qualified by sound; but then impermanence, which belongs to sound, cannot also be a property of the example, the vase. Dharmakīrti replies that the opponent has misconstrued the type of exclusion in the *sādhya*: if the proposition "sound is impermanent" implicitly involved *anyayogavyavaccheda* (exclusion of connection with anything other), it would exclude connections between impermanence and anything other than sound. In that case, the opponent would be right that impermanence could not also be a property of the example. However, it is not *anyayogavyavaccheda* which is implicit in this *sādhya*, but rather *ayogavyavaccheda*: the proposition is merely excluding the nonconnection of impermanence with sound, but does not in any way prevent impermanence from being connected with other entities.[227]

(39) *sāmānyam eva tat sādhyaṃ na ca siddhaprasādhanam* |
viśiṣṭaṃ dharmiṇā tac ca na niranvayadoṣavat[228] ||

This universal [i.e., impermanence, etc.] alone is being proved (*sādhya*). Neither is one proving something [already] established, nor does this [impermanence, etc.], which is qualified by the subject (*dharmin*) [through *ayogavyavaccheda*], have the fault of lacking co-presence (*niranvaya*) [in the example].

It is true that particular cases (like sound's impermanence) would not be properties of the example and that taking such particular cases as the property being proved would lead to the fault of no co-presence (*niranvaya*). However, this problem will be avoided by the Buddhist in that only universals, and not particular cases, are being proved. But then it could be argued that this restriction to universals would make inference redundant—we would be proving something which has already been proven to exist. PVV: "[Objection:] Surely the universal, impermanence, etc., is actually established somewhere [i.e., in things such as lightning and so

will utter *pārtho dhanurdharaḥ* in order to convey that Pārtha (i.e., Arjuna) is the only excellent archer among the Pāṇḍava brothers. Then we would have to translate: "It is Pārtha [alone] who is the archer." See PV IV, 190–192 translated and discussed in KAJIYAMA *op. cit.*

[227] Cf. Devendrabuddhi *ad* k. 39 (330a5): ... *źes sṅar bśad zin to* "[this] was already explained earlier." Indeed, the same objection and reply figure frequently in Dharmakīrti's works. E.g., PVSV 2, 7–10: *pakṣasya dharmatve tadviśeṣaṇāpekṣasyānyatrānanuvṛtter asādhāraṇateti cet* | *na* | *ayogavyavacchedena viśeṣaṇāt* | *yathā caitro dhanurdharaḥ* | *nānyayogavyavacchedena* | *yathā pārtho dhanurdhara ity ākṣepsyāmaḥ* |. See also PVin II 30, 6 *et seq.* in STEINKELLNER 1973; trans. STEINKELLNER 1979, 32.

[228] PV-k(III) *niranvapadoṣavat.*

forth]; a proof [of it] would be pointless. [Reply:] Now, one is not proving impermanence, which is [already] established as merely existing somewhere, for one is proving something unestablished, namely, an exclusion of nonconnection with regard to the subject (*dharmin*)."[229]

As we saw earlier in the *sadvitīyaprayoga* discussion, Dharmakīrti does seem to recognize that universals, such as impermanence, are established, or exist, *insofar* as they exist in some or another *dharmin*. However, from this it does not follow that proving that *sound* is impermanent is pointless, for one is proving something which may as yet be unestablished, viz., that impermanence is present in the *dharmin*, sound. Moreover, because one is establishing the mere exclusion of nonconnection (*ayogavyavaccheda*) between sound and impermanence, other entities, like the vase, can also be impermanent: the fault of no co-presence of the property and the reason in the example does not occur.

(40) *etena dharmidharmābhyāṃ viśiṣṭau dharmadharmiṇau |*
pratyākhyāto[230] *nirākurvan dharmiṇy evam asādhanāt ||*[231]

The [Cārvāka] who refutes [that sound has] the *dharma* [impermanence] qualified by the *dharmin* [sound] or the *dharmin* [sound] qualified by the *dharma* [impermanence] is [himself] rebuffed by this [assertion of Dignāga that what is intended is the *sādhya*], because one is not proving anything like that of the *dharmin* [sound].

The opponent (whom Manorathanandin specifies as still being the Cārvāka) continues his attempt to show that the Buddhist also incurs the faults of no co-presence and contradictoriness. We now find an obfuscating argument exploit-

[229]PVV 429, 3–6: *nanv anityatādi sāmānyaṃ siddham eva kvacit*[a] *sādhane vaiyarthyam ity āha | na ca siddhasya kvacit sattāmātreṇānityasya prasādhanam | dharmiṇy ayogavyavacchedasyāsiddhasya prasādhanāt |* [a] Cf. PVV-n's gloss on *kvacit* (somewhere): *vidyudādau* (in lightning, etc.).

[230]Ego *pratyākhyāto*: PV-k(I/II/III), MIY. *pratyākhyātau*. Manorathanandin, in PVV 429, 14–15, comments on *pratyākhyāto*: ... *sa evaṃ vadan pratyākhyātaḥ*. See n. 232. The idea, as Manorathanandin shows, is that when the Cārvāka argues that there is no *anvaya* when the *dharma* is construed as qualified by the *dharmin*, etc., he is himself rebuffed by Dignāga's specification *iṣṭa*. Note that the Tibetan in PVP (330b4–5) is in keeping with PVV: *chos can chos dag gis | chos daṅ chos can khyad par can | 'gog par byed pa'i rgol ba bsal ba yin te |* "The proponent who refutes ... is rebuffed / opposed (*bsal ba = pratyākhyātaḥ*)."

[231]Cf. PVin 290b7–8: *'dod pa bsgrub byar brjod pa 'dis ni chos daṅ chos can dag gis khyad par du byas pa'i chos daṅ chos can dag 'gog pa yaṅ bsal ba yin te | dper na sgra ni mi rtag pa'i sgra daṅ ldan pa ma yin pa'am sgra'i mi rtag pa daṅ ldan pa ma yin no | źes bya ba lta bu ste | chos can la spyi bkag pa ni 'gal ba med pa'i phyir ro ||* (D. 192b6–193a1).

ing the Buddhist's own idea of the *sādhya*, viz., the *dharma* qualified by the *dharmin* (see k. 39). The Buddhist maintains that one intends to prove the simple universal, impermanence (*anityatvamātra*), as being present in the *dharmin*, sound. The Cārvāka, however, misrepresents the Buddhist position as being that a *dharma* qualified by a *dharmin* (*dharmiviśiṣṭadharma*), or vice versa (i.e., *dharmaviśiṣṭadharmin*), is asserted to be present in the *dharmin*. Thus, the *sādhya* would be either "sound has the impermanence belonging to sound" (*śabdānityatvavān śabdaḥ*), or "sound has sound which is impermanent" (*anitya-śabdavān śabdaḥ*). In both cases there would be no co-presence of the reason and the *dharma* in an example, and thus the reason would prove the contrary of this *sādhya* and be a contradictory reason (*viruddhahetu*). Dharmakīrti, in effect, replies that the problem of no *anvaya* or *viruddhahetu* does not arise: the Buddhist never intends to prove that sound has impermanence belonging to sound or that it has sound which is impermanent. Dignāga's proviso *iṣṭa* (what is intended) in his definition of the thesis eliminates any such unintended properties.[232]

(41) *samudāyāpavādo hi na dharmiṇi virudhyate |*
sādhyaṃ[233] *yatas tathā neṣṭaṃ sādhyo dharmo 'tra kevalaḥ ||*

Indeed, the denial of the combination [of *dharma* and *dharmin*] in the *dharmin* is not a contradiction, since the *sādhya* was not intended in this manner. The *dharma* alone is what is to be proved in this [*dharmin*].

The Buddhist certainly *does* hold that the combination (*samudāya*) of the subject (*dharmin*) and property (*dharma*) is what is to be proved (*sādhya*).[234] Nonetheless, this combination is not, as the Cārvāka maintains, that of the *dharmin* plus a *dharmiviśiṣṭadharma* or a *dharmaviśiṣṭadharmin*: it is only of the *dharmin* plus the simple *dharma*, the universal: the Cārvāka's version was never intended at all. As a result, the fact that the reason would prove the opposite of the type of combination which the Cārvāka advances does not make it a *viruddhahetu*, because the

[232]See PVV 429, 11–15: *etene ṣṭasya sādhyatvavacanena dharmidharmābhyāṃ viśiṣṭau dharmadharmiṇāv ananvayān nirākurvan cārvāko yathā na śabdānityatvavān śabdo nānitya-śabdavān vā śabda iti | na hi śabdānityatvenānityaśabdena vā kvacid ghaṭādau dṛṣṭānte kṛtakatvasyānvayo 'sti tata iṣṭaviparyāsanād viruddhaṃ kṛtakatvam iti sa evaṃ vadan pratyākhyātaḥ katham ity āha | dharmiṇi śabde evaṃ dharmiviśiṣṭasya dharmasya dharma-viśiṣṭasya vā dharmiṇo 'sādhanād anityatvamātrasya śabde sādhyatveneṣṭatvāt* |. Cf. PVin, n. 231.

[233]PV-k(III) *sādhanaṃ*.

[234]Cf. PVV 429, 18–19: *dharmamātrasya dharmisādhyatvāt samudāya eva sādhyaḥ* | "Because the mere *dharma* is to be proved of the *dharmin*, the combination alone is the *sādhya*."

reason does *not* prove the opposite of the type of combination which the Buddhist himself intends to advance.[235]

This concludes the discussion of *iṣṭa* in the definition of the thesis in PS III, k. 2ab. Dharmakīrti will now comment until k. 71 upon *svayam*—Dignāga's condition that the proponent *himself* must intend to prove the thesis in question and that it is not merely a proposition to be found in a treatise of his school.

2.5 *svayam*: scripture and reason

2.5.1 Summary of Dharmakīrti's position

(42) *ekasya dharmiṇaḥ śāstre nānādharmasthitāv api* |
sādhyaḥ syād ātmanaiveṣṭa ity upāttā svayaṃśrutiḥ[236] ||[237]

The word 'himself' (*svayaṃśruti*) was employed with the following in mind: Even though in a treatise (*śāstra*) various properties (*dharma*) might be posited of one [and the same] subject (*dharmin*), what is to be proved (*sādhya*) would be what is intended by [the proponent] himself alone.

In a parallel passage in the NB, Dharmakīrti says: " '*svayam*' means by the proponent who states the means of proof (*sādhana*) at that time. Consequently, the following was meant: although he might state a *sādhana* basing [himself] on some treatise, [and] even though the author of that treatise might have accepted many properties [as belonging] to that subject, what is being proved is only that property which this proponent himself intends to prove at this time, and nothing else."[238]

Here, in k. 42 *et seq.*, begins a long argument, very possibly in part directed against Uddyotakara, who argued in the NV against the word *svayam* (see n. 239); the argumentation is generally directed against the view, held by the

[235]Cf. PVBh 501, 2–3: *na hi dharmiṇy aparaḥ śabdānityatvasamudāyaḥ śabde sādhyaḥ* | *tatas tasya nirākaraṇe 'pi na doṣaḥ* | *anityatāmātranirākaraṇe hi doṣaḥ* | "Indeed, another combination of sound and impermanence is not being proved of the *dharmin*, sound. So, even if it is refuted, there is no fault. For, it is when simple impermanence is refuted that there is a fault."

[236]PV-k(I),(II),(III), MIY. *svayaṃ śrutiḥ*. The word is a compound.

[237]Cf. PVin 291a3–4: *raṅ ñid kyi sgra ni chos can gcig la bstan bcos las chos du ma rnam par gźag*[a] *kyaṅ raṅ ñid bdag ñid 'dod pa de*[b] *kho na bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi* | *bstan bcos khas blaṅs su zin kyaṅ gźan ni ma yin no źes bstan pa'i phyir* |... ([a] P. *bźag*—[b] D. om. *de* [D. 193a2–3]).

[238]NB III, 42–44: *svayam iti vādinā* || *42* || *yas tadā sādhanam āha* || *43* || *etena yady api kvacic chāstre sthitaḥ sādhanam āha tacchāstrakāreṇa tasmin dharmiṇy anekadharmābhyupagame 'pi yas tadā tena vādinā dharmaḥ svayaṃ sādhayitum iṣṭaḥ sa eva sādhyo netara ity uktaṃ bhavati* || *44* ||. On the recurrent theme that one *dharmin* has many *dharma*s, cf. e.g., PS I, k. 5 and NM 17–18.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika *inter alia*, that "because [the proponent] accepts a treatise, everything found there is being proved (*sādhya*)."[239] The discussion thus centers on the following problem: when a proponent attempts to prove that a subject (*dharmin*) has a particular property (*dharma*), then is he also in some sense proving the other properties attributed to that subject by his school's philosophical treatises (*śāstra*) or scriptures (*āgama*)? In other words, does his thesis include not just the property under discussion, but also some or all of the other properties which happen to be mentioned in the canonical literature of his school? Dharmakīrti will use the term *svayam* to stress the proponent's independence from any doctrinal and dogmatic affiliations whatsoever: the proponent is only responsible for what he intends to prove at the moment of the argument. The implicit antidogmatism[240] here is radical indeed: subsequently, in the discussion of *āpta* (k. 93–108), we find the case of an apostate Mīmāṃsaka who, contrary to his school's tenets, decides to prove that words are impermanent. According to Dharmakīrti, the Mīmāṃsaka's heresy in denying a cardinal tenet of his own school does not constitute a refutation of his actual thesis.

[239]PVin 291a5–6: *bstan bcos khas blaṅs pa'i phyir de la mthoṅ ba thams cad bsgrub par bya ba yin no źes dogs pa srid par 'gyur ro* | (D. 193a5). Although neither Dharmakīrti nor his commentators explicitly identify which Naiyāyikas held this position, it seems reasonably clear that Uddyotakara did. He argued, against Dignāga (see n. 175), that if *svayam* showed that the position which the proponent sought to prove was independent of *śāstra* (*śāstrānapekṣa*), then we should ask what is meant by *śāstra*. If the latter means what is not contradicted by perception or scripture, then *not* relying on *śāstra* would be tantamount to holding and proving a false view. NV *ad* 1.1.33 p. 282, 4–8: *yad api svayaṃśabdena śāstrānapekṣam abhyupagamaṃ darśayatīti atroktam* | *kim utkam* | *parāvajānasyāyuktatvād ity evamādi* | *kiṃ punaḥ śāstraṃ yadanapekṣam abhyupagamaṃ darśayati* | *nanu śāstraṃ pratyakṣāgamābhyām aviruddham* | *āgamas tadanapekṣam abhyupagamaṃ darśayatīti bruvatā 'pramāṇakam artham abhyupaitīty uktam* | *yaś cāpramāṇako 'bhyupagamo nāsāv abhyupagantuṃ svasthātmanā yuktaḥ* | *nāpi pratipādayituṃ yukta iti* |.

[240]STCHERBATSKY 1958, 156, n. 2, explaining Vācaspatimiśra's comments on NV, conveys what dogmatism would be in this Indian context: "If, says Vācaspatimiśra, someone known to be an adherent of the Vaiśeṣika system would appear in a learned society (*pariṣad*) and advance the tenet that the sounds of speech are eternal entities, which is a tenet of the Mīmāṃsaka school against which the Vaiśeṣikas always protested, neither the society nor the official opponent would care to listen. He would not even be allowed to state his argument, he would be declared beaten as soon as he had pronounced the thesis." See *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* 282, 24–26.

2.5.2 If everything accepted in a treatise is also what is being proved (*sādhya*), there would be the absurd consequence that valid logical reasons would become contradictory reasons (*viruddhahetu*)

(43) *śāstrābhyupagamād eva sarvādānāt*[241] *prabādhane* |
tatraikasyāpi doṣaḥ syād yadi hetupratijñayoḥ ||[242]

Suppose the following is argued: [The proponent] holds all [the properties] precisely because he accepts the treatise. Consequently, if [a reason] invalidated even one [property] amongst those [mentioned in the treatise], there would be the fault of the reason and the thesis [being contradictory].[243]

An opponent might argue against a Vaiśeṣika that the reason, "being produced" (*kṛtakatva*), is contradictory (*viruddha*) when the latter philosopher seeks to prove that sound (or words) is impermanent. In the classic argument *anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt* (sound is impermanent because it is produced), *kṛtakatva* would also establish that sound is *not* a quality of space (*ākāśaguṇatva*), because space (*ākāśa*) is permanent and what depends upon it must be permanent too.[244] However, the Vaiśeṣika's own treatise says that sound *is* a quality of space (see VS 2.1.24–26), and hence this proposition must also be what is being proved. In that case, because the reason *kṛtakatva* would refute the Vaiśeṣika's *sādhya*, the reason would be one which is contradictory (*viruddhahetu*). To be precise, the commentaries speak of both the reason and the thesis being contradictory, so that

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[241] PV-k(I) *samādānāt*. Cf. Tib. *thams cad* = *sarva*.

[242] Cf. PVin 291a6–7: *log par rtogs pa yaṅ mthoṅ ba ñid de | kha cig na re bstan bcos las mthoṅ ba ni bsgrub par bya ba kho na yin la | de gnod na yaṅ gtan tshigs daṅ dam bca' ba dag gi skyon yin no źes zer ro* | (D. 193a6).

[243] I translate the *yadi* nonliterally here by "Suppose ... argued." See PVV-n 430, n. 1: *yadi tadāparaḥ ślokaḥ*. Cf. PVin, n. 242: *kha cig na re*. Following Bu ston's commentary on PVin, the opponent here is a Mīmāṃsaka. See also PVV 430, 12–13: *yadi punaḥ ... śāstreṇābhyupagamād eva sarveṣāṃ dharmāṇām ādānāt parigrahāt vādinā tatra teṣu madhye ekasyāpi dharmasyopanyastahetunā bādhane hetupratijñayor viruddhatā doṣa ucyate* ||. Note, however, that PVV's *śāstreṇābhyupagamād eva* (precisely because there is acceptance *by* the treatise) is a rather odd understanding. The Tibetan versions of the other PV and PVin commentaries do not have this instrumental *sāstreṇa*; cf. PVinṬ 30a7 *bstan bcos khas blaṅs pa'i phyir ro*. We have followed PVBh 502, 25: *yadi śāstram abhyupagatam ity eva śāstrabādhane doṣaḥ pratijñāhetvos tadā...* "Suppose that the treatise is indeed accepted, and that consequently if there is an invalidation of the treatise there will be a fault of the thesis and reason. Then ..."

[244] See PVV-n 430, n. 2: *ākāśasya nityatvāt tadāśritaṃ ca nityaṃ syāt | tad anityatvena bādhyate* |. Cf. VS 2.1.27: *dravyatvanityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte*.

what seems to be at stake here is a version of *pratijñāvirodha* (contradiction of the thesis), a type of fault which is a point of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*) described in *Nyāyasūtra* 5.2.4, but which is rejected by Dignāga.[245] Elsewhere in PV IV (see k. 44 and 56f.) and PVin (see n. 248), however, the problem is explicitly phrased in terms of *viruddhahetu*. Thus, Dharmakīrti and his commentators phrase the opponent's argument in terms of both schemata.

It is clear that the philosophical position of the proponent under attack here is that of a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika—Śākyabuddhi notably speaks in this context of the "author of the Vaiśeṣikaśāstra" (*bye brag pa'i bstan bcos byed pa*) in PVṬ 318b3. Although the major Indian commentaries on PV do not explicitly identify the attacker, i.e., the opponent of the Vaiśeṣika, nonetheless, Bu ston's commentary to the PVin and Vibhūticandra's notes to the PVV maintain that he is a Mīmāṃsaka.[246] The attribution is quite plausible, given the Mīmāṃsaka's view that sounds/words (*śabda*) are permanent, but in fact this line of attack is not exclusive to the Mīmāṃsaka. The very same argument concerning sound's impermanence and its being a quality of space is on occasion generalized and used to attack the possiblity of any inference whatsoever: every valid reason risks to become a *viruddhahetu* because it may lead to a contradiction with a statement in a treatise. Such is one of the Cārvāka's strategems as depicted in the arguments against inference found in Kamalaśīla's TSP *ad* TS 1456–7.

We can summarize the logic of the argument in k. 43 as follows:

(a) Everything mentioned in treatises which *A* accepts is *A*'s *sādhya*.

(b) *śabdākāśaguṇatva* is mentioned in the Vaiśeṣika's treatises and hence is also the Vaiśeṣika's *sādhya* in the proof of sound's impermanence by the reason *kṛtakatva*.

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[245]See NS 5.2.1ff. which speaks of twenty-two types of points of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*), of which one is *pratijñāvirodha*; thus NS 5.2.4: *pratijñāhetvor virodhaḥ pratijñāvirodha* (*pratijñāvirodha* is a contradiction between the reason and the thesis). Dignāga in NM (TUCCI 1930, 8; KATSURA 1977, 116;) and PSV (fragment 5 and 6 in KATSURA 1975) criticized the Naiyāyikas for postulating *pratijñāvirodha* as an additional type of fallacy of the thesis, arguing that the Naiyāyika case ("Sound is eternal, because everything is non-eternal") collapses into a type of fallacy of the reason (*hetvābhāsa*), or the reason is actually a *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta* (dissimilar example). See the long note in PREISENDANZ 1994, 320ff. Finally, cf. NS 1.2.6's definition of *viruddhahetvābhāsa*: *siddhāntam abhyupetya tadvirodhī viruddhaḥ* "When one has accepted a philosophical system, what contradicts it is *viruddha*."

[246]For the reference to the Mīmāṃsaka, see Bu ston 373 which glosses PVin's *kha cig na re* as *dpyod pa ba* [= Mīmāṃsaka] *na re*. See also Vibhūticandra, PVV-n 430, n. 3, which speaks of the *vedāpauruṣeyavādin*.

(c) If sound is *ākāśaguṇa* then sound is permanent.

(d) *kṛtakatva* establishes that sound is impermanent and hence that sound is not *ākāśaguṇa*.

(e) Therefore, *kṛtakatva* establishes the opposite of the Vaiśeṣika's *sādhya* and thus leads to the fault of *viruddhahetu* or *pratijñāvirodha*.

(44) *śabdanāśe prasādhye syād gandhabhūguṇatākṣateḥ*[247] |
hetur viruddho 'prakṛter no ced anyatra sā samā ||[248]

[Here the following absurdity is deduced:] Then, when the perishability of sound is being proved, the reason ['being a product' (*kṛtakatva*)] would be contradictory (*viruddha*) due to refuting that smell is a quality of the earth [element] (*gandhabhūguṇatā*). [Objection:] Suppose [it were said] that it wouldn't, because [smell's being a quality of the earth] was not under discussion (*aprakṛti*). [Reply:] This [fact of not being under discussion (*aprakṛti*)] is the same in the other case [viz., sound's being a quality of space (*ākāśaguṇatva*].

Dharmakīrti accepts that k. 43's refutation of the Vaiśeṣika is inevitable, *providing* the *sādhya* is thought to include all properties which the school's treatises attribute to the subject. (See Dharmottara's gloss on the PVin given in n. 248.) He then takes the absurd consequences coming from this view of the *sādhya* one step further: just as[249] "being a product" (*kṛtakatva*) refutes the tenet that sound (*śabda*) is a quality of space (*ākāśaguṇa*), so "being a product" would also refute the Vaiśeṣika tenet (cf. VS 2.1.1; 2.2.3) that smell (*gandha*) is a quality of the earth element (*bhūguṇatva*); hence, when proving *anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt*, *kṛtakatva* would also be contradictory in that it would also refute the *sādhya*, *gandhabhūguṇatva*. To this the exponent of the position that the *sādhya* includes everything found in treatises, might retort by saying that "being a quality of the earth [element]" (*bhūguṇatva*) would be irrelevant in this context, as it was not

[247] PV-k(I/III) *gandhe bhūguṇatākṣateḥ*. For PV Tib. we read *dri sa'i yon tan*: P., D., N. and MIY. erroneously read *dri za'i yon tan*, but *dri za* = *gandharva*!

[248] Cf. PVin 291a7–8: *de dag gi ltar na byas ñid ni*[a] | *sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa na*[b] *dri la sogs pa'i yon tan bzlog pa'i phyir gtan tshigs 'gal bar 'gyur ro* || *skabs ma yin pa'i phyir ma yin no źe na de ni gźan la yaṅ mtshuṅs so* || ([a] D. *kyi*—[b] D. om. *na* [D.193a6–7]). PVinṬ 30b4 has an important gloss on PVin's *de dag* (they): *bstan bcos las mthoṅ ba thams cad bsgrub par bya ba yin par smra ba de dag* ... "those who say that everything found in the treatise is the *sādhya*."

[249] Cf. the *yathā* ... *tathā* construction in PVV 430, 14–20.

actually under discussion—in some sense (left unspecified for the moment), the proponent was not "talking about" smells and qualities of the earth element but only about sounds and their qualities. Dharmakīrti then replies that there would be no difference between *bhūguṇatva* and *ākāśaguṇatva* on this score: the Vaiśeṣika did not discuss or intend to prove *ākāśaguṇatva* either, but since on his view his *sādhya* was to include all which was to be found in his Vaiśeṣika treatises, *śabdākāśaguṇatva* and *gandhabhūguṇatva* would equally be his *sādhya*!

(45) *athātra dharmī prakṛtas tatra śāstrārthabādhanam* |
atha vādīṣṭatāṃ brūyād dharmidharmādisādhanaiḥ ||[250]

But [an adversary might argue that] here [i.e., in the case of *ākāśaguṇatva*] the subject ['sound'] was under discussion: in that case there [could] be invalidation of the property found in the treatise. Next, [in answer to Dharmakīrti's reply that neither *śabdākāśaguṇatva* nor *gandhabhūguṇatva* were intended by the proponent and hence that neither were under discussion, the adversary] might assert through means of proof [i.e., logical reasons] such as [its] 'being a property of the subject (*dharmidharma*)' that [*ākāśaguṇatva*] was [indeed] intended by the proponent.

The PVV elaborates on the meaning of k. 45: "[Adversary:] But here, i.e., in the case of *ākāśaguṇatva*, etc., the subject 'sound' was under discussion. In that case, there is invalidation of a property found in the treatise, viz., *ākāśaguṇatva*, etc. And when this [property] is invalidated the reason will be contradictory (*viruddha*). However, to take the case of *bhūguṇatva*, the subject 'smell' was not under discussion. Therefore, even if this [i.e., *bhūguṇatva*] is invalidated, there will be no contradiction. [Dharmakīrti's reply:] This is no answer. For indeed, the fault is not said to be because the opposite of what the proponent intended [is the case], but rather because of the contradiction with properties [found] in his treatises. And so being under discussion [or not] is inapplicable. Rather, because they are not intended by the proponent, this [*bhūguṇatva*] and *ākāśaguṇatva* are the same in not being under discussion. Next, through means of proof [i.e., logical reasons] such as [its] 'being a property of the subject' the adversary might assert that *ākāśaguṇatva* was [indeed] intended by the proponent. [The formal argument

[250]Cf. PVin 291a8–291b2: *mi mtshuṅs te 'dir chos can gyi skabs*[a] *yin pa'i phyir ro źe na* |... *'on te rgol bas kyaṅ 'dod pas sgrub par byed do*[b] || *bsgrub par bya ba spyi'i phyogs gcig tu gyur ba'i khyad par yin pa'i phyir bsgrub par bya ba'i chos bźin no źe na* | ([a] P. *skabs su*; PVinṬ reads *skabs*—[b] P. *sgrub byed*; PVinṬ *sgrub par byed pa de'i tshe*. [D. 193a7–193b2]).

(*prayoga*) is as follows:] since it is a property of the subject being proved, or since it is a part of that [combination being proved (*sādhyasamudāya*)], *ākāśaguṇatva* was intended by the proponent, just like impermanence."[251]

An adversary, subscribing to Vaiśeṣika tenets, might try to show a dissimilarity between "being a quality of space" (*ākāśaguṇatva*) and "being a quality of the earth [element]" (*bhūguṇatva*), saying that what is being proved is not *every* property found in the treatise, but rather all properties mentioned in the treatise as pertaining to the particular subject (*dharmin*) under discussion. Therefore, *ākāśaguṇatva* is being proved when the subject is sound, but *bhūguṇatva* is not—that would have necessitated a different subject, viz., smell. Thus *ākāśaguṇatva* could be refuted by the reason "being a product" (*kṛtakatva*) when one is proving that sound is impermanent, but *bhūguṇatva* could not be refuted in such a discussion. The *kārikā* does not actually give Dharmakīrti's own refutation of this argument, but some idea of it can be gleaned from Devendrabuddhi's and Manorathanandin's commentaries:

(a) The adversary makes the mistake of simply speaking of properties mentioned in treatises as being *sādhya* and does not take the proponent's intentions into account at all.

(b) Nonetheless, whether something is under discussion or not is a function of the proponent's intentions.

(c) *śabdākāśaguṇatva* and *gandhabhūguṇatva* are then the same in both being unintended, and hence in not being under discussion.

Note, however, that the PVin has a somewhat different refutation, one which appeals to the fact that neither *ākāśaguṇatva* nor *bhūguṇatva* are connected in reality with the property being proved (*sādhyadharma*), impermanence.[252]

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[251]PVV 431,9–15: *athātrākāśaguṇatvādau dharmī śabdaḥ prakṛtaḥ | tatra śāstrārthasyākāśaguṇatvādeḥ bādhanam*[a] *tadbādhane ca viruddhatā hetoḥ | bhūguṇatve tu gandho dharmy aprakṛta iti tadbādhane 'pi na virodhaḥ | naiṣa parihāraḥ | tathā hi na vādīṣṭaviparyāsanena doṣa uktaḥ | kiṃ tu śāstrārthavirodhena tathā ca prakṛtatvam anupayuktam | atha vādyaniṣṭatayā 'prakṛtatvaṃ taccākāśaguṇatvayoḥ samānam | athākāśaguṇatvasya vādīṣṭatāṃ paro brūyāt dharmidharmādisādhanaiḥ | sādhyadharmidharmatvāt tadekadeśatvād vākāśaguṇatvam iṣṭaṃ vādinā*[b] *'nityatvavad iti* | ([a] PVV *sādhanam*—[b] PVV *vādino*).

[252]See PVinṬ 31a7–31b2: *ma yin te źes bya ba ni mtshuṅs pa ñid do || chos can skabs su bab pa daṅ ma bab pa dag gis ni khyad par du gyur pa ma yin no || ci'i phyir źe na | gaṅ gi phyir chos can skabs su bab pa yin yaṅ mi rtag pa ñid sgrub pa na | gaṅ la dṅos po la 'brel ba yod pa de ni ma smos kyaṅ bsgrub bya ñid du 'gyur ba yin te | dper na bdag med pa la sogs pa lta bu'o || nam mkha'i yon tan ñid la ni de ltar dṅos la 'brel ba yod pa ma yin te | de med pa'i rgyu'i phyir ro || 'on kyaṅ 'di dag ni bstan bcos khas blaṅs pa'i rgyu kho nas bsgrub par bya ba ñid du 'brel*

Finally, in k. 45cd, the adversary seeks to argue that *ākāśaguṇatva is* in fact intended by the proponent, while *bhūguṇatva* is not.[253] Devendrabuddhi's PVP and Vibhūticandra's notes to PVV give the details of the two formal logical reasonings used by Dharmakīrti's adversary to prove his point: "Whatever is a quality of the subject (*dharmin*) is being proved (*sādhya*), because it is a property of the subject (*dharmidharma*), just like the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*)." Or: "Whatever is a quality of one part of the combination [of subject and property] being proved (*sādhyasamudāyaikadeśaviśeṣa*), that is intended to be proved (*sādhya*) by the proponent, just like, for instance, the property to be proved. Similarly, [*ākāśaguṇatva*] is also a quality of the subject."[254]

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ba na bstan bcos khas blaṅs pa de ni sa'i yon tan la sogs pa thams cad la yaṅ mtshuṅs pa yin te | *de'i phyir nam mkha'i yon tan ñid daṅ* | *sa'i yon tan 'di gñis*[a] *la luṅ gi sgo nas 'oṅs pa'i bsgrub par bya ba ñid du bye brag med do* || ([a] P. *ñid* [D. 27a6–b3]) "No, i.e., they are in fact similar. There is no difference whether the subject is under discussion or not. Why? For the following reasons: Even when the subject is under discussion, if one then proves impermanence, whatever is necessarily connected in reality would be the *sādhya*, albeit not stated, as for example [properties] like selflessness (*nairātmya*). But *ākāśaguṇatva* will have no such necessary connection (*'brel ba* = *sambandha*) in reality, for the reason that it does not exist. However, if these [i.e., *ākāśaguṇatva*, etc.] are connected as *sādhya* merely because of acceptance in treatises, then this acceptance in treatises is completely the same in the case of *bhūguṇatva* and the like, and therefore *ākāśaguṇatva* and *bhūguṇatva* both have no difference in being *sādhya* which stem from scriptures."

[253]If we follow Dharmottara's interpretation, the adversary actually abandons his definition of the *sādhya* as being "what is accepted in treatises" in favour of "what is intended by the proponent." PVinṬ 31b3–5: *'di sñyam du bstan bcos khas blaṅs pa'i phyir bsgrub byar 'gyur ba ni ma yin gyi* | *'on kyaṅ rgol ba 'dod pa yin pa'i phyir ro* || *rgol ba la skabs su bab pa'i chos can la ji sñed yod pa'i chos de thams cad bsgrub par bya ba ñid du 'dod pa yod pa yin te* || *des na de*[a] *kho na la bsgrub par bya ba ñid yod pa yin no* || *chos can gźan la brten pa bsgrub par bya ba ñid du mi 'dod pa'i phyir 'di la yaṅ bsgrub par 'dod pa ma grub par 'gyur ba ni ma yin no źe na* | ([a] Ego *de*: P. D. om. [D. 27b2–4]) "The following might be thought: something does not become the *sādhya* because it is accepted in treatises, but rather because of the proponent's intention. For the proponent the properties which pertain to the subject under discussion are all intended to be proved (*sādhya*), and thus this alone is what is being proved. What relies on another subject is not intended to be proved. Consequently, it is not so that this [*ākāśaguṇatva*] is also not established as intended to be proved."

[254]PVP 332a1–3: *chos can gyi bye brag*[a] *gaṅ yin pa de ni bsgrub*[b] *par bya ba yin te* | *chos can gyi*[c] *chos ñid yin pa'i phyir bsgrub*[d] *par bya ba'i chos bźin no* || *sogs pa smos pa*[e] *ni* | *gaṅ daṅ gaṅ bsgrub par bya ba'i spyi'i phyogs gcig gi bye brag gis gaṅ yin pa de ni bsgrub par bya ba ñid du rgol bas 'dod pa yin te* | *dper na bsgrub par bya ba'i chos lta bu'o* || *de bźin du chos can*[f] *gyi khyad par yaṅ yin no źe na* | ([a] P. *cha bye brag*—[b] P. *sgrub*—[c] D. om. *gyi*—[d] P. *sgrub*—[e] P. *pas*—[f] D. om. *can* [D. 278b1–2]). PVV-n *ad* k. 45, n.2: *yo dharmiṇo viśeṣaḥ sādhyasamudāyaikadeśaviśeṣo vā sa sādhyaḥ* "Whatever is a quality of the subject or is a quality of one part of the combination [of subject and property] being proved, that is being proved (*sādhya*)."

(46) *kaiścit prakaraṇair icchā bhavet sā gamyate ca taiḥ* |
balāt tavaccheyam[255] *iti vyaktam īśvaraceṣṭitam* ||[256]

[Dharmakīrti's reply to k. 45cd:] It is because of some contexts of discussion (*prakaraṇa*) that there would be an intention. And this [intention] is understood by means of those [contexts]. If one says [of a proponent who does not himself intend to prove a particular property], 'You have this intention because of the force [of a means of proof (*sādhana*)],' then it is obviously the work of God!

Dharmakīrti refers back to his previously stated view (see k. 31) that the proponent's intentions are conditioned by the contexts of the discussions—what the debate is about — and he ridicules the adversary's attempt to use the above-described inconclusive arguments to say that someone *must* have certain intentions. Here in PV IV Dharmakīrti does not seem to criticize explicitly the *sādhana* alluded to in k. 45cd, contenting himself with some caustic sarcasm. In PVin 291b2–4, however, he attacks the reasons as leading to the absurdity (*atiprasaṅga*) that one would have a constant, never ceasing, intention to prove *ākāśaguṇatva*, etc. Moreover, to say that the proponent *must* have these intentions is simply contradicted by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*): it is plainly not true that people always intend to prove *whatever* is a property of a particular subject—they want to prove some properties but not others. Devendrabuddhi, in the same vein, criticizes the reasons, *dharmidharmatva* and *sādhyasamudāyaikadeśaviśeṣatva*, by arguing that because there is no *sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* (*pramāṇa* which invalidates the presence of the reason in the contrary of the *sādhya[dharma]*), the *vyāpti* (pervasion) is not established, and the reasons are hence *śeṣavat* (with remainder).[257]

(47) *vadann akāryaliṅgāṃ*[258] *tāṃ vyabhicāreṇa bādhyate* |
anāntarīyake cārthe bādhite 'nyasya kā kṣatiḥ ||[259]

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[255] MIY. *taveccheyam.*

[256] PV IV, k. 46 = PVin III, k. 7; 291b4–5.

[257] PVP 332a3–4: *'di ltar chos can chos sogs sgrub byed kyis rgol ba'i 'dod pa 'grub par mi 'gyur te | bzlog na gnod pa can gyi tshad ma med pas*[a] *khyab pa med pa'i phyir | rjes su dpag pa lhag ma daṅ ldan pa ñid du 'gyur ro* || ([a] D. *ma yin pas* [D. 278b2–3]) "Thus *sādhana* [i.e., logical reasons] such as *dharmidharma*, etc. will not establish the intention of the proponent, for since there is no [*sādhya*]*viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa*, there is no *vyāpti*. The inference becomes *śeṣavat*." Note that the term *sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* had been interpreted somewhat differently in KAJIYAMA 1966, 97 and MIMAKI 1976, 59–66; cf. STEINKELLNER 1991b, 314ff. and our n. 159 above.

[258] MIY. *vadan na kāryaliṅgāṃ.* Cf. PVV *tām icchām akāryaliṅgāṃ** *kāryetaraliṅgām.* *Text reads *akāryaliṅgajāṃ.*

[259] PV IV, k. 47 = PVin III, k. 8; 291b5.

> One who says that this [intention] has something other than an effect as the reason [proving its existence] is invalidated on account of [such a reason] being deviant (*vyabhicāra*). And [furthermore], although an entity [i.e., *ākāśaguṇatva*] which is not invariably related [with what is to be proved, i.e., 'impermanence',] might be invalidated, what refutation is there of the other [term, i.e., what is to be proved]?

One can infer the presence of a speaker's intention from its effects (*kārya*), viz., his words—this theme recurs constantly in the PV.[260] The adversary, however, sees that this *kāryaliṅga* will not prove that when the proponent is speaking about sound's impermanence he also intends to prove *ākāśaguṇatva*. He thus proposes another type of reason, one which is not a *kāryaliṅga*. This is predictably discounted by Dharmakīrti as leading to deviance, i.e., the *vyāpti* will not hold.

According to Dharmottara, the adversary might then argue: "Even though *ākāśaguṇatva* were not under discussion, still if it were invalidated, the *sādhya* would be invalidated. Hence, the establishment of the *sādhya* goes together with the establishment of this [*ākāśaguṇatva*], and consequently the latter is also the *sādhya*."[261] Dharmakīrti certainly does acknowledge that what is necessarily connected with what is to be proved should not be refuted—this is only reasonable, as a negation of what the *sādhya* entails would lead to the negation of the *sādhya* by contraposition. Arguably, it would still be quite another matter for a Dharmakīrtian to say that what is necessarily connected with the *sādhya is* also itself being proved (*sādhya*, or, what would be even stronger, that it was somehow *intended* to be proved. Dharmottara (see n. 252) at least did seem to subscribe to the first position, saying that all which is necessarily connected with the *sādhya* is also being proved. In PV IV, k. 47, however, this issue is not addressed: Dharmakīrti simply argues that there is in fact no necessary connection (*sambandha*), or in other terms, no invariable relation (*nāntarīyakatā*), between *ākāśaguṇatva* and the actual *sādhya*, impermanence. Proving impermanence by means of the logical reason, "being a product" (*kṛtakatva*), does not also entail proving *ākāśaguṇatva*; nor does denying *ākāśaguṇatva* logically imply denying impermanence.

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[260]Cf. PV I, k. 213 and PV II, k. 1–2; see our remarks to PV IV, k. 16.

[261]PVinṬ 33a4–5: *'di sñam du gal te nam mkha'i yon tan ñid skabs su bab pa ma yin pa de ltar na yaṅ de la gnod na bsgrub bya la gnod par 'gyur bas bsgrub par bya ba grub pa ni de grub pa daṅ lhan gcig pa yin te | des na bsgrub bya yin no sñam na |* (D. 29a1–2).

2.5.3 The general role of treatises and scripture in logical argumentation

(48) *uktaṃ ca nāgamāpekṣam anumānaṃ svagocare* |
siddhaṃ tena susiddhaṃ tan na tadā śāstram īkṣyate ||[262]

Now, it has [already] been said that an inference [which functions by the force of real entities (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*)] does not depend upon scripture with regard to its object, [i.e., what is to be proved (*sādhya*)].[263] What is established by such an [inference], is well established; at the time [of making such an inference],[264] a treatise is not taken into account.

The reference is to PV IV, k. 2: *anumāviṣaye neṣṭaṃ...* | *vācaḥ prāmāṇyam* "Speech is not held to be a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) with regard to the realm of an inference." PVV *ad* k. 2 specifies that the inference at stake here is *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*.

We have treated of the epistemological school's position on scriptural authority in some detail elsewhere.[265] So without pretending to develop fully the problem here, let us briefly describe the background of k. 48–51. First of all, the usual type of inference, such as that of sound's impermanence, which proceeds objectively from one real state of affairs (*artha*) to another (cf. PV IV, k. 16) and involves a natural connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*) between the terms, is known as *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*. Dharmakīrti also accepts that there are inferences which are based on passages in accepted scriptures (*āgamāśrita*), rather than upon the real states of affairs themselves, but maintains that these inferences are permissible only in cases of radically inaccessible (*atyantaparokṣa*)[266] objects, namely, those, such as the details of the law of karman, which cannot be ascertained by

[262] PV IV, k. 48 = PVin III, k. 9; 291b5–6 (without *pāda* d).

[263] Cf. PVV 432, 11: *vastubalpravṛttam anumānaṃ nāgamāpekṣaṃ svasya gocare sādhya iti.*

[264] Cf. PVV 432, 13–14: *tadānumākāle śāstrasyānāśrayaṇāt.* We follow DS in reading *tadānumākāle*; RS reads *tadānukāle*.

[265] See TILLEMANS 1990a, I / 23–35 and the references therein, TILLEMANS 1999a; cf. YAITA 1987, HAYES 1984, VAN BIJLERT 1989, 80–82 and 122–125 and the introduction to TILLEMANS 1993, 9ff. For references and explanations concerning *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*, see also JACKSON 1987, II / 428–430 (n. 146).

[266] The translation of the term *atyantaparokṣa* has posed us considerable problems, one of them being that a literal rendering of *atyantaparokṣa* by "completely imperceptible" and of *parokṣa* by "imperceptible" is anomalous since imperceptibility should not admit of degrees. We have opted for "radically inaccessible" for *atyantaparokṣa* and have kept "imperceptible" for *parokṣa*. On the rare occasion when *parokṣa* is actually being used to mean *atyantaparokṣa* (see k. 106), we have altered the translation to "inaccessible."

means of direct perception or *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*. A treatise or scripture will be authoritative for such inferences, if it passes the following investigation:

(a) Its accounts of perceptible states of affairs (*pratyakṣa*) are not refuted by direct perception.

(b) Its accounts of imperceptible states of affairs (*parokṣa*), such as selflessness (*nairātmya*), which are accessible to the usual *vastubala*-type inference, are not refuted by any *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*.

(c) The treatise's statements concerning radically inaccessible (*atyantaparokṣa*) states of affairs are not directly or indirectly contradicted by other statements in the treatise, i.e., by another scripturally based inference (*āgamāśritānumāna*).

*Kārikā*s 48 and 49 stress that when one is analysing a treatise to see whether it satisfies criteria (a) and (b), one cannot *at that time* use the treatise's own statements to prove anything: one can only rely on inferences whose validity can be assessed independently, i.e., *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*. Clearly, to do otherwise would make the evaluative investigation run the risk of circularity, for one would rely on the treatise to evaluate the selfsame treatise. Hence Dharmakīrti's important point (in k. 48f.) that the treatise should not be taken into account at the time one is investigating its statements by means of *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*. It is only *after* criteria (a) and (b) have been satisfied that one may proceed to (c)—this is the point of k. 50f. (see n. 273). Note that Dharmakīrti's method for determining the authority of treatises and scriptures was initially developed in PV I, k. 215–217, these verses being in turn an explanation of PS II, k. 5a.[267]

(49) *vādatyāgas tadā syāc cen na tadānabhyupāyataḥ* |
upāyo hy abhyupāye 'yam anaṅgaṃ sa tadāpi san ||[268]

[Objection:] But in that case the debate would be relinquished. [Reply:] No, because there is no acceptance [of a treatise] at the time [of making a *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*].[269] Indeed, this [in-

[267]PV I, k. 215–216: *pratyakṣenānumānena dvividhenāpy abādhanam* | *dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthayor asyāvisaṃvādas tadarthayoḥ* || *āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā* | *buddher agatyābhihitā parokṣe 'py asya gocare* ||. PS II, k. 5a: *āptavākyāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā*. Trans. in VAN BIJLERT 1989, 122–124 and TILLEMANS 1990a, 24–25. Trans. of PV I, k. 213–217 with PVSV in YAITA 1987.

[268]PV IV, k. 49 = PVin III, k. 10; k. 10 and k. 11a are missing in P., but found in D. 193b6.

[269]Cf. PVinṬ 33b4–5: *dṅos po'i stobs kyis źugs pa'i rjes su dpag pa'i dus de'i tshe khas blaṅs pa med pa'i phyir ro* ||. Cf. PVV's gloss on *tadā*, *sādhanopanyāsakāle*, and PVV-n, n. 1, *vastubalapravṛtte*.

vestigation (*vicāra*)] is the method for accepting [a treatise]; [so] even if there is [acceptance of a treatise] at this time, this is not a factor.[270]

On the opponent's position, see our explanations to k. 53.

(50) *tathā*[271] *viśuddhe viṣayadvaye śāstraparigraham* |
cikīrṣoḥ sa hi kālaḥ syāt tadā śāstreṇa bādhanam ||[272]

When the two [types of] objects [viz., those which are perceptible (*pratyakṣa*) and those which are imperceptible (*parokṣa*)] are [ascertained as] faultless in this manner [i.e., by means of direct perception and inference], then for one who wishes to adopt the treatise, this would indeed be the occasion [to accept it]. It is at this time that there [can] be invalidation (*bādhana*) on account of a treatise.[273]

(51) *tadvirodhena cintāyās tatsiddhārtheṣv*[274] *ayogataḥ* |
tṛtīyasthānasaṃkrāntau nyāyyaḥ[275] *śāstraparigrahaḥ* ||[276]

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[270]PVV 432, 20–21: *śāstrābhyupāye 'yaṃ vicāra upāyaḥ* | *tatas tadā vicārakāle sann apy abhyupagamo 'naṅgaṃ ...*

[271]PV-k(III) *tathā*; PV-k(I) *śāstrā*; PV-k(II) *tadā*. PV Tib. *de ltar* = *tathā*.

[272]PV IV, k. 50 = PVin III, k. 11; 291b6.

[273]See PVBh 505, 3–4: *tathety anumānena pratyakṣeṇa ca viṣayadvayasya pratyakṣaparokṣasya viśuddhatāyāṃ yadi tāvatā na paritoṣas tadā śāstraparigrahacikīrṣāyāṃ sa hi kālaḥ syād abhyupagamasya* | *tadaiva śāstreṇa bādhanam* |. We have in the main followed Prajñākaragupta here; Manorathanandin does not comment upon *śāstraparigrahaṃ cikīrṣoḥ*, but speaks only of *śāstrāśrayaṇenānumānaṃ cikīrṣoḥ sataḥ* "when one wishes to make an inference by recourse to a treatise." PVV 433, 4: *śāstropadarśite viṣayadvaye pratyakṣaparokṣe rūpanairātmyādau tadā pramāṇapravṛttyā viśuddhe nirṇīte sati paścād atyantaparokṣe svargādau śāstreṇa śāstrāśrayaṇenānumānaṃ cikīrṣoḥ sataḥ sa hi kālo 'bhyupagamasya*[a] *yadi śāstrabādho na bhavet* | *atas tadā śāstreṇa bādhanaṃ sādhyasādhanāder iṣyate* | ([a] Text has *abhyupagamya*; cf. PVBh above) "Suppose the two [types of] objects taught in the treatise—viz., perceptible and imperceptible [objects] such as form and selflessness [respectively]—are ascertained by the action of a *pramāṇa* as being faultless. Then, subsequently (*paścāt*), when one wishes to make an inference concerning radically inaccessible [objects] (*atyantaparokṣa*), such as heaven, by means of a treatise, or by recourse to a treatise, then this is indeed the occasion for acceptance, provided that this treatise is not invalidated. Therefore, at this time, one admits that *sādhya*, *sādhana*, etc. can be invalidated on account of a treatise."

[274]MIY. *tat siddhārtheṣv*.

[275]MIY. *nyāyaḥ*.

[276]PV IV, k. 51 = PVin III, k. 12; 291b6–7.

[This is] because one should not think that things established by means of that [treatise] are in contradiction with that [treatise]. When one proceeds to the third type of existent [i.e., *atyantaparokṣa*], it is correct to adopt a treatise.

There seem to be two different commentarial interpretations of *tadvirodhena* in k. 51ab. Devendrabuddhi, and probably Manorathanandin, understood k. 51b as follows: *due to the fact that* the proponent contradicts his treatise, the contents of that treatise could no longer be invoked in any deliberation.[277] Accordingly, if we followed Devendrabuddhi, k. 51ab would have to be translated as: "[This is] because, due to a contradiction with the [treatise] (*tadvirodhena*), it would be unfitting to deliberate upon the things established in that [treatise]." We have, however, preferred *not* to interpret *tadvirodhena* as giving a reason (i.e., "due to"), but instead to take it together with *cintāyās*: "think that ... are in contradiction with that." Note that the Tibetan translation of *tadvirodhena cintāyās* by *de daṅ ni 'gal bar sems pa* supports this latter interpretation and that Prajñākaragupta also seems to have construed k. 51ab in this way.[278]

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[277]PVP 333a2–4: *de tshe bstan bcos ñid kyis gnod par rgol ba la 'gyur ro || ci'i phyir źe na | de daṅ 'gal ba ste | bstan bcos daṅ 'gal bas so || de grub pa'i don te bstan bcos la mthoṅ ba'i don dag la dpyod pa gaṅ yin pa de'i | dpyod du mi ruṅ ñid phyir ro || bstan bcos la 'gal ba yod na des bstan pa'i don mi ruṅ ba'i phyir te | rten*[a] *med pa'i dpyad pa mi 'jug go źes bya ba'i don to* | ([a] P. D.[279a5–6] *gtan*. PVṬ comments on *rten* [see n. 280]) "At that time the proponent would incur invalidation on account of the treatise itself. Why? Because, due to contradiction with that, i.e., due to contradiction with the treatise, it would be unfitting to deliberate upon the things established in that, i.e., upon the things which are found in the treatise. If there is a contradiction in the treatise, then since the things which the [treatise] teaches are unfitting, the deliberation, which is without any basis, will not function."

[278]PVBh 505, 8–12: *na hi parīkṣye*[a] *śāstrābhyupagame tadvirodhena cintā tacchāstraprasiddhe 'rthe yuktā | tathā hi | parīkṣitaṃ tad yadi śāstram uccaiḥ pratijñayā tat katham asya vācyaṃ*[b] *parīkṣaṇaṃ tasya punar na kāryaṃ parīkṣaṇaṃ cen na parīkṣitaṃ tat || tasmāt parīkṣya pratyakṣānumānābhyāṃ tadaviṣayaṃ tṛtīyasthānasaṃkrāntinimittaṃ śāstrābhyupagama iti nānumānaviṣayasya śāstraṃ bādhakam* | ([a] *sic* RS, but cf. PVBh Tib. 186b2 *brtags nas bstan bcos khas blaṅs na* implying *parīkṣya*—[b] *sic* RS, but PVBh Tib. 186b3 has *gnod*, suggesting that we should read some form of *BĀDH*, e.g., *bādhyaṃ*) "Indeed, when one has examined and then accepted a treatise, it is not reasonable to think that the things established by that treatise are in contradiction with it [i.e., the treatise]. For, if this treatise has been much examined, how could it be invalidated by the [proponent's] thesis? Another investigation of the [treatise] should not be undertaken; if there is investigation, the [treatise] was not examined. Therefore, when one has examined by means of perception and inference, the ground for proceeding to the third type of existent is one which does not concern this [perception or inference], [but] is the acceptance of a treatise. Thus, a treatise is not an invalidator (*bādhaka*) for the realm of inference."

The point of k. 51ab is to provide a reason for k. 50d's assertion, "It is at this time that there [can] be invalidation (*bādhana*) on account of a treatise." Once a proponent has accepted a treatise, then its propositions concerning radically inaccessible matters (*atyantaparokṣa*) can invalidate a thesis which directly or indirectly is in contradiction with the description of those matters in the treatise. The proponent cannot allow or think that his thesis concerning radically inaccessible subjects (*dharmin*)—subjects which are establishable *only* by means of a treatise—is in fact in contradiction with that selfsame treatise which he accepts. If such a contradiction occurs, the proponent's thesis is thereby invalidated.[279]

Contrary to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and other schools, which use proofs from authority in the case of both empirical and nonempirical matters (*dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārtha*), the Buddhist uses them only in the case of *atyantaparokṣa*, that is, things which are inaccessible to perception and *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*. For *atyantaparokṣa*, however, not only *may* treatises be used, but indeed they *must* be used to ascertain these otherwise rationally inaccessible truths: the natures of radically inaccessible subjects (*dharmin*) are only knowable through recourse to treatises. Hence Dharmakīrti's statement in k. 51cd: "When one proceeds to the third type of existent [i.e., *atyantaparokṣa*], it is correct to adopt a treatise."[280]

(52) *tatrāpi sādhyadharmasya nāntarīyakabādhanam*[281] |
parihāryaṃ na cānyeṣām anavasthāprasaṅgataḥ ||[282]

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[279]Cf. PVinṬ 34b4–5: *bstan bcos khas blaṅs na yaṅ de daṅ 'gal ba'i don khas mi blaṅ ste* | *de khas len na bstan bcos kyis*[a] *gnod par 'gyur ro* || *dper na bstan bcos las rab tu grags pa'i chos khas blaṅs nas de daṅ 'gal ba bde ba ma yin pa rab tu ster ba ñid smra na bstan bcos kyis*[a] *gnod pa bźin no* ||([a] *sic* following D.; P. reads *kyi* [30a5–7]) "If one has accepted the treatise, things in contradiction with it should not be accepted; for if one does accept them, one will be invalidated by the treatise. For example, when one has accepted the Dharma recognized in a treatise, then if one asserts something which contradicts that [treatise], such as that [Dharma] bestows unhappiness [on people], this would be invalidated by the treatise."

[280]For the Naiyāyika position see NS 1.1.7f.: *āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ* | *sa dvividho dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthatvāt* |. On the indispensability of scripture see PVinṬ 34b3–4: *gnas gsum pa dbaṅ po las 'das par 'pho ba na* | *bstan bcos len pa rigs ldan yin te* | *gdon mi za bar bya ba yin te* | *bstan bcos khas ma blaṅs na ni dpyod pa'i gźi med pa'i phyir ro* || "When one proceeds to the third type of existent, which transcends the senses, it is justified to adopt a treatise, i.e., this definitely should be done; for if one does not accept a treatise, there will be no basis for the investigation." See also PVṬ 320a2–3 which comments on Devendrabuddhi's phrase *rten med pa* (no basis; see n. 277) in terms of the nonexistence of the *dharmin* (*chos can*) recognized in the treatises: *rten med pa źes bya ba ni bstan bcos la 'gal ba yod na de la rab tu grags pa'i chos can yaṅ yod pa ma yin pa de bas na rten med pa'i dpyod pa mi 'jug go* |.

[281]PV-k(III), MIY. *sambaddhasyaiva bādhanam.* PV-k(I/II)'s *nāntarīyakabādhanam* is supported by PV Tib. *med na mi 'byuṅ la gnod ñid.*

[282]PV IV, k. 52 = PVin III, k. 13; 291b7.

> In this case too [when one adopts a treatise], the invalidation of what is invariably related (*nāntarīyaka*) with the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*) [as for example, selflessness (*nairātmya*) with momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*)][283] is to be avoided, but not [the invalidation] of other things; for then it would follow absurdly that there would be no end (*anavasthā*).

2.5.4 Does engaging in logical debate presuppose that one holds the tenets found in the treatise of some philosophical school?

The PVV provides the following introduction to k. 53: "[Objection:] But a debate should not be engaged in unless one has relied upon a treatise. Thus, also in the case of an inference which functions due to the force of real entities (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*), there is reliance upon a treatise. [Dharmakīrti] replies:"[284]

(53) *keneyaṃ sarvacintāsu śāstraṃ grāhyam iti sthitiḥ |*
kṛtedānīm asiddhāntair grāhyo dhūmena nānalaḥ ||[285]

> Who made this rule that a treatise must be held in every deliberation? Now [if that were so], then people who had no philosophical tenets (*asiddhānta*) could not understand fire by means of smoke.

The objection which provoked k. 53 as a reply was no doubt based on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika views and is essentially the same objection as in k. 49—although in both cases precisely who the adversary was remains unanswered by Dharmakīrti and his commentators. Prajñākaragupta introduces k. 53 as replying to the charge that if one engaged in debate without accepting a treatise, one would simply be a caviller (*vaitaṇḍika*) and a nihilist (*nāstika*), raising objections without having a position of one's own.[286] The opponent's views are thus in keeping with

[283]See PVV 433, 14–15: *...sādhyadharmasya yan nāntarīyakaṃ sambaddhaṃ yathā kṣaṇikatvasya nairātmyaṃ tasya bādhanaṃ parihāryam |*. On the connection between impermanence / momentariness and selflessness, see e.g., PV II, k. 254ab. See n. 355 below.

[284]PVV 433, 20–21: *nanu śāstram anapekṣya na vādaḥ kartavya iti vastubalapravṛttānumāne 'pi śāstrāpekṣety āha.*

[285]PV IV, k. 53 = PVin III, k. 14; 291b7–8.

[286]PVBh 505, 21: *nanu śāstram anabhyupagamyāpi vāde vaitaṇḍikaḥ syāt | anāśritaśāstrakasya nāstikatvāt |* "[Objection:] But surely, in a debate, when one has not even accepted a treatise, one would be a caviller, for he who does not base himself upon a treatise is a nihilist." As we argued in connection with k. 42, Uddyotakara, in the NV, rejected Dignāga's proviso *svayam* and the view that the thesis should be "independent of treatises" (*śāstrānapekṣa*)—thus Uddyotakara is one of the plausible candidates for being the opponent in this discussion.

the Naiyāyika's definition of debate (*vāda*) in NS 1.2.1, which speaks of *vāda* not contradicting the school's philosophical tenets (*siddhāntāviruddha*). For the Naiyāyika, arguing without holding a system of tenets at all would be cavil (*vitaṇḍā*), as defined in NS 1.2.3. Dharmakīrti's initial reply is to invoke the obvious fact that unphilosophical people certainly do make inferences; following the Naiyāyika's strictures, however, their ordinary day to day inferences—such as inferring that there is fire because there is smoke—would all become impossible, because no treatises are relied upon.

The PVV then introduces k. 54 as follows: "Now, for anyone to have a connection (*sambandha*) with philosophical tenets is incoherent. For indeed, if there were [such] a connection, it would be either congenital (*sahaja*) or dependent upon contingent conditions (*aupādhika*). To negate both [these alternatives Dharmakīrti] states:"[287]

(54) *riktasya jantor*[288] *jātasya guṇadoṣam apaśyataḥ* |
vilabdhā vata kenāmī siddhāntaviṣamagrahāḥ[289] ||[290]

When a person is born without [philosophical tenets] and does not see [their] virtues and faults, then alas, who bestowed [upon him] these wicked demons (*graha*)[291] of philosophical tenets!

If we accepted the opponent's view that a person is always answerable for *his* philosophical tenets, Dharmakīrti would then ask in what sense a person *has* or is connected with these tenets. "When a person is born without [philosophical tenets]" shows that there is no congenital (*sahaja*) connection; "does not see [their] virtues and faults" shows that there is no connection dependent upon contingent conditions (*aupādhika*). In other words, tenets are certainly not congenital parts of a person, like the organs of his body. They would only become *his* when contingent conditions had been satisfied, viz., that he had evaluated them by means of *pramāṇa*s: the virtues and faults of tenets cannot be understood simply

[287] PVV 434, 2–3: *na ca kasyacit siddhāntasambandho yuktaḥ* | *tathā hi sambandho bhavan sahajo vā bhaved aupādhiko vā* | *dvayam api niṣeddhum āha* |.

[288] MIY. *jantoj*.

[289] MIY. *siddhāntaviṣam agrahāḥ*.

[290] PV IV, k. 54 = PVin III, k. 2; 285b6–7.

[291] Cf. M. Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* s.v. *graha*: "... evil demons or spirits who seize or exercise a bad influence on the body and mind of man." Devendrabuddhi specifies that these tenets are like wicked demons because one cannot get rid of them. See PVV-n 434, n. 5, which is a small fragment of PVP: *tyājayitum aśakyatvāt*.

by citing scripture.[292] However, prior to a person's making an independent evaluation by means of *pramāṇa*s, the tenets could not be attributed to him—who then decrees or decides that he is still answerable for various treatise-based positions? As Prajñākaragupta explains, the conclusion is: "Therefore, inference does not presuppose the acceptance of treatises."[293]

(55) *yadi sādhana ekatra sarvaṃ śāstraṃ nidarśane*[294] |
darśayet sādhanaṃ syād ity eṣā lokottarā sthitiḥ ||[295]

It is said that if, on the basis of the example, [the proponent] could show that all the [properties found in] treatises were [pervaders (*vyāpaka*)] of one and the same means of proof (*sādhana*) [i.e., the logical reason], then [the latter] would be a [valid] *sādhana*. This rule is out of this world, [for in the world there actually are some *sādhana*, but if this were correct, there would not be any *sādhana* at all]![296]

The position of Dharmakīrti's adversary is that the only reasons which could be considered valid would be those which did in fact imply all the properties spoken of in treatises in connection with the proof in question. In short, if some treatises held properties *Q*, *R* (e.g., the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*'s position that sound is a "quality

[292]PVP 334a3–4: *gñis pa yaṅ ma yin te* | *luṅ tsam gyis yon tan ñes pa ma mthoṅ ba*[a] *la'o* || ([a] *sic* D. [280a3], P. om.) "It is not the second [type of connection] either, for virtues and faults are not seen by means of mere scripture."

[293]PVBh 506, 10: *tasmān na śāstrābhyupagamapūrvakam anumānam* |.

[294]PV-k(I) *sarvaśāstranidarśane*.

[295]PV IV, k. 55 = PVin III, k. 15; 291b8–292a1.

[296]Additions follow PVinṬ 35a5–6: *gal te dpe la bstan bcos las mthoṅ ba'i don kun sgrub par byed pa gcig la khyab par byed pa yin par ñe bar bstan pa de lta na sgrub par 'gyur ro źe na* | *'di ni 'jig rten las 'das pa'i lugs śig go* | *'jig rten la sgrub par byed pa cuṅ zad yod pa kho na ste* | *de lta na ni sgrub par byed pa 'ga' yaṅ med par 'gyur te* | (D. 30b6–7). Tibetan commentators, such as dGe 'dun grub pa, follow Dharmottara and emphasize that pervasion (*vyāpti*) is being spoken of here. dGe 'dun grub pa summarizes the opponent's view as "if something is a valid reason, then one should show, on the basis of the example, that it will be pervaded by all scriptural properties (*luṅ don*)"; see dGe 302, 1–2: *gal te mthun dpe la bstan bcos kun gyis sgrub par byed pa gcig ñid la khyab par bstan pa* | *sgrub byed yaṅ dag tu 'gyur ro źe na* | *rtags yaṅ dag yin na* | *luṅ don kun gyis mthun dpe'i steṅ du khyab pa bstan dgos so źes pa 'di ni chos can* | *mi 'thad de* | *'jig rten gyi tha snyad las 'das pa'i lugs ṅan yin pa'i phyir* |. While Manorathanandin does not speak of *vyāpaka* | *vyāpti* in his commentary on this *kārikā*, he does in connection with k. 56, which is a continuation of the argument in k. 55. Finally, note that Devendrabuddhi brings out Dharmakīrti's caustic humour: *de dag 'jig rten 'das lugs sam źes bźad gad du mdzad pa'o* "He ridicules [this position] by saying 'Are these rules which are out of this world?' "

of space," *ākāśaguṇa*) and others held *S* and *T*, then a reason *P* (e.g., "being produced," *kṛtakatva*) would be valid only if *Q*, *R*, *S* and *T* were indeed implied by *P*. The demand is absurdly strong: the result would be that there could no longer be any valid reasons at all, for treatises contradict each other in ascribing mutually incompatible properties.[297]

The adversary here and in what follows takes up the theme, begun in k. 43, that a reason which proves the opposite of a property ascribed in a treatise incurs the fault of being a contradictory reason (*viruddhahetu*).[298]

2.5.5 *viruddhahetu* again

(56) *asambaddhasya dharmasya kim asiddhau na sidhyati |*
hetus tatsādhanāyoktaḥ kiṃ duṣṭas tatra sidhyati ||[299]

When an unconnected property [such as *ākāśaguṇatva*] is not established, then why should [impermanence (*anityatva*), which is what one sought to prove and which is a pervader (*vyāpaka*) of the reason, 'being a product' (*kṛtakatva*)] not be established? Why should the reason which was stated as a *sādhana* for that [pervader, i.e., impermanence] be faulty when the latter [which is its actual *sādhya*] is established?[300]

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[297]Cf. PVBh 506, 16: *śāstravirodho hi parihartum aśakya eva | śāstrāṇām eva parasparavirodhāt |*. Cf. also the summary of the argument in Bu ston 378, 6–7: *rtags la luṅ don ma lus pas khyab pa ṅes dgos źes bya ba 'di ni 'jig rten las 'das pa'i lugs yin te | 'jig rten na rtags yaṅ dag yod kyaṅ luṅ don ma lus pas khyab pa ṅes pa med pa'i phyir ro ||* "When it is said that there must be the certainty that the reason (*rtags* = *liṅga*) is pervaded by all scriptural properties without exception, this is a rule which is out of this world; for in the world there are valid reasons, but there is no certainty that they are pervaded by all scriptural properties without exception."

[298]PVP 334a8–b2: *de lta ma yin na | chos gcig ma bstan pa na yaṅ rjes su 'gro ba can de ñid la gnod pa'i phyir | gtan tshigs thams cad 'gal ba daṅ dpe bsgrub par bya bas stoṅ par 'gyur ro źe na |* (D. 280a 6) "[Opponent:] Otherwise, if one *dharma* were not demonstrated, then that which has co-presence (*anvaya*) [with it] would be invalidated. Therefore, reasons would all become contradictory, and the examples would be void of what is to be proved (*sādhya*)." Cf. NS 1.2.6's definition of *viruddhahetu*: "When one has accepted a set of philosophical tenets (*siddhānta*), [the reason] which is in contradiction with it is [termed] *viruddha* (*siddhāntam abhyupetya tadvirodhī viruddhaḥ*)."

[299]PV IV, k. 56 = PVin III, k. 16; 292a1.

[300]For additions, see PVV. The phrase *tatra sidhyati* should be understood as a locative absolute in accordance with PV Tib.: *de grub yin na de sgrub brjod || gtan tshigs skyon ldan ji ltar yin |*.

Dharmakīrti continues his reply to the opponent in k. 55 by saying that there is, at any rate, no danger that a logical reason, like "being a product" (*kṛtakatva*) be contradictory, because it is impermanence which is being proved; whatever problems there might be with an irrelevant and unconnected property like *ākāśaguṇatva* do not concern the validity of *kṛtakatva* in this context.

PVV's introduction to k. 57: "[Objection:] But if a property [mentioned] in the treatise is invalidated, then what was intended [to be proved] will not be established either. [Dharmakīrti] replies:"[301]

(57) *dharmān anupanīyaiva*[302] *dṛṣṭānte dharmiṇo 'khilān*[303] |
vāgdhūmāder jano 'nveti caitanyadahanādikam ||[304]

A person infers [things] such as consciousness and fire from [reasons] such as speech and smoke [respectively] without in any way adducing every one of the subject's properties in the example.[305]

(58) *svabhāvaṃ kāraṇaṃ vārtho*[306] *'vyabhicāreṇa sādhayan* |
kasyacid vādabādhāyāṃ[307] *svabhāvān na nivartate* ||[308]

When a state of affairs (*artha*) proves an essential property (*svabhāva*) or a cause (*kāraṇa*) without any deviation (*avyabhicāreṇa*), then if it should [happen to] invalidate the position of someone [who is devoted to a treatise], it does not relinquish its

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[301] PVV 435, 2: *śāstrārthabādhane 'bhimatasyāpi na siddhir iti cet | āha ||*.

[302] MIY. *dharmânanupanīyaiva.*

[303] PV-k(III) °*khalān.*

[304] PV IV, k. 57 = PVin III, k. 17; 292a1–2.

[305] PVV 435, 5–7: *dharmiṇo dharmān śāstradarśitān akhilān hetuvyāpakatvenānupanīyāpradarśya vāgdhūmāder hetoś caitanyadahanādikaṃ yathākramaṃ svasantānavan mahānasavac ca jano 'nveti pratipadyate ||* "A person infers (*anveti* = *pratipadyate*) consciousness, fire, etc. from the reasons, speech, smoke and so forth, just as in the case of his own continuum and a kitchen respectively, but without adducing (*anupanīyā* = *pradarśya*) as a *vyāpaka* of the reason every one of the subject's (*dharmin*) properties which are taught in a treatise." The allusion is to the analogical proof for other minds which is to be found in Dharmakīrti's *Saṃtānāntarasiddhi* (SS): one can infer the existence of other minds from others' speech-behaviour, just as in one's own case. See SS *śloka* 1: *buddhipūrvāṃ kriyāṃ dṛṣṭvā svadehe 'nyatra tadgrahāt | jñāyate yadi dhīś cittamātre 'py eṣa nayaḥ samaḥ ||*, a Skt. fragment translated in KITAGAWA 1973, 408–409, n. 8 as follows: "If [you say that] one shall know [the existence of] intelligence [other than his own] on the ground that he grasps actions in other [persons' bodies] after having seen [in] his own body that his actions are preceded by [his own] intelligence, then [I must say that] this method of reasoning is the same even in the case of idealism."

[306] PV-k(II) *cārtho.*

[307] PV-k(I) *vādibādhāyāṃ.*

[308] PV IV, k. 58 = PVin III, k. 18; 292a2–3.

essential property (*svabhāva*) [of being either identical with what is to be proved or an effect of what is to be proved].[309]

(59) *prapadyamānaś cānyas*[310] *taṃ nāntarīyakam īpsitaiḥ* |
sādhyārthair hetunā tena katham apratipāditaḥ ||[311]

And when the adversary understands that this [reason] is invariably related (*nāntarīyaka*) with the intended states of affairs to be proved, then how is it possible that he is not persuaded by this reason?

*Kārikā*s 57–59 serve to show the complete irrelevance of what is stated in treatises when one makes an inference which functions due to the force of real entities (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*):

(a) When we prove something of some subject (*dharmin*), then psychologically speaking it is not the case that we at the same time seek to prove everything which a treatise might ascribe to that same subject.

(b) If the reason is valid by the usual standards of Dharmakīrtian logic (i.e., if it is a *svabhāvahetu* or a *kāryahetu*), then it does objectively prove what we wish it to prove, whether or not it also happens to prove the opposite of what the treatise says. As Dharmottara explicitly brings out (PVinṬ 36b8ff.), proof is dependent on ontological considerations, namely, the existence of a natural connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*) between the terms.

(c) Once the opponent has understood the reason and its natural connection with what is to be proved, he too will be convinced, irrespective of what his treatises might say.

In what follows, Dharmakīrti replies to the adversary's idea that the proponent is refuted because of his impropriety in *stating* the reason, *kṛtakatva*, which contradicts *ākāśakaguṇatva*. The general discussion seems to be situated, broadly speaking, in the context of the Naiyāyika's scheme of debaters' points of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*), one of which is *pratijñāvirodha* (contradiction of the thesis)—see our remarks to k. 43. Dharmakīrti's view is that contradiction between *kṛtakatva* and *ākāśaguṇatva* occurs objectively, and thus that the proponent

[309]Cf. PVV 435, 13: *svabhāvād vyāpakakāraṇagamakān na nivartate* "It will not relinquish its *svabhāva*, i.e., making known a *vyāpaka* or a cause"; and PVinṬ 36a4: *de'i bdag ñid daṅ de'i 'bras bu'i ṅo bo ñid las ldog par mi 'gyur ro* | "It will not relinquish its *svabhāva* of either identity with [what is to be proved] or being an effect of [what is to be proved]."

[310]MIY. °*mānaścānyas*.

[311]PV IV, k. 59 = PVin III, k. 19; 292a3.

himself, who never intended to prove *ākāśaguṇatva*, should not be thought to be responsible for *creating* a contradiction by just stating a logical reason. The contradiction was already there.

2.5.6 Does the proponent commit a fault in merely *stating* something leading to a contradiction with the treatise he accepts?

(60) *ukto 'nukto 'pi vā hetur*[312] *viroddhā*[313] *vādino 'tra kim* |
na hi tasyoktidoṣeṇa sa jātaḥ śāstrabādhanaḥ ||

Whether the reason is stated or not, it is [objectively (*vastuta eva*)] in contradiction [with the property mentioned in the treatise]. What [refutation (*dūṣaṇa*)] would there be of the proponent in this case! For indeed it was not due to a fault in his statement that the [reason] came to invalidate the treatise.[314]

(61) *bādhakasyābhidhānāc ced doṣo yadi vaden na saḥ* |
kiṃ na bādheta so 'kurvann ayuktaṃ[315] *kena duṣyati* ||

[Objection:] There is a fault [attributable to the proponent], because he states [a reason] which invalidates [a property, like *ākāśaguṇatva*, which is mentioned in his treatise].[316] [Reply:] If he did not state [the reason], wouldn't it [still] invalidate [that property]? [Because objectively (*vastutas*) the reason is in contradiction with the property mentioned in the treatise, then it definitely does invalidate it.][317] When he does nothing incorrect, why is he at fault!

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[312]PV-k(I/III), MIY. *ced dhetur*. PV-k(II)'s reading *vā hetur* is better supported by PV Tib. *gtan tshigs brjod dam ma brjod kyaṅ*.

[313]PV-k(I/III), MIY. *virodho*. PV-k(II) has the quasi-adjectival *viroddhā* (from *viroddhṛ*) qualifying *hetuḥ*. This seems preferable to the noun *virodha* and corresponds better to PV Tib.: *gtan tshigs brjod dam ma brjod kyaṅ* || *'gal na rgol pas 'dir ci byas* ||.

[314]Additions follow PVV.

[315]MIY. *'kurvan na yuktaṃ*.

[316]Devendrabuddhi specifies that the proponent states the reason *without realizing* that it contradicts his treatise; see PVP 335b2: *gal te bstan bcos kyi don khas blaṅs pa la gnod byed dpyad pa med par brjod pa'i phyir rgol ba de'i skyon yin no że na* | (D. 281a4–5) "[Objection:] Because he unwittingly states something which invalidates an accepted property [mentioned] in the treatise, the fault is [attributable] to this proponent."

[317]See PVV 436, 8–9: *vastutas tadvirodhitvād avaśyaṃ bādhate*.

PVV's introduction to k. 62: "[Objection:] But surely if the proponent were not at fault even when he stated a faulty reason, then he would not commit any fault even if he were to state [reasons] which were unestablished (*asiddha*), etc. [Dharmakīrti] replies:"[318]

(62) *anyeṣu hetvābhāseṣu sveṣṭasyaivāprasādhanāt |*
duṣyed vyarthābhidhānena nātra tasya prasādhanāt ||

In the case of the other [types of] fallacious reasons (*hetvābhāsa*), the [proponent] would be at fault because, by stating stating something ineffectual (*vyartha*), there would be no proof of what [the proponent] himself really intended. [But] in this case [i.e., when the proponent states the reason 'being a product' (*kṛtakatva*)], then because it does prove that [property, viz., impermanence], he is not [at fault].[319]

(63) *yadi kiṃcit kvacic chāstre na yuktaṃ pratiṣidhyate |*
bruvāṇo yuktam apy anyad iti rājakulasthitiḥ ||[320]

It is royal decree to say that if in some treatise there is anything which is not correct, then when [the proponent] asserts another [property], even though it is correct, he will be refuted![321] [For, a king's edict, operating by force, is precisely what is outside distinctions between correct and incorrect.][322]

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[318]PVV 436, 10–11: *nanu yadi duṣṭahetuvacane 'pi na vādino duṣṭatā | tadāsiddhādivacane 'pi na doṣaḥ syād ity āha |*.

[319]See PVV 436, 15–16: *atra kṛtakatve tu vādyukte vāñchitasyānityatvasya prasādhanān na vādī duṣyati | śāstrārthe tu vādyaniṣṭe bādhyamāne śāstram eva duṣṭaṃ bhaviṣyati ||* "But in this case, i.e., when the proponent states [the reason] *kṛtakatva*, then because it does prove the intended [property], impermanence, the proponent is not at fault. By contrast, when a property [mentioned] in a treatise, but unintended by the proponent, is invalidated, then it is only the treatise which will be faulty."

[320]PV IV, k. 63 = PVin III, k. 20; 292a3–4.

[321]See PVV 436, 22–23: *tāvatānyad anityatvādi yuktam api kṛtakatvahetunā bruvāṇaḥ pratipādyan pratiṣidhyate* ... "Then simply because of that, when [the proponent] asserts (*bruvāṇaḥ = pratipādayan*), by means of the reason 'being a product' (*kṛtakatva*), other [properties], such as impermanence, etc., which are even correct, he will be refuted." Note that the Tibetan versions of PV and PVin place *api* (= *kyaṅ*) after *anyad* (= *gźan pa dag*). Cf. PVinṬ 36b3–4 which understands *api = kyaṅ* in this way and takes *gźan pa dag kyaṅ* as meaning "other reasons too": *gal te bstan bcos la lar dṅos po 'ga' rigs pa ma yin pa des na gtan tshigs des dgag par bya ba yin pa de tsam gyis rigs*[a] *pa smra ba'i gtan tshigs gźan dag kyaṅ ci ste khyod kyis dgag par bya bar 'gyur* | ([a] P. reads *rig* [D. 32a2–3]).

[322]PVV 436, 23: *rājaśāsanasyaiva balapravṛttasya yuktāyuktavicāraṇābahirbhāvāt |*.

(64) *sarvān arthān samīkṛtya vaktuṃ śakyaṃ na sādhanam |*
sarvatra tenotsanneyaṃ[323] *sādhyasādhanasaṃsthitiḥ* ||[324]

Once all properties [found mentioned in a treatise] are treated equally [as being proved], no *sādhana* (= 'reason') can [ever] be stated; [for one cannot, on the basis of an example, apprehend a pervasion (*vyāpti*) by all properties found in a treatise].[325] Thus, in all cases (*sarvatra*),[326] the possibility of there being *sādhya* and *sādhana* would be eliminated.

Dharmakīrti, in *kārikā*s 60–62, sets forth some of the basic principles of his own account of points of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*):

(a) A reason is to be evaluated only in terms of whether it proves the intended *sādhya*, and not *vis-à-vis* other properties spoken of in the treatises of the proponent's school.[327]

(b) The proponent commits a fault, or is defeated, by presenting a reason which fails to prove *this sādhya*.

(c) Therefore, presenting a fallacious reason, such as an unestablished or inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) reason, *does* indeed constitute a point of defeat for the proponent, because it fails to prove what he actually intends to prove. However, the fact that a reason such as "being a product" also objectively happens to be in contradiction with an unintended property such as *ākāśaguṇatva* is no fault of the proponent: at most it shows the faults of his treatise.[328]

*Kārikā*s 63 and 64 stress the irrationality of holding the proponent responsible for everything in the treatise of his school. On the one hand, the interest of truth is not served by an arbitrary requirement that the proponent must comply with treatises, be they correct or not. On the other hand, it would be psychologically impossible for anyone to pursue logical argumentation if in all inferences he had to ascertain that the numerous properties which a treatise ascribed to some subject were actually implied by the reason.

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[323]PV-k(II) *tena succhanneyaṃ*, MIY. *tenotsanne 'yaṃ*.

[324]PV IV, k. 64 = PVin III, k. 21; 292a4–5.

[325]PVV 437, 1–2: ...*sādhanaṃ vaktum aśakyaṃ dṛṣṭānte śāstradṛṣṭākhiladharmavyāptyanupalambhāt* |.

[326]PVV glosses *sarvatra* by *dharmiṇi* "with regard to any *dharmin*."

[327]Cf. Dharmakīrti's remarks in connection with k. 67, as well as PVin: *gtan tshigs thams cad kyi skyon daṅ yon tan ni raṅ gi bsgrub par bya ba la bltos nas bsam par bya ba yin.* "The faults and merits of all reasons are to be judged in reference to their own *sādhya*." See n. 345.

[328]See n. 319. Dharmakīrti's own account of *nigrahasthāna* will be elaborated and systematized in his later work, the VN. See MUCH 1986 for a summary of the VN's position on *nigrahasthāna*.

2.5.7 A false parallel with antinomic reasons (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*)

PVBh's introduction to k. 65: "[Objection:] But if the reason is not faulty even though *ākāśaguṇatva* is invalidated, then how could a [reason] which is antinomic (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*) be a faulty *sādhana*? In the latter case, on the one hand, there is a fault because of a contradiction with a property which is established by another *sādhana*. In the former case, on the other hand, it is precisely the contradiction with a property established by a treatise which constitutes a fault. [Reply:] This is not correct, for"[329]

(65) *viruddhayor ekadharmiṇy ayogād astu bādhanam* |
viruddhaikāntike nātra[330] *tadvad asti virodhitā* ||

Since two contradictory [properties (*dharma*)] cannot occur in one subject (*dharmin*), let us grant that there is invalidation of the antinomic [reason] (*viruddhaikāntika*). [But] there is no contradiction like that here.

Following Dharmottara's NBṬ to NB III, 110, the term *viruddhāvyabhicārin* (which is synonymous with PV's term *viruddhaikāntika*) can be interpreted as either a *tatpuruṣa* compound—i.e., "a [reason] which is nondeviant with regard to something in contradiction [with another proven property]"—or as a *karmadhāraya* compound—i.e., "a nondeviant [reason] which is [also a] contradictory [reason]."[331] For simplicity, we have adopted the translation "antinomic reason." To take a concrete case, consider Dignāga's own example, involving

[329]PVBh 508, 29–31: *yadi tarhy ākāśaguṇatvabādhane 'pi na hetudoṣaḥ kathaṃ viruddhāvyabhicārī sādhanadoṣaḥ* | *tatrāpi sādhanāntaraprasiddhārthavirodhato doṣaḥ* | *ihāpi śāstraprasiddhārthavirodha eva doṣaḥ* | *na sad etat* | *yataḥ* |.

[330]MIY. °*ntikenâtra*, but cf. PV Tib. ... *'gal ṅes la* | *gnod 'gyur 'dir ni de 'dra ba'i* || *'gal ba yod pa ma yin no* ||. Both PV Tib. and the Indian commentators clearly read the locative *viruddhaikāntike*.

[331]NBṬ 224, 9–11 *ad* NB III, 110: *nanu cācaryeṇa viruddhāvyabhicāry api saṃśayahetur uktaḥ* | *hetvantarasādhitasya viruddhaṃ yat tan na vyabhicaratīti viruddhāvyabhicārī* | *yadi vā viruddhaś cāsau sādhanāntarasiddhasya dharmasya viruddhasādhanāt avyabhicārī ca svasādhyāvyabhicārād viruddhāvyabhicārī* || "But surely the Ācārya [Dignāga] said that a [reason which is] *viruddhāvyabhicārin* is a cause for doubt. *viruddhāvyabhicārin* means that [a reason] does not deviate from that which is in contradiction with something established by the other reason. Or else, it is *viruddhāvyabhicārin* if it is (a) contradictory (*viruddha*) because of being a *sādhana* for the contradiction of a property which has been proved by the other *sādhana* and is (b) nondeviant (*avyabhicārin*) because of being nondeviant with regard to its own *sādhya*"; cf. NPV 26, which also discusses both renderings of the compound, but argues against the *karmadhāraya*. For a philosophical treatment of the antinomic reasons, see OETKE 1994a.

kṛtakatva (being a product) and *śrāvaṇatva* (audibility), given in his PSV III. The same reasoning is discussed in Śaṅkarasvāmin's *Nyāyapraveśa* (NP) and is cited by Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin in connection with PV IV, k. 65.[332] In a debate between a Vaiśeṣika and an advocate of sound's permanence, such as a Mīmāṃsaka, the reason, *kṛtakatva*, will prove the Vaiśeṣika's view that sound is impermanent, just as it would in Buddhist logic. On the other hand, the Mīmāṃsaka may then argue to the Vaiśeṣika that sound is *permanent* because it is audible (*śrāvaṇatvād*), like 'soundness' (*śabdatva*). In such a case, the reason, *śrāvaṇatva* (being audible), will be absent from all dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*), for there is nothing which is both audible, impermanent *and* different from the *pakṣa*, sound. However, for the Vaiśeṣika, the example, 'soundness', would be a similar instance (*sapakṣa*), as it is audible and, being a universal, is permanent. Thus, *śrāvaṇatva* would have to be (for the Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsaka at least) a valid reason which would prove exactly the opposite of what *kṛtakatva* validly proves.[333]

Dignāga's position here is probably best understood as maintaining that if we take *kṛtakatva* and *śrāvaṇatva* together, this complex reason itself will be antinomic (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*) in that it will lead to sound's being both permanent and impermanent. This seems to be what is maintained in the PSV, which speaks of *lhan cig pa dag* (the two together), and is definitely the position in the NP and Haribhadrasūri's NPV.[334] In short, a reason composed of two parts *X* and *Y* is antinomic (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*) if *X* proves a property *P* and *Y* proves *not-P*.

[332]See PSVb 132a4–5: *gaṅ gi phyir bśad pa'i mtshan ñid can gyi 'gal ba dag gcig la the tshom bskyed pa dag mthoṅ ste | dper na byas pa daṅ mñan par bya ba dag las sgra la rtag pa daṅ mi rtag pa dag ñid la the tshom za ba bźin no ||* (cf. KITAGAWA 1973, 495 and 194). In NM 4, 2 (ed. KATSURA 1979) Dignāga spoke of the five inconclusive reasons (*anaikāntikahetu*) in the ninefold *hetucakra*—viz., nos. I, III, V, VII, IX—and then added the *viruddhāvyabhicārin* as an extra type, yielding the sixfold classification, which is what we find in the NP. In NM's k. 8 (= PS III, k. 25) Dignāga classified *anaikāntikahetu* according to a threefold scheme: "common" (*sādhāraṇa*), "over-exclusive" (*asādhāraṇa*) and *viruddhāvyabhicārin.* We follow Haribhadrasūri's NPV in taking the first reason (i.e., *kṛtakatva*) as having a Vaiśeṣika proponent and the second (i.e., *śrāvaṇatva*) as being the reply of the Mīmāṃsaka (NPV 26, 23–24: *anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavad iti vaiśeṣikeṇokte mīmāṃsaka āha | nityaḥ śabdaḥ śrāvaṇatvāc chabdatvavat |*).

[333]The argument by means of *śrāvaṇatva* turns on the logical structure of the so-called "inconclusive reason which is over-exclusive" (*asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu*). See TILLEMANS 1990b and the references therein.

[334]NP 3.2.2 (TACHIKAWA 1971: 125, 142 [6]) cites the same case of *kṛtakatva* and *śrāvaṇatva*, explicitly specifying that the *viruddhāvyabhicārin* reason is the two taken together: *ubhayoḥ saṃśayahetutvād dvāv apy etāv eko 'naikāntikaḥ samuditāv eva.* See NPV 27, which debates whether the two reasons together (*samasta*) or separately (*vyasta*) are the "cause for doubt," but

Although it is clear that Dignāga recognized that there were reasons which were *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, and gave examples of them, it is somewhat less clear as to *why* Dignāga himself thought this possibility was really worth considering from a logical point of view. The most reasonable explanation might be that Dignāga himself implicitly recognized that his theory of the triple characterization (*trairūpya*) of valid logical reasons did not specify wholly sufficient conditions for inferring the truth of a proposition, and that paradoxical cases like the antinomic reason and others could thus arise, needing elimination by an *ad hoc* category of fallacies. This is indeed plausible.[335] However, significantly, this was *not* Dharmakīrti's explanation of Dignāga's point about antinomic reasons. In NB III, 110ff. Dharmakīrti definitely did take the *trairūpya* as providing such sufficient conditions and argued that Dignāga was thinking of cases where one or both of the component reasons were "valid" only within a defective system of philosophical tenets—thus, the problem of antinomic reasons could arise when one of the disputants relied on an inference which was simply based on his scriptures (*āgamāśritānumāna*). In fact, genuinely valid reasons leading to two contradictory *dharma*s qualifying one and the same *dharmin* were, according to Dharmakīrti, logically impossible: objectively speaking, at least one of the reasons must simply be tainted by one of the usual fallacies of *asiddha*, *anaikāntika*, etc. The result was that in formulating NB's classification of *hetvābhāsa*, Dharmakīrti deemed the *viruddhāvyabhicārin* to be *logically* irrelevant. In PV IV he used the Dignāgean term on a few occasions, and perhaps even granted it some applicability, but later in the NB the *viruddhāvyabhicārin* was not considered to be worthy of inclusion in the scheme of *hetvābhāsa* at all.[336]

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concludes in favor of the former alternative. Finally, see PSVb 132b1: *lhan cig pa dag la the tshom gyi mtshan ñid daṅ ldan pa'i phyir.*

[335]Whatever Dignāga himself thought, we see that the commentator Īśvarasena took Dignāga's *trairūpya* as not presenting sufficient conditions, but more like necessary conditions. To arrive at sufficient conditions, Īśvarasena was compelled to introduce three further requirements: (a) *abādhitaviṣayatva* (the fact that the [reason] does not have as its object an invalidated [*sādhya*])—see STEINKELLNER 1966, 82ff., 1967, 70–73; (b) *vivakṣitaikasaṃkhyatva* (the fact that the intended [reason] is single)—see STEINKELLNER 1967, II, 73–75 and 198, n. 26; (c) *jñātatva* (the fact of the [reason] being understood)—see STEINKELLNER 1967, II, 76ff. The second of these supplementary requirements, viz., *vivakṣitaikasaṃkhyatva*, is destined specifically to rule out *viruddhāvyabhicāra*, by specifying that only one single reason (and not two reasons or a two part reason) can be presented in any given argument for a *sādhya*. See also HAYES 1980, 266, n. 33 for the view that Dignāga's *trairūpya* only presented necessary conditions.

[336]NB III, 110–113: *viruddhāvyabhicāry api saṃśayahetur uktaḥ | sa iha kasmān noktaḥ || anumānaviṣaye 'saṃbhavāt || na hi saṃbhavo 'sti kāryasvabhāvayor uktalakṣaṇayor anupalambhasya ca viruddhatāyāḥ || na cānyo 'vyabhicārī ||* "It was said [by Dignāga] that the

With this background in mind, we can now turn to the argumentation in k. 65. The opponent is seeking to establish a parallel between the case of the antinomic reason being fallacious and the case of *kṛtakatva* proving a property (i.e., the negation of *ākāśaguṇatva*) which is in contradiction with the property (i.e., *ākāśaguṇatva*) mentioned in the treatise. If proving an antinomy is a fallacy, why is not the case at hand also a fallacy? Dharmakīrti's answer in k. 65cd is simply that the contradiction brought about by the antinomic reason and the putative "contradiction" brought about by *kṛtakatva* plus the treatise are not analogous: in the former case we would be proving both impermanence and permanence, two mutually exclusive properties; in the latter case, we would only prove impermanence and the absence of *ākāśaguṇatva*, i.e., *ākāśaguṇatvābhāva* (see PVV), properties which are perfectly compatible, neither invalidating (*BĀDH*) the other.[337]

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viruddhāvyabhicārin is also a cause* for doubt. Why then was it not mentioned here? [Reply:] Because it cannot occur in the realm of inference. Indeed, it is impossible that effects or essential properties, with the characteristics which we have described, or nonperceptions too, could be contradictory. And there is no other [type of] nondeviant [reason]." (*Note that the Tibetan of NB translates *saṃśayahetu* by *the tshom gyi rgyu*). NB III, 114: *tasmād avastudarśanabalapravṛttam āgamāśrayam anumānam āśritya tadarthavicāreṣu viruddhāvyabhicārī sādhanadoṣa uktaḥ* | "Therefore, when [the disputants] rely on a scripturally based inference which operates due to unrealistic understanding, then in investigations concerning these properties, *viruddhāvyabhicārin* is said to be a fault of *sādhana*."

[337]See PVP 336b3–6: *'di la ni de 'dra'i 'gal ba yod ma yin | ji ltar rtag pa daṅ mi rtag pa 'di gñis 'gal ba yin pa de ltar na skabs su bab pa daṅ skabs su bab pa ma yin pa'i chos can dag gi naṅ nas skabs su bab pa'i bsgrub par bya ba la skabs su bab pa ma yin pa daṅ 'gal ba yod pa ma yin na gaṅ gis na gcig grub pa na gźan la gnod par 'gyur | dper na sgra la mi rtag pa ñid daṅ nam mkha'i yon tan ñid med pa dag byas pa ñid las grub pa thob pa lta bu'o || de bas na gnod par bya ba daṅ*[a] *gnod par byed pa ma yin pa dag rtags gcig las grub pa la 'gal ba yod pa ma yin no* || ([a] D. [282a3–4] om. *gnod par bya ba daṅ*) "There is no contradiction like that here. Contrary to permanence and impermanence which *are* contradictory, then in terms of what is and is not under discussion, the *sādhya* under discussion is *not* [in fact] in contradiction with a [property] which is not being discussed [i.e., *ākāśaguṇatvābhāva*], so that [if it had been in contradiction], the establishment of one would have implied the invalidation of the other. Sound's being impermanent and not being a quality of space (*nam mkha'i yon tan ñid med pa* = *ākāśaguṇatvābhāva*) are, for instance, both proved by *kṛtakatva*. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the two [properties] which do not invalidate each other (*gnod par bya ba daṅ gnod par byed pa ma yin pa* = *abādhyabādhaka*) and which are proved by the same reason." Prajñākaragupta gave a somewhat different account relating k. 65 to some of the main themes discussed in NB; see PVBh 509, 1–6: *viruddhāvyabhicāriṇor iha parasparaviruddhārthāvyabhicāritā dvayor api samānabalaiva | dvayor apy āgamāśritatvāt | vastubalapravṛttaṃ tv anumānaṃ śāstraṃ ca na tathābhūtam | tatas tayor na parasparabādhanaṃ viruddhāvyabhicārivat | na ca dvayor api sādhanaṃ viruddhayor ekatra dharmiṇy ayogāt | śāstrasya tu viruddhānumānāpekṣayā pramāṇatvābhāvāt tadartho bādhyata eva na bādhako*

2.5.8 Properties having a necessary connection (*sambandha*) with the *sādhya* should not be negated by a valid logical reason, but all others can be negated with impunity.

(66) *abādhyabādhakatve 'pi tayoḥ śāstrārthaviplavāt* |
asambandhe 'pi bādhā cet syāt sarvaṃ sarvabādhanam[338] ||[339]

Suppose that the two [properties, viz., impermanence and 'not being a quality of space' (*ākāśaguṇatvābhāva*) which were respectively under and not under discussion][340] did not invalidate each other (*abādhyabādhaka*), but that because a property [like *ākāśaguṇatva*] [mentioned] in the treatise had been nullified (*viplava*), there would [still] be invalidation (*bādhā*) of even a [property like impermanence] which had no necessary connection (*sambandha*) [with *ākāśaguṇatva*].[341] Then any [reason] would invalidate any [*sādhya*].

Dharmakīrti's argument is a complex *reductio ad absurdum*. Suppose one admitted that impermanence and "not being a quality of space" (*ākāśaguṇatvābhāva*) were indeed compatible, but nonetheless maintained that impermanence was invalidated (i.e., negated) by the reason "being a product" (*kṛtakatva*), because

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viruddhāvyabhicārivat | *śāstrasya ca pramāṇabalānanugṛhītasya pratiṣiddham eva prāmāṇyam* | *tasmān na viruddhāvyabhicāripakṣopakṣepapakṣaḥ kṣamaḥ* | "Here the two [reasons which are] *viruddhāvyabhicārin* are [each] nondeviant with regard to mutually contradictory properties; both too have exactly the same force in that they both depend upon scripture. By contrast, an inference which functions by the force of [real] entities (*vastubalapravṛtta*) and a treatise are not like that. Therefore, these two do not invalidate each other as do [reasons] which are *viruddhāvyabhicārin*. Now, both [reasons] [can] not be *sādhana*, for it is impossible that two contradictory [properties] be present in one and the same *dharmin*. The treatise, however, is not a *pramāṇa* with regard to inferences of contradictory [properties], and therefore, the property [mentioned] in it is just simply invalidated (*bādhyata eva*), but does not [itself] invalidate (*bādhaka*) as in the case of [reasons] which are *viruddhāvyabhicārin*. And any validity for a treatise which is not favored with the force of *pramāṇa*s is completely denied. Consequently, the position which cites the thesis of a *viruddhāvyabhicārin* [as being analogous] is untenable." Note that Prajñākaragupta maintains that *both* the *viruddhāvyabhicārin* reasons, *kṛtakatva* and *śrāvaṇatva*, depend upon scripture.

[338] PV-k(I), MIY. °*bādhakam.*

[339] Cf. PVin 292a5–6: *gnod bya gnod byed ma yin pa dag gcig las grub pa 'gal ba med*[a] *kyaṅ* | *gal te bstan bcos la gnod pas 'gal bar 'dod na* | *de ni yul gźan la yaṅ mtshuṅs pa'i phyir 'gal bar 'gyur ro* | ([a] P. *'gal me med.* [D. 194a6]).

[340] PVV 437, 14 glosses *tayoḥ* as *prakṛtāprakṛtayor anityatvākaśaguṇatvābhāvayoḥ.*

[341] Cf. PVV 437, 18–19: *śāstrārthasya śāstrābhyupagatasyākāśaguṇatvasya viplavāt kāraṇād asambaddhe 'prakṛtākāśaguṇatvasambandharahite 'nityatve 'pi bādhā bhavatīti cet* |.

ākāśaguṇatvābhāva was in contradiction with what the treatise advocated. This would have been justified if there had been a necessary connection (*sambandha*) between impermanence and *ākāśaguṇatva*, so that negating *ākāśaguṇatva* would have *logically implied* negating impermanence.[342] But there is no such connection. Now, suppose that in spite of the lack of any connection, the invalidation of impermanence is *still* to be accepted. Then whenever any reason invalidates any property whatsoever in the treatise, the *sādhya*, impermanence, will also be invalidated and *kṛtakatva* will thus be contradictory. Dharmakīrti's commentators once again introduce the now familiar parallel between *ākāśaguṇatva* and smell's being a quality of the earth element (*pṛthivīguṇatva* = *bhūguṇatva*) first evoked in PV IV, k. 44f. The logic is as follows:

(a) A reason such as "arising from effort" (*prayatnānantarīyakatva*) would indeed invalidate the proposition in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*s (cf. VS 2.1.1; 2.2.3) to the effect that smell is a quality of the earth (*bhūguṇa*), in that if something has *bhūguṇatva*, it must be permanent and hence cannot arise from effort.

(b) Thus the Vaiśeṣika's treatise is vitiated. One of its propositions has been nullified.

(c) Smell's being a quality of the earth and sound's being a quality of space are also two completely unconnected propositions, just like sound's impermanence and sound's being a quality of space.

(d) Therefore, if the reason *kṛtakatva* invalidated impermanence because an unconnected property, like *ākāśaguṇatva*, was invalidated, then *kṛtakatva* would even invalidate impermanence when some completely unrelated scriptural proposition, i.e., smell's being a quality of the earth, had been invalidated by a different reason like *prayatnānantarīyakatva*.[343]

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[342] Note that Devendrabuddhi glosses k. 65's use of *sambandha* as the logically necessary connection where one term cannot exist without the other, viz., *avinābhāva* (= *med na mi 'byuṅ ba*).

[343] Cf. PVV 437, 19–22: *evaṃ tarhi prayatnānantarīyakatvād gandhe pṛthivīguṇatvabādhane sarvaṃ kṛtakatvādi sarvasyānityatvādeḥ sādhyasya bādhanaṃ syāt | śabdādau dharmiṇy aprakṛtaśāstrārthabādhanasya tulyatvāt* | "Now, in this manner, when smell's being a quality of the earth is invalidated on account of [the reason] *prayatnānantarīyakatva*, then any [reason] such as *kṛtakatva*, would invalidate any *sādhya*, such as impermanence. [This is] because with regard to the *dharmin* sound and the like, the invalidation of a property [mentioned] in the treatise, but not under discussion, remains the same."

(67) *sambandhas tena tatraiva*[344] *bādhanād asti ced asat* |
hetoḥ sarvasya cintyatvāt svasādhye guṇadoṣayoḥ ||[345]

[Objection:] There is a necessary connection (*sambandha*)[346] in that there is invalidation by that [reason, *kṛtakatva*] with regard to that [*dharmin*, sound] alone. [Reply:] [This] is not correct, in that the merits and faults of all reasons are to be judged in reference to their own [actual] *sādhya*.[347]

PVV's introduction to k. 68: "Moreover, merely being present in the subject (*dharmin*) does not constitute a necessary connection (*sambandha*). Rather,"[348]

(68) *nāntarīyakatā sādhye*[349] *sambandhaḥ seha nekṣyate*[350] |
kevalaṃ śāstrapīḍeha[351] *doṣaḥ sānyakṛte samā* ||[352]

Being invariably related (*nāntarīyakatā*) with the *sādhya* is [what we term] the necessary connection (*sambandha*). This [invariable relation with the *sādhya*] is not found here [i.e., when

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[344]PV-k(II) *tasyaiva.*

[345]Cf. PVin 292a6–7: *des*[a] *de ñid la gnod par*[b] *'gyur gyi* | *de lta ma yin na ni 'gyur ro že na* | *ma yin te* | *gtan tshigs thams cad kyi*[c] *skyon dan yon tan ni ran gi bsgrub par bya ba la bltos nas bsam par bya ba yin pa'i phyir ro* || ([a] D. *des na*—[b] D. om. *par*—[c] D. *kyis* [D. 194a6–7]).

[346]Cf. PVP 337a2: *gal te nam mkha'i yon tan ñid la sogs pa de sgra ñid dan* | *'brel pa yod pa yin gyi ...* (D. 282a7–b1) "[Objection:] *ākāśaguṇatva*, etc. has a necessary connection with 'being a sound' (*sgra ñid = śabdatva*)..."

[347]The translation of *kārikā* 67ab is tentative at most. First of all, the Sanskrit ablative *bādhanād* in *pāda b* differs from the Tibetan *gnod par 'gyur,* which does not in any way reflect an ablative. Secondly, only Manorathandin comments on *bādhanād*, and he does so in a syntactically quite tortuous fashion. See PVV 437, 25–27: *atha tatra śabda eva dharmiṇi ākāśaguṇatvasya sattvāt sambandho 'sti tena kṛtakatvāt tasyaiva bādhanād virodhaḥ* | *pṛthivīguṇatvaṃ tu śabde dharmiṇy asambaddham* | *tatas tadbādhane 'pi śabde kṛtakatvam aviruddham iti cet* |. As Devendrabuddhi, PV Tib. and PVin clearly do not read the ablative, it may well be better to translate k. 67ab on the basis of the Tibetan: *'brel yod des na de ñid la* || *gnod 'gyur že na ma yin te* || "[Objection:] There is a necessary connection. There would thus be invalidation with regard to that [*dharmin*, sound] alone. [Reply:] This is not correct...." Finally, note that *tena* has been rendered into Tibetan by *des na* which usually means "thus," but PVP and PVV would suggest rather that the point is that there is invalidation "by that [reason *kṛtakatva*]" with regard to sound, and not by another reason (e.g., *prayatnānantarīyakatva*) with regard to some other subject (*dharmin*). Cf. PVP 337a3: *...des de ñid las* | *sgra la skabs su bab pa'i gtan tshig kyis gnod par 'gyur* | *gžan gyis gžan la min no že na* |.

[348]PVV 438, 1: *kiṃ ca dharmiṇi sattāmātraṃ na sambandhaḥ* | *kiṃ tu.*

[349]MIY. *nāntarīyakatāsādhye.*

[350]PV-k(III) *nekṣate.*

[351]PV-k(I) *śāstrabādheha*; PV-k(II) *śāstrapīḍeti*. Cf. Tib. *'dir = iha.*

[352]Cf. PVin 292a8: *de ni gžan gyis byas na yan mtshuns pa'i phyir 'gal bar 'gyur ro* | (D. 194b1).

> *ākāśaguṇatva*, which is not under discussion, is invalidated].[353] In this case, the only fault is the invalidation of the treatise; this [invalidation of the treatise] would be the same [even] when effectuated by another [reason, like *prayatnānantarīyakatva* with regard to another *dharmin*, such as smell].[354]

The opponent in k. 67 maintains his position that vitiation of a treatise will make the reason contradictory (*viruddhahetu*). But he seeks to eliminate the undesirable consequence that simply *any* refutation of *any* property mentioned in the treatise would lead to this result. In particular, the invalidation of smell's being a quality of the earth element (*bhūguṇatva*; *pṛthivīguṇatva*) will not count when one is proving sound's impermanence, because the respective subjects (*dharmin*) are different: it is only those properties, like *ākāśaguṇatva*, which are linked to sound that are relevant in an argument about sound.

The opponent in k. 67 thus invokes the usual Vaiśeṣika view that sound is an *ākāśaguṇa* and construes *this* connection as constituting the *sambandha* which Dharmakīrti had required. According to the opponent, then, since *ākāśaguṇatva* has a *sambandha* with sound, it is only when *ākāśaguṇatva* (and not *bhūguṇatva* / *pṛthivīguṇatva*) is invalidated that the reason *kṛtakatva* would become contradictory (see n. 346, 347). Dharmakīrti's initial reply in k. 67 is to reiterate his fundamental idea that reasons are valid or invalid only with regard to the *sādhya* which the proponent actually intends, the point being that *ākāśaguṇatva* is not intended at all. In k. 68, however, Dharmakīrti attacks the opponent's version of a *sambandha* between the *dharmin* and the *sādhya* as irrelevant. The real necessary connection or invariable relation at stake should have been between the property, *ākāśaguṇatva*, and the *sādhya*, impermanence: in that case, invalidating *ākāśaguṇatva* would have invalidated impermanence. But, in fact, such a connection does not exist at all between those two terms.[355]

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[353]PVV 438, 4–5: *sādhye nāntarīyakatā sādhyāvinābhāvitvaṃ sambandha ucyate | sā sādhyanāntarīyakatā*[a] *ihāprakṛtākāśaguṇatvabādhane*[b] *sati nekṣyate* | ([a] text reads *nāntarīyatā*—[b] text reads *iha pra°*).

[354]Cf. PVV 438, 7–9: *sā ca kṛtakatvād anityatvasiddhau dṛśyate śāstrapīḍānyena prayatnānantarīyakatvādinā gandhe pṛthivīguṇatvabādhane 'pi sameti kṛtakatvaṃ śabde viruddhaṃ syāt* ||.

[355]Cf. PVBh 510, 3–5: *vyāpakasya hi sādhyasyābhāvasādhanaṃ parihartavyaṃ | yaḥ sādhyasādhananāntarīyakas tadbādhane hi tadabhāve vyāpyasyāpi nivṛtteḥ | na cākāśaguṇatvasya sādhyanāntarīyakatā | tatas tadabhāve 'pi na sādhyoparodhaḥ* | "One should avoid proving the nonexistence of a pervader (*vyāpaka*) of what is being proved (*sādhya*). Indeed, this is because when there is an invalidation of some [property] *x* which is invariably related with the establishment of the *sādhya*, then when *x* is nonexistent, what is pervaded [by *x*] (*vyāpya*) will also be negated.* But *ākāśaguṇatva* is not invariably related with the *sādhya*. Therefore, even if it [i.e.,

Finally, in k. 68cd, Dharmakīrti restates his earlier point (see k. 62 and our explanations) that a contradiction between *kṛtakatva* and *ākāśaguṇatva* only serves to invalidate the treatise: it does not constitute a logical fault for the proponent, like *viruddhahetu*. Moreover, it is not just *kṛtakatva* which would invalidate the treatise. Any other reason (e.g., *prayatnānantarīyakatva*) which clashes with a property in the treatise (e.g., *bhūguṇatva*) would have the same result of invalidating the treatise. Thus, the opponent's views in k. 66 about "nullification of properties [mentioned] in the treatise" (*śāstrārthaviplava*) would lead to the absurdity that even valid reasons, like *kṛtakatva*, would become contradictory.[356]

2.5.9 Against some co-religionists' positions on the role of treatises in logical argumentation

The PVV introduces k. 69 in the following way: "But the followers of the Ācārya [Dignāga] argue, 'When a debate is engaged in after one has accepted a treatise,

ākāśaguṇatva] be absent, the *sādhya* is not negated" (*cf. PVBh Tib. 191b3–4: *bsgrub bya'i khyab par byed pa med par bsgrub pa ni spaṅ bar bya ba yin te | bsgrub par bya ba 'grub pa med pa na mi 'byuṅ ba gaṅ yin pa de la gnod na ni de med na khyab par bya ba yaṅ ldog pa yin pa'i phyir ro*). Devendrabuddhi describes the required necessary connection with the *sādhya*, impermanence, as being just like the invariable relation between impermanence and suffering discussed in PV II; see PVP 337a6: *dper na mi rtag pa ñid ni sdug bsṅal la sogs pa med na mi 'byuṅ ba'i phyir ro* || (D. 282b 3), and cf. PV II, k. 254ab (= 253cd in VETTER 1990): *anityāt prāha tenaiva duḥkhaṃ duḥkhān nirātmatām* | "Thus [the Buddha] said that from impermanence, suffering [and] from suffering, selflessness." Finally, note that while this relatively sophisticated argument in PV and PVBh is phrased in the terminology of Indian logic, it certainly is also formally valid, as can be seen by the following reconstruction. Let us accept that sound's being produced (*kṛtakatva*) establishes the following two true propositions: (a) For all x: if x is a sound, then x is impermanent, and (b) For all x: if x is a sound, then x is not an *ākāśaguṇa*. From (a) and (b) we cannot derive the negation of sound's impermanence as in: (c) For all x: if x is a sound, then x is not impermanent. We could only derive (c) if there was a *sambandha* between impermanence and *ākāśaguṇatva*, i.e., something like the following would have to be true: (d) For all x: if x is impermanent, then x is an *ākāśaguṇa*. While the truth of (b) and (d) would have allowed us to derive the truth of (c), in fact (d) is false, and hence (c) cannot be derived.

[356]PVP 337a8–b2: *bstan bcos kyi gnod pa*[a] *de gźan gyis byas te | gźan brtsal ma thag tu byuṅ ba'i gtan tshigs kyis dri la sogs pa'i chos can gźan la sa'i yon tan ñid la sogs pa zlog*[b] *par byed pa mtshuṅs śiṅ 'dra ba yin no || de bas na sgra la byas pa ñid la sogs pa 'dod pa sgrub par byed pa yaṅ skyon daṅ ldan pa yin no ||* ([a] D om. *bstan bcos kyi gnod pa*—[b] P. *bzlog* [D. 282b5–6]) "This invalidation of the treatise is effectuated by another. In other words, another, i.e., the reason *prayatnānantarīyakatva*, would be similar in negating [properties] such as *bhūguṇatva* of another *dharmin*, smell, etc. Consequently, in the case of sound, accepted *sādhana*, like *kṛtakatva*, would also [absurdly] have faults."

then at that time all the properties found in the treatise are being proved (*sādhya*).' Here [Dharmakīrti] replies:"[357]

(69) *śāstrābhyupagamāt sādhyaḥ śāstradṛṣṭo 'khilo yadi |*
pratijñā 'siddhadṛṣṭāntahetuvādaḥ[358] *prasajyate* ||[359]

Suppose that because one accepted a treatise, all [properties] found in the treatise would be being proved. Then it would follow absurdly that a statement of an unestablished example or reason would have to be a thesis.

As we see in Manorathandin's introduction to k. 69, the objector is now supposedly a Buddhist follower of Dignāga. Prajñākaragupta goes even further and characterizes him as a commentator on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, leading us to conjecture that k. 69 might well be an argument with Īśvarasena, the earlier commentator on the PS whose views were largely contested by Dharmakīrti.[360]

Dharmakīrti's reply consists in invoking a parallel with Dignāga's rejection (in PS III, k. 3) of the definition of the thesis (*pratijñā*) which the Naiyāyika had given in NS 1.1.33, i.e., *sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñā* (see PV IV, k. 24–26 and our explanations). Dignāga's argument against the Naiyāyika comes forth a number of times in PV in different contexts, but essentially its logic is as follows: if "statement of a *sādhya*" (*sādhyanirdeśa*) were to be the defining characteristic of the thesis, then, absurdly, statements of unestablished reasons and examples would also become theses, since, being unestablished (*asiddha*), they thus state something "to be established," i.e., *sādhya*. Now, when faced with the Buddhist

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[357]PVV 438, 10–11: *yad apy āhur ācāryīyāḥ śāstram abhyupagamya yadā vādaḥ kriyate tadā śāstradṛṣṭasya sakalasya dharmasya sādhyatety atrāha* |. Cf. PVBh 510, 8–11: *pramāṇasamuccayasya vyākhyātā prāha | śāstrābhyupagamāt sādhyatā sakalasya śāstradṛṣṭasyānyathā śāstrābhyupagamasya vyarthatā | na hi tadarthāsādhyatāyāṃ śāstropagamaḥ kvacid upayogī | abhyupagamaṃ vārhati | svātantryeṇa pramāṇena na kiṃcit | tasmād upagamya śāstraṃ tadarthaḥ sādhanīyaḥ | tatas tadvirodhe doṣa eva* | "A commentator on the PS says [the following]: 'Because one accepts a treatise, all which is found in the treatise is being proved. Otherwise, accepting a treatise would be meaningless. Indeed, if its propositions were not being proved, then accepting the treatise would not be of use for anything, nor would one be entitled to accept [it]. Nothing is [effectuated] autonomously by a *pramāṇa*. Therefore, once one has accepted a treatise, a property [mentioned] in it would be what is to be proved. Thus, when there is a contradiction with the [treatise], a fault does indeed occur."

[358]PV-k(I) °*dṛṣṭānte hetu*°.

[359]Cf. PVin 292b2–3: *gźan yaṅ gal te bstan bcos khas blaṅs pa'i phyir bstan bcos las*[a] *mthoṅ ba thams cad bsgrub bya ba*[b] *ñid du 'dod pa yin na ma grub pa'i gtan tshigs brjod pa yaṅ dam bca' bar 'gyur ro* | ([a] D. *la*—[b] D. om. *ba* [194b2–3]).

[360]On earlier commentators' positions on the thesis definitions in PS III, k. 2 and NM, see TILLEMANS 1994.

commentator's view that all the properties mentioned in the treatise should also be the *sādhya*, Dharmakīrti replies that the Buddhist would have to include the unestablished reasons and examples which are mentioned in the treatise. Thus, in effect, the Buddhist commentator would fall into the same absurdities as the Naiyāyika, whom Dignāga had refuted.

(70) *uktayoḥ sādhanatvena no ced īpsitavādataḥ*[361] |
nyāyaprāptaṃ na sādhyatvaṃ vacanād vinivartate ||[362]

[Objection:] Because [the word] 'intended' (*īpsita*) is specified [in Dignāga's definition of the thesis], then the [unestablished reasons and examples] which are stated as *sādhana* would both not be [*sādhya*]. [Reply:] The fact that [unestablished properties accepted in the treatise] would be *sādhya*, which is a logical consequence, does not disappear [merely] because of the statement [that what is intended is the *sādhya*].[363]

(71) *anīpsitam asādhyaṃ ced vādinānyo 'py anīpsitaḥ* |
dharmo 'sādhyas tadā 'sādhyaṃ bādhamānaṃ virodhi kim ||

[Opponent:] But what is unintended [by the proponent] is not the *sādhya* [even if it is the position of the treatise]. [Reply:] Then the other property [viz., *ākāśaguṇatva*, etc.], which was not intended by the proponent, would not be the *sādhya* either. In that case, why is [a reason, like *kṛtakatva*] which invalidates a non-*sādhya* [like *ākāśaguṇatva*] contradictory?[364]

The PVV and PVBh explain that in k. 70 the opponent invokes Dignāga's definition of the thesis as given in NM, k. 1: *svayaṃ sādhyatvenepsitaḥ pakṣo viruddhārthānirākṛtaḥ* (the thesis is what is intended by [the proponent] himself as the *sādhya* [and] is not opposed by contradicting states of affairs). The provision *īpsita* in this definition, just like *svarūpeṇaiva* in the PS's version (see PV IV, k. 28–29 and our explanations), should eliminate all *sādhana*, like reasons and examples, for the proponent never intended to prove such things: he only in-

[361]PV-k(I) *īpsitabādhataḥ*; cf. Tib. *smros phyir* = *vādataḥ*.

[362]Cf. PVin 292b3: *tshig phrad smos pas sgrub byed du 'dod pa spaṅs pa'i phyir skyon med do źe na ma yin te | rigs pas*[a] *thob pa ni tshig gis bzlog par mi nus pa'i phyir ro* | ([a] P. *rigs pa*. [D. 194b3–4]).

[363]Cf. PVV 438, 22–23: *nanv asiddhasya śāstrābhyupagatasya sādhyatvaṃ nyāyaprāptaṃ vacanamātrād īpsitasādhyatvapratipādakatvān na vinivartate* ||.

[364]Additions are all based on PVV *ad* k. 71.

tended to prove *sādhya* and not *sādhana*.[365] Dharmakīrti's initial reply in k. 70 is to stress that if the adversary seriously holds that every property in the treatise is being proved, then the unpalatable consequences in question cannot be averted, for they are logically derivable. Merely citing Dignāga's words changes nothing in this respect, for if one agrees with k. 69's principle, *śāstrābhyupagamāt sādhyaḥ śāstradṛṣṭo 'khilaḥ*, then every property in the treatise, whether intended by the proponent or not, *must be* the *sādhya*. If, however, the opponent (in k. 71) insists that it is really only what is intended by the proponent which is the *sādhya*, then the other properties mentioned in the treatise will become irrelevant, and thus the *sādhya* for the reason *kṛtakatva* will be just impermanence; *ākāśaguṇatva*, which was never intended by the proponent at all, can be refuted with impunity and with no threat of the reason becoming a contradictory reason (*viruddhahetu*).

2.6 *svayam*: refuting rival Buddhist exegeses of PS III, k. 2b

2.6.1 A co-religionist's view: properties mentioned in the treatise are being proved; *svayam* guarantees that the treatise is the one which the proponent accepts now

The PVP's introduction to k. 72: "Moreover, if all properties mentioned in the treatise were being proved (*sādhya*), the word 'himself' (*svayam*) would also be pointless. How so?"[366]

(72) *pakṣalakṣaṇabāhyārthaḥ svayaṃśabdo*[367] *'py anarthakaḥ* |
śāstreṣv icchāpravṛttyartho yadi śāṅkā kuto nv iyam[368] ||[369]

[365]For NM, k. 1 see KATSURA 1977, 109. In PVin (see n. 362), which speaks of the particle *eva*, it is clear that the related discussion there concerns PS III's definition rather than that of NM. Dharmakīrti, in PV IV, k. 86–88, will argue that the definitions in NM and PS are equivalent.

[366]PVP 338a5: *gźan yaṅ gal te bstan bcos kyi don thams cad bsgrub par bya ba yin pa de'i tshe bdag ñid sgra yaṅ don med can yin no || ci 'dra ba źig ce na* | (D. 283a 7). Cf. PVV 439, 10: *yadi śāstrābhyupagatatvaṃ pakṣalakṣaṇaṃ tadā* ... "If 'what is accepted in the treatise' were the defining characteristic of the thesis, then ...."

[367]MIY. *svayaṃ śabdo*.

[368]PV-k(I) *śāṅkāṃ gato hi yaḥ*. MIY.'s incorrect reading *'nviyaṃ* (instead of *nv iyam*) was corrected in MIYASAKA 1974.

[369]Cf. PVin 292b3–4: *phyogs kyi mtshan ñid las phyi rol tu 'gyur ba'i don can raṅ ñid kyi sgras kyaṅ don cuṅ zad rgyas par mi byed do || gal te bstan bcos la 'dod pas 'jug pa'i don du yin no źe na*[a] | *gaṅ gis de'i don du na 'bad par byed dogs pa 'di ga las yin*[b] | ([a] D. *gal te bstan bcos la 'jug pas 'dod du yin no*—[b] D. *gaṅ gis de'i don du 'bad par byed par dgos pas 'di ga las yin* [D. 194b4–5]).

> The word 'himself' (*svayam*), whose meaning would be alien to [that of] the defining characteristic of the thesis, would also be pointless. Suppose that it [i.e., 'himself'] were in order [to show] inclination to treatises according to what the [proponent] wished. Then [we would reply] 'But why should this qualm occur?'

The position being attacked is, as in the previous verses, that all properties mentioned in the proponent's treatise are also being proved by the proponent. In other words, according to this position, when a Vaiśeṣika, for example, is proving sound's impermanence, then the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*'s principle that sound is a quality of space (*ākāśaguṇatva*) is equally the thesis which is being proved. For Dharmakīrti, however, if we accepted this idea of what a thesis was, then the word 'himself' would have no place in the thesis-definition, for the restrictions which it expresses would not in fact apply to the thesis—this is what Dharmakīrti meant by saying that its meaning would "be outside" (*bāhya*) or "alien to" the defining characteristic of the thesis (*pakṣalakṣaṇa*).[370] In particular, in the sound-impermanent reasoning *svayam* should eliminate the properties which the proponent did not *himself* intend to prove, such as *ākāśaguṇatva*. But if what was in the treatise *were to be* the *sādhya*, then *ākāśaguṇatva*, etc. would also inevitably have to be the *sādhya*. Thus, the restrictions which *svayam* imposes would become pointless.

The third *pāda* of k. 72 (*śāstreṣv icchāpravṛttyartho yadi*) presents the reply of Dharmakīrti's adversary, who believes that properties mentioned in the treatise *are sādhya*, but that *svayam* nonetheless does have a point. First of all, who was Dharmakīrti's interlocutor? It is clear that the adversary must be a Buddhist who *accepts* Dignāga's thesis-definition and thus wants to justify all of its provisions, including *svayam*. Indeed, Śākyabuddhi's PVṬ (322a3) identifies him as being a "commentator on [Dignāga's] *Pramāṇasamuccaya*" (*tshad ma kun las btsus pa'i ṭīkā byed pa = pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkākāra*). It seems reasonable, then, to hypothesize that Dharmakīrti was arguing specifically against his teacher, Īśvarasena, whose commentary on the PS was the catalyst for many of the important developments in Dharmakīrti's own thought. True, the general position that all the properties mentioned in the treatise accepted by the proponent are also his *sādhya* is, as we argued in connection with k. 53, in its essentials that of the Nyāya-

[370]Cf. PVinṬ 39a1–2: *bstan bcos las mthoṅ ba bsgrub bya yin na raṅ gi sgra yaṅ don med par 'gyur te | phyogs kyi mtshan ñid las phyi rol tu gyur pa'i brjod par bya ba can yin pa'i phyir ro || 'di ni brjod par bya ba ni phyogs kyi*[a] *ṅo bo ma yin te | 'on kyaṅ bla lhag pa yin no || des na dgos pa med par 'gyur ro ||* ([a] P. *kyis* [D. 34a2–3]) "If what is found in the treatise was the *sādhya*, then the word *svayam* would be pointless, for it would have an expressed content alien to the defining characteristic of the thesis. Its expressed content would not be the essence of the thesis, but rather would be redundant. Therefore, *svayam* would be needless."

Vaiśeṣika. But this general position was also said to be that of "a/the commentator on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*," or that of a "follower of the Ācārya [Dignāga]" (see k. 69 and our explanations). Īśvarasena thus seems the likely candidate in connection with k. 72 too, and once again we supposedly have a Buddhist commentator who believes that all properties mentioned in the treatise are the *sādhya*.[371]

If it is indeed Īśvarasena whose views are discussed in k. 72ff., he proposed the following explanation for *svayam*: the word is needed to show that the treatise in question, whose properties are the *sādhya*, is the very one which the proponent *himself* (*svayam*) accepts now, rather than some treatise which he might have accepted earlier, but now rejects. To quote Devendrabuddhi's explanation of the commentator's views: "Having given up some previously accepted treatise, then it is not contradictory that at the time of the debate the proponent relies on another treatise as he himself wishes."[372] In short, *svayam* supposedly serves to eliminate doubt about *which* treatise is to be the basis for the *sādhya*. Dharmakīrti, in k. 72d and the following *kārikā*s, argues that this doubt is groundless.

(73) *so 'niṣiddhaḥ pramāṇena gṛhṇan kena nivāryate |*
niṣiddhaś cet pramāṇena vācā kena pravartyate ||[373]

When the [proponent] holds [a treatise] without being opposed by a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) [which invalidates a property mentioned in the treatise], then who stops him [from doing so]? But if he is opposed by a *pramāṇa* [which invalidates a property in the treatise], then who [i.e., which author of a definition] makes him inclined [to accept the treatise] by means of the word [*svayam*]?[374]

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[371]See TILLEMANS 1994 on the Buddhist opponents against whom Dharmakīrti argues in this section.

[372]PVP 338a7–8: *bstan bcos cuṅ zad sṅar khas blaṅs pa de gaṅ yin pa de bor nas | rtsod pa'i dus su bdag ñid kyi 'dod pas bstan bcos gźan la brten pa'i rgol ba yaṅ 'gal ba yod pa ma yin no źes* (D. 283b2). Cf. PVV-n 439, n. 2: *svīkṛtaśāstraṃ muktvā vādakāle śāstrāntaram icchayā labhyate 'ṅgīkartum |* "Having abandoned a treatise which he had accepted, then at the time of the debate another treatise could be accepted as wished."

[373]Cf. PVin 292b5: *gal te tshad mas ma bzlog na de 'jug pa sus bzlog ciṅ | tshad mas bzlog na yaṅ sus tshig gis 'jug par byed nus |* (D. 194b5).

[374]Additions based on PVV 439, 18–22: *sa vādī pramāṇena śāstrārthabādhakenāniṣiddhaḥ śāstraṃ gṛhṇan kena nivāryate na kenacit | yataḥ svayaṃgrahaṇaṃ śāstraṃ grāhayat saphalaṃ syāt | pramāṇena cec chāstrārthabādhakena niṣiddho vādī vācā svayaṃśabdena śāstrābhyupagame kena lakṣaṇakartrā pravartyate na kenacit ||*.

(74) *pūrvam apy eṣa siddhāntaṃ svecchayaiva gṛhītavān |*
kathaṃcid[375] *anyaṃ sa*[376] *punar grahītuṃ labhate na kim ||*[377]

The [proponent] previously too held a system of philosophical tenets (*siddhānta*) exactly as he wished (*svecchayaiva*). Why shouldn't he somehow manage to hold another later?

Kārikā 73 explains that proponents will choose treatises first and foremost because of *pramāṇa*s. Equally, if the content of the treatise fails to be corroborated by *pramāṇa*s, they will not then accept the treatise simply because they wish to do so. In short, *mere* wishes are irrelevant: what counts in accepting something is a *pramāṇa*. Thus if *svayam* is destined to guarantee that the treatise is the one which the proponent chose according to his own wishes, it fulfils no needed role whatsoever. *Kārikā* 74 argues that proponents have previously accepted a philosophical system as they wished and would also automatically accept another treatise in exactly same way. Thus the treatise which they accept would invariably be the one they wanted to accept: *svayam* would not be needed to ensure this fact. Note that Prajñākaragupta and the Tibetan commentators, rGyal tshab rje and dGe 'dun grub pa, take k. 73 and 74 as speaking about two different types of proponents of unequal intelligence. On this interpretation, k. 73 speaks of an *intelligent* proponent who proceeds by logic and *pramāṇa*s; in k. 74 the proponent is a fool who accepts treatises irrationally.[378]

2.6.2 Dharmakīrti's own position

PVV's introduction to k. 75: "[Objection:] But surely it has [already] been established that what is intended (*iṣṭa*) is also included as the *sādhya* exactly as the [proponent] himself wishes (*svecchayaiva*). So the word *svayam is* [indeed] ineffectual. [Dharmakīrti] replies:"[379]

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[375] PV-k(II) *kiṃcid*.

[376] PV-k(I/III) *na*.

[377] As MIY. points out, k. 74 is quoted in Jñānaśrīmitra's *Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya* 10, 5f.

[378] PVBh 516, 23f.: *necchāmātrāt pravartante prekṣāpūrvakriyākṛtaḥ | vimṛśyakāritā puṃsāṃ sudhiyāṃ prathamaṃ padam || aprekṣāpūrvakārī cet tasyecchaiva nibandhanam |* "Those who perform actions preceded by reflection are not inclined [to a treatise] because of their mere wishes. Intelligent people act after analysis—[this is] the first rank. Should he be one who acts without previous reflection, then his ground is just his wishes alone." Probably following PVBh, dGe 307 makes the contrast between *dbaṅ rnon* and *dbaṅ rtul*, i.e., proponents of sharp (k. 73) and dull (k. 74) faculties. See also rGyal 278, 11 on the proponents described in k. 74: *rgol ba blun po de dag* "these foolish proponents."

[379] PVV 440, 4: *nanv iṣṭasyāpi svecchayaiva sādhyatāparigrahaḥ siddha iti vyartha svayaṃgrahaṇam ity āha |*.

(75) *dr̥ṣṭer vipratipattīnāṃ atrākārṣīt svayaṃśrutiṃ*[380] |
iṣṭākṣatim asādhyatvam anavasthāṃ ca darśayan ||[381]

[The Ācārya Dignāga] employed the word *svayam* here [in the definition of the thesis] in view of [various] mistaken conceptions, showing (a) that [even if a property mentioned in treatises, like *ākāśaguṇatva*, is not established] what is intended [by the proponent] is not nullified; (b) that [what is accepted in a treatise] does not constitute the *sādhya*; (c) and that [if it were the *sādhya*] there would be no end [of absurdities, such as that valid reasons would become contradictory (*viruddhahetu*)].[382]

Dharmakīrti grants that *svayam* was not strictly speaking necessary in the definition of the thesis; its logical role would also be accomplished by *iṣṭa*. Nonetheless, *svayam* was needed to eliminate various seductive misconceptions. The verse is a summary of previous arguments: on point (a) (i.e., *iṣṭākṣati*) see e.g., k. 56; on (b) (i.e., *asādhyatva*) see e.g., k. 42–43; on (c) (i.e., *anavasthā*) see k. 44, 52. As PVV makes clear, the absurdities in (c) are that logical reasons, such as "being produced" (*kr̥takatva*), which do validly prove sound's impermanence, would become contradictory if they happened to invalidate any proposition in the treatise, *whatever be the subject* (*dharmin*). Thus, *kr̥takatva* would be contradictory when one is proving that the *dharmin*, sound, has impermanence. Not only would *kr̥takatva* be contradictory because it proves that sound is not a quality of space (*ākāśaguṇa*), but it would also be contradictory because of proving that a different *dharmin*, smell, is *not* a quality of the earth (*bhūguṇa*)—both sound's being a quality of space and smell's being a quality of the earth are accepted in the Vaiśeṣika's treatise.

2.6.3 Refuting another Buddhist view, viz., that *svayam* ensures that the subject is commonly recognized (*prasiddha*)

In what follows (i.e., k. 76–88), Dharmakīrti will deal with other explanations of *svayam*. It is not clear that these rival explanations were really those of historical individuals, for the commentators on PV IV say virtually nothing on the identity of the opponent(s). Vibhūticandra's note 3 to PVV *ad* k. 76 does speak of Dharmakīrti refuting a "commentator" (*ṭīkākāra*), but for the rest we have no

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[380] PV-k(I | III), MIY. *svayaṃ śrutim*.
[381] PV IV, k. 75 = PVin III, k. 25; 293a8.
[382] Additions follow PVV, apart from those in (c) which are our own résumé of PVV.

other indications. Tibetan topical outlines generally distinguish separate opposing positions in k. 76–77 and 78–88, as does PVBh *ad* k. 89 in its summary of this section.

(76) *samayāhitabhedasya parihāreṇa dharmiṇaḥ* |
prasiddhasya gṛhītyarthāṃ[383] *jagādānyaḥ svayaṃśrutim*[384] ||[385]

Another [commentator] has said that by [its] elimination [of any subject] which has a particularity added by a [philosophical] tradition, the word *svayam* has the purpose of making one hold a commonly recognized subject (*dharmin*).

The view on *svayam* being proposed here is that the term serves to eliminate subjects (*dharmin*) which have "superimposed" (*āhita* = *āropita*) natures consisting in properties accepted only in treatises and scriptures; such subjects are not what the proponent himself intends when he puts forth a thesis. This version of *svayam* would, in effect, restate the requirement in Dignāga's logic that the *dharmin* must be "commonly recognized" (*prasiddha*), failing which the reason will have an "unestablished locus" (*āśrayāsiddha*) and will thus be fallacious. Indeed, when a proponent proves that sound is impermanent, he is speaking only of sound as it is commonly recognized by himself, his adversary and all sorts of individuals in the world (down to and including cowherds[386]); he is not speaking of the theoretical entity, "sound," which is described in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*s as being a quality of space (*ākāśaguṇa*) and which is certainly not recognized by anyone other than holders of that particular philosophical tenet.

(77) *vicāraprastuter eva prasiddhaḥ siddha āśrayaḥ* |
svecchākalpitabhedeṣu padārtheṣv avivādataḥ ||[387]

Since there is actually an undertaking of an investigation [as to whether the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*) is present or not in the subject], then the locus (*āśraya*) is established as com-

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[383]PV-k(III), MIY. °*arthaṃ*. PVV analyzes the compound as a *bahuvrīhi* qualifying *svayaṃśrutim*.

[384]PV-k(I/III), MIY. *svayaṃ śrutiṃ*.

[385]Cf. PVin 292b5–6: *gźan dag ni raṅ ñid kyi sgra gźuṅ lugs kyi mtshan ñid kyis bskyed pa'i khyad par gyi chos can yoṅs su spaṅs nas rab tu grags pa'i chos can yoṅs su gzuṅ ba'i phyir ro* | *źes 'dzer to* | (D. 194b5–6).

[386]See PVP 339a4: *gnag rdzi mo'i bar la rab grags pa'i chos can dag...*

[387]Cf. PVin 292b6–7: *de la*[a] *yaṅ rnam par dpyod pa'i skabs ñid kyis gźi rab tu grags pa yin par grub pa'i phyir 'di ni ci yaṅ ma yin no* || *raṅ gi 'dod pas brtags pa'i*[b] *khyad par can don la gtso bor*[c] *ñe bar sbyor ba med pa'i don dag la ñe bar bkod pa'i rnam par gźag pa ni 'ga' yaṅ bzlog par bya ba ma yin no* || ([a] P. *las*—[b] D. *pa*—[c] D. *gtsor* [D. 194b6–7]).

monly recognized; for there is no debate about things whose particularities are imagined according to one's own wishes.

Dharmakīrti's reply to the view proposed in k. 76 is that elimination of "theoretical" and unrecognized subjects is already presupposed in any debate on whether a subject has the property to be proved. As soon as it is understood that the subject is not a commonly recognized real entity, the debate will cease. Hence, *svayam*, if explained as assuring a commonly recognized subject, would perform no needed function.

2.6.4 Against the view that *svayam* is to ensure that the subject is not something to be proved (*sādhya*)

(78) *asādhyatām atha prāha siddhādeśena dharmiṇaḥ* |
svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśya ity anenaiva tad gatam ||[388]

[Objection:] But surely he [i.e., Dignāga] said that the subject was not something to be proved, by indicating [with the word *svayam*] that [the subject] be established. [Reply:] This [fact that an established subject is not something to be proved] is [already] understood just by means of that [part of the thesis-definition] which says *svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ* ('[the thesis] should be stated in its proper form alone').[389]

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[388]Cf. PVin 292b8–293a1: *'on te rab tu grags pa ñe bar bstan pa'i sgo nas grub pa'i chos can bsgrub par bya ba ma yin par*[a] *bśad pa yin no że na | ma yin te | raṅ gi ṅo bo kho nar bstan pa żes bya ba 'di ñid kyis*[a] *rtogs pa'i phyir ro* || ([a] D. om. *par*—[b] P. *kyi*—[D. 195a1]).

[389]See PVV 441, 3–6: *atha siddhādeśena prasiddhārthavācakena svayaṃśabdena dharmiṇo 'sādhyatāṃ prāha | yathāsti pradhānaṃ bhedānām anupadarśanād*[a] *iti | idam apy ayuktam | yasmāt svarūpeṇa sādhyatvenaiva nirdeśya ity anena pakṣalakṣaṇāvayavenaiva ca tad dharmiṇaḥ siddhasyāsādhyatvaṃ gataṃ pratītam* || ([a] We should probably read *anvayadarśanād*; cf. Uddyotakara's NV 168 [*asti pradhānam anvayadarśanāt*; the passage is cited and discussed in KATSURA 1978, 110 and KITAGAWA 1973, n. 257]) "[Objection:] But surely he declared that the *dharmin* was not the *sādhya* by indicating that it be established with the word *svayam*, which expresses the meaning of *prasiddha*. For example: [the *dharmin* is not established when it is argued] 'Primordial Matter (*pradhāna*) exists, because we observe that individual things have the same general character.' [Reply:] Such [an explanation of *svayam*] is also incorrect. For, this fact that an established *dharmin* is not the *sādhya* is understood (*gatam* = *pratītam*) just by means of this part of the thesis-definition which says *svarūpeṇa nirdeśya* (*svarūpeṇa* = *sādhyatvenaiva* 'only as a *sādhya*')."

To show an improper reasoning where the *dharmin* is *not* established and *is* hence a *sādhya*, PVV followed NM and PSV and cited the Sāṃkhya argument, "Primordial Matter (*pradhāna*) exists, because we observe that individual things have the same general character." Cf. Vibhūticandra

(79) *siddhasādhanarūpeṇa nirdeśasya hi sambhave* |
sādhyatvenaiva[390] *nirdeśya itīdaṃ phalavad bhavet* ||[391]

Indeed, if [it were thought that] a statement in the form of something established or in the form of a *sādhana* could be [a thesis], then this [phrase], which says that [the thesis] is to be stated as a *sādhya* alone (*sādhyatvenaiva nirdeśyaḥ*), would have effect.

The opponent now argues that *svayam* is not redundant, in that by indicating that the subject intended by the proponent himself would be something commonly recognized and thus established, it insures that the subject is not itself "to be established," i.e., it is not the *sādhya*. Thus, *svayam* supposedly serves to eliminate doubts as to whether a statement of the subject is a thesis.

Now, the rule that one does not prove the subject, and that it must be established, was repeatedly put forth by Dignāga.[392] In short, inference does not prove the existence of the subject—that is presupposed in a proper debate—but only establishes the "exclusion of nonconnection" (*ayogavyavaccheda*) between it and a universal property (see e.g., PV IV, k. 37). In k. 78cd and 79 Dharmakīrti replies to his opponent that the subject, which must in any case be established, cannot be thought to be the thesis, for the proviso, *svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ*, in the definition in PS III, k. 2, guarantees that the thesis must in fact be a statement in the form of a *sādhya* and not a statement of something established (i.e., a subject)

PVV-n 441, n. 2, which elaborates: *dharmy eva pradhānam asiddhaḥ kvāstitvaṃ sādhyam* "The *dharmin*, i.e., *pradhāna*, is itself not established. In what then is existence to be proved?" For Dignāga's discussion of this reasoning, see NM *ad* k. 2 (KATSURA 1978, 110–111; TUCCI 1930, 16; KATSURA 1992, 230). Cf. also the reason, *bhedānāṃ samanvayāt*, which is used for proving *pradhāna* in *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, k. 15–16. NM argues that the thesis needs to be reworded in the following way so that the *dharmin does* exist: "The individual things definitely have one and the same cause [i.e., *pradhāna*]." See also PSVb 128b6–7 (KITAGAWA 1973, 159f., 484): *chos kyi chos can yaṅ bsgrub pa ma yin te* | *dper na gtso bo gcig yod pa yin te* | *khyad par rnams la rjes su 'gro ba mthoṅ ba'i phyir ro źes bya ba lta bu'o* || *de ni khyad par rnams kho na rgyu gcig pa can ñid du bsgrub par bya ba yin te* | *der yaṅ gyo mo la sogs pa'i rgyu gcig pa ñid dper byed pa yin no* || "The *dharmin* of the *dharma* is not being proved (*sādhya*), as in [an argument] like 'A unique *pradhāna* exists, because we observe that the individual things have the same general character.' The *sādhya* is that the individual things themselves have one and the same cause; here too 'potsherds and so forth having the same cause' is taken as the example." See also TILLEMANS 1998a, on the arguments against *pradhāna* in NM, PS, PVin and PV.

[390] PV-k(II) *sādhyatvaineva.*

[391] Cf. PVin 293a1: *grub pa daṅ sgrub par byed pa'i ṅo bor bstan pa yin par dogs nas*[a] *bsgrub par bya ba kho nar bstan par bya ba źes bya ba 'di 'bras bu daṅ*[b] *bcas par 'gyur ro* || ([a] D. *dgos na*; PVinṬ 40b3 reads *dogs*; see n. 393. —[b] D. om. *daṅ* [D. 195a1–2]).

[392] See n. 389.

or a *sādhana* (i.e., a reason or an example).[393] Thus, as Dharmakīrti points out in k. 79cd, Dignāga's specification that the thesis should be only a statement of a *sādhya* would itself, without the aid of *svayam*, have the effect of preventing statements of *dharmin*s from being theses.

(80) *anumānasya sāmānyaviṣayatvaṃ ca varṇitam |*
ihaivaṃ na hy anukte 'pi kiṃcit pakṣe virudhyate ||[394]

And [furthermore], [Dignāga] has taught that inference has universals as its objects (*sāmānyaviṣayatva*). [But if a subject (*dharmin*) were a thesis, then because the subject is a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*), then *sāmānyaviṣayatā* would be violated.][395] Indeed, even if [*svayam*] is not stated here [in the thesis-definition] in this manner, nothing will be opposed in the thesis.

Dharmakīrti refers to PSV *ad* PS I, k. 2, where Dignāga gave his well-known account of the two sorts of objects of cognition (*prameya*) corresponding to the two *pramāṇa*s: perception has particulars as its objects, while inference has universals.[396] Dharmakīrti then uses Dignāga's principle as a further argument to

[393]Cf. PVinṬ 40b1–4: *ci'i phyir źe na | raṅ gi ṅo bo kho nar źes bya ba la sogs pa smos te | mtshan ñid kyi phyogs gcig po 'di ñid kyis grub pa bsgrub par bya ba ma yin par rtogs pa'i phyir ro | ci'i phyir rtogs śe na | grub pa daṅ źes smos te | gaṅ gi phyir grub pa daṅ sgrub par byed pa de dag gi ṅo bor bstan pa phyogs yin par dogs pa yod na bsgrub par bya ba kho nar bstan pa źes bya ba'i ṅag 'di grub pa daṅ sgrub byed dag bsgrub par bya ba ñid yin sel bas 'bras bu daṅ bcas par 'gyur ro ||* (D. 35a5–7) "Why [does *svayam* not serve this purpose]? [Dharmakīrti] answers with *svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśya ity [anenaiva tad gatam].* I.e., it is because by this part of the definition alone it is understood that established things are not the *sādhya.* Why is [this] understood? [Dharmakīrti] answers with *siddha[sādhanarūpeṇa, etc.].* In other words, it is because if there is a doubt whether statements in the form of something established or in the form of a *sādhana* might be theses, then the phrase which says that [the thesis] is to be stated as a *sādhya* alone would have effect in that it would eliminate that established things [like *dharmin*s] or *sādhana* could be *sādhya*."

[394]Cf. PVin 293a2–3: *raṅ ñid grub pa'i chos can yoṅs su gzuṅ bar ma brjod na chos can ñid bsgrub byar*[a] *byed par 'gyur ro źe na*[b] *| ma yin te | rjes su dpag pa spyi'i yul can yin pa ñid kyis don rtogs pa'i phyir ro || chos can yod par 'gyur |*[c] *bsgrub par bya ba yin na raṅ gi mtshan ñid bsgrub byar 'gyur na de yaṅ spaṅs zin to || de'i phyir 'dir de skad ma brjod kyaṅ phyogs la 'gal ba cuṅ zad kyaṅ med do ||* ([a] D. *chos can ñid du sgrub byar*—[b] P. *'gyur źes na*—[c] P. om. *'gyur |* [D. 195a2–3]).

[395]PVV 441, 17–18: *yadi ca dharmī pakṣaḥ tadā tasya svalakṣaṇatvāt sāmānyaviṣayatā vyāhanyeta |.*

[396]See PSV fragment cited in PVBh 169, 9f. (HATTORI 1968, 79, n. 14): *na hi svasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyām anyat prameyam asti | svalakṣaṇaviṣayaṃ hi pratyakṣaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayam anumānam iti pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ |* "Apart from the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the universal

show that *svayam*, if it were supposed to eliminate subjects (*dharmin*) from being *sādhya* or theses, would be completely unnecessary. The thesis which is inferred must always be a universal property connected with a subject, and never a particular. Thus the subject, which *is* a particular, could never be the object of inference, or the thesis which is being proved (*sādhya*). To quote the PVin: "If the subject's existence were being proved, then a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) would become the *sādhya*. This has been refuted."[397]

The conclusion in k. 80 is that if *svayam* were explained as eliminating the subject, this function would have been already assured, in any case, by the universal nature of objects of inference; even if the definition lacked the word *svayam*, there still would be no risk that subjects would be mistakenly included as theses.

(81) *kuryāc ced dharmiṇaṃ sādhyaṃ tataḥ kiṃ tan na śakyate* |
kasmād dhetvanvayābhāvān nanu[398] *doṣas tayor ayam*[399] ||[400]

Suppose that [if *svayam* were not stated, the thesis-definition] would make the subject something to be proved. Then what [would ensue] from this? [Opponent:] The [subject] could not [be something to be proved]. [Dharmakīrti:] Why? [Opponent:] Because the reason would have no co-presence (*anvaya*). [Dharmakīrti:] Now surely this is a fault of both the [reason and example, rather than of the thesis].[401]

(*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) there is no other object to be cognized, and we shall prove that perception has only the particular for its object and inference only the universal" (trans. HATTORI 1968, 24).

[397] *chos can yod par 'gyur* | *bsgrub par bya ba yin na raṅ gi mtshan ñid bsgrub byar 'gyur na de yaṅ spaṅs zin to* || (see n. 394 above). As we shall see in the following verses, the reason that a particular could not be the *sādhya* is because, by being a unique item, existing in only one place at one time, it could never be present in other things such as the example. If absurdly a particular *were* the *sādhya*, the result would be that the reason and the *sādhya* would not *both* be present in the example—in short there would be no co-presence (*anvaya*).

[398] PV-k(I/II), MIY. *na ca*. PV-k(III) *nanu* = Tib. *min nam*.

[399] PV-k(I),(II) *api*. Cf. Tib. *'di* = *ayam*.

[400] Cf. PVin 293a3–4: *ci ste chos can ñid bsgrub byar byas na de las cir 'gyur* | *de ni mi nus so* || *ci'i phyir źe na* | *gtan tshigs ni khyad par daṅ rjes su 'gro ba med pa'i phyir ro źe na* | *'di ni gtan tshigs daṅ dper dag gi skyon yin gyi phyogs kyi ni ma yin te* | *yan lag phyi ma la ltos pa'i phyir ro* || (D. 195a3–5).

[401] See PVV 441, 21–442, 3: *nanv anukte svayaṃśabde pakṣalakṣaṇaṃ ... dharmiṇaṃ sādhyaṃ kuryād iti doṣaḥ* | *tato dharmiṇaḥ pakṣatvaprasaṅgāt kiṃ dūṣaṇam* | *taddharmipakṣatvaṃ kartuṃ na śakyata ity aśakyatādūṣaṇam* | *kasmād kāraṇād dharmī pakṣo bhavituṃ nārhati* (|) *dharmiṇaḥ sādhyatvenāsiddhatāyāṃ hetor abhāvāt* | *viśeṣasya dharmiṇo dṛṣṭānte 'sambhavāt* | *anvayābhāvāc ca dharmī pakṣaḥ kartuṃ na śakyate* | *nanv ayaṃ doṣas tayor hetudṛṣṭāntayor na*

It is admittedly somewhat complicated to decipher who is arguing which position in this *kārikā* of PV. However, by relying upon PVV and the parallel passage in the PVin (see n. 400), the roles can be distributed as above. The argument begins with the opponent's objection that *svayam* must be stated, or else nothing in the thesis-definition would preclude that the subject might also be a *sādhya* / thesis. Although Dharmakīrti obviously does not himself accept that a thesis-definition without the proviso *svayam* would make the subject a *sādhya* / thesis, he concedes the point for the sake of argument. He then questions his opponent ("What would ensue from this?") as to what absurdities or faults would ensue if a subject were a *sādhya*. The opponent then replies and elaborates upon his own view by saying "Because ... no co-presence"—that this is indeed the opponent speaking is clearly shown in the Tibetan of the PVin by the *źe na* (if it is said) occurring at the end of the sentence. The opponent's point, then, is that if the subject were what was being proved, the reason could not have the requisite co-presence (*anvaya*) with the *sādhya*; the reason (*hetu*) and *sādhya* could not both qualify the example (*dṛṣṭānta*). The argument turns on the fact that a *dharmin* is a particular, rather than a universal, and hence that it cannot qualify any other entity.

Dharmakīrti, in k. 81d and k. 82–83, then criticizes this account of *svayam* as being inadequate because it invokes a problem which does not actually concern the thesis, but only the reason. His point is to remind the opponent that the provisions in the thesis-definition were designed to eliminate only faulty theses: no *anvaya* would indeed occur if the *dharmin* were allowed to be the *sādhya*, but such a fault would not be classifiable as a fault of the thesis; it would only concern the reason.

(82) *uttarāvayavāpekṣo na doṣaḥ pakṣa iṣyate* |
tathā hetvādidoṣo 'pi pakṣadoṣaḥ prasajyate ||

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tu pakṣasya || "[Opponent:] Surely if the word *svayam* was not stated, the thesis-definition would make the *dharmin* a *sādhya*. Thus there would be a fault. [Dharmakīrti:] What fault would ensue from this, i.e., from the consequence that the *dharmin* would be a thesis? [Opponent:] The *dharmin* cannot be made a thesis, so therefore there is the fault of impossibility. [Dharmakīrti:] Why cannot the *dharmin* be a thesis? [Opponent:] Because there are no [valid logical] reasons when the *dharmin*, by being a *sādhya*, is not established[a] ; because the *dharmin*, which is a particular, cannot occur in the example; and because there is no co-presence (*anvaya*), the *dharmin*, therefore, cannot be made a thesis. [Dharmakīrti:] Surely this is a fault of those two, i.e., of the reason and example, but not of the thesis." ([a] Besides the fault of no *anvaya*, PVV also alludes to the fault of *āśrayāsiddhahetu*; see Vibhūticandra's PVV-n, n. 1 on this passage in PVV: *āśrayāsiddhyā*. In other words, when the *dharmin* is a *sādhya*, and hence unestablished, the reason will incur the fault of *āśrayāsiddhi*: its locus will be unestablished.)

(83) *sarvaiḥ pakṣasya bādhātas tasmāt tanmātrasaṅginaḥ*[402] |
pakṣadoṣā matā nānye pratyakṣādivirodhavat ||[403]

What concerns the subsequent members [of a proof, i.e., the reason and example] is not accepted to be a fault of the thesis. In such a case [i.e., if it were], it would follow absurdly that a fault of the reason and so forth would also be a fault of the thesis; for they would all invalidate the thesis.[404] Therefore, it is [only] those associated with the [thesis] alone, and no others, which are admitted as faults of the thesis, like contradiction with perception (*pratyakṣa*) and so forth.

In the PV Dharmakīrti seems to have kept a rather unstable schema of fallacies which he had inherited from Dignāga, a schema which included fallacies of the reason (*hetvābhāsa*) and of the example (*dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*), as well as those of the thesis (*pakṣābhāsa*). At this stage in Dharmakīrti's thought, then, there had to be a clear separation between the three types of fallacies. Thus, if it were argued that a fault of the reason must also be one of the thesis because it too invalidates the thesis, then, in effect, the distinction between different sorts of faults would collapse. True, in his later works, viz., the HB and VN, Dharmakīrti would come to banish completely the statement of the *pakṣa* from any formal reasoning and would thus also abandon the whole schema of *pakṣābhāsa*. But here, in the PV, he remained close to Dignāga's position as found in the PS. As we shall see below in connection with k. 91ff., Dignāga in PS had a fourfold classification of *pakṣābhāsa*, one type of which would consist in theses like "sound is not audible" (*aśrāvaṇaḥ śabdaḥ*) which were refutable by perception.[405]

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[402] PV-k(III), MIY. *tanmātraliṅginaḥ*.

[403] Cf. PVin 293a4–6: *'di ni gtan tshigs daṅ dpe dag gi skyon yin gyi | phyogs kyi ni ma yin te | yan lag phyi ma la bltos pa'i phyir ro || de lta ma yin na gtan tshigs la sogs pa'i skyon mtha' dag phyogs kyi skyon yin par 'gyur te | thams cad la*[a] *phyogs ñid la gnod pa'i phyir ro || de'i phyir de tsam daṅ rjes su 'brel ba kho na phyogs kyi skyon yin te | mṅon sum la sogs pa daṅ 'gal ba bźin no* || ([a] D. *du* [D. 195a4–6]).

[404] See PVV 442, 7–8: *yadi tūttarāvayavāpekṣo 'pi pakṣasya bādhanāt pakṣadoṣa ucyate tathā sati hetvādidoṣo 'pi pakṣadoṣaḥ prasajyate* | "If, however, those which concern the subsequent members are also said to be faults of the thesis because the thesis is invalidated, then in such a case it would follow absurdly that a fault of the reason and so forth would also be a fault of the thesis."

[405] On Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's positions and their evolution, see M. INAMI 1991; see also TILLEMANS 1991a and pp. xv–xvi above.

2.6.5 Continuation of the argument: the function of the thesis-definition and a comparison of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*'s and *Nyāyamukha*'s definitions

(84) *hetvādilakṣaṇair bādhyaṃ muktvā pakṣasya lakṣaṇam |*
ucyate parihārārtham avyāptivyatirekayoḥ[406] ||[407]

Leaving aside what ought to be ruled out by the defining characteristics of [valid] reasons and so forth, the defining characteristic of the thesis is stated in order to eliminate non-pervasion (*avyāpti*) and excessive extension (*vyatireka*) [i.e., *ativyāpti* 'over-pervasion'].

It is probably best to see this excursus on definitions in k. 84–88 as not being an independent or new subject, but rather as being a continuation of the previous arguments against the view that *svayam* was destined to ensure that the subject (*dharmin*) would not be something to be proved (*sādhya*).[408] The internal logic of k. 84 can then be brought out as follows:

(a) The triple characterization (*trairūpya*) of a valid reason will eliminate the various faulty reasons, viz., those which are unestablished (*asiddha*), contradictory (*viruddha*), inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) or lacking co-presence (*ananvaya*).[409]

(b) Now, eliminating these faults of the reason is not, however, the role of a definition of the thesis—the only criterion for the soundness of a thesis-definition is whether it does in fact eliminate non-pervasion (*avyāpti*) and over-pervasion (*ativyāpti*), thereby including all which is the thesis and excluding non-theses.

(c) Dharmakīrti does not himself give an explicit conclusion to k. 84, but, following Prajñākaragupta, the point is that *svayam* cannot be destined to guarantee that

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[406]PV-k(I) *na vyāptivyatirekayoḥ*.

[407]PV IV, k. 84 = PVin III, k. 22; 293a6.

[408]Following dGe 'dun grub pa, k. 84–88 provide a reason for the arguments in k. 80–83 (*de'i rgyu mtshan*), with k. 84–86 giving the actual reason (*dṅos*) and 87–88 constituting a rebuttal of counterarguments (*rtsod spaṅ*). There is, however, no unanimity amongst Tibetan commentators here: dGe 'dun grub, Go ram(s) pa and mKhas grub rje in one way or another take k. 84–88 as a continuation of the earlier argument, while rGyal tshab and 'U yug pa take 84ff. as a new section explaining the need for presenting the thesis-definition (rGyal: *phyogs kyi mtshan ñid bstan pa'i dgos pa*); Śākya mchog ldan takes k. 87–88 as the start of a new set of arguments and rebuttals. See FUKUDA and ISHIHAMA 1986, 65.

[409]Cf. PVṬ 324b4: *gtan tshigs daṅ dpe dag gi*[a] *mtshan ñid kyis spaṅ par bya ba'i skyon ma grub pa daṅ 'gal ba daṅ ma ṅes pa daṅ rjes su 'gro ba med pa la sogs pa* ... ([a] P. *gis*).

the subject is not the *sādhya*; if *svayam* were supposedly needed to avoid faults of the reason such as "lack of co-presence" (*ananvaya*), it would be useless and misplaced in the context of the thesis-definition, as its work would be done by another definition.[410]

Some remarks on *avyāpti* and *ativyāpti* are in order. Any defining characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) must be coextensive with what is to be defined, i.e., the definiendum (*lakṣya*), and thus two faults are always to be avoided: non-pervasion (*avyāpti*) and over-pervasion (*ativyāpti*)—the terminology and theory of definition being invoked here are those accepted in common by Buddhists and Naiyāyikas alike:[411] (i) *avyāpti*—the *lakṣaṇa* applies to a set of elements which is smaller than that of the *lakṣya*, and (ii) *vyatireka*, or (what is the same) *ativyāpti*—the *lakṣaṇa* applies to a set of elements which is larger than that of the *lakṣya*. In brief, in the case of *avyāpti*, the *lakṣaṇa* does not include enough; in the case of *ativyāpti* it includes too much.

(85) *svayaṃnipātarūpākhyā*[412] *vyatirekasya bādhikāḥ* |
sahānirākṛteneṣṭaśrutir[413] *avyāptibādhanī*[414] ||[415]

The words 'himself' (*svayam*), 'alone' (*nipāta* or 'particle' = *eva*) 'its proper form' (*rūpa* = *svarūpa*), as well as 'not opposed'

[410]See PVBh *ad* k. 84, 520, 25–29: *hetudṛṣṭāntalakṣaṇena nirākṛtaṃ doṣaṃ muktvā 'nyadoṣaparihārāya pakṣalakṣaṇam ucyate | yataḥ sakalam eva lakṣaṇam avyāptivyatirekayoḥ parihārāya | na cānyena lakṣaṇena yaḥ parihṛto doṣas tadaparihāre 'pi lakṣaṇasyāvyāptyativyāptitā bhavet | etāvad eva lakṣaṇam astu kim anyena | yadarthaṃ tat kṛtaṃ tasyānyena parihārād anarthakam svayaṃgrahaṇam* | "Leaving aside the fault which is opposed by the defining characteristic of a reason or example, the thesis-definition (*pakṣalakṣaṇa*) is stated in order to eliminate other faults, for every defining characteristic without exception is supposed to eliminate non-pervasion (*avyāpti*) and excessive extension (*vyatireka* = *ativyāpti*). Now, though a fault [like no co-presence] which is eliminated by another defining characteristic [i.e., by the *hetulakṣaṇa*, etc.] is not eliminated by the [*pakṣalakṣaṇa*], the defining characteristic [in question, i.e., the *pakṣalakṣaṇa*] does not have [the faults of] non-pervasion (*avyāpti*) or over-pervasion (*ativyāpti*). Let the defining characteristic [of the thesis] be just this; what point is served by the other? The word *svayam* would be useless because that for which it was [supposedly] used was eliminated by the other [definition, i.e., by the definition of the reason or that of the example]."

[411]See STAAL 1961 and BIARDEAU 1957 on the theory of definition. There can, in fact, be a third type of fault, that of *asaṃbhāva*: the *lakṣaṇa* is entirely absent from the *lakṣya*.

[412]PV-k(III), MIY. *svayaṃ nipātarūpākhyā*.

[413]PV-k(I) *saha*°.

[414]PV-k(I) °*bādhinī*.

[415]PV IV, k. 85 = PVin III, k. 23; 293a6–7.

(*anirākṛta*), serve to rule out excessive extension (*vyatireka*). The word 'intended' (*iṣṭa*) rules out non-pervasion (*avyāpti*).

Kārikā 85 gives the details as to how Dignāga's thesis-definition avoids the relevant faults of *avyāpti* and *ativyāpti*. The words *svayam*, *eva*, *svarūpa* and *anirākṛta* respectively exclude the following from the set of valid theses: (i) those propositions simply held in a treatise; (ii) unestablished *sādhana*; (iii) established propositions; and (iv) those opposed by perception, inference, authoritative words and what is commonly recognized (see k. 28–29). Thus, these four provisos guarantee that the set corresponding to the *lakṣaṇa* will not be "over-pervasive," or larger than that corresponding to the *lakṣya*. By contrast, *iṣṭa*, which eliminates a fifth type of fault, guarantees that the set corresponding to the *lakṣaṇa* will not be too small, i.e., "non-pervasive." If this term had been absent in the specification of the *lakṣaṇa*, then the thesis would have been only the proponent's explicit words, and not his underlying intention. But as we saw in the discussion of the Sāṃkhya's "proof" of the eyes, etc. being for the benefit of another (*parārtha* [see k. 31–33]), the thesis must include what the proponent actually intends.

PVV's introduction to k. 86: "[Objection:] Granted the words *svayam*, *eva*, *svarūpa*, which serve to rule out excessive extension, were stated in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*'s definition. Then these [words] do not occur in the *Nyāyamukha* in [its] definition of the thesis, viz., 'the thesis is what is intended as the *sādhya* and is not opposed by contradicting states of affairs.' So how does this [NM definition] rule out both non-pervasion and excessive extension? [Dharmakīrti] replies:"[416]

(86) *sādhyābhyupagamaḥ pakṣalakṣaṇaṃ teṣv apakṣatā* |
nirākṛte bādhanataḥ śeṣe 'lakṣaṇavṛttitaḥ ||[417]

'What is accepted as the *sādhya*' (*sādhyābhyupagama*) is the [real] defining characteristic of the thesis. Among the [five cases], what is opposed [by perception and so forth] is not a [valid] thesis, because it is invalidated. As for the rest, it is because the defining characteristic is not present [in them that they are not valid theses].

Dignāga's definition of the thesis as given in k. 1 of his NM was: *svayaṃ sādhyatvenepsitaḥ pakṣo viruddhārthānirākṛtaḥ* "The thesis is what is intended

[416]PVV 443, 3–5: *yadi svayaṃnipātarūpākhyā vyatirekasya bādhikāḥ pramāṇasamuccaya-lakṣaṇe nirdiṣṭās tadā nyāyamukhe sādhyatvenepsitaḥ pakṣo viruddhārthānirākṛta iti pakṣa-lakṣaṇe tā na santīti kathaṃ tenāvyāptivyatirekayoḥ parihāra ity āha* |.

[417]PV IV, k. 86 = PVin III, k. 24; 293a7–8.

by [the proponent] himself as the *sādhya* [and] is not opposed by contradicting states of affairs" (see PVBh 510, 23–24). Curiously, Manorathanandin, in his introduction to k. 86, leaves out the word *svayam* in NM's definition (see n. 416), and Dharmakīrti in k. 86ff. does not seem to speak of it either: this may well be because *svayam* is generally considered to serve at most a clarifying function, but one which is redundant from a logical point of view (see k. 30 and 75).

Dharmakīrti, in k. 86, is faced with the exegetical problem of reconciling the apparently different definitions in PS and NM and showing that they both eliminate the same five faults spoken of in connection with k. 85. Following Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, Dharmakīrti in k. 86ab maintains that what is actually (*dṅos su*) or really (*don dam par* = *paramārthatas*) meant as the definition of the thesis in NM is just simply *sādhyābhyupagama*, i.e., what is expressed in NM by *sādhyatvenepsita*.[418] This defining characteristic in itself is even sufficient to eliminate non-pervasion (*avyāpti*) and over-pervasion (*ativyāpti*).[419] Nonetheless,

[418]Cf. PVV 443, 12–13 which glosses k. 86's *alakṣaṇavṛttitaḥ* as *lakṣaṇasya sādhyatvenepsitatvasyāvṛttitaḥ*.

[419]PVṬ 323a5–6: *bsgrub byar khas blaṅs źes bya ba ni de tsam ñid don dam par phyogs kyi mtshan ñid yin te | de tsam ñid kyis*[a] *khyab pa med pa daṅ khyab ches pa bzlog pa'i phyir ro |* ([a] Text reads *kyi*) "Simply *sādhyābhyupagama* alone is what is really the defining characteristic of the thesis, for this much alone eliminates non-pervasion (*avyāpti*) and over-pervasion (*ativyāpti*)." PVP 341a4–8: *dṅos su ni bsgrub byar khas blaṅs phyogs mtshan ñid yin | ji ltar khas blaṅs pa yin źe na | skabs gźan bstan pa med pa'i phyir daṅ | bsgrub par bya ba bstan pa'i skabs yin pa'i phyir bsgrub par bya ba ñid yin no źes khoṅ du chud par bya'o || de bas na 'dis ni raṅ gi ṅo bo yi*[a] *sgras thob pa'i don yin no || gaṅ gis śe na | rgol bas źes bya ba ñe ba'i phyir | bstan bcos byed pa'i 'dod pa bsal bas bdag ñid kyi sgra'i don yin no || de'i tshe sgrub par byed pa ma grub pa bsgrub par bya ba ñid du khas len pa med pa'i phyir | rtsod gźir gyur pa khas len pa'i phyir | śugs las ṅes par gzuṅ ba rtogs pa'i phyir | kho na'i don daṅ | 'dod pa'i tshig gi don khas blaṅs pa'i sgras thob pa yin no || sgrub par 'os pa'am nus pas na bsgrub par bya'o źes bśad pas bsal ba med pa'i don 'phaṅs pa yaṅ yin no || phyogs kyi mtshan ñid de tsam yaṅ kha na ma tho ba med pa ñid yin no ||*([a] D. *ṅo bo'i* [D. 285b6–286a2]) "Actually (*dṅos su*) the defining characteristic of the thesis is *sādhyābhyupagama*. How is [a thesis] accepted? Since another topic of discussion is not being presented and since the *sādhya* is the topic of discussion being presented, one should recognize that [the thesis] is a *sādhya*. Thus, by this [phrase, *sādhyābhyupagama*] the meaning which was obtained by the word *svarūpa* [in PS's definition is conveyed]. By whom [is the thesis accepted]? As the words 'by the proponent' are implicit [in *sādhyābhyupagama*], then what is [simply] the position of the author of a treatise is eliminated, and hence, the meaning of [PS's] word *svayam* [is conveyed]. And then, since [the proponent] does not accept an unestablished *sādhana* as being a *sādhya* and since he does accept that which is the [intended] basis of the debate, and since indirectly the restriction [*eva*] is understood, therefore the meanings of [PS's] words *eva* and *iṣṭa* are obtained by the word *abhyupagama*. Since it is said that something is a *sādhya* providing [a proponent] ought to or is able to establish it, the meaning of [PS's term] *anirākṛta* is also implied. [In conclusion:] Even just this mere defining characteristic of the thesis [viz., *sādhyābhyupagama*] is beyond reproach."

although *sādhyābhyupagama / sādhyatvenepsita* is, strictly speaking, adequate as a defining characteristic, Dharmakīrti divides NM's definition into two parts: the real defining characteristic (i.e., *sadhyābhyupagama / sādhyatvenepsita*) and *viruddhārthānirākṛta*. Thus, *viruddhārthānirākṛta* eliminates propositions which are seen to be in clear contradiction with *pramāṇa*s, while *sādhyabhyupagama / sādhyatvenepsita* eliminates the other four faults.

(87) *svayamiṣṭābhidhānena*[420] *gatārthe 'py avadhāraṇe |*
kṛtyāntenābhisambandhād uktaṃ kālāntaracchide ||[421]

Although the restriction [by *eva*] is something understood through stating [the words] *svayam iṣṭa*, still, because [in the PS] [*iṣṭa*] is related with [*nirdeśya* ('to be stated')] which ends in an affix showing obligation (*kṛtyānta*), [the restriction] was specified to eliminate times other [than the present].[422]

(88) *ihānaṅgam iṣer niṣṭhā*[423] *tenepsitapade punaḥ |*
aṅgam eva tayāsiddhahetvādi[424] *pratiṣidhyate ||*[425]

Here [in the PS's definition of the thesis] the past participle affix (*niṣṭhā*) added to [the root] *iṣ* is not a factor [for showing that the

[420]Miy. *svayam iṣṭābhidhānena.*

[421]Cf. PVin 293b1: *'dir raṅ ñid 'dod pa'i sgra dag gis*[a] *ṅes par gzuṅ ba'i don rtogs*[b] *kyaṅ byed pa daṅ ldan pa'i mtha' can daṅ 'brel ba'i phyir ston par 'gyur pa la yaṅ thal bar 'gyur bas de bcad pa'i phyir bśad pa yin no* || ([a] D. *gi*—[b] P. *rtog* [D. 195b1–2]).

[422]See PVV 443, 19–24: *svayam iṣṭa ity anayoḥ padayor abhidhānenāvadhāraṇe nipātārthe gate pratīte 'pi kṛtyāntena nirdeśyaśabdena sarvakālasambandhayogyābhidhāyinābhisambandhād iṣṭaśabdasyāvartamānakālecchāviṣayasyāpi pakṣatvaṃ syāt | yathāgato devadatto draṣṭavya iti | yadāgamiṣyati tadā drakṣyata ity arthaḥ | ato vartamānakālāt kālāntarasya bhaviṣyadādeḥ sādhyecchīviṣayasya cchide pratiṣedhārtham uktam avadhāraṇaṃ svarūpeṇaiveti* | "Through stating the two words *svayam iṣṭa*, the restriction, i.e., the sense of the particle [*eva*], is understood (*gate* = *pratīte*). But the word *iṣṭa* is related with the word *nirdeśya* which ends in an affix of obligation [and] expresses the propriety of a relation with all times. Therefore, what concerns an intention with regard to a time which is not the present would also be the thesis, just as 'Devadatta is to be seen coming back' means that when he comes back, then he will be seen. Thus, the restriction, i.e., *svarūpeṇaiva*, was specified to eliminate (*chide* = *pratiṣedhārtham*) what concerns intentions with regard to the *sādhya* in a time, such as the future, which is other than the present."

[423]Miy. *ihāṅgamiṣern niṣṭā*, corrected in Miyasaka 1974.

[424]Miy. *tathā 'siddhahetvādi.* PV-k(I),(II),(III) read *tayā*; PV Tib. confirms this with *de yis.*

[425]Cf. PVin 293b1–2: *'dir ni 'dod pa'i skad kyi*[a] *dbyiṅs la niṣtha yan lag ma yin no* || *'dod pa'i tshigs la ni*[b] *yan lag ñid yin pas des gtan tshigs ma grub pa la sogs pa 'gog par byed do* || ([a] P. om. *skad kyi*; cf. PVinṬ 43b4: *'dod pa'i skad kyi dbyiṅs la iṣu la*—[b] D. om. *ni* [D. 195b2–3]).

> intention pertains to a present *sādhya*.] [In the NM] however, because of this [lack of any relationship with a word ending in an affix of obligation], [the *niṣṭhā*] in the word *īpsita* is indeed such a factor. Unestablished reasons, etc. are ruled out [from being intended as *sādhya*] by this [past particle affix, which shows an intention pertaining to a present *sādhya*].[426]

Previously (see k. 24–26 and 28–29) it had been argued that the restriction *eva* (only, alone) in *svarūpeṇaiva* (in its proper form alone) in PS's definition was designed to rule out any *sādhana* from being the thesis: the thesis is *only* something stated as a *sādhya*; unestablished reasons, which are both *sādhana* and *sādhya* are not theses. Dharmakīrti is now faced with a sophisticated grammatically based query as to why the restriction *eva* should be necessary for such a purpose in PS's thesis-definition, but not in the definition in NM, one which was, after all, supposedly equivalent to that of PS (see k. 86). The opponent's objection turns on Pāṇini's *sūtra* concerning the past participle affix, i.e., the letters *ta*, which are designated in the Pāṇinian metalanguage as *kta* and are termed *niṣṭhā*: "And after [roots] meaning inclination, understanding or respect [*kta* is employed in the sense of the present]."[427] Now, *iṣṭa* and *īpsita* in the definitions in PS and NM both end in *kta*, the past participle affix; Pāṇini's rule should apply. Thus (according to Dharmakīrti's opponent) in both definitions the thesis is the *sādhya* which the proponent intends to prove now (i.e., at the time of the argument), and not what he had intended in the past or will intend to prove at some later time. The result is that unestablished reasons, which are now *sādhana*, but might later be sought to be proved and thus become *sādhya*, would not *now* count as being the thesis. PS's use of *eva* would thus become unnecessary; the elimination of unestablished reasons from being theses would be effectuated by the *kta* affix in PS's *iṣṭa* just as it is by the *kta* in NM's *īpsita*.[428]

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[426]See PVV 444, 1–4: *iha pramāṇasamuccayalakṣaṇe niṣṭhā vartamānasādhyatveṣṭipratipādanaṃ praty anaṅgam ahetuḥ | nyāyamukhe tena kṛtyāntena sambandhābhāvenepsitapade punar aṅgam eva niṣṭhā vartamānasādhyecchābodhane tayā vartamānasādhyecchābodhikayāsiddhahetvādy apīṣyamāṇaṃ sādhyatvena pratiṣidhyate* | "Here, in the PS's definition, the past participle affix (*niṣṭhā*) is not a factor (*anaṅga* = *ahetu*) for showing an intention pertaining to a present *sādhya*. In the NM, however, because of this, i.e., the lack of any relation with a [word] ending in an affix of obligation (*kṛtyānta*), the past participle affix (*niṣṭhā*) in the word *īpsita* is indeed a factor for understanding an intention pertaining to a present *sādhya*. By means of this [*niṣṭhā*][a], which shows an intention pertaining to a present *sādhya*, unestablished reasons and so forth are also ruled out as being intended to be *sādhya*" ([a] PVV-n, n. 1 glosses *tayā* as *niṣṭhayā*).

[427]*Aṣṭādhyāyī* III, 2, 188: *matibuddhipūjārthebhyaś ca.*

[428]PVinṬ 43a3–4: *gal te raṅ ñid daṅ 'dod pa'i sgra dag gis gtan*[a] *tshigs ma grub pa brjod pa spaṅs pa ma yin nam | gtan tshigs ma grub pa ni rgol ba bdag ñid bsgrub bya ñid du 'dod pa ma*

To this objection Dharmakīrti replies in k. 88 that *eva* is in fact necessary in PS, although not in NM. It must be mentioned in PS's definition, because of the occurrence of an affix of obligation (*kṛtya*), the *ya* in *nirdeśya* (is to be stated). Because of this *kṛtya* affix in *nirdeśya*, the *kta* affix in *iṣṭa* does not suffice to guarantee that the intention pertains only to the present *sādhya*, for the proponent might intend that an unestablished reason is to be stated *later* as a *sādhya*. To quote Dharmottara: "Because the proponent intends that unestablished reasons and examples are to be stated as *sādhya*, then it would follow absurdly that even at the time he presents them as *sādhana* they would be theses."[429] Since "to be stated" (*nirdeśya*) can apply to the present or to a future time, the particle *eva*, in effect, would be needed in PS to eliminate the possibility that the thesis could be both *sādhya* and *sādhana* at different times.

2.6.6 Résumé

(89) *avācakatvāc cāyuktaṃ teneṣṭam*[430] *svayam ātmanā |*
anapekṣyākhilaṃ śāstraṃ tadabhīṣṭasya[431] *sādhyatā ||*

Now [in sum],[432] because [*svayam*] does not express [the various

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yin pa'i phyir ṅes par gzuṅ ba'i don med do źe na | ([a] P. om. *gtan* [D. 37b1–2]) "[Objection:] Don't the words *svayam* and *iṣṭa* eliminate statements of unestablished reasons? Unestablished reasons are not intended by the proponent himself as *sādhya*, and therefore there is no point to the restriction [by *eva*]." Manorathanandin alludes to Pāṇini's *sūtra*, in a passage brimming with textual problems (PVV 443, 14–16): *nanu yathā matyarthebhyo*[a] *vartamāne ktavidhānād*[b] *īpsitaśabdo vartamānām*[c] *icchām āha | tatheṣṭaśabdo 'pi tatra eṣiṣyamāṇe pakṣatvam aprasaktam eva tat kiṃ pramāṇasamuccayalakṣaṇe 'vadhāraṇaṃ kṛtam ity āha |* ([a] RS and DS both erroneously read *satyarthebhyo*. What is at stake is *Aṣṭādhyāyī* III, 2, 188, as can be seen by the fact that Vibhūticandra's PVV–n, n. 1 to PVV 443 gives the correct quotation from Pāṇini; see also PVinṬ 43b2: *gal te blo'i don dag las ...* [= *matyarthebhyaḥ*].—[b] RS and DS read *kuvi°*, but what is being discussed in Pāṇini's rule is the *niṣṭhā* affix *kta*—[c] RS and DS read *°nam*) "[Objection:] Just as because of the rule that after [roots] meaning inclination the [past participle] affix *kta* is [employed] in [the sense of] the present, the word *īpsita* expresses a present intention, so too for the word *iṣṭa*: it does not follow at all that what *will be* intended is the thesis. Therefore, why is the restriction [i.e., by *eva*] made in the PS's [*pakṣa*]*lakṣaṇa*?"

[429]PVinṬ 43b1–2: *gtan tshigs daṅ dpe ma grub pa de dag ni rgol ba bsgrub par bya ba ñid du bstan par bya bar 'dod pa yin pa'i phyir sgrub par byed pa ñid du ñe bar bkod pa'i dus su na yaṅ phyogs ñid yin par thal lo ||* (D. 37b5–6).

[430]PV-k(I) *teneṣṭā.*

[431]PV-k(II) *tadvādīṣṭasya*; MIY. *tad abhīṣṭasya.*

[432]Cf. PVṬ 324a4–5: *yaṅ gi sgra ni sṅar bśad pa'i skyon sdud par byed pa'i don can yin no |* "The word *ca* has the sense of summarizing the faults which we explained earlier." PVV closes its comment on k. 89 with *ity upasaṃhāraḥ* "a résumé."

purposes which other commentators have wrongly attributed to it], then [specifying *svayam* for those purposes] is incoherent. So, [it means] what is intended by [the proponent] himself personally [and not by some other expounder]. [Therefore] what is intended by him, independently of all treatises, is the *sādhya*.[433]

(90) *tenānabhīṣṭasaṃsṛṣṭasyeṣṭasyāpi*[434] *hi bādhane* |
yathā sādhyam abādhātaḥ pakṣahetū na duṣyataḥ ||[435]

Therefore, even if there is invalidation of an intended [property] associated with one which is unintended, the thesis and reason are not faulty, for as the *sādhya* [in fact] is, there is no invalidation.

The PVBh and PVV *ad* k. 89 reiterate that it is wrong to explain *svayam* as showing that the subject (*dharmin*) is something established and not a *sādhya* (see k. 78–80), or that the subject is commonly recognized (*prasiddha* [see k. 76–77]), or that the treatise accepted as the basis for the thesis should be the very one which the proponent himself wished to accept (see k. 72–74).

The last *kārikā* is the conclusion to the long ongoing discussion (first introduced in k. 43) concerning the necessity to eliminate propositions only accepted in treatises from being the thesis. Thus, *svayam* serves to bar the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*'s position that sound is a quality of space (*ākāśaguṇatva*). Specifically, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika stance is that the two universals, "being a quality of space" (*ākāśaguṇatva*) and impermanence (*anityatva*) are both the *sādhya*, as they are indirectly connected through *ekārthasamavāya*, i.e., inherence in the same objects (see n. 435, 436). Neither universal inheres in the other, but they do both nontheless inhere in the same objects, such as sounds and so forth. (Cf. the usual Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika example of *ekārthasamavāya*, viz., "vaseness" (*ghaṭatva*) and existence (*sattā*): both inhere in the individual vases.) For Dharmakīrti, even though the reason, *kṛtakatva*, does indeed refute the "impermanence" which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika associates with *ākāśaguṇatva* through *ekārthasamavāya*, such a version of impermanence

[433] PVBh 523, 4–5: *teneṣṭaṃ nānyena vyākhyātrā svayam ātmanā* | *tasmād anapekṣya śāstram akhilaṃ tadabhīṣṭasya sādhyatā* |. Prajñākaragupta's insertion of *tasmād* (therefore) is similar to the *de tshe* = *tadā* (then) in PVP 342a3: *de tshe bstan bcos thams cad la* | *ltos med 'dod pa ...*

[434] MIY. °*saṃsṛtasye*°.

[435] Cf. PVin 293b2–4: *rgol ba bdag ñid kyi*[a] *'dod pa rjes su dpag par bya ba ñid du brjod pa 'dis ni mi 'dod pa daṅ 'dres pa'i 'dod pa yaṅ bsgrub par bya ba*[b] *ma yin źiṅ* | *de la gnod na*[c] *yaṅ phyogs daṅ gtan tshigs kyi skyon du 'gyur ba med par rig par bya ba*[d] *ste* | *ji ltar bsgrub par bya ba yin pa bkag pa med pa'i phyir ro* || *dper na nam mkha'i yon tan ñid daṅ don gcig la 'du ba can gyi*[e] *mi rtag pa ñid med par yaṅ sgrub par byed pa bźin no* || ([a] P. *kyis*—[b] P. *'dod pas 'grub par bya ba*—[c] P. *ma*—[d] D. om. *ba*—[e] D. om. *gyi* [D. 195b3–4]).

was never intended by the proponent to be the *sādhya* at all. As a result, invalidating this "impermanence-*cum-ākāśaguṇatva*" is not a fault of the reason, for the proponent just intended to prove impermanence *simpliciter* (*anityatvamātra*).[436]

[436]See PVV 444, 16–21: *tena kāraṇena vādino 'nabhīṣṭenākāśaguṇatvena saṃsṛṣṭasyeṣṭasyānityatvasyāpi hi bādhane 'bhidhīyamāne pakṣahetū na duṣyataḥ | kiṃ kāraṇam ity āha | yathā sādhyam abādhātaḥ | na hi vādinākāśaguṇatvaikārthasamavāyyanityatvaṃ sādhayitum iṣṭaṃ yenāsya bādhaḥ syāt kiṃ tv anityatvamātraṃ | na cāsya pratyakṣādibādhāsti | hetor vā tadapekṣayā viruddhatādikam | tad evaṃ svayaṃnipātarūpākhyā vyatirekasya bādhikāḥ sahānirākṛteneti vyākhyātam* || "For this reason, even if an invalidation were stated of the intended [property], viz., impermanence, associated with something which was unintended by the proponent, viz., *ākāśaguṇatva*, still the thesis and the reason would not be faulty. Why? [Dharmakīrti] replies: 'For as the *sādhya* [in fact] is, there is no invalidation.' Indeed, the proponent does not intend to prove [a property] impermanence which inheres in the same objects (*ekārthasamavāyin*) as *ākāśaguṇatva*, so that there would be an invalidation of this [impermanence connected with *ākāśaguṇatva*]. Rather, [he intends to prove] impermanence *simpliciter* (*anityatvamātra*). Now, there is no invalidation of this by [*pramāṇa*s] such as perception, etc., nor is the reason contradictory, etc. with regard to that [property]. So, in this fashion, it was said [in k. 85]: 'The words "himself" (*svayam*), "alone" (*nipāta* or 'particle' = *eva*) "its proper form" (*rūpa* = *svarūpa*), as well as "not opposed" (*anirākṛta*), serve to eliminate excessive extension (*vyatireka*)'." Note that Manorathanandin (and Prajñākaragupta) express the point by connecting k. 90 with k. 85: *svayam* and the other components serve to eliminate over-pervasion (*ativyāpti*) in the thesis-definition.

Chapter 3

The second half of the definition of the thesis: PV IV, k. 91–148 *ad* PS III, k. 2cd

Dignāga, in the latter half of PS III, k. 2, had specified four possible types of invalidation of the thesis:

> *anirākṛtaḥ* | *pratyakṣārthānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharmiṇi* ||
> With regard to [the proponent's] own subject (*svadharmin*), [the thesis] is not opposed (*anirākṛta*) by (a) perceptible objects (*pratyakṣārtha*), by (b) inference (*anumāna*), by (c) authorities (*āpta*) or by (d) what is commonly recognized (*prasiddha*).

Dharmakīrti, in what follows, will systematically take up these four types of "opposition," or "invalidation" (*bādhā*), mentioned in PS III, k. 2cd, although in a different order from that given by Dignāga: he comments briefly upon *vastubalapravṛttānumāna* in k. 91–92, at length upon *āpta* in k. 93–108 and upon *prasiddha* in k. 109–130, upon *pratyakṣārtha* in k. 131–135, and finally in k. 136–148 upon *svadharmin*.

3.1 *anirākṛta*: the thesis is unopposed by any means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*)

(91) *aniṣiddhaḥ pramāṇābhyāṃ sa copagama iṣyate* |
saṃdigdhe hetuvacanād vyasto hetor anāśrayaḥ ||[437]

[437]Cf. PVin 294a4–5; 294a6–7: *khas blaṅs pa de yaṅ* | *mṅon sum don daṅ rjes dpag daṅ yid ches grags pas ma bsal ba* | *bstan par bya ba yin no* || (D. 196a4–5) and *yaṅ ci'i phyir bsal*[a] *ba phyogs ma yin źe na* | *gtan tshigs the tshom la brjod phyir* | *bsal*[b] *ba gtan tshigs rten*[c] *ma yin* || ([a] D. *gsal*—[b] D. *gsal*—[c] P. *brten* [D. 196a6–7]).

> Now, this position [i.e., the thesis] is held to be unopposed by the two means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) [viz., perception and inference]. As the reason is stated when there is doubt, then what is excluded [by a *pramāṇa*] is not grounds for a reason.

PVV's introduction to k. 92: "[Objection:] If the invalidation of the thesis is of two sorts, then how is it that the Ācārya [Dignāga] showed it to be of four sorts when he said '[unopposed] by perception, inference, authorities and what is commonly recognized'? [Dharmakīrti] replies:"[438]

(92) *anumānasya bhedena sā bādhoktā*[439] *caturvidhā* |
tatrābhyupāyaḥ[440] *kāryāṅgaṃ svabhāvāṅgaṃ jagatsthitiḥ*[441] ||[442]

> This invalidation [of the thesis] was explained as being of four sorts due to the [three] different kinds of inference [along with perception].[443] Amongst these [invalidators (*bādhaka*)], an acceptance (*abhyupāya*) [viz., the words of an authority or the proponent's own words][444] is a reason which is an effect (*kāryāṅga* = *kāryahetu*), [while] worldly custom (*jagatsthiti*) is a reason which is an essential property (*svabhāvāṅga* = *svabhāvahetu*).

From k. 91 on Dharmakīrti takes up the proviso, *anirākṛta* (not opposed), found in the PS's definition of the thesis. As we mentioned in connection with k. 83, Dharmakīrti at this stage in his philosophical development still had essentially Dignāga's position on the role of the thesis-statement (*pakṣavacana*) in an inference-for-others. Thus, he also accepted that the thesis *could* be stated simply to show the goal of the reasoning, although such a statement was in no way a means of proof (*sādhana*) on the same level as a reason or example (see k. 15–23). The thesis would be fallacious (*pakṣābhāsa*) if opposed by a *pramāṇa*. The rationale given in k. 91 behind excluding such theses was that their falsity would be already decided, and hence, given that there would be no doubt on the matter in question, there would also be no necessity to state a reason.[445]

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[438] PVV 445, 5–6: *yadi dvividhau pakṣabādhau tadā pratyakṣānumānāptaiḥ prasiddheneti katham ācāryeṇa caturvidhā sā darśitety āha* |.

[439] PV-k(I) °*tiḥ*.

[440] PV-k(I) *atrā*°.

[441] MIY. *jagat sthitiḥ*.

[442] PV IV, k. 92 = PVin III, k. 27; 294b1–2.

[443] See PVV 445, 9: *anumānasya bhedena traividhyena pratyakṣeṇa caikena saha sā bādhā caturvidhoktā* |.

[444] PVV 445, 10: *tatra teṣu bādhakeṣv abhyupāya āptasvavacane.*

[445] Cf. PVP 342b3–4: *de ltar na phyogs ni gtan tshigs kyi yul yin la*[a] *gaṅ gi tshe bsal bar gyur pa de'i tshe yul can gyi gtan tshigs kyaṅ mi 'jug pa de ltar na | phyogs ltar snaṅ ba*[b] *brjod pa*

The essential point, as we see in PV, k. 91, is that the thesis should not be invalidated by a *pramāṇa*. But this then leads to the doubt as to whether the fourfold classification in PS III, k. 2 can be harmonized with the usual Buddhist view of there being two and only two *pramāṇa*s: such doubts are answered in k. 92 by saying that in fact *anumāna*, *āpta* and *prasiddha* designate three subspecies of inference; thus we arrive at a fourfold classification which is only an elaboration of the usual two *pramāṇa*s, viz., inference and perception. Note that the three kinds of inference referred to in k. 92 are those which function by the force of [real] entities, or facts (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*), those based on the words of an authority (*āpta*), and those based on what is commonly recognized (*prasiddha*) by the world, i.e., our generally accepted linguistic conventions. In k. 93ff. Dharmakīrti will develop a significant philosophical account explaining the PS's practice of grouping *svavacana* (one's own words) and *āptavacana* (the words of an authority; i.e., treatises and scriptures) together under one and the same rubric—in PS III, k. 2 Dignāga had designated both completely indifferently by means of *āpta* / *āptavacana*.[446] (PV IV k. 92's statement that both kinds of

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'bras bu med pa yin te | phyogs kyi tshig gi gtan tshigs kyi yul bstan pa'i don ñid yin pa'i phyir ro || ([a] P. *la de'i*—[b] P. om. *ba* [D. 287a3–4]) "Thus, the thesis is the goal of the reason. And when it is opposed, the reason, which is what has [this] goal, will not function either. Thus, stating a fallacious thesis (*pakṣābhāsa*) accomplishes nothing, for the statement of the thesis only has the purpose of showing the goal of the reason."

[446]This treatment of *āpta* was however a major change from Dignāga's earlier work, the *Nyāyamukha*, where there is clear separation made between one's own words and those of treatises and scriptures, thus yielding a fivefold classification of invalidated or fallacious theses (*pakṣābhāsa*). See k. 103 and our remarks. Cf. PVṬ 324b5–325a1: *rjes su dpag pa rnam pa gsum yin pas źes bya ba la rjes su dpag pa gcig ni dṅos po'i stobs kyis*[a] *źugs pa yin la gźan ni yid ches pa'i tshig daṅ raṅ gi tshig gi bdag ñid khas blaṅs pa'i sgra'i brjod par bya ba yin te* | *tshad ma kun las btus pa'i mdor yid ches pa'i sgras bstan pa gaṅ yin pa daṅ* | *gźan rab tu grags pa'i sgras brjod pa de bas na rnam pa gsum du 'gyur ro* || *de ñid kyi phyir yid ches pa daṅ raṅ gi tshig gcig tu byas pas rjes su dpag pa'i gnod pa rnam pa gsum daṅ* | *mṅon sum gyi gnod pa daṅ bcas pa ste rnam pa bźir 'gyur ro* || *de ltar ma yin na dṅos po'i stobs kyis źugs pa'i rjes su dpag pa daṅ yid ches pa'i tshig daṅ* | *raṅ gi tshig daṅ 'jig rten la grags pa ste 'gal ba rnam pa bźi daṅ* | *mṅon sum gyi 'gal ba gcig ste de ltar na rnam pa lṅar 'gyur te* | *dper na rigs pa'i sgor rnam par bśad pa lta bu'o* ||([a] P. *kyi*) "When [PVP] says 'Since inference (*anumāna*) is of three sorts,' one [sort of] inference is *vastubalapravṛtta*, another [sort] is what is expressed by the word 'acceptance' (*abhyupāya*), which is the essence of authoritative words (*āptavacana*) and one's own words (*svavacana*). In the PS's aphorism, [this twofold acceptance] is what is shown by the word *āpta* while the other [i.e., third type of inference] is expressed by the word 'commonly recognized' (*prasiddha*): thus [inference] is of three sorts. Therefore, since *āptavacana* and *svavacana* were taken together [in PS], there were three sorts of invalidation by inference, and [these three] along with invalidation by perception (*pratyakṣa*) would yield four sorts. Otherwise, there

'authoritative words' are *kāryahetu* will be explained below in connection with k. 93.)

As for k. 92cd's assertion that "worldly convention" is a *svabhāvahetu*, the usual example of the fallacious thesis to be eliminated here is: "That which is marked with a hare (*śaśin*) is not the moon (or, what is the same, cannot be designated by the word 'moon') because it exists." To this we should infer the contrary: *śaśin* can indeed be designated by the word 'moon' because of its being a conceptual object to which terms can be applied in accordance with our conventional agreements. The general subject will be dealt with at considerable length in k. 109ff. and thus need not be developed here (see also Appendix B), but suffice it to say that Dharmakīrti's main point in terming *prasiddha* a *svabhāvahetu* is that whatever is a conceptual object has, in its essence, a fitness (*yogyatā*) to be named in whichever way we might wish it to be named. Note that the actual formal reasoning (*prayoga*) is not given in the commentaries to this part of PV IV, but is to be found in Dharmottara's NBṬ and Durvekamiśra's subcommentary on the passage concerning "opposition by a [conventional] acknowledgment" (*pratītinirākṛta*) in NB III, 51. Durvekamiśra: "The *prayoga* should be regarded as follows: 'Whatever entity is the object of a conceptual cognition (*vikalpavijñānaviṣaya*), can be designated by an agreed upon word (*sāṃketikena śabdena*), just like the entity having branches and so forth [can be designated] by the word 'tree.' Now, *śaśin* is the object of a conceptual cognition."[447]

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would be four sorts of contradiction [with inference]—viz., those with *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*, *āptavacana*, *svavacana*, and with what is recognized in the world (= *prasiddha*)—as well as one sort of contradiction with perception. And then there would be five sorts [of invalidation of the thesis], as is the explanation in the NM." Note that the Tibetan scholastics would codify these three types of inference so that they would become the standard threefold division of *anumāna* which one finds in indigenous Tibetan logic and epistemology manuals. Thus we typically have *dṅos stobs rjes dpag* (= *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*), *grags pa'i rjes dpag* (inference consisting in what is commonly recognized / inference which is an acknowledgment [of fitness]) and *yid ches pa'i rjes dpag* (inference based on authority); these three are then assigned corresponding types of valid reasons (*rtags yaṅ dag*). See *Yoṅs 'dzin rtags rigs*, ed. ONODA 1981, 45–46. Finally, for the NM's fivefold scheme, see NM *ad* k. 1 (§1.3 in KATSURA 1977; TUCCI 1930, 7). NM spoke of opposition by *svavacana*, *pūrvābhyupagama* (a previously accepted position), *śābdaprasiddha*, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*; see the detailed discussion in PREISENDANZ 1994, 320ff.

[447]DMP 184, 16–17: *evaṃ tu prayogo draṣṭavyaḥ yo 'rtho vikalpavijñānaviṣayaḥ sa sāṃketikena śabdena vaktuṃ śakyaḥ | yathā śākhādimān artho vṛkṣaśabdena | vikalpavijñānaviṣayaś ca śaśīti |*. PVinṬ 50a8–50b1 explains *prasiddha / pratīti* as being something established by conceptual cognition: *grags pa źes bya ba rnam par rtog pa la gnas pa ñid ni don gyi raṅ bźin yin no źes gtan la phebs par 'gyur ro*. The usual Tibetan formulation of the *prayoga* does not mention *prasiddha* or *pratīti* as such, but speaks of a things being conceptualized as entailing its fitness to

3.2 The thesis is unopposed by authorities (*āpta*)

3.2.1 Why Dignāga treated both treatises and one's own personal speech together under the category of authorities (*āpta*)

PVV introduces k. 93 as follows: "[Query:] But why are the words of an authority (*āptavacana*) [i.e., treatises, etc.] and one's own words (*svavacana*) said to be 'an acceptance' (*abhyupāya*) [in k. 92]? [Dharmakīrti] replies:"[448]

(93) *ātmāparo vābhimato*[449] *bhūtaniścayayuktavāk* |
āptaḥ svavacanaṃ śāstraṃ caikam[450] *uktaṃ samatvataḥ*[451] ||[452]

Whether oneself or another, he who is accepted to be someone whose words are endowed with the certainty of truth is [termed an] an authority (*āpta*).[453] One's own words and treatises were

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be designated by a given word: *ri boṅ can la zla ba źes pa'i sgras brjod ruṅ ba yin te* | *rtog yul na yod pa'i phyir* | "That which is marked with a hare is fit to be named by the word 'moon' because it exists as an object of conceptualization." The reason is classified as a *svabhāvahetu* because it has an essential identity (*tādātmya*) with the property to be proved. See ONODA 1981, 46 and cf. dGe 312, 6–313, 1: *'gro ba la grags pa rtog yul na yod pa chos can* | *ri boṅ can zla ba'i sgras brjod ruṅ du sgrub pa'i raṅ bźin gyi rtags yaṅ dag yin te* | *de sgrub kyi sgrub rtags yaṅ dag gaṅ źig* | *zla ba'i sgras brjod ruṅ la bdag gcig tu 'brel ba'i phyir* |. Note that there are some variations in the formulation of this so-called "inference consisting in an acknowledgment [of fitness]" (*grags pa'i rjes dpag*). In k. 126, where Dharmakīrti speaks of *pratītyākhyānumā* (the inference known as 'a [conventional] acknowledgment' (*pratīti*)), the commentator's formulation of the *prayoga* is more general in scope and concerns the fitness of words to be used for whatever the speaker might intend. See PVV 456, 13–14 (≈ PVP 351a3–4): *prayogaḥ punaḥ* | *yaḥ puruṣecchānuvidhāyī*[a] *sa sarvatra sambhavī tadyathā vikalpaḥ puruṣecchānuvidhāyi cārtheṣv iṣṭaśabdābhidheyatvam iti* | ([a] RS. and DS. *puruṣecchānubhidhāyī*) "The formal reasoning is as follows: 'Whatever conforms to people's intentions can [apply] to anything, like a conceptualization. Now, objects being the intended designata of a word conforms to people's intentions." Śākyabuddhi (PVṬ 328b1–2) gives this latter reasoning in connection with k. 110–111 and terms it a *svabhāvahetu*.

448 PVV 445, 13: *kasmāt punar āptavacanaṃ svavacanaṃ cābhyupāya ucyata ity āha*.

449 PV-k(I / II), MIY. *ātmāparodhābhimato*; PV-k(III) *ātmāparodhābhimate*. *ātmāparodha* makes no sense whatsoever in this context and is not reflected in PV Tib.: *yaṅ dag ṅes ldan brjod 'dod pa* || *bdag gźan yid ches*. Although *vā* is not found explicitly in PV Tib., the related passages in PVin and PVinṬ do in fact read *bdag gam* (=*vā*) *gźan* (see n. 452).

450 PV-k(I / III), MIY. *caivam*. *caikam* in PV-k(II) is supported by PV Tib. *gcig tu bśad pa yin*.

451 PV-k(I) *samattvataḥ*; PV-k(III) *samantataḥ*.

452 Cf. PVin 294b2–3: *bdag gam gźan don ji ltar ba bźin du mthoṅ ba'i sgo nas ṅag 'jug par 'dod pa ni yid ches pa yin te* | *de'i tshig ni de lta bu'i don gyi dṅos po med na mi 'jug pa'i phyir de'i 'bras bu yin no* || (D. 196b3–4); see p. 130.

453 We follow PVV in taking *bhūtaniścayayuktavāk* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound.

mentioned together [by means of the word *āpta*] because of their similarity [in being *kāryahetu*].[454]

In k. 92cd–108, Dharmakīrti will offer various arguments for the logical similarity of *āptavacana* and *svavacana*, and hence for the appropriateness of Dignāga's treating them together in PS III. His initial argument in k. 92cd–93 is that both, if agreed upon as coming from an authority, serve as a *kāryahetu* for the state of affairs in question. On k. 93, cf. the PVin (quoted n. 452): "His [i.e., the authority's] words would not occur if the corresponding state of affairs had been nonexistent; therefore, they are the effects of that [state of affairs]." Cf. also Devendrabuddhi on the similarity between *svavacana* and *śāstra* spoken of in k. 93: "If the propositions of these two [authorities] were not accurate, their statements would not occur. Thus, it is on account of the intentions of the speaker that [the words] are a *kāryahetu*. Therefore, because of their similarity, or [in other words] because both are similar in being *kāryahetu*, *svavacana* and *śāstra* were explained together by means of the word *āpta*."[455] In short, the words are the effect (*kārya*) of the speaker's correct understanding of reality and intention to express this understanding verbally.

Note that Dharmakīrti's point is *not* that the mere fact of someone stating a proposition will *ipso facto* prove its truth, but rather that *once* a person, be he the proponent himself or the writer of a treatise, has been accepted as an authority, *then* his words will be a *kāryahetu* for those (and only those) who accept his authority. This latter aspect is conveyed by designating *svavacana* and *āptavacana* by the term *abhyupāya* (what is agreed upon; acceptance): both the proponent's own words and those of a treatise are taken as probative due to *abhyupāya*, and not objectively, or by the force of [real] entities (*vastubalapravṛtta*).[456]

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[454] See n. 455.

[455] Cf. PVP 343b1–2: *de dag gi don de lta bu'i ṅo bo med par tshig mi 'jug pas na 'chad pa po'i bsam pa'i dbaṅ gis | 'bras bu'i rtags yin pa de bas na | mtshuṅs pa'i phyir ro || de dag ni 'bras bu'i rtags yin par mtshuṅs pa'i phyir ro || raṅ gi tshig daṅ bstan bcos ni gcig tu byas nas yid ches pa'i sgras bśad do ||* (D. 287b6–7).

[456] Cf. PVṬ 325a4: *de lta bu'i rnam pa can du khas len pa źes bya ba ni don ji lta ba bźin du śes pa daṅ ldan pa'i ṅag ni khas blaṅs pa'i dbaṅ gis de dag tshad mar gyur pa yin gyi dṅos po'i stobs kyis*[a] *ni ma yin no źes bya bar dgoṅs so |* ([a] P. reads *kyi*) "When [PVP *ad* k. 93] says, 'accepting [the treatise as well as himself] as being like that [i.e., being a *pramāṇa*],' the meaning is as follows: In the case of the words of those who are endowed with the knowledge of things as they are, it is because such [words] are accepted that they become *pramāṇa*s and not due to the force of entities." The importance of *abhyupāya* is brought out nicely in dGe 312, 5–6, which says that *āptavacana* can be said (*bśad du ruṅ*) to be a *kāryahetu* "for one who accepts that [the words] are the effect of what they express" (*raṅ gi brjod bya'i 'bras bur khas len pa'i ṅor*): *rjes dpag*

Finally, it is to be noted that the paradigm cases of "own words" (*svavacana*) which interest Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are not so much those where one states something different from what one has said earlier, but rather those cases where one's very statement is self-refuting: the proponent's own thesis-statement invalidates itself, as when, for example, he seeks to prove a proposition like "My mother is barren" (NP 3.1), "Everything which is said is false" (NM *ad* k. 1), "Inference is not a *pramāṇa*" (NB III, 52), or "There are no *pramāṇa*s having *prameya*s as their objects" (PSV III; see below p. 136). In all such cases, affirming the thesis would also imply negating it.

(94) *yathātmano 'pramāṇatve vacanaṃ na pravartate* |
śāstrasiddhe[457] *tathā nārthe vicāras tadanāśraye*[458] ||

Just as words would not come forth if one were not oneself a *pramāṇa*, so too there is no investigation about a proposition established by means of a treatise without reliance upon that [treatise].[459]

(95) *tatprastāvāśrayatve*[460] *hi śāstraṃ bādhakam ity amum* |
vaktum arthaṃ svavācāsya sahoktiḥ sāmyadṛṣṭaye ||[461]

Indeed, in order to state this point that a treatise can invalidate (*bādhaka*) when it is the basis for the discussion, [Dignāga] spoke of these [authoritative words] together with one's own words so as to show similarity [between the two].

Kārikā 93 had argued that *svavacana* and *āptavacana* (i.e., treatises) were similar in being *kāryahetu*. Now k. 94–95 provide two other aspects in which the statements of a treatise and the proponent's own statements are similar:

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gsum yod pa de la rgol bas khas blaṅs pa'i yid ches pa'i tshig chos can | raṅ gi brjod bya'i 'bras bur khas len pa'i ṅor | raṅ gi brjod bya sgrub pa la 'bras rtags yaṅ dag yin źes bśad du ruṅ ste | de'i ṅor de sgrub kyi 'bras bu'i tshul gsum yin źes brjod du ruṅ ba'i phyir |.

[457]PV-k(III), MIY. *śāstradṛṣṭe*. PV Tib. *bstan bcos ... grags* would tend to support *śāstrasiddhe* (see MIYASAKA 1974).

[458]MIY. *tad anāśraye*.

[459]See PVin (n. 461) *bstan bcos la ma brten par* and PV Tib. *bstan bcos mi brten na*.

[460]MIY. *tat prastāvāśrayatve*.

[461]Cf. PVin 294b4–5: *skabs*[a] *kyi rten ñid la bstan bcos gnod par byed pa yin no źes bya ba'i don 'di brjod pa'i don du ji ltar bdag ñid tshad ma ma yin na tshig mi 'jug pa de bźin du bstan bcos la ma brten par des grags pa*[b] *la dpyod pa mi 'jug go źes mtshuṅs par bstan pa'i phyir 'di raṅ gi tshig daṅ lhan cig tu brjod par mdzad do* || ([a] D. *stobs*—[b] D. *pas* [D. 196b5–6]). This parallel passage in PVin expresses the ideas in both *kārikās*.

(a) *Presupposition of truth.* Just as stating something to convince others presupposes that one considers oneself to be reliable and a speaker of the truth, so too deliberating about propositions in a treatise presupposes that one accepts the treatise as reliable. In the first case, the fact of the proponent stating something implies that he accepts his statements as being true—otherwise he would not have uttered them. In the second case, when one deliberates about suprasensual matters described in a treatise, the very fact that one deliberates on these matters at all implies that one accepts the truth of the treatise's statements on such matters. To be precise: acceptance of a treatise is only presupposed when one deliberates upon propositions concerning suprasensual and otherwise rationally inaccessible entities, such as, for example, the karmic causes of happiness or misfortune. Such propositions have subjects (*dharmin*) which are *atyantaparokṣa* (radically inaccessible) and which cannot be understood by any means other than acceptance of what is stated about them in a treatise. In short: *if* one investigates the truth of such a proposition at all, *ipso facto*, one must have accepted a treatise as the basis: otherwise a debate on the matter simply would not have arisen.[462]

(b) *Invalidation* (*bādhā*). When the truth of *P* (i.e., the proponent's own statement or one found in the treatise) has been accepted, *P* can serve to invalidate a thesis

[462] Dharmottara comments on PVin (see n. 461) as follows in PVinṬ 51a1–8: *'dra ba de yaṅ gaṅ źe na | ci ltar źes smos so || bdag ñid tshad ma ma yin na źes bya ba ni | gal te ṅa'i tshig ni brjod par bya ba'i don med na mi 'byuṅ ba yin no źes gźan la khas len pa de ltar na smra ba po tshig brjod par 'gyur gyi | gźan du ni ma yin te dgos pa med pa'i phyir ro || ṅa'i tshig las don 'di rtogs par gyis śig ces gźan la smra ba yin no ||... || de'i phyir smra ba po tshig brjod pa'i śugs ñid kyis tshig don med na mi 'byuṅ ba daṅ | bdag ñid kyaṅ don ci lta ba bźin mthoṅ bar ston par byed do || gal te bdag ñid bden pa mthoṅ ba ma yin pa daṅ | tshig kyaṅ mi bden pa'i don can du gźan la ston par 'dod na ni | tshig brjod pa ñid du mi 'gyur te | tshig gi dgos pa don rtogs pa'i raṅ bźin mi 'dod pa'i phyir ro ||... de bźin du bstan bcos la ma brten par te | tshad mar khas ma blaṅs par des grags pa'i chos can la dpyod pa mi 'jug go ||* (D. 43b7–44a5) "What is this similarity [between *āptavacana* and *svavacana*]? [Dharmakīrti] states 'just as ...'. The [words] 'If one were not oneself a *pramāṇa*' mean the following: A speaker will state words provided he promises to others, 'My words are necessarily related (*med na mi 'byuṅ ba* = *nāntarīyaka*; *avinābhāvin*) with the state of affairs which is to be described,' but otherwise he will not [state anything], for there will be no purpose. He asserts to others 'Understand this state of affairs from my words!'. ... So, by the mere force of the speaker stating words (*smra ba po tshig brjod pa'i śugs ñid kyis*) he conveys that his words are necessarily related with the state of affairs [at issue] and that he himself also perceives that state of affairs correctly. If he intended to convey to others that he himself did not perceive the truth and that [his] words were also untrue, then he could state no words [at all], for he would not accept the purpose of words, viz., their nature to [lead us to] understand states of affairs. ... Similarly, unless one relies on a treatise, i.e., unless one accepts it as being a *pramāṇa*, no investigation will occur with regard to the *dharmin*s which are recognized by that [treatise]."

which is in contradiction with *P*. In the case of the self-refuting statements like "Everything which is said is false" (*sarvam uktaṃ mṛṣā*),[463] the very speech-act of stating the thesis presupposes that one accepts it to be true; the content of the statement, however, will imply that if it is accepted as true, it is then false; and thus the statement invalidates itself.

We should mention that Dharmakīrti makes (see also k. 98ff.) an extremely important contrast between a treatise or own words being a *bādhaka* (invalidator) and being merely a *pratibandhaka* (something which merely impedes, or clashes), a distinction which turns on whether there is or is not a genuine means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) which backs the statement in question or its opposite. The application of this pair of concepts is not without considerable complexity in the commentarial literature, the problem being how and to what degree treatises and own words can be said to actually invalidate or prove anything. Or do opposing statements just clash, with neither invalidating the other? This difference between *bādhaka* and *pratibandhaka*, as Dharmakīrti and his commentators use the terms, can be brought out as follows. For any two statements, *P* and *Q*,

(a) *P* is a *bādhaka* (invalidator) of *Q* means that *P* implies *not-Q* and that it is known by means of a *pramāṇa* that *P* is true.

(b) *P* is a *pratibandhaka* (impediment) to *Q* means that *P* implies *not-Q* and that it is not known by means of a *pramāṇa* whether *P* is true or false. (Dharmakīrti does not say what the nature of this impediment is, i.e., whether it is purely logical or psychological / causal. Interestingly enough, in later Indian logic it does seem that *pratibandha[ka]* is taken in a more causal way as a "cognitive blocker": holding a certain proposition psychologically stops one from holding another.[464])

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[463] See our remarks on k. 93 and 103. Prajñākaragupta (PVBh *ad* k. 94) takes the statement "All that I am saying is false" (*sarvaṃ mithyā bravīmi*) as an example of *svavacanavirodha*. He then cites a verse which can be recognized as being from the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* of the third chapter of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*. *Vākyapadīya* III 3, 25 (ed. W. RAU) reads: *sarvaṃ mithyā bravīmīti naitad vākyaṃ vivakṣyate | tasya mithyābhidhane hi prakrānto 'rtho na gamyate ||* "When one says 'All that I am saying is false,' this sentence [itself] is not intended to be referred to. Indeed, if it were a false statement, the point in question would not be conveyed." PVBh 524, 23–24 reads: *sarvaṃ mithyā bravīmīti*[a] *naitad eva niṣidhyate | tasya mithyābhidhane hi prakrānto 'rtho na sidhyatī ||* ([a] RS erroneously prints *pabrav°*). Curiously, Prajñākaragupta seems to cite this verse as *support* for the idea that *sarvaṃ mithyā bravīmi* would be an example of a self-refuting statement; Bhartṛhari, however, thought that such a statement would *not* refer to itself. RS mistakenly numbered this verse of Bhartṛhari in PVBh as PV IV, k. 95 (including *yathā* which obviously introduces the quotation in its first *pāda*), thus wrongly yielding two k. 95's in PV-k(III).

[464] See PHILLIPS 1995, 161: "Cognitive blockers, *pratibandhaka*, emerge as key to, especially, later Navyas' development of a cognitive logic. The blockers themselves are understood natural-

What emerges clearly from the discussion in PV IV, PVin III and the various commentaries is that in the case of treatises and scriptures, statements can only be considered to be invalidators (*bādhaka*) when the subject (*dharmin*) of the thesis in question is completely suprasensual (*atyantaparokṣa*), i.e., when the *dharmin* is only knowable through the treatise and not through more objective *pramāṇa*s such as perception or *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*.[465] If, on the other hand, the subject and its properties *can* be ascertained by means of such objective, belief-independent *pramāṇa*s, then a mere statement about such subjects in treatises can only be a *pratibandhaka*, and can not be used to invalidate a thesis. In brief, just saying that *P* is so, when actually one *could* objectively decide the matter, means that the mere statement and its opposite only clash and impede each other; it is only when there is no genuine objective *pramāṇa* available to decide the truth of the statement that a treatise's description of an otherwise inaccessible fact can be taken to be a *pramāṇa* and hence considered to be a potential invalidator.

Finally, a thorny problem arises as to how we are to take k. 94–95's position that both *svavacana* and treatises can (in special cases) be invalidators (*bādhaka*), when there is also fairly unambiguous evidence that Dharmakīrti in a continuation of the PVin's parallel passage to k. 93 (see n. 466) characterized them both as being more like *pratibandhaka*—the leaning towards *pratibandhaka* also appears in PV IV, k. 98f. The most plausible explanation may well be along the lines of Dharmottara, who in the PVinṬ had said that the *bādhaka* spoken about in contexts like PV IV, k. 95 only shows that Dharmakīrti *provisionally* (*re źig*) accepted that treatises, scriptures and own words could invalidate: Dharmakīrti's *real* point of view was supposedly that they could never be as fully probative as *pramāṇa*s such as perception and *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*; strictly speaking they were *pratibandhaka*.[466] If we took this approach, Dharmakīrti's

istically: a cognition with *Fa* as content is opposed, like fire to water, to a cognition with -*Fa* as content."

[465]Prajñākaragupta explains k. 95 as follows: "When there can be no investigation without a treatise because the *dharmin*s would not [otherwise] exist, then the treatise can invalidate, but not otherwise" (*yadi śāstram antareṇa vicāro na pravartate dharmiṇa evābhāvāt [|] tadā śāstraṃ bādhakam anyathā neti*).

[466]See PVin 294b3–4: *raṅ gi 'bras bus*[a] *yaṅ dag par bstan pa de ni raṅ las phyin ci log tu khas blaṅs pa'i gegs byed do || de'i phyir de ltar mtshuṅs pas na raṅ gi tshig daṅ bstan bcos bsdus te gcig tu brjod do* ([a] P / D. *bu*; cf. PVinṬ *raṅ gi 'bras bus* [D. 196b4]) "What is expressed correctly by its effect [i.e., by the *āptavacana*], is an impediment (*gegs byed* = *pratibandha*) to accepting [the state of affairs] in an opposite way. Therefore, because of their being similar in this respect, *svavacana* and treatises were grouped together and designated as one." Cf. PVinṬ 50b3–6: *gaṅ*

thought would seem to turn on two senses of *pramāṇa* and *bādhaka*, a strict sense where both are objective and belief-independent, and a looser provisional one, where the terms are used in a *façon de parler*—thus, in certain special situations and in those alone, we can *speak* of treatises, etc. being *pramāṇa* and of them being *bādhaka*, but only in a thoroughly belief-dependent way; in the stricter sense no two mere statements, lacking genuine belief-independent *pramāṇa*s, can ever do anything but pose impediments to each other.[467]

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gi phyir de'i tshig ni de lta bu'i don gyi dṅos po phyin ci ma log pa ñid med na mi 'jug pa de'i phyir don de'i 'bras bur 'dod pa yin no || yid ches pa'i tshig gi mtshan ñid raṅ gi 'bras bus yaṅ dag par bstan pa'i don de yaṅ | raṅ las phyin ci log tu raṅ gi ṅo bo daṅ 'gal bar khas blaṅs pa'i gegs byed do[a] *|| źes bya ba la 'dir gegs byed pa ñid du gnas par 'gyur ba'i phyogs yin te | de*[b] *ltar ni re źig gnod pa źes bya ba'i don 'dod pa yin no ||* ([a] D. *de*—[b] P / D. *da* [D. 43b3–5]) "Since his [the authority's] words would not have occurred if the corresponding state of affairs had not been correct, therefore we accept that they are the effects of that state of affairs. The state of affairs expressed correctly by its effect, i.e., by what is of the character of *āptavacana*, is an impediment (*pratibandha*) to accepting [the state of affairs] in an opposite way, i.e., in contradiction with its own nature. This [passage] here [in PVin] is the position [of the two types of authoritative words] being *pratibandhaka*. Nonetheless, the sense of *bādhaka* is provisionally accepted." Finally, cf. mKhas grub rje's *sDe bdun yid kyi mun sel* f.204b2–3: *luṅ gi brjod bya'i sgrub byed du 'gyur ba la luṅ phan tshun gegs byed pa źes bya ba 'di ñid 'thad pa'i phyogs su bźed pa yin no | de'i phyir slob dpon chos mchog gis kyaṅ | gegs byed pa ni gnas par 'gyur ba'i phyogs yin la | de lta na yaṅ re źig gnod pa źes bya ba'i don 'dod pa yin no | źes gsuṅs so |* (trans. DREYFUS 1991, 776); here mKhas grub rje explicitly cites the passage from Dharmottara and argues that it shows that *pratibandha* is accepted as the correct position (*'thad pa'i phyogs su bźed pa*).

[467]Note that Dharmakīrti's use of the term *bādhaka* in k. 95 and *pratibandhaka* in PVin (as well as other related issues) led to a philosophically rich intra-Tibetan debate on the question as to whether scripture (*āgama* = *luṅ*) and one's own words (*svavacana* = *raṅ gi tshig*) could *actually* invalidate (*bādhaka* = *gnod byed*) or could only properly serve as "impediments" (*pratibandha[ka]* = *gegs byed*). Some Sa skya pas, such as gSer mdog Paṇ chen Śākya mchog ldan (1428–1507), adopted the former position (i.e., *luṅ gnod byed du 'dod pa'i lugs* "the tradition which accepts scripture as being a *bādhaka*) and dGe lugs pa writers generally adopted the latter (i.e., *luṅ gegs byed du 'dod pa'i lugs* "the tradition which accepts scripture to be a *pratibandhaka*); see DREYFUS 1991, 773–795, TILLEMANS 1990a, 27–28, n. 75 and 1993a, 12–15. As we saw above, Dharmottara is frequently cited by the *luṅ gegs byed* faction. However, as Dreyfus shows, the passages from PVinṬ (and others) are interpreted in different fashions by Tibetans, so that it should be cautioned that there is no Tibetan consensus here. (I think it is fair to say that many Tibetans, such as mKhas grub rje, rGyal tshab rje *et al.*, have tended to focus on what is a separate issue from that of the predominant Dharmakīrtian problem of the probative status of arguments from authority. These Tibetans have, rather, seen the debate as turning on the exact ways to formulate scripturally based reasonings: can one ever cite the actual words of the scriptural passage as a probative reason or should one cite as the reason *the fact* that the words pass the threefold analysis?) We should note that both Prajñākaragupta (see n. 495, 633) and Devendrabuddhi also show evidence of elements of the *luṅ gegs byed* position; cf. PVP 343b4–344a1: *gal te gñi ga yid ches pa'i sgra'i brjod par*

(96) *udāharaṇam*[468] *apy atra sadṛśaṃ tena varṇitam*[469] |
pramāṇānām abhāve hi śāstravācor ayogataḥ ||[470]

Here he [i.e., Dignāga] stated the same example too [viz., 'There are no *pramāṇa*s which have *prameya*s (something to be cognized) as their objects' (*na santi pramāṇāni prameyārthānīti*)].[471] Indeed, this is because both a treatise and [one's own] words are improper in the absence of any *pramāṇa*s.

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bya ba ñid yin na | 'dren mar bstan pa la dgos ci źig yod ce na | 'di ñid dgos pa yin te | 'di ltar gaṅ gi tshe rgol ba gaṅ gi tshig gi nus pa ñid khas mi len pa de'i tshe | gźan la bstan par bya ba'i phyir tshig cuṅ zad kyaṅ brjod par mi 'gyur na | ston par yaṅ byed pa de'i phyir tshig gi nus pa ñid la des raṅ gi tshig de ni[a] *rtsod pa'i gnas skabs kyi rten la tshad mar 'dod pa yin no || de lta bu'i ṅo bo rtog pa la gnod par byed pa yin gyi | dṅos po'i stobs kyis ni ma yin no || de ñid kyi phyir gegs*[b] *byed pa tsam yin par 'dod do || de bźin du luṅ la grags pa'i chos can la tshig khas len pas gdon mi za bar luṅ tshad ma ñid du bya'o || de lta ma yin na dpyod pa ñid 'jug par 'mi 'gyur ba de ltar na dpyod pa'i rten bstan bcos yin no | de ni dpyod pa'i skabs kyi rten yin na | bstan bcos gnod par*[c] *byed pa yin gyi dṅos po'i stobs kyis źugs pa'i rjes su dpag pa la ni ma yin no źes bya ba'i don to* || ([a] P. gives what seems to be a corrupt reading of the passage from *de'i phyir* to *de ni*: *de'i phyir tshig gi nus pa ñid las des raṅ gi tshig gi nus pas ñid la des raṅg gi tshig de ni*—[b] D. *gags*—[c] P / D. *pa* [D. 288a2–5]) "[Query:] Given that both [*svavacana* and treatises] are to be designated by the word *āpta* [in PS III, k. 2], what is the need for them to be shown together? [Reply:] The need is as follows: When the proponent does not accept the capability of his words, he will not state any words at all to inform someone else. However, because he does in fact state [something], therefore, since the words are capable, he holds his own words to be *pramāṇa*s with regard to the basis of the occasion for the debate. They serve as invalidators (*gnod par byed pa* = *bādhaka*) for [someone whose] thought is of this type, but not due to the force of entities (*dṅos po stobs* = *vastubala*). And for precisely this reason [own words] are held to be only *pratibandhaka* (*gegs byed*) [and not real invalidators.] Similarly, because one accepts the statements concerning the *dharmin*s which are recognized in a scripture, inevitably the scripture has to be taken as being a *pramāṇa*. Otherwise, the investigation would not have occurred. Thus the basis for the investigation is the treatise. When it [i.e., the treatise] is the basis for an occasion for investigation, then the treatise is an invalidator, but not in the case of an inference which functions due to the force of [real] entities (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*)."

[468]PV-k(II) *udāhāraṇam.*

[469]PV-k(I/III) *darśitam.*

[470]Cf. PVin 294b5–6: *de ñid kyi phyir gźal bya'i don can gyi tshad ma dag med do źes 'di la dper brjod pa yaṅ 'dra bar mdzad de | tshad ma rnams*[a] *med na bstan bcos daṅ tshig dag mi ruṅ ba'i phyir ro* || ([a] P. *rnam pa* [D. 196b6–7]).

[471]PVV 446, 15: *yathā na santi pramāṇāni prameyārthānīti* |. The Skt. corresponds to the Tibetan given in PVin (see n. 470) and Devendrabuddhi's PVP 344a2 (*dper na gźal bya'i don can gyi tshad ma dag yod pa ma*[a] *yin no źes bya ba lta bu'o* || [[a] P. om. *ma.* (D. 288a6)]).

(97) *svavāgvirodhe vispaṣṭam udāharaṇam āgame |*
diṅmātradarśanaṃ tatra pretya dharmo 'sukhapradaḥ[472] ||[473]

The example, which is very clear with regard to contradiction with one's own words, shows only a mere indication with regard to [contradiction with] scripture. For the latter [a thesis like], 'Morality does not bring happiness after one dies' [would be the chief type of example].

In the PSV Dignāga had specified that a valid thesis had to be free of the four types of opposition (see PV IV, k. 92 and our explanations), and then had proceeded to give examples of theses which were respectively opposed by perception, inference, authority and what is commonly recognized. See PSV *ad* PS III, k. 2: "Otherwise, it is a fallacious thesis (*pakṣābhāsa*), as in the following examples: [1] 'sound is not audible'; [2] 'a vase is permanent'; [3] because of simply accepting it, [a proposition like] 'there are no means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) which have cognizable things (*prameya*) as their objects'..."

Dignāga, thus, did indeed state the same example for opposition by *svavacana* and for opposition by treatises. This, according to k. 96, was because the nonexistence of any *pramāṇa*s whatsoever, as expressed by the thesis *na santi pramāṇāni prameyārthāni*, would not only falsify that thesis itself, but would equally mean that one could never accept a treatise as valid.[474] *Kārikā* 97, however, explains that while the thesis *na santi pramāṇāni prameyārthāni* does indeed directly show opposition by the proponent's own words, it is not the chief type of example of a thesis which would be contradicted by a treatise. The subject (*dharmin*) of a thesis which is contradicted by a treatise ought to be one which is *only* knowable through treatise-based descriptions—a *pramāṇa* is not such a

[472]PV-k(I) *pretya dharmo sukhapradaḥ*; PV-k(II/III) *pretyadharmosukhapradaḥ*; MIY. *pretyadharmo sukhapradaḥ*. We should, however, read *pretya dharmo 'sukhapradaḥ*, which is in keeping with PVV's commentary (see n. 475), PVin (*chos ni 'phos nas bde ba ster bar byed pa ma yin no*) and PV Tib. *de la ma 'oṅs pa na chos bde ba mi 'grub* ces bya yin.* *MIY. erroneously read *'grug*.

[473]Cf. PVin 294b6–7: *raṅ gi tshig daṅ 'gal ba la gsal*[a] *ba'i dper brjod pa yin la | luṅ la ni 'di phyogs tsam źig bstan pa yin no || 'di la dper brjod pa ni chos ni 'phos nas bde ba ster bar byed pa ma yin no źes bya ba yin no ||* ([a] P. *bsal*; cf. PV Tib. *gsal* [D. 196b7]).

[474]Cf. PVBh 525, 15–17: *ata eva sāmyapradarśanārthaṃ sadṛśam udāharaṇam āha | pramāṇapratikṣepe śāstravacanayor abhāvāt | pramāṇapratiṣedhe śāstram api naiva bhavataḥ pramāṇam iti kim abhyupagama iti parasparavirodhamātram eva syāt |* "Thus, [Dignāga] stated the same example in order to show similarity, for if one denies [the possibility of] any *pramāṇa*s, [valid] treatises and words will be nonexistent. If you negate *pramāṇa*s, a treatise will not be a *pramāṇa* for you either. And then why accept it? Thus there would be nothing but reciprocal contradiction."

type of entity. Thus a more exact formulation of such a thesis would be one, like that given in k. 97, whose subject, morality (*dharma*), is radically inaccessible (*atyantaparokṣa*), and hence only knowable on the basis of scripture.[475]

3.2.2 *pratibandhaka* versus *bādhaka*

(98) *śāstriṇo 'py atadālambe viruddhoktau tu vastuni |*
na bādhā pratibandhaḥ syāt tulyakakṣyatayā[476] *dvayoḥ*[477] ||
(99) *yathā svavāci tac cāsya*[478] *tadā svavacanātmakam |*
tayoḥ pramāṇaṃ yasyāsti tat syād anyasya bādhakam ||[479]

Even for someone who accepts a treatise, however, there is no invalidation (*bādhā*) when he states a contradicting [quality] with regard to an entity [i.e., a *dharmin* which is established by a *pramāṇa* and] which does not depend upon that [treatise].[480] Because the two [propositions] have the same force, there would [just] be a *pratibandha* (impediment; clash) between them, just as in the case of own words [when one says, 'My mother is barren']. Now this [treatise] of the [proponent] is essentially the same as his own words (*svavacana*) at that time [i.e., when the proponent's thesis contradicts a treatise with regard to a commonly recognized *dharmin*]. Of the two [i.e., the treatise's assertion and the counter-

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[475]See PVV 443, 23–26: *āgame śāstre punar udāharaṇasya diṅmātradarśanam upalakṣaṇamātram etat | na tu mukhyam udāharaṇam | pramāṇasya dharmiṇa āgamasiddhatvābhāvāt | idaṃ punar mukhyam udāharaṇam āgame pretya paraloke dharmo 'sukhapradaḥ |*.

[476]PV-k(I) *tulyaśaktitayā*; PV-k(II) *tulyakakṣatayā*. As for the choice between reading *śakti* or *kakṣ[y]a*, note that k. 100 uses the latter.

[477]PV-k(II) and Dānaśīla's copy of PVBh read *tayoḥ*; cf. PV Tib. *gñis po dag* = *dvayoḥ*.

[478]MIY. *cāsyā*.

[479]Cf. PVin 295a6–8: *de la mi brten pa'i dṅos po la ni bstan bcos daṅ ldan pas 'gal brjod kyaṅ gnod pa ma yin te | gegs byed par 'gyur ro || gñis ka*[a] *stobs mtshuṅs pa'i phyir te | dper na raṅ gi tshig bźin no ||... de dag las gaṅ la tshad ma yod pa de ni gźan la gnod par byed pa yin te |* ([a] D. *gñi ga* [D. 197a7–b1]).

[480]See PVV 447, 3–4: *śāstriṇo 'bhyupagataśāstrasyātadālambe śāstrāsiddhe pramāṇasiddhe vastuni dharmiṇi śāstrapratijñāviruddhasya dharmasyoktau na sā bādhā |*. PV Tib. seems to reflect a very different understanding of *śāstriṇo 'py*, taking it as *bstan bcos daṅ 'gal brjod na yaṅ*. On *śāstriṇo 'py* (literally "even for one who has a treatise), cf. PVP 344b4 and PVṬ 325b1: *bstan bcos pa*, which is then glossed as *bstan bcos khas len pa can* "one who accepts a treatise." Cf. also PVin (n. 479): *bstan bcos daṅ ldan pas 'gal brjod kyaṅ*.

> thesis put forth by the proponent], the one which has a *pramāṇa* [supporting it] would invalidate the other.[481]

In commenting upon k. 98–99, Manorathanandin and Devendrabuddhi give the example of a(n apostate!) Mīmāṃsaka who argues that sound is impermanent. This thesis is, of course, the contrary of the Mīmāṃsaka treatises' proposition to the effect that sound is permanent, but such a clash, or impediment (*pratibandha*), does not, *in itself*, in any way constitute an invalidation of sound being impermanent.[482] *Intrinsically*, i.e., *qua* mere words, neither statement has any more claim to truth than the other—in that sense, the two, *qua* statements, are of the "same force" (*tulyakakṣya*); determining the truth or invalidation of one or the other statement depends upon knowing which is supported by a genuine *pramāṇa*.

Dharmakīrti in k. 99a (*yathā svavāci* 'just as in the case of own words') makes an analogy with self-refuting statements like "My mother is barren" or "Everything said is false": *yathā svavāci* thus becomes the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) in

[481] See PVV 447, 9–18: *nanu svavacanayos tulyakakṣatvād yuktaḥ pratibandhaḥ | āgamasvavacanayos tulyabalataiva katham ity āha |... tac ca śāstraṃ nityatvapratijñātasya vādinaḥ tadā prasiddhe dharmiṇi śāstraviruddhapratijñāsamaye svopagamasvīkṛtapramāṇatvāt svavacanātmakaṃ jātaṃ vacanam śāstraṃ ca svayamabhyupagataprāmāṇyayuktaṃ tulyakakṣaṃ yathā svavāci mātā me vandhyeti vacanamātrayoḥ pratibandho 'nyonyam (|) tayoḥ śāstravacanayor viruddhārthābhidhāyinor madhye yasya pramāṇam anuvartakam asti tat pramāṇavad anyasyāpramāṇakasya bādhakaṃ bhavati yathā 'nityatvaṃ nityasya śabde ||* "[Objection:] As two of one's own statements are of the same force, it is correct that there is a *pratibandha* between them. But how could a scripture and one's own statement be of exactly equal strength? [Dharmakīrti] replies: ... [k. 99]. Now this treatise of a proponent who had accepted permanence has become essentially the same as his own words at that time, i.e., when [his] thesis contradicts the treatise with regard to a commonly recognized *dharmin*. This is because they are admitted as *pramāṇa*s [just] because of his acceptance [of them]. The statement and the treatise, which are both endowed with a validity accepted by the [proponent] himself, are of equal force, just as when one says, 'My mother is barren,' there is a mutual *pratibandha* between two mere statements [viz., between 'My mother is barren' and 'My mother is not barren'].[a] Among the two, viz., the treatise and the statement which express contradictory propositions, the one which has a corresponding *pramāṇa*, i.e., the one which is endowed with a *pramāṇa*, is the invalidator of the other, viz., the one without a *pramāṇa*, just as impermanence is [the invalidator] of permanence with regard to sound." ([a] Cf. rGyal 296, 15–18: *dper na | bden źen gyis kho bo'i ma mo gśam mo źes pa'i raṅ gi tshig 'gal ba bu bskyed pa'i nus pa yod pa daṅ med pa gñis | gźi bud med gcig bu de'i steṅ du gnod bya gnod byed ma yin te | gegs byed tsam yin pa'i phyir | ces pa bźin no ||* "For example: the two contradicting [propositions] in one's own words when one sincerely (*bden źen gyis*) says 'My mother is barren,' namely, that she has and has not the power to give birth, are not *bādhya* and *bādhaka* with regard to the locus, viz., the one woman. This is because they are just *pratibandhaka*.")

[482] See PVV 447, 4–6: *yathā mīmāṃsakasya gṛhītaśāstrasya pratyakṣasiddhe śabde dharmiṇi kṛtakatvād anityatvoktāv api śāstrapratijñātena nityatvena na bādhā |*.

the formal reasoning (*prayoga*) given in k. 98–99ab. (In the parallel passage in the PVin, *dper na raṅ gi tshig bźin* = *yathā svavāci* is also clearly linked with the reason 'because they are both of the same force'.) As PVin and PVV *ad* k. 98–99 show (see n. 481; cf. also PVP *ad* k. 95, n. 467), Dharmakīrti seems to have clearly held the position that *svavacanavirodha* (self-contradiction) of a thesis, as in "My mother is barren," did not objectively lead to invalidation (*bādhā*): there is in fact no genuine objective *pramāṇa* pertaining to the facts of the matter which would decide whether the statement is true or false. All there is is the speaker's own acceptance and commitment to the truth of the statement, this being a *sine qua non* for him engaging in the speech act. From that angle, as in the case of treatises, there is no more than a *pratibandha* between the stated proposition and its contrary. A statement like "My mother is barren" and its implied opposite ('My mother is not barren') are both simply words lacking genuine *pramāṇa*s: in other words, we do not know the truth-value of either.

Logically speaking, we might remark, however, that there is an oddity in saying that both "My mother is barren" and "My mother is not barren" are just statements of which we do not know the truth-value. What does not seem to have entered into consideration for Dharmakīrti is the following inference: granted that if *P* then *not-P*, we can then infer *not-P*. Arguably, what Dharmakīrti could have said is that a self-refuting statement is indeed false *simply because* if it were true, it would be false. This inference would be valid because the statement $((P \rightarrow not\text{-}P) \rightarrow not\text{-}P)$ is a theorem; in fact it is a frequently invoked tautology of propositional calculus.[483] To put things in Dharmakīrtian terms, then, one could well maintain there *is* a *pramāṇa* for the opposite of a self-contradictory thesis. It is fair to say that the thrust of Dharmakīrti's discussion of *svavacanavirodha* here strongly suggests that either he did not know this basic logical theorem (a plausible hypothesis given the state of Indian logic at his time), or, perhaps more interestingly from a philosophical point of view, that he did not accept it.

Be this as it may, the formal reasoning (*prayoga*) in k. 98–99ab and in the PVin can be reconstructed as follows:

(a) When two contradictory propositions have the same force, there is just a *pratibandha* between them, as in the case of one's own words when one says 'My mother is barren.'

[483] A basically similar theorem is to be found in Stoic logic ("If the first, then the first; if the first then not the first; therefore not the first"). It had been used in Plato's rejection of Protagoras's relativism ("If it were true, it would be false; therefore it is false") and became known as a *consequentia mirabilis* in the Renaissance, figuring prominently in mathematical proofs. See KNEALE and KNEALE 1962, 171–174; MATES 1972, 216.

(b) The treatise's proposition concerning a commonly recognized subject is the same as the proponent's thesis-statement in that both are of the same force.

(c) The implicit conclusion is: Therefore, when speaking of a commonly recognized subject, there is just a *pratibandha* between the treatise's proposition and the proponent's thesis-statement.

(100) *pratijñām anumānaṃ vā pratijñāpetayuktikā* |
tulyakakṣyāṃ[484] *yathārthaṃ vā bādheta katham anyathā* ||[485]

If it were otherwise [i.e., if one did *not* agree that two statements lacking *pramāṇa*s were just merely *pratibandhaka*],[486] [then we would reply:] how is it possible that a thesis lacking any rational justification should invalidate either a thesis with the same force or a true inference?

(101) *prāmāṇyam āgamānāṃ ca prāg eva vinivāritam* |
abhyupāyavicāreṣu[487] *tasmād doṣo 'yam iṣyate* ||[488]

Now, it had already been refuted earlier that scriptures were *pramāṇa*s.[489] Thus, it is [only] in investigations proceeding from acceptance [of the statements concerning a subject recognized in a treatise] that this fault [i.e., invalidation by a treatise] is accepted.

In k. 98–100 Dharmakīrti considered the case of reliance upon scriptural authority when the subject being discussed (e.g., sound) was in fact accessible to other *pramāṇa*s: such statements, unsupported by *pramāṇa*s, are only *pratibandhaka* and cannot be taken to be *bādhaka* at all. In k. 100 the argument is that taking

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[484]PV-k(I), MIY. *tulyakakṣyā*; PV-k(II) and Dānaśīla's copy of PVBh *tulyakakṣā*; PV-k(III) *tulyakakṣyāṃ*. Note that PV Tib. would support *tulyakakṣ[y]ā* and that PVV comments upon *tulyakakṣā* as qualifying *pratijñāpetayuktitā*, although PVP is ambiguous on this point. Vibhūticandra's manuscript of PVBh, however, does read *tulyakakṣyāṃ* and, what is particularly important, this latter reading is in keeping with PVin (see n. 485).

[485]Cf. PVin 295a8–295b1: *de lta ma yin na dam bca' ba stobs mtshuṅs pa'am* | [a] *rjes su dpag pa daṅ ldan pa don ji lta ba bźin du 'jug pa la rigs pa med pa'i dam bcas pas ji ltar gnod par 'gyur* | ([a] P. adds *rjes su dpag pa daṅ mtshuṅs pa'am* |, a phrase which is not commented upon in PVinṬ 54b–55a. [D. 197b1–2]).

[486]PVP 345a2–3: *gźan du gal te tshad ma can ma yin pa'i tshig dag gegs byed pa tsam du mi 'dod pa de'i tshe* ... (D. 289a4).

[487]PV-k(III) *abhyupetavic°*.

[488]Cf. PVin 295b1: *luṅ rnams tshad ma yin pa yaṅ bkag zin to* || *de'i phyir khas blaṅs nas dpyod pa*[a] *dag la skyon 'dir 'gyur ro* || ([a] D. *gcod pa* [D. 197b2]).

[489]See our remarks on k. 101.

such statements as *bādhaka* would lead to the absurdity that mere unsubstantiated words on rationally or empirically decidable matters could refute other unsubstantiated words, or even overrule a valid inference. *Kārikā* 101, however, reiterates that treatises can taken to be *bādhaka* in the case of radically inaccessible (*atyantaparokṣa*) subjects, such as the question whether morality (*dharma*) brings happiness in a future life. Dharmakīrti had devoted considerable argumentation in the first chapter of the PV to refuting the non-Buddhist views that statements in certain scriptures must be considered to be *intrinsically pramāṇa*s, because of some inherent property of their words or because of the circumstances of the scripture's origin. For example, PV I, k. 224ff. discusses *in extenso* the Mīmāṃsaka's argument that the *Veda*s must be *pramāṇa*s because they were not made by man (*apauruṣeya*).[490] Here, in PV IV, however, the point seems to be that although the scriptural statements are certainly not *pramāṇa*s *inherently* or *intrinsically*, they can be *accepted* as *pramāṇa*s, and hence as a type of belief-dependent invalidator (*bādhaka*) with regard to such *atyantaparokṣa* matters: no other *pramāṇa*s are available to provide a decision procedure.[491]

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[490] Cf. PVin II, in STEINKELLNER 1979, 65ff.; see also PVinṬ in n. 491.

[491] K. 101 does not figure in Manorathanandin's commentary, nor is it commented upon by PVBh, which classifies k. 99–101 as *antaraśloka* (intermediate verses; see MIMAKI 1980, esp. 240f. on Prajñākaragupta's specific use of the term). The verses are, however, commented upon by PVP, and their counterpart in PVin is commented by Dharmottara; cf. PVinṬ 54b6–55a4 on the arguments in k. 100–101: *de lta ma yin źes bya ba ni gal te tshad ma med pa dag gegs ma yin pa daṅ | tshad ma can tshad ma med pa la gnod par byed pa ma yin gyi | 'on kyaṅ bstan bcos ñid gnod par byed 'dod na | de'i tshe raṅ gi tshig*[a] *tshad ma med pa daṅ rjes su dpag pa daṅ ldan pa don ci lta ba bźin te | dṅos po las ma 'das par 'jug pa'i raṅ gi tshig tshad ma daṅ ldan pa gaṅ yin pa de la rigs pa*[b] *med pa'i dam bca' ba luṅ gi ṅo bos ci ltar gnod par 'gyur te | mi 'gyur ba ñid do || rigs pa*[c] *med pa źes bya ba*[d] *ji ltar brjod de gaṅ gi phyir luṅ yaṅ tshad ma ñid yin pa'i phyir ro źe na | luṅ rnams tshad ma yin pa yaṅ bkag zin to źes smos te | le'u gñis par luṅ rnams | raṅ bźin ma byas pa daṅ | don skyes bus ma byas pa daṅ yid ches pa'i tshig ñid kyis tshad ma yin pa bkag zin to | gaṅ gi phyir bstan bcos las mi brten pa'i dṅos po la luṅ daṅ 'gal ba brjod pa la luṅ gis*[e] *gnod pa med pa de'i phyir luṅ tshad mar khas blaṅs nas dpyod pa gaṅ dag yin pa ste | dper na chos la sogs pa lta bur gaṅ dag gi*[f] *chos can bstan bcos las*[g] *rab tu grags pa'i dpyod pa de dag la bstan bcos kyis*[h] *gnod pa'i skyon 'dir 'gyur gyi gźan du chos can bstan bcos las rab tu grags pa ma yin pa'i dpyod pa la ni ma yin no ||* ([a] P. *tshig gi*—[b] P. *reg pa*—[c] P. *rig pa*—[d] P. om. *bya ba*—[e] P. *gi*—[f] D. *gis*—[g] P. *la*—[h] P. *kyi* [D. 47a2–6]) "If it were otherwise'—Suppose that the two [statements] lacking *pramāṇa*s were not *pratibandhaka* and that one with a *pramāṇa* did not invalidate one without a *pramāṇa*, but rather that it was maintained that the treatise alone served to invalidate. Then, in that case, how is it possible that a scriptural thesis lacking rational justification should invalidate either one's own statements lacking *pramāṇa*s or true inferences, i.e., one's statements which do have a *pramāṇa* and [hence] which apply without straying from [real] entities? In fact, [such a scriptural thesis] would not [invalidate either a statement lacking *pramāṇa*s or a true inference].

3.2.3 The reason why *āpta* was specified separately from inference

(102) *tasmād viṣayabhedasya darśanāya*[492] *pṛthakkṛtaḥ*[493] |
anumānābahirbhūto 'py abhyupāyaḥ prabādhanāt ||[494]

Consequently, although acceptance (*abhyupāya*) is not outside [the category of] inference in that it can invalidate, it was treated separately in order to show a difference of scope.[495]

[Objection:] How can you say that they lack rational justification, for scriptures are also *pramāṇa*s. [Reply:] [Dharmakīrti] stated, 'It has already been refuted that scriptures are *pramāṇa*s.' In other words, in the second chapter [of PVin] it has already been refuted that scriptures are *pramāṇa*s due to being naturally uncreated, or because their meaning was not made by man, or because they were the words of an authority. In the case of an entity which does not rely upon a treatise, stating something in contradiction with a scripture does not constitute invalidation by scripture. Therefore, it is in investigations [proceeding] from acceptance of a scripture as being a *pramāṇa*, e.g., such as of morality (*dharma*), etc: it is in those investigations whose *dharmin*s are established from a treatise that the fault of invalidation by a treatise might occur, but in other cases, i.e., in investigations where the *dharmin* is not established from a treatise, this would not be so."

[492]PV-k(I | II) *darśanārtham*. PV Tib. *bstan pa yi phyir na* supports *darśanāya*.

[493]PV-k(I), MIY. *pṛthak kṛtaḥ*.

[494]Cf. PVin 295b1–2: *de ñid kyi phyir gnod par byed pa*[a] *khas blaṅs pas na | rjes su dpag pa las phyi rol tu gyur pa ma yin yaṅ khas blaṅs pa logs śig tu byas pa ni yul gyi dbye ba bstan pa'i phyir te* | ([a] D. *gnod pas byed pas* [D. 197b2–3]).

[495]See PVV 448,6–9: *anumānaṃ sarvatra bādhakaṃ śāstraṃ tu śāstrāśraye dharmiṇīti bādhakatvaviṣayabhedopadarśanaṃ pṛthakkaraṇaphalam | kathaṃ jñāyate 'numānābahirbhūtaṃ śāstram ity āha | svasiddhe dharmiṇi svopagamaviruddhasya dharmasya prabādhanāt | na hy apramāṇaṃ bādhakam | pramāṇaṃ cāpratyakṣatvāt anumānam eva* || "Inference serves to invalidate in all cases, but a treatise [only invalidates] in the case of a *dharmin* based on the treatise. Therefore, showing a difference in the scope of invalidation (*bādhakatvaviṣayabhedopadarśana*) was what was accomplished by treating [treatises] separately. [Objection:] How do we know that a treatise is not outside [the category of] inference? [Dharmakīrti] replies: Because it invalidates a *dharma* which is in contradiction with its own position concerning a *dharmin* which it has established. Indeed, what serves to invalidate does not fail to be a *pramāṇa*. And the *pramāṇa*, since it is not a perception, can only be an inference." Note that Manorathanandin interprets the "difference of scope" (*viṣayabheda*) as consisting in the fact that inferences can invalidate all theses, while treatises apply only to the *dharmin*s based upon accepted treatises. The interpretation is the same as that of Dharmottara. See PVinṬ 55a6–7: *rjes su dpag pa daṅ bstan bcos kyi gnod pa ni yul tha dad pa yin te | rjes su dpag pa ni thams cad du gnod par byed pa yin la | bstan bcos la bstan pa'i chos can la gnod par byed pa yin pas | yul gyi dbye ba 'di bstan pa'i phyir logs śig tu byas so* ||. Prajñākaragupta has a somewhat different interpretation of this *kārikā* (and the next), an interpretation which seems to lean towards what the later Tibetan scholastic would term the *luṅ gegs byed du 'dod pa'i lugs* (the tradition which accepts scripture as being a *pratibandhaka*)"; see n. 467). In PVBh 526, 12–14 he states: *ata eva bādhanābhyupagamāt āgamo 'numānābahirbhūto*

(103) *anyathātiprasaṅgaḥ syād vyarthatā vā pṛthakkṛteḥ*[496] |
bhedo vāṅmātravacane pratibandhaḥ svavācy api ||[497]

Otherwise, there would be the absurd consequence [that the different kinds of inferences involving effects (*kārya*), essential properties (*svabhāva*) and nonperceptions (*anupalambha*) should have been stated in full].[498] Or [alternatively], separate treatment [of acceptance] would have been pointless. [Objection: Why is it that, in the NM, *svavacanavirodha* and *pūrvābhyupagamavirodha* were treated separately from each other? Reply:][499] The difference in the case of one's own words, however, is the fact that they are a *pratibandha* to the statement consisting of the mere words (*vāṅmātra*) [themselves].

'pi pṛthakkṛto 'numānāt viṣayabhedapradarśanārtham | [a] *anumānam bādhakam eva* | *śāstram tu pratibandhakam* | *abhyupagataṃ ca tat pratibandhakaṃ nānyathā* | ([a] RS placed the *daṇḍa* before *viṣaya°*; we have placed it after in keeping with PVBh Tib. 209a2) "Therefore, although scripture is not outside [the category of] inference because it is accepted as invalidating, still it was treated separately from inference in order to show a difference of scope. Inference is really a *bādhaka*, but a treatise is a *pratibandhaka*. Now this *pratibandhaka* is something which is accepted—it is not [a *bādhaka*[a]] otherwise" ([a] Yamāri's PVAṬ [D. 68b3] glosses *nānyathā* (not otherwise) as follows: *gźan du ni źes bya ba khas ma blaṅs na ni ma yin no* | *khas blaṅs pa kho nas gnod par byed pa yin no źes bya ba 'di ga las sñams na* | *de ltar ma yin na źes bya ba'o* || "Not otherwise' means that it is not [a *bādhaka*] if it is unaccepted. Why is this so, viz., that it is a *bādhaka* only when accepted? [Dharmakīrti] answers [in k. 103] 'Otherwise ...'."). See also n. 633.

[496] MIY. *pṛthak kṛteḥ.*

[497] Cf. PVin 295b2–3: *de lta ma yin na yaṅ*[a] *ha caṅ thal ba'am* | *logs śig tu byas pa don med par 'gyur te* | *raṅ gi tshig logs śig tu byed pa'i rgyu mtshan yaṅ tshig tsam brjod*[b] *pa la gegs byed pa yin no* || ([a] D. om. *yaṅ* [b] D. *rjod* [D. 197b3–4]).

[498] See PVV 448, 12–13: *anyathā yadi viṣayabhedopadarśanaphalaṃ pṛthakkaraṇaṃ neṣyate tadā prabhedadarśanārthaṃ vaktavyam* | *tathā ca kāryasvabhāvānupalambhānāṃ prabhedo yāvatsambhavaṃ vācya ity aptiprasaṅgaḥ syāt* | "Otherwise, if one did not accept that the separate treatment had the effect of showing difference of scope, then it [i.e., the separate treatment of *āpta* in PS III, k. 2] would have to have been stated to show a division [of reasons]. And if that were the case, then there would be the absurd consequence that the division into effects, essential properties and nonperceptions should have been stated in full."

[499] PVBh 526, 18: *svavacanopagamavirodhayos tarhi kathaṃ pṛthakkaraṇaṃ parasparaṃ nyāyamukhe* |. Cf. PVV 448, 16–18: *yadi viṣayabhedopadarśanārtham anumānāt pṛthagvacanaṃ śāstrasya tadābhyupagamāt svavacanam ācāryeṇa kim arthaṃ pṛthakkṛtaṃ nyāyamukhe* | *yathā sarvam uktam mṛṣeti tathā aulūkasya nityaḥ śabda iti* | *atrāha* "[Objection:] If there is a separate mention of treatises apart from inference in order to show difference of scope, then why did the Ācārya [Dignāga] in the *Nyāyamukha* treat [opposition by] *svavacana* separately from *abhyupagama* ('accepted position'). The [thesis] 'Everything said is false' is just like the Vaiśeṣika who says that sound is permanent. To this [Dharmakīrti] replies:."

If PS III, k. 2 had specified *āpta*, not in order to make a distinction in the range of objects treated by inference and treatises, but rather in order to distinguish between types of *inferences*, then Dignāga should also have mentioned the other types of inferences, viz., those dependent upon *kāryahetu*, *svabhāvahetu* or *anupalabdhihetu*. Or, alternatively, as treatises are included in inference, he should not have mentioned *āpta* separately at all.

The second half of k. 103 introduces a new argument. Dignāga, in NM *ad* k. 1, had indeed made a separation between *svavacana* and treatises, or more exactly, between *svavacana* and *pūrvābhyupagama* (a previously accepted position). He had given *sarvam uktaṃ mṛṣā* (Everything which is said is false) as an example of the former; the Vaiśeṣika's statement that sound is permanent was an example of "opposition by a previously accepted position," in that the Vaiśeṣika's treatises affirm that sound is impermanent.[500] The question then arises as to why Dignāga actually made such a separation in NM. Dignāga's point, according to Dharmakīrti, is that in the case of *svavacana* such as *sarvam uktaṃ mṛṣā*, the very act of stating the thesis implies that the proponent accepts it to be true; this accepted truth then clashes with what the statement itself asserts, viz., that it is itself false—in short, the thesis clashes with itself. In the case of treatises, or *pūrvābhyupagama* concerning perceptible subjects such as sound, the thesis only clashes with some *other* statement. PVV explains: "One's own statement is accepted as being a *pramāṇa* by implication from its being uttered. Otherwise [if it were not accepted as being a *pramāṇa*], there would be no utterance [of it]. Now, being a *pramāṇa* (*prāmāṇya*) means having a meaning which is true (*satyārthatā*). This is negated by 'having a meaning which is false (*mṛṣārthatā*),' which is what is being asserted [by *sarvam uktaṃ mṛṣā*]. And thus because of their same force, there is only a *pratibandha* between the latter two [viz., *satyārthatā* and *mṛṣārthatā*], and no *bādhā* ('invalidation'). So, this sentence [i.e., *sarvam uktaṃ mṛṣā*] impedes (*pratibadhnāti*) its own meaning (*svārtha*), [but] the treatise [impedes] a fact taught by another sentence. Thus, it was asserted that there was a difference between the two [i.e *svavacana* and treatises]."[501]

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[500]See NM *ad* k. 1; KATSURA 1977, 113–114; TUCCI 1930, 7.

[501]PVV 448, 22–25: *uccāraṇasāmarthyād abhyupagataprāmāṇyaṃ svavacanam | anyathoccāraṇam eva na syāt | satyārthatā ca prāmāṇyam | tan mṛṣārthatayā vācyayā niṣedhyata iti tulyakakṣatayā pratibandha evānayor na bādhā | tad enaṃ vākyaṃ svārthaṃ pratibadhnāti | vākyāntaranirdiṣṭaṃ vastu śāstram ity anayor bheda ity uktam |*.

(104) *tenābhyupagamāc chāstraṃ pramāṇaṃ sarvavastuṣu* |
bādhakaṃ yadi necchet sa bādhakaṃ kiṃ punar bhavet ||[502]

[Objection:] Because of acceptance by the [proponent], a treatise is a *pramāṇa* [and hence] a *bādhaka* with regard to [any and] all entities.[503] [Reply:] If he did not accept it, would it then still be a *bādhaka*?[504]

The opponent, echoing Dharmakīrti's position that a treatises is a *pramāṇa* in certain very specific circumstances because of our acceptance of it, now maintains that the treatise, because it is accepted, will be a *pramāṇa* with regard to *all* types of entities—in other words, with regard to those subjects (like sound) which are perceptible, those which are imperceptible but inferable, as well as

[502]Cf. PVin 296a2–3: *des*[a] *khas blaṅs pa'i phyir dṅos po thams cad la bstan bcos tshad ma yin pas gnod par byed pa kho na'o źe na* | ([a] D. *de* [D. 198a4]).

[503]PV Tib. has a different understanding of the first half of k. 104: *de yis bstan bcos tshad mar ni* || *khas blaṅs phyir na dṅos kun la* || *gnod byed ce na* "[Objection:] Because the [proponent] accepts the treatise as a *pramāṇa*, it is a *bādhaka* with regard to all entities." We have, however, followed PVin (see n. 502), PVP (see n. 504) and PVV 449, 3–4 (*śāstrasya tena vādinābhyupagamāt sarvatra vastuṣu dharmiṣu śāstrasiddhe vastubalapravṛtte pramāṇaniściteṣu ca śāstraṃ pramāṇaṃ sat bādhakam eva syāt* |).

[504]See PVP 345b8–346a3: *rgol ba de yis bstan bcos khas blaṅs phyir* | *rgyu'i phyir te* | *bstan bcos tshad ma ñid yin no* | *de bas na*[a] *de dṅos kun la gnod byed yin* | *yul*[b] *la lar ni ma yin no źe na* | *gal te bstan bcos tshad ma ñid yin par khas blaṅs pa'i phyir ro* || *gnod par byed par skyes pa de'i tshe* | *gal te sgrub par byed pa'i dus na bstan bcos tshad ma daṅ gnod par byed pa yin no źes rgol ba de mi 'dod pa de'i tshe* | *cis kyaṅ gnod par byed par 'gyur* | *mi 'gyur ba ñid yin no* || *de ltar na 'dod pas*[c] *de'i skyon de thob par 'gyur gyi* | *rigs pa las ma yin no* | *luṅ de mi 'dod na ni gnod par byed pa yin par mi 'gyur ro* || ([a] P. om. *na*—[b] P. om. *yul*—[c] D. *'dod pa* [D. 289b6–290a2]) "[Objection:] Because the treatise is accepted by the proponent, it is therefore a *pramāṇa*. Hence it is a *bādhaka* with regard to all entities and not just with regard to some objects. [Reply:] Suppose that the treatise is accepted as a *pramāṇa* and that it therefore becomes a *bādhaka*. Then if the proponent did not accept that the treatise was a *pramāṇa* and a *bādhaka* when he proved [a proposition], then why would it still be a *bādhaka*? It would not be one. In that case, the fault of [invalidation of a thesis] would occur [just] due to [the proponent's] *icchā* ('acceptance'; 'wishes'), and not due to *yukti* ('logic'). If he did not accept the scripture it would not be a *bādhaka*." Cf. PVBh 426, 29–30: *yadi hy asau necchet kiṃ tad bādhakaṃ bhavet* | *yadi na kathaṃ*[a] *tadicchāyām api bādhakam* | *na hīcchāpramāṇe*[b] *prāmāṇyaṃ janayati* | ([a] RS read *yadi vā*, however Dānaśīla's copy gives *yadi na kathaṃ* which corresponds to PVBh Tib.—[b] RS read *'pramāṇasya* instead of Dānaśīla's *'pramāṇe*, the latter again concording with PVBh Tib. Cf. PVBh Tib. 209b1: *gal te mi 'dod na ci gnod par byed pa yin nam* || *gal te ma yin no źe na* | *des 'dod na yaṅ gnod par byed par ci ltar 'gyur* || *'dod pa tshad ma ma yin na ni tshad mar byed pa ñid ma yin no* ||) "If he did not accept it, then would it [still] be a *bādhaka*? Suppose that it would not. Then even when he does accept it how can it be a *bādhaka*? For, an acceptance, if it is not a *pramāṇa*, does not make something a *pramāṇa*."

those which are radically inaccessible (*atyantaparokṣa*) and hence only knowable through scripture.[505] Thus, according to the opponent, the treatise should be a *bādhaka*, rather than *pratibandhaka*, in all cases. This, however, would lead to the absurdity that *all* invalidation would become completely subjective: Devendrabuddhi stresses that *bādhā* would become completely dependent upon *icchā* (wishes; acceptance), and not upon logic (*yukti*); see n. 504.

3.2.4 Other similarities between one's own words and treatises

PVBh's introduction to k. 105: "[Objection:] What has been accepted earlier should not be stated to be otherwise later. [Reply:] If one did so, what contradiction would there be? [Objection continued:] There would in fact be a contradiction with one's own words (*svavacanavirodha*). [Reply:]"[506]

(105) *svavāgvirodhe*[507] *'bhedaḥ syāt svavākśāstravirodhayoḥ* |
puruṣecchākṛtā[508] *cāsya paripūrṇā pramāṇatā* ||[509]

If there is contradiction with one's own words, then there would be no difference between contradiction with one's own words and contradiction with a treatise. Moreover, its being a *pramāṇa* due to the person's acceptance is fulfilled [also in the case of one's own words! Therefore, a treatise is no different from one's own words].[510]

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[505] I.e., *pratyakṣa*, *parokṣa* and *atyantaparokṣa*. See our remarks in connection with k. 48.

[506] See n. 510.

[507] PV-k(I/III), MIY. *svavāgvirodho*. PV Tib. *raṅ tshig 'gal na* supports PV-k(II) *svavāgvirodhe*; cf. also PVBh 527, 1–2: *evaṃ tarhi svavāgvirodhe 'bhyupagamyamāne svavākchāstravirodhayor abheda eva prāpto na śāstrabādhavailakṣaṇyam* |.

[508] PV-k(I/III), MIY. *puruṣecchā kṛtā*.

[509] Cf. PVin 296a4: *'di'i*[a] *tshad ma ñid skyes bu'i 'dod pas byas pa yaṅ yoṅs su rdzogs pa yin no* || ([a] D. *'di ni* [D. 198a5]).

[510] See PVBh 526, 30–527, 5: *abhyupagataṃ pūrvaṃ paścād anyathā na vaktavyam* | *karaṇe ko virodhaḥ* | *svavacanavirodha eva* | *evaṃ tarhi svavāgvirodhe 'bhyupagamyamāne svavākśāstravirodhayor abheda eva prāpto na śāstrabādhavailakṣaṇyam* |... *puruṣecchākṛtā cet pramāṇatā śāstrasya* | *vacanasyāpi svasya sā paripūrṇā* | *tato na viśeṣaḥ svavacanāc chāstrasya* | "[Objection:] What has been accepted earlier should not be stated to be otherwise later. [Reply:] If one did so, what contradiction would there be? [Objection continued:] There would in fact be a contradiction with one's own words. [Reply:] In that case, if one admitted it to be a contradiction with one's own words, it would follow that there would be no difference at all between contradictions with own words and contradictions with treatises; it would be no different from invalidation by means of treatises. ... If it is due to acceptance by the person that the treatise is a *pramāṇa*,

Dharmakīrti's adversary now maintains, in a riposte to k. 104, that when a proponent abandons a treatise which he had earlier accepted, and now asserts the contrary of any of its propositions, the contradiction is one of *svavacanavirodha*—the proponent contradicts his own words. Dharmakīrti can, however, without difficulty accept that a contradiction with a previously accepted treatise is a case of *svavacanavirodha*. After all, he himself had just argued extensively in k. 93ff. that there was no significant difference between contradictions with own words and with statements in treatises. The opponent's argument thus, in a backhanded way, reinforces Dharmakīrti's own fundamental positions.[511]

As for k. 105cd (*puruṣecchākṛtā cāsya paripūrṇā pramāṇatā*), Prajñākaragupta interprets it as just showing that there is similarity between own words and treatises in that people take both to be *pramāṇa* insofar as they believe in them and accept them. Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin, however, add an important ironic dimension, taking the terms *pramāṇatā* and *paripūrṇā* (fulfilled) in k. 105d as being used in a sarcastic or mocking way[512] to show that in fact acceptance of words does *not* lead to their being genuine *pramāṇa*: "A person's acceptance does not depend upon [real] entities, and thus [Dharmakīrti] had a sarcastic intention, thinking that [in fact] there was no *pramāṇatā* through such [acceptance]" (PVP [see n. 510]).

(106) *tasmāt prasiddheṣv artheṣu śāstratyāge 'pi na kṣatiḥ |*
parokṣeṣv[513] *āgamāniṣṭau na cintaiva pravartate ||*

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then this is fulfilled (*paripūrṇā*[a]) also in the case of one's own words! Therefore, a treatise is no different from own words" ([a] Cf. PVBh Tib. 209b4 *ma tshaṅ ba med pa*). Cf. PVP 346a7–346b1: *gźan yaṅ rgol bas khas blaṅs pa'i phyir | gaṅ gi tshe bstan bcos tshad ma ñid yin pa de'i tshe | skyes bu'i 'dod pas tshad ma ñid du byas pa yin par 'gyur te | skyes bu'i 'dod pas byas pa 'di'i | tshad ma ñid ni yoṅs su 'dzogs | skyes bu'i 'dod pa ñid ni dṅos po la rag las pa ma yin pa'i phyir | de'i dbaṅ gis*[a] *tshad ma ñid du yod pa ma yin no sñam du dgoṅs pa*[b] *gźad gad du mdzad pa'o ||* ([a] P. *gi*—[b] P. *dges pa* [D. 290a5–6]).

[511] See PVP 346a3–5: *gal te sṅar des bstan bcos khas len ciṅ phyis de mi 'dod par 'gyur ba sṅa ma des phyi ma la gnod pa'i phyir rgol ba 'di'i raṅ gi tshig daṅ 'gal ba yin no źe na | 'o na de lta yin na | kho bo cag gis sṅar ji skad bśad pa bźin | raṅ gi tshig bstan bcos 'gal tha dad med 'gyur ba | de ltar na gegs*[a] *byed pa ñid yin par 'gyur ro |* ([a] P | D. *gags* [D. 290a2–3]) "[Objection:] Earlier, he [i.e., the proponent] accepted the treatise, but later he does not accept it: the earlier invalidates the later. Thus, [the later] contradicts the words of the proponent himself. [Reply:] Then, in that case, as we have explained earlier, there should be no difference between contradictions with own words and contradictions with treatises. Thus they would only be *pratibandhaka*" (See also PVBh in n. 510; cf. PVin 295b7: *bstan bcos daṅ 'gal ba raṅ gi tshig daṅ 'gal ba las tha mi dad pa des na gegs byed pa yin gyi gnod par byed pa ni ma yin no ||* [D. 197b7–198a1]).

[512] PVV 449, 16: ... *ity upahasati*. PVP: ... *gźad gad du mdzad pa*—see n. 510.

[513] PV-k(I) *parokṣe 'py*; but cf. PV Tib. *lkog gyur dag la*.

> Therefore, in the case of states of affairs which are commonly recognized [by means of perception and inference], then even if the treatise is abandoned, there will be no fault. [However] in the case of inaccessible things (*parokṣa*),[514] if a scripture is not accepted [as being a *pramāṇa*], then no analysis will occur at all.

Manorathanandin offers the following explanation: "A treatise is a *bādhaka* only with regard to subjects (*dharmin*) and logical reasons (*liṅga*) established through it, but not also with regard to those established by a *pramāṇa*. ... Therefore, when the subject, the logical reason, what is being proved (*sādhya*), the necessary connection (*sambandha*) and so on and so forth are recognized by means of perception or inference, then even if the treatise is abandoned, there will be no fault. For example, when sound, producthood, impermanence, the necessary connection, etc., are established by means of *pramāṇa*s, then even if one abandons the treatise which teaches that [sound] is a quality of space (*ākāśaguṇa*), nothing unacceptable will ensue. However, if a scripture is not accepted as a *pramāṇa* in the case of inaccessible things such as morality (*dharma*) and immorality (*adharma*), then no analysis will occur at all. For there will be no investigation (*vicāra*) concerning an unestablished subject (*dharmin*)."[515]

Kārikā 106 thus gives the conclusion to the arguments in k. 104–105 and summarizes the author's position on the use of scripture. Note that the key idea in k. 106cd is the recurrent Dharmakīrtian theme that if the subject (*dharmin*), or locus (*āśraya*), is unestablished for someone, that person will not then investigate as to whether the *dharmin* really does or does not possess a certain property. The question will not arise for him.[516]

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[514]Devendrabuddhi glosses *parokṣa* here by the term *śin tu lkog gyur* (= *atyantaparokṣa*), and that is clearly the point at stake.

[515]PVV 449, 18–25: *yasmāc chāstraṃ tatsiddha eva dharmiṇi liṅge ca bādhakaṃ na tu pramāṇasiddhe 'pi* |... || *tasmāt pratyakṣānumānābhyāṃ prasiddheṣu dharmiliṅgasādhyasambandhādiṣu satsu śāstratyāge 'pi na kṣatiḥ* | *yathā śabdakṛtakatvānityatvasambandhādiṣu pramāṇasiddheṣu śāstrasyākāśaguṇatvapratipādakasya tyāge 'pi nāniṣṭam* | *parokṣeṣu dharmādharmādiṣu punar āgamasya pramāṇatvenāniṣṭau cintaiva na pravartate* | *na hy asiddhe dharmiṇi vicāraḥ* ||.

[516]Cf. k. 77; cf. also PVin 294b7–8: *chos can rnam par gźag*[a] *pa de la brten pa'i phyir de la gnod na gźi med pas khyad par*[b] *la dpyod pa mi 'jug pa'i phyir rnam pa de lta bu'i yul la ni gdon*[c] *mi za bar bstan bcos tshad mar 'gyur dgos so* ||([a] P. *bźag*—[b] P. *pa*—[c] P. *gnod* [D. 196b7–197a1]) "Since [an investigation] depends upon an established *dharmin*, then if the [treatise] is invalidated, there will no locus (*gźi* = *āśraya*), and thus no investigation will occur concerning the qualities [of the locus]. Therefore, in the case of this type of object, the treatise definitely has to be a *pramāṇa*."

PVV's introduction to k. 107: "[Objection:] But the treatise is not a *pramāṇa*. How then could there be any investigation concerning the subject or the reason and so forth, things which are established by means of that [treatise]. [Dharmakīrti] replies:"[517]

(107) *virodhodbhāvanaprāyā*[518] *parīkṣāpy atra tadyathā* |
adharmamūlaṃ rāgādi snānaṃ cādharmaśodhanam[519] ||

In the case of this [treatise], examination, moreover, consists chiefly in pointing out contradictions [between prior and subsequent propositions and is not concerned with facts (*vāstavī*)]. For example, [contradictions such as when it is said that] desire, etc. are the root of immorality and that bathing is what purifies immorality.[520]

The opponent provisionally concedes the Dharmakīrtian position that a treatise would not be a genuine *pramāṇa*, but would at most be accepted as a *pramāṇa* by proponents so that there could be deliberations concerning suprasensual entities. He then argues that, if that were so, there could be no such deliberations whatsoever, because suprasensual *dharmin* etc., which are known just by means of descriptions in treatises (and not by perception or *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*), would not actually be established as bases for a well-grounded understanding of reality; investigation as to whether the subject had such and such properties or not would thus be impossible, as any debate about unestablished *dharmin* is recognized as being futile. Dharmakīrti and his commentators, interestingly enough, grant that investigations of descriptions of *atyantaparokṣa* subjects do not proceed on the basis of our examining objective facts—*atyantaparokṣa* entities, although they may be facts in themselves, cannot be directly examined, at least not by individuals without extraordinary types of cognition. In the PVin Dharmakīrti explains that even though the treatise is not in fact a *pramāṇa*, investigation does still take place, simply because the proponent *accepts* the treatise to be a *pramāṇa*. In other words, the *belief* in the validity of the treatise is all that is necessary for deliberations to occur about the *dharmin*s discussed in it.[521] PV IV stresses that *de facto*

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[517] PVV 449, 26: *nanu śāstraṃ cen na pramāṇaṃ kathaṃ tatsiddhe dharmiṇi liṅgādau vā vicāra ity āha* |.

[518] PV-k(I) *virodhād bhāvanaprāyā*.

[519] PV-k(I/II) *cādharmanāśanam*; cf. PV Tib. *chos min dag 'gyur pa'o*.

[520] Additions follow PVV 450, 3–4: *atra śāstre parīkṣāpi yā kriyate sā pūrvāparābhyāṃ virodhodbhāvanaprāyā na vāstavī* |.

[521] PVin 295b5–6: *bstan bcos de tshad ma ma yin na*[a] *'o na ni ji ltar chos can rnam par 'jog par byed pa yin źe na* | *tshad mar khas blaṅs pa'i phyir ro* ||([a] P. *no* [D. 197b6–7]) "[Objection:]

a deliberation on suprasensual matters will chiefly or for the most part consist in looking for internal inconsistencies in scriptural descriptions.[522] Unfortunately, there are no more details as to what is meant by "chiefly" (°*prāya; phal cher*) here. The point may well be that although the threefold analysis does involve first testing the scripture's account of observable and inferrable states of affairs by *pramāṇa*s such as perception and inference, this examination of objective facts figures only indirectly—i.e., in the background as a presupposed preliminary—when we turn to the scripture's propositions on the suprasensual.

It is probably worthwhile to stress that, philosophically speaking, it seems extremely unlikely that Dharmakīrti is saying that there is no objective fact to the matter at all (for anyone, enlightened or otherwise), or, worse, that the internally coherent or pragmatically useful descriptions of suprasensual entities are actually fictional or designate nonentities. The thrust of the argumentation concerning the threefold analysis in PV and PVin is that although scriptural inference is fallible and is not even a full-fledged *pramāṇa*,[523] the *truth* of scriptural descriptions of the suprasensual does not reduce simply to their internal coherence, nor to their usefulness or to any other such nonrealist theory of truth. The more likely interpretation is that the threefold analysis, including the discussion of the usefulness of belief in scripture for the achievement of the goals of man (*puruṣārtha*) and that of the scripture's passing tests for inconsistency, combines certain pragmatic

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Suppose the treatise is not a *pramāṇa*. Then how could it establish the *dharmin*? [Reply:] It is because [the treatise] has been accepted to be a *pramāṇa*." Prajñākaragupta introduces k. 107 with the same argument.

[522]The example which Dharmakīrti gives of such an internal inconsistency is when a treatise states that immorality stems from the passions (*kleśa*), and then the same treatise advocates an antidote like bathing in Ganges, which has nothing to do with eliminating the passions. Cf. PVP 346b5–7: *gal te gaṅ gi tshe bstan bcos tshad ma ñid ma yin pa de'i tshe | des bstan pa'i chos can nam rtags gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ don dam par rtogs pa de'i rten ma yin pa de ltar na ji ltar de la des dpyod pa*[a] *yin źe na | bden te 'on kyaṅ bstan bcos 'di la'aṅ brtag pa'aṅ phal cher ni sṅa phyi 'gal ba brjod yin don dam pa ni ma yin te | 'di lta ste | 'dod chags la sogs chos min rtsa | khrus kyaṅ chos min gnod byed yin źes bya ba 'gal ba yin no* || ([a] P. om. *pa* [D. 290b2–3]) "[Objection:] Since the treatise is not a *pramāṇa*, then the *dharmin* or *liṅga* taught by that [treatise] is not a basis for real understanding (*don dam par rtogs pa*). In that case, how is there any investigation on this by means of that [treatise]. [Reply:] That is true. But in the case of this treatise, the investigation, moreover, consists chiefly in asserting [that there are] contradictions between prior and subsequent [propositions] and does not concern what is really so (*don dam pa*). For example, contradictions such as saying that desire and other [passions] are the root of immorality and that bathing also annuls immorality."

[523]See our forthcoming article "How much of a proof is scripturally based inference (*āgamāśritānumāna*)?"

and coherentist elements in a theory of justification as to why we might believe in a scripture, but is not concerned with elaborating a rival theory of truth that would replace (some version of) correspondence to reality.[524]

(108) *śāstraṃ yat siddhayā yuktyā svavācā ca na bādhyate* |
dṛṣṭe 'dṛṣṭe 'pi tad grāhyam iti cintā pravartate[525] ||[526]

That treatise which is not invalidated by proven reasoning or by its own words with regard to [respectively] empirical [objects] (*dṛṣṭa*) and to nonempirical [objects] (*adṛṣṭa*) [i.e., *atyantaparokṣa*] is to be accepted. And thus [for this second purpose] analysis [consisting chiefly in revealing contradictions between prior and subsequent propositions] occurs.[527]

Dharmakīrti now concludes this section by giving the conditions under which a treatise ought to be accepted: the treatise's statements on *pratyakṣa*, *parokṣa* and *atyantaparokṣa* matters should not be seen to be invalidated by any *pramāṇa*s whatsoever. In effect, Dharmakīrti restates the threefold criterion for evaluating scripture which he had given earlier in PV I, k. 215–217. As stated earlier in k. 107, one aspect of this threefold analysis is that the treatise's propositions on *atyantaparokṣa* should not be invalidated by any "inferences based upon scripture" (*āgamāśritānumāna*) which might show the treatise's account of

[524]For the difference between a truth theory (i.e., the necessary and sufficient conditions defining the truth of *P*) and a theory of justification (i.e., the properties which allow us to reasonably determine that *P* is true and satisfies the definition), see KIRKHAM 1995, 41 *et sq*. We can also speak of practical projects, such as elaborating criteria for justified belief, versus more metaphysical projects, such as specifying the nature or essence of truth. See ibid. 33–34: "... a philosopher who indicates he or she is looking for a *practical* criterion that could actually be used to determine whether or not a given proposition should be regarded as true is almost certainly pursuing the justification project."

[525]PV-(II) *pravartyate*.

[526]Cf. PVin 295a5–6: *de ñid kyi phyir luṅ gis mthoṅ ba'i don dag la ni 'gal ba brjod par phal cher sems pa yin te* | *bstan bcos gaṅ źig mthoṅ ba daṅ ma mthoṅ ba'i yul dag la dṅos po'i stobs kyis*[a] *źugs pa'i tshad ma daṅ* | *raṅ gi tshig gis mi gnod pa de gzuṅ bar bya ba yin no* || ([a] P. *kyi* [D. 197a5–7]). The passage is to be correlated with PV IV, k. 107 and 108.

[527]Cf. PVV 450, 15–18: *yac chāstraṃ dṛṣṭe pramāṇaviṣaye*[a] *yuktyā pratyakṣādyākhyayā na bādhyate* | *adṛṣṭe pramāṇaviṣaye ca svavācāgamāśrayenānumānena na bādhyate* | *tat pramāṇatvenādṛṣṭe viṣaye pravṛttikāmasya grāhyaṃ na tu yat kiṃcid ity anena prayojanena śāstre virodhodbhāvanaprāyā cintā pravartyate* | ([a] RS and DS read *pramāṇe viṣaye*). Devendrabuddhi glosses the term *adṛṣṭa* in k. 108 by *atyantaparokṣa* (*śin tu lkog tu gyur pa*) and states that the analysis (*cintā*) is one of showing contradictions between the prior and subsequent propositions in the treatise (*de la sṅga phyi 'gal ba'i dpyod 'jug 'gyur* | [PVP 347a7]).

atyantaparokṣa matters to be internally inconsistent.[528] *Kārikā* 108 marks the end of the section in PV IV concerning the explanation of the term *āpta* in Dignāga's definition of the thesis.[529]

3.3 The thesis is unopposed by what is commonly recognized (*prasiddha*)

In the section from k. 109 until k. 130 in PV IV, Dharmakīrti presents his commentary on the term *prasiddha* (what is commonly recognized) in the PS's definition of the thesis: a valid thesis is unopposed (*anirākṛta*) by what is commonly recognized. Dharmakīrti gives a highly philosophical interpretation of this idea—it is more than *just simply* a matter of theses having to obey proper accepted use of the Sanskrit language. Indeed, the essence of Dharmakīrti's interpretation is not that specific solecisms or misuses of words are to be eliminated by invoking a usage which is commonly recognized from verbal knowledge (*śābdaprasiddha*) of Sanskrit. Rather Dharmakīrti's point is that *any* thesis whatsoever that a word *w* does not (or cannot) designate a specific object *x* will be refuted by *śābdaprasiddha*, because there is always a conceivable usage according to which *w* is fit to designate *x*. In short, *prasiddha* is not primarily designed to refute wrong accounts of usage, but instead to refute a philosophical position that words are somehow limited to signifying certain objects and not others. The section is one of the most difficult parts of PV IV, with a dense and technical argumentation. Some introductory remarks are thus probably indispensable. In this vein, we have also translated a relevant passage from Jinendrabuddhi's PSṬ, which summarizes the Dharmakīrtian way of interpreting Dignāga's use of the terms *śābdaprasiddha* and *asādhāraṇatva*—see Appendix A. Finally, in Appendix B we have reproduced an earlier article, "Dharmakīrti on *prasiddha* and *yogyatā*," which can be consulted for more detail on the philosophical and historical issues involved.

Much of Dharmakīrti's treatment of *prasiddha* in Dignāga's definition will be developed in his interpretation of Dignāga's own elaboration of the idea in the PSV *ad* PS III, k. 2cd. In particular, Dharmakīrti comments at length upon the

[528]For the threefold analysis of scripture, see our remarks in connection with k. 48.

[529]Note, however, that in R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana's editions of PV, PVBh and PVV, k. 108 is incorrectly classified as belonging to the subsequent section concerning *pratītibādhā* (invalidation [of theses] by means of [conventional] acknowledgments) or *prasiddhibādhā*. MIY. follows RS on this. That the section on *pratītibādhā* in fact begins with k. 109 is readily seen from PVV's introduction to k. 109: *pratītibādhāṃ vyākhyātum āha* |.

following passage, found entirely in Dignāga's PSV and partly in his earlier work, the NM, a passage where Dignāga had elaborated on what he had meant by theses being opposed by *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *āpta* and *prasiddha*. The quotation in question from Dignāga is as follows:

> *tadyathā | aśrāvaṇaḥ śabdo nityo ghaṭa iti | na santi pramāṇāni prameyārthānīti pratijñāmātreṇa | yatrāpy asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve śābdaprasiddhena viruddhenārthenāpohyate yathā 'candraḥ śaśī sattvād iti (nāsau pakṣaḥ)*
>
> [Otherwise, it is a fallacious thesis (*pakṣābhāsa*)] as in the following examples: [1] 'sound is not audible'; [2] 'a vase is permanent'; [3] because of simply accepting it, [a proposition like] 'there are no means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) which have cognizable things (*prameya*) as their objects'; [4] and where, though there is no [valid] inference since [the latter] would be over-exclusive (*asādhāraṇatva*), [a proposition] is opposed by a contradicting proposition commonly recognized through verbal knowledge (*śābdaprasiddha*), as in [the reasoning] 'that which has a rabbit (*śaśin*) is not the moon (*acandra*) because it exists.'[530]

The first thesis (viz., 'sound is not audible') is refuted by perception (*pratyakṣa*), the second (viz., 'a vase is permanent') by inference (*anumāna*), or more specifically, by "inference which functions due to the force of real entities" (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*). In the case of the third thesis, Dignāga not only presents the proposition itself, but also gives the specific reason as to why it is invalidated. It is self-refuting to accept that there are no *pramāṇa*s, for by merely ac-

[530]Skt. of *yatrāpy ... nāsau pakṣaḥ* in TSP *ad* TS 1395. The Skt. of *tadyathā ...apodyate* is found in PVBh *ad* k. 130 (PVBh 545, 8–10): *tadyathā | aśrāvaṇaḥ śabdo nityo ghaṭa iti | na santi pramāṇāni prameyārthāniti pratijñāmātreṇa | yatrāpy asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve śābdaprasiddhena viruddhenā[rthenā]podyate na sa pakṣa iti* |. See also KITAGAWA 1973, n. 169. We should, however, read *śābdaprasiddha* instead of Kitagawa's *śabdaprasiddha*; furthermore, Kitagawa, in his translation, seems to have chosen PSVa's reading of *sbyor ba* (use) instead of PSVb's *sel bar byed pa* (oppose), the latter being the equivalent of *apohyate*. The passage *yātrāpy* ... also occurs in NM, T. XXXII 1628 1a19–20; see KATSURA 1977, §1.3; INAMI 1988, 383. In both the Chinese of NM and the Tibetan of PSVa 43b1–2 and PSVb 125a4–5 (see KITAGAWA *op. cit.* 472), there is no equivalent of the words *nāsau pakṣaḥ* (this is not a [valid] thesis) found in TSP's quotation. PVin 296b5–6 also cites this passage and does include *nāsau pakṣaḥ*: *gaṅ la thun moṅ ma yin pa'i phyir ... de yaṅ phyogs ma yin no źes so.* Note that in PV IV, k. 130 and PVBh we see that *śābdaprasiddhena* is taken as showing the cause (*hetu*; *rgyu*) for invalidating the thesis *acandraḥ śaśī*, just as "mere acceptance" (*pratijñāmātreṇa*) of a thesis like *na santi pramāṇāni prameyārthāni* is the cause for invalidating that very thesis; see below n. 635.

cepting that proposition as true, it is understood that one recognizes that there is at least *one pramāṇa*, viz., the one which validates the proposition itself. The fourth type of invalidation—where propositions like *acandraḥ śaśī* are refuted because of what is commonly recognized through verbal knowledge (*śābdaprasiddha*)—is the subject of PV IV, k. 109–130. The key passage in Dignāga which inspires this section is thus *yatrāpy ... sattvād iti*. Let us now take up in some detail the major terms figuring in Dharmakīrti's lengthy interpretation of this passage from PSV.

yogyatā. In the PSV passage quoted above, Dignāga had given the following example of a bogus thesis which would be refuted by *śābdaprasiddha*: "That which has a rabbit (*śaśin*) is not the moon (*acandra*), because it exists (*sattva*)." While the word "*śaśin*" was, of course, commonly recognized in India to mean the moon (*candra*), Dignāga held that there was no inference functioning objectively, or due to the force of real entities (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*), which would be able to prove either *candraḥ śaśī* (that which has a rabbit is the moon) or the contrary, *acandraḥ śaśī*, for logical faults like over-exclusiveness (*asādhāraṇatva*) would ensue. The result is that, for Dignāga, the thesis *acandraḥ śaśī* was to be refuted simply because of commonly recognized speech-conventions. This seems to be the usual interpretation of Dignāga accepted by many modern scholars and indeed even by some lesser known Indian commentators: Dignāga wished to refute the bogus thesis *acandraḥ śaśī* by appealing to the *linguistic convention* which all users of Sanskrit recognize, viz., *śaśin* = *candra*.[531]

While it seems very possible that this was indeed what Dignāga was driving at (see our Appendix B), Dharmakīrti's interpretation of Dignāga is much more complex. First of all, he significantly reinterprets the bogus thesis in question: in effect, the thesis is not just "*śaśin* is not *candra*," but rather "*śaśin* is not the designatum of the word *candra*" (*candraśabdavācya*), or equivalently, "*śaśin* is not fit (*yogya*) to be (i.e., cannot be) designated by the word *candra*."[532] Dharmakīrti thus transforms Dignāga's proviso concerning opposition by *prasiddha* into an argument against the *philosophical view* which maintained that the proper referent of a word was predetermined by the word's objective or inherent (*svabhāvatas*) "fitness" (*yogyatā*) to designate certain things and not others. For the sake of convenience, we shall speak of this general view on *yogyatā* as being a kind of "semantic realism": broadly speaking, the holders of this view are defenders of the *Veda*s, such as the Mīmāṃsakas and also possibly Bhartṛhari, who held that the relation between word and object (*śabdārthasambandha*) was eternal and

[531]Cf. KITAGAWA 1973, 63–67; KATSURA 1977, 113ff.

[532]See INAMI 1988, 131 and our n. 447 and p. 128 above. See also NBṬ *ad* NB III, 51 in n. 708.

governed by a "fitness which had no beginning in time" (*anādir yogyatā*). Although the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila Bhaṭṭa does not himself seem to use the word *yogyatā* in the *Ślokavārttika*, using instead *śakti* (power; capacity), Dharmakīrti in PVSV *ad* k. 283 clearly considered the ideas to be equivalent, although apparently recognizing that he was attributing a somewhat foreign terminology to his adversaries.[533] Indeed, the argumentation in PV IV has to be seen as a continuation of the anti-Mīmāṃsaka polemic in PV I, k. 224f. and k. 314f. A recurrent preoccupation of the Mīmāṃsaka semantic realist in PVSV is to eliminate the specter of polysemy in Vedic language, for if Vedic words, which are supposedly true because of not having human authorship (*apauruṣeya*), could nonetheless admit of several meanings, the guarantee that words would not deceive (*vipralambha*), because of an eternal correlation between word and object, would be lost: a Vedic sentence could just as easily express something false.

Dharmakīrti, in order to counter this "semantic realism" (and hence the realist's explanation of the authority of the *Veda*s), maintains that words do not have any restriction or necessity (*niyama*) stemming from their own natures (*svabhāvatas*) which will limit what they can, or are fit (*yogya*) to denote; they thus have an unlimited and unrestricted *yogyatā*, a property which in turn stems from the fact that all words designate only conceptual objects (*kalpanāviṣaya*), i.e., universals (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). In short, Dharmakīrti's attack on this realism is essentially to invoke his "panfictional" theory of language (the term is due to the late B.K. Matilal): words do not refer to external, real entities, but rather to conceptually created fictions, and there is nothing intrinsic to a word or to its fictional object which determines that the word should be applied in one way and not another. The result is that for Dharmakīrti *any word is fit for any object.*

Now, to return to the bogus thesis *acandraḥ śaśī*, Dharmakīrti is, in effect, interpreting this as a semantic realist's attempt to eliminate the possibility of polysemy. In other words, the realist, as viewed by Dharmakīrti, is arguing that actually there is no real, objective connection between the word *candra* and *śaśin* so

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[533] PVSV (ed. Gnoli) 150, 5–6: *yā ca śabdaśaktir yogyatākhyā arthapratipattyāśrayo jaiminīyair varṇyate...* | Cf. STEINKELLNER 1979, 68, n. 211: "...Dharmakīrti verwendet den Terminus 'Geeignetheit' an Stelle des von Kumārila verwendeten 'Kraft' (*śakti*)... Sonst bevorzugt aber Dharmakīrti eher das Wort *śakti* und schreibt den Terminus *yogyatā* ausdrücklich den Mīmāṃsakas zu (...)." See our Appendix B, p. 221 below for the quotation from PVSV; on "realism" see also RUEGG 1959, 11: "Le point de vue est réaliste et peut être rapproché de la doctrine de la Mīmāṃsā sur la connexion permanente et incréée entre les mots du *Veda* et leurs objets." On *yogyatā* and similar notions in Buddhism, see also ELTSCHINGER 1995. On *yogyatā* in Bhartṛhari, see HOUBEN 1995, 233 *et seq.*

that the former is fit to designate the latter. (Presumably, the word "*candra*" would only be fit to designate the actual moon, i.e., *candra* but not *śaśin*.) Dharmakīrti then replies that precisely because there are no restrictions on *yogyatā*, a Buddhist can then refute this thesis by saying that the word *candra* is fit to designate *anything* we might wish. The thesis is false, not simply because *śaśin* is generally used to mean *candra* in Sanskrit, but rather because *śaśin*, and for that matter, *everything else*, is fit to be the designatum of the word *candra*. It is clear that this Dharmakīrtian position on *yogyatā* links up with, presupposes and even reinforces key themes in the Buddhist *apoha* theory of language, and notably in the view on the essential nature of conceptual thought (*kalpanā*), for the latter is repeatedly defined as being a cognition in which there is a representation or image which is *fit* to be associated with any verbal designation (*abhilāpasaṃsargayogya*).[534]

Initially one might be tempted to think that all Dharmakīrti and his commentators mean is that we *can*, if we so wish, use words to designate any object we might intend—the word *candra* is not now connected with vases and such, but *could* have such a connection later, if we wished. This is, however, something of a seductive trivialization. As Dharmakīrti develops his argument, a surprisingly different picture emerges, especially in k. 113f.. Dharmakīrti's idea that every word is fit for every object actually means that every word *is*, objectively speaking (*vastutas*), connected to every object—we may not acknowledge such a connection, but it is so.[535]

To be more precise, there would seem to be two possible positions on what word-object connections and unrestricted *yogyatā* might possibly mean for Dharmakīrti and his commentators, one weak (and rather uncontroversial) and the other considerably stronger. We could formulate the alternatives as follows:

(a) When there is presently no conventional linguistic usage of a word *w* for an entity *x*, *w* does not designate *x* and is not actually connected with *x*, but is only potentially capable of designating *x* given the requisite intentions on the part of the speaker.

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[534]See Appendix B, n. 224.

[535]The idea of objective connection, irrespective of whether it is acknowledged or not, is nicely brought by Dharmottara, in PVinṬ 61b4–5: *don 'ga' źig la sgra 'ga' źig kho na 'brel bar mthoṅ ba ma yin nam de ci ltar thams cad 'brel ba yin źes brjod ce na | dṅos su na źes smros te | 'jig rten na ma byas kyaṅ tshogs pa tshaṅ bas thogs pa med pa la | (...)* "[Objection:] Is it not observed that it is only some words which are connected to some objects? How then can you say that all are connected [to all]? [Reply:] He [i.e., Dharmakīrti] said 'objectively' (*dṅos su na* = *vastutas*). Even when [the connection] is not made in the world, there is nothing obstructing it because the complex [of causal conditions] is complete ...."

(b) When there is presently no conventional usage of *w* for *x*, *w* is still said to designate and be connected with *x*, in the same way as an unexercised ability or disposition to perform an action allows us to say that a person (or a thing) *is* a performer of that action.

Taking into account the commentarial explanations on k. 113, Dharmakīrti's idea is more along the lines of the strong position outlined in (b). In other words, to say that a word *w* is *fit* to designate an entity *x*, implies that *w* *is* itself a designator of *x*. The point turns on what can be called a "principle of latent action": if something (or someone) can, given the right conditions, perform an action, then it (or he/she) is a performer of that action. Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin *et al.*, in commenting on k. 113, make a parallel with other dormant or presently unexercised dispositions and abilities, such as being a cook. Śākyabuddhi explains: "When [Devendrabuddhi] said, 'Just as in the case of a cook' (*pācaka*), this meant that even though [his] cooking might not be manifest he will be said to be a cook in virtue of fitness / capability (*ruṅ ba ñid kyi stobs kyis* = *yogyatābalāt*)."[536] The *ka*-suffix in *pācaka*, *vācaka*, etc., seems to be taken as temporally neutral (*sarvakāla*), so that one's being a cook (*pācakatva*) does not at all imply that one actually performs the action now, but merely that one is capable of performing it. Equally, a word *w* *is* a designator (i.e., "signifier" *vācaka*) of *x* just because it is capable of (*samartha*) or fit to (*yogya*) designate *x*.

śābdaprasiddha. The Dignāgean term *śābdaprasiddha*—which probably refers to little more in the PSV than the verbal usages which every competent speaker of a language knows—has to bear all of this very considerable Dharmakīrtian load. Not surprisingly, many *kārikā*s in this section of PV IV are devoted to explaining just how this term can be charged with so many philosophical ideas. In k. 110 Dharmakīrti explains that *prasiddha* is used metaphorically: it does not mean the linguistic usages (*vyavahāra*) themselves, but rather the conceptually created property, arising from such usages (*tadvyavahāraja*), that a specific word is fit to designate a specific thing. In k. 113 and 116 Dharmakīrti then speaks of *śābdaprasiddha* from the "objective point of view" (*vastutas*), invoking what we have termed the "principle of latent action" to abolish any restrictions upon acknowledgments of fitness. Thus, although a specific fitness is not acknowledged now (e.g., we do not now recognize that the word "vase" correctly designates the moon), it would or could be at some other time, if there were such linguistic inten-

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[536]PVṬ 328b6–7: *dper na 'tshed par byed pa źes bya ba ni tshes pa mṅon sum du gyur pa ma yin na yaṅ ruṅ ba ñid kyi stobs kyis*[a] *'tshed par byed pa źes brjod do* || ([a] P. *kyi*). Jinendrabuddhi also discusses this example; see p. 215.

tions. In this fashion, then, *śābdaprasiddha* comes to encompass also the *limitless* possibilities (i.e., fitness) of using a word. The intriguing result is that to say that some proposition like *acandraḥ śaśī* is in contradiction with *śābdaprasiddha* does not just mean that it is contradiction with established usage and word-object connections recognized now, but that it is in contradiction with connections which exist, because they *could* be intended or recognized at some other time.

It must be noted that the translation of *prasiddha* and *śābdaprasiddha* in the usual ways ("what *is* commonly recognized"; "what *is* commonly recognized through verbal knowledge") could pose problems when we are trying to capture Dharmakīrti's highly philosophical interpretation of these terms. Translating *prasiddha* by "what is commonly recognized" may well capture Dignāga's own use of the term, as for him opposition by *prasiddha* was probably only a matter of eliminating solecisms, i.e., theses which violate *presently* obvious and recognized verbal usage. However, "what is commonly recognized" is less adequate for the Dharmakīrtian interpretation of PSV, because as we see in k. 113f., *prasiddha* is taken to be not just what presently is, but also what *could* be commonly recognized usage, i.e., what is conceivably recognized, or equivalently, what is recognized (in a suitably atemporal interpretation of "is"). Thus a refutation by *śābdaprasiddha* is refutation by any conceivable usage which would be, that is to say, *which is*, recognized through verbal knowledge—the difference between "is" and "would be" ends up in effect annulled by the principle of latent action.[537]

anumānābhāva. In the above-quoted passage from Dignāga's PSV, we are told that inferences like *acandraḥ śaśī sattvāt* are bound to fail because they will incur a certain logical fallacy, *asādhāraṇatva*: *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve* "though there is no [valid] inference since [the latter] would be over-exclusive

[537]The compound *śābdaprasiddha* can be taken as an instrumental or an ablative *tatpuruṣa*; both versions are supported by passages in PV IV. Following Jinendrabuddhi's PSṬ (see Appendix A), when we take the compound as an instrumental *tatpuruṣa*, *śābda* (verbal knowledge) is to mean the inference known as "a [conventional] acknowledgment (*pratītyākhyānumāna*) [of fitness to designate]"; by means of this inferential understanding it is ascertained (i.e., *niścita* = *prasiddha*) that in fact any word designates any object. A thesis like *acandraḥ śaśī* being opposed by *śābdaprasiddha* thus means that this proposition is refuted by an inferentially ascertained unrestricted fitness. If the compound is an ablative *tatpuruṣa*, then *śābda* consists in the conventions arising from repeated usage of certain words to designate certain objects (e.g., "moon" for moon/s); from *śābda* arises a conceptually created property (*dharma*) of being the designatum of a particular intended word (*iṣṭaśabdābhidheyatva*); this is "thoroughly established" (*prasiddha*), according to Jinendrabuddhi, in that it applies universally—all things are in fact the designatum of that word. In what follows, we shall take *śābdaprasiddha* as an instrumental *tatpuruṣa* "what is commonly recognized through verbal knowledge."

(*asādhāraṇatva*)." The essential move in the PSV passage is to say that no matter how our opponent, or we ourselves, attempt to prove or refute inferentially a particular linguistic convention of the world (such as *śaśin* being or not being *candra*), the fault of *asādhāraṇatva* is bound to occur. *And it is for that reason that only śābdaprasiddha can be relied upon in such an argument.* It should be noted, however, that "inference" here means *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*, where one would cite some or another facts in order to prove or refute a particular linguistic convention. This type of inference would be impossible because of *asādhāraṇatva*, but not *every* inference whatsoever would be impossible, for we do know that in k. 117 and 126 (as well as earlier in k. 92; see n. 447) Dharmakīrti explicitly accepts that proving that a word *w* is fit for an object *x*, is itself a special case of inference, an inference which, following k. 118–119 and k. 126–130, is in a separate category from the *vastubala*-variety. Thus *śābdaprasiddha* is taken by Dharmakīrti and his commentators as itself involving a special sort of inference, the sort that is termed *pratītyākhyānumāna* (*grags pa źes bya ba'i rjes dpag* (an inference known as a [conventional] acknowledgment [of fitness]).[538] The difference here is important: while it is supposedly impossible to prove or refute a particular convention by *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*, it certainly is possible, according to Dharmakīrti, to use a *pratītyākhyānumāna* to infer universal and unrestricted *yogyatā* of words.

asādhāraṇatva. The term *asādhāraṇatva* (over-exclusiveness) refers to the fallacy which occurs when a logical reason is neither ascertained to be present in its similar instances (*sapakṣa*), nor ascertained to be present in its dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*). In the usual type of example of this fallacy, i.e., when proving that sound is impermanent because it is audible, the reason, audibility (*śrāvaṇatva*) is not ascertained as present in the similar instances because it is an exclusive property of the subject, sound. Hence the reason is over-exclusive, in particular, it is said to be "uncertain because of being overly exclusive" (*asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu*). As we see in the present argumentation in PV IV, however, *asādhāraṇatva* is not just a matter of whether something is or is not present in *sapakṣa* / *vipakṣa*, but whether a particular debater can have certainty (*niścaya*) of this presence. The general importance of *niścaya* in the context of the *asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu* is, as we have argued elsewhere, a recurrent feature in Dharmakīrti's interpretation of this fallacy and one which distinguishes the

[538] Indigenous Tibetan writers use a shortened term: *grags pa'i rjes dpag*, an inference consisting in an acknowledgment). See n. 447.

Dharmakīrtian interpretation from that of Dignāga.[539] Jinendrabuddhi, in his PSṬ, (see Appendix A) explains the phrase *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve* from PSV in two ways, both of which are to be found in Dharmakīrti's PV IV:

(a) If the realist opponent seeks to prove inferentially that something like *śaśin* is not fit to be designated by the word "moon" (*acandra*), there will be no similar instances (*sapakṣa*), i.e., things which are not, or are not fit to be, designated by the word "moon." Everything can be so designated. Although, in fact, the reason would be present in only the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa* = the things which are fit to be termed "moon"), the realist does not acknowledge this fact, because he is unable to acknowledge that *vipakṣa* such as vases and so forth can be designated by the word "moon." Thus although the reason would actually be a *viruddhahetu* (contradictory reason) if we were arguing with an opponent who was a fellow Buddhist, it is considered to be *asādhāraṇa* because of the inability of the realist opponent to ascertain presence in the *vipakṣa*. In short the reason is *neither ascertained to be present in the sapakṣa nor in the vipakṣa* because (i) it is not in fact present in the *sapakṣa* and (ii) the realist opponent cannot (given his own views) admit and hence ascertain presence in the *vipakṣa*.

(b) A Buddhist cannot inferentially prove that *śaśin* is indeed the moon if he is arguing with a semantic realist. The point is that for a semantic realist who does not even accept so obvious a fact of generally accepted linguistic usage as *śaśin* = *candra*, then *for him* there could be no conventional acknowledgments (*pratīti*) of fitness at all, where "fitness" is to be taken in the Buddhist sense of something governed by simple intentions and linguistic conventions. Hence nothing could ever be fit to be designated by the word "moon." Again the result would be *asādhāraṇatva*, because the opponent would not ascertain presence in the *sapakṣa* and there would in fact be no presence in the *vipakṣa*.

The first interpretation of *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve* is to be found in Dharmakīrti's k. 114–117; the second is to be found in k. 118–120, beginning with k. 118's words *atha vā* (alternatively).

[539]On the *asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu*, see KAJIYAMA 1958; see TILLEMANS 1990b for Dharmakīrti and later logicians' interpretations of this fallacy and the related notions of *sapakṣa* / *vipakṣa*; cf. also OETKE 1994b, 33 *et passim*.

3.3.1 The unrestricted fitness of words (*yogyatā*) to designate whatever speakers intend them to designate

(109) *artheṣv apratiṣiddhatvāt puruṣecchānurodhinaḥ* |
iṣṭaśabdābhidheyatvasyāpto 'trākṣatavāg[540] *janaḥ* ||[541]

The fact of being the intended designatum (*abhidheya*) of a word, which [fact] is in keeping with people's wishes, is unrestricted with regard to objects. Therefore, the person [i.e., the user of language], whose speech is unopposed, is an authority here [i.e., with regard to the intended designatum of the word].[542]

(110) *uktaḥ prasiddhaśabdena*[543] *dharmas tadvyavahārajaḥ*[544] |
pratyakṣādimitā mānaśrutyāropeṇa sūcitāḥ[545] ||[546]

The [conceptual] property (*dharma*) [known as 'fitness' (*yogyatā*)], which arises from that [linguistic] usage (*vyavahāra*), was what was meant [by Dignāga] by the word *prasiddha*.[547] [Else-

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[540]PV-k(I/II) *vākṣata°*; PV-k(III) and MIY. *'trākṣata°* is in accordance with PVP; see n. 542. P.D. and N. of PV Tib. all read: *bkag med phyir na gnod med ṅag*[a] || *skye bo rnams 'dod yid ches yin* || ([a] MIY *dag*). It seems likely that *'dod* is an error for *'dir* = *atra*.

[541]Cf. PVin 296b2–3: *grags pa yaṅ 'gal ba'i don gyis dam bca' ba*[a] *la gnod par byed pa yin te* | *skyes bu'i 'dod pa*[b] *tsam daṅ rjes su 'brel bas 'dod pa'i sgras brjod par bya ba ñid ni don rnams la dgag par mi nus pa'i phyir ro* || ([a] P. om. *ba*—[b] D. *'dod pa 'dod pa* [D. 198b4–5]).

[542]See PVV 491, 7–8: *tataś cātreṣṭaśabdābhidheyatve viṣaye āpto vyavahartā jano 'kṣatavāg apratiṣiddheṣṭavacanaḥ* |. Devendrabuddhi, however, glosses *atra* (= *'di*) as *śābdaprasiddhārtha* (= *sgra las byuṅ ba'i grags pa'i don*), so that *atra* would be interpreted as "with respect to what is *śābdaprasiddha*"; see PVP 347b3–4:*bkag pa med ñid phyir 'di* | *sgra las byuṅ ba'i grags pa'i don la* | *gnod med tshig ste* | *raṅ gi 'dod pa ston par byed pa'i yul can gyi tshig ma bkag pa can gyi skye bo yid ches pa yin no źes bya ba'i don to* | (D. 291a4–5).

[543]PV-k(III) *prasiddhi°*; Dignāga in PSV *ad* k. 2cd has *prasiddha*.

[544]MIY. *tad vyavahārajaḥ*. Devendrabuddhi (PVP 347b4–5) clearly takes *tad* as compounded with *vyavahāra*: *slob dpon gyis tha sñad de las skyes pa'i chos rab tu grags pa yis bstan* | (D. 291a5–6); note that PV Tib. anomalously takes *tad* as qualifying *dharma*: *tha sñad las ni skyes pa yi* || *chos de grags pa'i sgra yis brjod* ||.

[545]MIY. *pratyakṣādim iti mānaśrutyāropeṇa sūcitaḥ*. PV-k(I/II/III) *pratyakṣādimitā mānaśrutyāropeṇa sūcitāḥ*; cf. PV Tib: *mṅon sum sogs kyi gźal bya yaṅ* || *'jal byed sgra sgro btags nas brjod* ||.

[546]Cf. PVin 296b3: *tha sñad las skyes pa'i chos de ni grags pa'i sgras brjod do* || (D. 198b5).

[547]See PVV 451, 13–14: *candraś candra ityādiśabdavyavahārajāto dharmaḥ kalpanāviṣayo yogyatākhya ācāryeṇa prasiddhaśabdena tadyathā śābdaprasiddhenetyādinoktaḥ* | "The *dharma*, which arises from [linguistic] usage such as that the moon is termed 'moon,' and which is a conceptual object (*kalpanāviṣaya*) [and] which is known as *yogyatā*, was what was meant by

> where in the thesis-definition,] the [objects] cognized (*mita*) by perception and so forth were indicated by superimposing [upon them] the names of the means of cognition (*māna*).

Kārikā 109 gives the Buddhist logician's fundamental position: words are used according to the speaker's wishes and designate anything whatsoever which he might intend. The speaker is thus an authority as to what he is referring to in that he can ascertain his own intention by a means of a valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), viz., reflexive awareness (*svasaṃvedana*).

Kārikā 110 explains the Dharmakīrtian interpretation of Dignāga's use of the term *śābdaprasiddha* in the passage from the PSV cited above: the term *prasiddha* / *prasiddhi* is not used in its usual or literal way to mean the commonly recognized *uses* of words, or the *vyavahāra* itself, but rather the idea of a usage's appropriateness, or fitness, which such *vyavahāra* engenders. In k. 110cd Dharmakīrti argues that this is not the only nonliteral use of a technical term in the thesis-definition in PS III, k. 2. The term *pratyakṣa* is also used nonliterally in that context. The word *pratyakṣa* means "direct perception," nonetheless, it can also metaphorically designate the *objects* of direct perception, in other words, perceptible objects—this is the case in PS III, k. 2cd where Dignāga speaks of a thesis not being opposed by "perceptible objects" (*pratyakṣārtha*).

(111) *tadāśrayabhuvām icchāvartitvād*[548] *aniṣedhinām*[549] |
kṛtānām akṛtānāṃ vā[550] *yogyaṃ viśvaṃ svabhāvataḥ* ||[551]

> Because [conventionally governed words], which occur in dependence upon the [world], apply according to [people's] intentions, then everything is by its nature (*svabhāva*) fit (*yogya*) [to be the designatum] of non-restrictive [words], whether [the latter] have been fixed or not.[552]

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the Master by the word *prasiddha* in the following [phrase in PSV]: *śābdaprasiddhena* [*viruddhenārthenāpohyate*] etc., etc."

[548]PV-k(II) *icchānurodhād.*

[549]PV-k(I) *aniṣedhitām.*

[550]PV-k(II/III) *ca.*

[551]Cf. PVin 296b3–4: *'dod pa tsam gyis 'jug pa'i phyir thams cad ṅo bo ñid kyis byas daṅ ma byas pa'i sgrar ruṅ ba yin la* | (D. 198b5).

[552]See PVV 451, 22–24: *tasya lokasyāśrayeṇa bhuvāṃ bhavatāṃ śabdānāṃ vyāvahārikāṇām icchānurodhinām artheṣu vācakatvapravṛtteḥ kāraṇāt kvacid api viṣaye 'niṣedhināṃ niṣedharahitānāṃ kṛtānāṃ saṃketitānām asaṃketitānāṃ ca viśvam idaṃ vācyatvena svabhāvād eva yogyam* ||.

Manorathanandin and Dharmottara gloss the phrase *kṛtānām akṛtānāṃ vā* (whether they have been fixed or not) in k. 111 as meaning that whether the word is one whose designation has already been *agreed upon* (*saṃketita*) or not, any conceptual object is fit to be the word's designatum. Note that the term *svabhāvataḥ* (by its nature) means in keeping with the objects' natures as the latter appear to, or are constructed by, conceptual cognition, and not the *svabhāva* which are grasped by sense-perception.[553] In short, it is the conceptually created fiction, i.e., a universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) and not a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*), which k. 111 asserts to be fit to be the designatum for any and all words.

(112) *arthamātrānurodhinyā bhāvinyā bhūtayāpi vā |*
bādhyate[554] *pratirundhānaḥ śabdayogyatayā tayā ||*[555]

He who is in opposition [to unrestricted fitness and who argues that *śaśin* is not the moon because it exists][556] is refuted by means of this fitness of words (*śabdayogyatā*), be it past or future, [a fitness] which is in keeping with the mere [conceptual] object.[557]

When k. 112 speaks of past or future fitness of words to designate their objects, the point here is that when one wishes to designate the moon by the word "moon" this use of the word "moon" has already been agreed upon in the past; in the future it is, however, possible that someone will intend the word "moon" to refer to vases: in neither case, however, is there anything more than speakers' intentions to use words in certain ways; there is no fact pertaining to objects or to words which would dictate that a certain use of a word is correct and fit while another one is not.[558] The argumentation has to be seen in the light of the discussion in PV I's

[553] See PVinṬ 60b4: *ṅo bo ñid kyis źes bya ba ni rnam par rtog pa'i śes pa la snaṅ ba'i ṅo bos yin gyi dbaṅ pos gzuṅ ba ma yin no |* "By means of their natures' means 'by means of the natures which appear to conceptual cognition', but it does not [mean] those grasped by the senses."

[554] PV-k(I), MIY. *vādhyate*.

[555] Cf. PVin 296b4: *byuṅ ba'am 'byuṅ bar 'gyur ba'i sgra'i ruṅ ba ñid don tsam daṅ rjes su 'brel ba des ni de 'gog pa la gnod pa yin no ||* (D. 198b5–6).

[556] See PVV 452, 4–5: ... *tām eva yogyatāṃ pratirundhānaḥ | yathācandraḥ śaśī sattvād iti.*

[557] Cf. PVinṬ 60b8–61a1, which glosses *arthamātrānurodhinī* as "complying with the mere object which exists for conceptual cognition [rather than with an external object]" (*rnam par rtog pa la gnas pa'i don tsam daṅ rjes su 'brel ba yin no*).

[558] See PVinṬ 60b6–7: *byuṅ ba sgra la brdar byas pa dper na zla ba'i sgra la zla ba lta bu daṅ | 'byuṅ bar 'gyur ba sgra la brdar ma byas pa dper na zla ba'i sgra la bum pa la sogs pa lta bu'o ||* " 'Past' means the word has been agreed upon, as e.g., the moon [being the designatum] for the word 'moon.' 'Future' means the word has not been agreed upon, as e.g., vases and like for the word 'moon'."

anti-Mīmāṃsaka polemic (see our Appendix B), and indeed, Prajñākaragupta, in commenting upon PV IV, k. 112, refers to *Svārthānumānapariccheda*, k. 318 (PV I, k. 318 = PVin II, k. 37), arguing that the words "One who desires heaven should offer the *agnihotra* sacrifice" are equally fit to mean "One should eat dogmeat."[559]

3.3.2 Fitness taken objectively (*vastutas*)

(113) *tadyogyatābalād eva vastuto ghaṭito*[560] *dhvaniḥ* |
sarvo 'syām apratīte 'pi tasmiṃs tatsiddhatā tataḥ ||[561]

Precisely in virtue of their fitness (*yogyatā*), then objectively (*vastutas*) every word is connected in this [fitness], even if this [connection] is not acknowledged.[562] Thus it is established.[563]

Manorathanandin, closely following Devendrabuddhi's PVP, comments on k. 113 in the following fashion: "Precisely in virtue of their fitness, then, objectively, due to their capacity, all words, whether agreed upon or not, are connected in this fitness, for even if this word is not directly acknowledged as being the designator (*vācakatva*), the fitness which has the character of non-opposition, is present universally in reality. Thus, the Master [Dignāga] had said that this fitness was commonly recognized through verbal knowledge (*śābdaprasiddhatā*). Whatever has a capability for some [action], even when it is not present [before us], will still be designated in terms of that [action], just as when someone is said to be a cook (*pācaka*). Now, an entity is capable of being the intended designatum of a [given] word. It was with this in mind that [Dignāga] used the term *śābdaprasiddha*."[564]

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[559]See Appendix B, n. 698.

[560]PV-k(III) *ghaṭato*.

[561]Cf. PVin 296b4–5: *de ruṅ ba'i stobs ñid kyis dṅos su na sgra thams cad de la 'brel ba yin pa'i phyir de la grags pa med kyaṅ de grub par bśad de* | (D. 198b6).

[562]Devendrabuddhi (see n. 564) glosses *apratīte 'pi tasmiṃs* by *'brel pa grags pa med na'aṅ* "even if the connection is not acknowledged"; Manorathanandin, however, takes it as *tasmin śabde 'pratīte 'pi* "even if this word is not acknowledged." Finally, note that PV Tib. interprets the word *tasmiṃs* differently from both PVV and PVP, reading *des na de la de ni grub pa yin.* Following this interpretation, we have to translate k. 113cd along the lines of: "Thus [Dignāga had asserted that] this [fitness] was established *in this case*."

[563]There are different commentarial interpretations of k. 113d: *tatsiddhatā tataḥ*. PVinṬ 61b7–8 glosses: *slob dpon phyogs kyi glaṅ po de kho na ñid du na de grub par bśad de* | "Thus Ācārya Dignāga had asserted that this [fitness] was established in truth (*de kho na ñid du* = *tattvataḥ*)". PVP glosses: "Therefore, even in the case of words which are not present to us, [Dignāga] spoke [in PSV] of *śābdaprasiddha*"; see n. 564—PVV is similar.

[564]PVV 452, 8–13: *yogyatābalād eva vastutaḥ sāmarthyāt sarvaḥ saṃketito 'saṃketitaś ca*

The key notion in k. 113 is that of a word-object connection existing objectively (*vastutas*), irrespective of whether we acknowledge it or not. In other words, to say that any word *w* is able or fit to designate an entity *x*, entails that *w is* itself a designator (*vācaka*) of *x*, just as an unexercised ability to cook is a sufficient condition for someone being a cook. Following Devendrabuddhi and Manorathandin, the point seems to turn on the grammar of *ka*-suffixes as found in *pācaka* or *vācaka*. In these cases, the suffix seems to have been taken as temporally neutral (*sarvakāla*), that is to say, saying someone is a cook or that a word is a designator is not restricted to just a present activity, such as his cooking now or a word's designating now—rather *pācaka* or *vācaka* show abilities, which may or may not be exercised at the present time.[565] Finally, the Dignāgean term *śābdaprasiddha*—which earlier in k. 110 had been explained to be a recognition of a specific fitness and specific appropriate usage—is accordingly to be taken suitably objectively too, and entails universally applicable and unrestricted concepts of fitness. The term, in effect, does not mean just what is recognized now, but any conceivable usage. The point is subtle: in a non-temporal sense of "is," there is always a commonly recognized usage of any *w* for any *x* in the sense that, just as in the case of *pācaka*, the word *w* is (non-temporally) a designator (*vācaka*) of *x*. These unlimited connections between *w* and *x* would thus *be* recognized (*prasiddha*), even if one might not actually have the requisite usage now. See our introductory remarks to this section of PV IV, s.v. *yogyatā* and *śābdaprasiddha*.

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dhvanir asyāṃ yogyatāyāṃ ghatitaḥ sambaddhaḥ sākṣāt vācakatvena tasmin śabde 'pratīte 'pi vastuny aprātikūlyalakṣaṇasya yogyatvasya sarvadā sthiteḥ | yata evaṃ tatas tasyā yogyatāyāḥ śabdaprasiddhatācāryeṇoktā | yad yatra samarthaṃ tadasaṃmukhībhāve 'pi tat tena vyapadiśyate yathā pācaka iti | samarthaṃ ca vastv iṣṭaśabdābhidheyatva iti kṛtvā śābdaprasiddha iti |. Cf. PVP 348a5–7: *de ruṅ ñid kyi stobs ñid las de la ruṅ ba ñid las | sgra kun dṅos su sbyar*[a] *ba ste | 'brel ba grags pa med na'aṅ | sgra la dṅos po de la ni | ṅes pa | de phyir de ni grub pa ñid | slob dpon gyis sgra las byuṅ ba grags pa ñid yin par bśad pa yin no | de ltar na gaṅ źig gaṅ la nus pa yod pa de ni mṅon du phyogs pa med na yaṅ | de la des tha sñad du byed pa yin te | dper na 'tshed par byed pa*[b] *źes bya ba lta bu'o || dṅos po yaṅ 'dod pa'i sgras bstan pa ñid nus pa yod pa'i*[c] *phyir | sgra rnams mṅon du phyogs pa med na yaṅ sgra las byuṅ ba'i grags pa źes brjod do* ||([a] D. *sbyor*—[b] P. *mched par byed pa*; *'tshed par byed pa* = *pācaka*—[c] D. *nus pa med pa'i*; cf. PVV *samarthaṃ ca* [D. 291b4–6]).

[565]My thanks to my colleague, J. Bronkhorst, for this valuable observation. Categorizing suffixes (*pratyaya*) in terms of *sarvakāla* (as opposed to *vartamānakāla*) figures e.g., in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* 2.3.1, *Vārttika* 9 (ed. Kielhorn I, p. 442, 17–20).

3.3.3 The first interpretation of *asādhāraṇatva* in PSV: any reasoning the realist might make to restrict the fitness of words will incur the fault of being over-exclusive.

(114) *asādhāraṇatā na syāt bādhāhetor ihānyathā |*
tanniṣedho[566] *'numānāt syāc chabdārthe 'nakṣavṛttitaḥ ||*[567]

If this were not so [i.e., if it were not so that a word, though not present to us, was nonetheless connected in fitness], then in that case the reason for the invalidation [viz., '*śaśin* is not *candra*, because it exists'] would not be over-exclusive (*asādhāraṇatā*).[568] As the senses do not function with regard to the objects of words, the restriction of this [fitness] would have to be on account of an inference.

Kārikā 114 is a contrapositive argument against realism and turns on Dharmakīrti's first interpretation of the PSV's phrase, *yatrāpy asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve* (...) (though there is no [valid] inference since [the latter] would be over-exclusive); see our introductory remarks to this section of PV IV, s.v. *anumānābhāva* and *asādhāraṇatva*.

The logic of k. 114 can be explained as follows: If a realist seeks to establish that a certain object *x* objectively is not designated, or (what is the same) is unfit to be designated, by a word *w*, then he must formulate an inference to

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[566] MIY. *tan niṣedho.*

[567] Cf. PVin 296b6–7: *de ñid kyi phyir gnod pa'i gtan tshigs ni thun moṅ ma yin pa*[a] *te | gaṅ la yaṅ zla ba*[b] *ma yin pa ma grub pa'i phyir ro || de skad du brjod*[c] *pa ni 'di dgag par mi nus pa ñid dam | zla bo'i tshad ma med pas*[d] *ṅes par bstan pa'i phyir ro || de 'gog pa ni rjes su dpag pa las 'gyur te | mṅon sum gyis ni ruṅ ba ñid mi ṅes pa'i phyir ro ||* ([a] P. om. *pa*—[b] D. *bo*; PVinṬ 62a3 comments upon *zla ba*—[c] D. *rjod*—[d] P. *par*; PVinṬ 62a8 comments upon *med pas* [D. 198b7–199a1]).

[568] PVV 452, 16–18: *anyathā yadi śabdo 'saṃmukhībhavann api yogyatāyāṃ na sambaddhaḥ | tadeha śabdayogyatāpratiṣedhe kartavye bādhāhetor acandraḥ śaśī sattvāder ityāder asādhāraṇatoktā na syāt | sarvasya candraśabdayogyatve sapakṣābhāvāt asādhāraṇaṃ*[a] *syān nānyathā |* ([a] text has *sapakṣābhāvātmatvasādhāraṇaṃ*; cf. PVP 348b2: *gal te thams cad zla ba'i sgrar ruṅ bar 'gyur ba de'i tshe | mthun pa'i phyogs med pa'i phyir | thun moṅ ma yin par 'gyur ro ||*) "If this were not so, i.e., if it were not so that a word, though not present to us, was nonetheless connected in fitness, then in that case, i.e., when we must deny the fitness of a word, the reason for the invalidation, viz., '*śaśin* is not *candra*, because it exists,' would not be said to be over-exclusive. Given that everything is fit for the word *candra*, then because there would be no similar instances (*sapakṣa*) the [reason] would be over-exclusive, but not in the contrary case [i.e., when not everything is fit]."

this effect, for a word's fitness or lack of it cannot be perceived by means of the senses (cf. k. 114cd). If he formulates a reasoning (*prayoga*) such as *acandraḥ śaśī sattvād* (which, as we saw, is interpreted by Dharmakīrti as meaning that *śaśin* is not fit to be called *candra* because it exists), the reason *sattva* will not be present amongst the similar instances (*sapakṣa*), or in other words, amongst those things which are *not* fit to be called *candra*. This is because *nothing* is in fact unfit to be called *candra*; in other words, there simply are no *sapakṣa*. If, however, the realist's position were correct, and words did *not* designate any and all objects, then Dignāga's idea in PSV that *acandraḥ śaśī sattvād* does not yield an inference because it is an *asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu* would be incomprehensible or wrong. For, if realism was right, there would be *sapakṣa* (i.e., things objectively unfit to be termed *candra*). The conclusion is, of course, that realism and Dignāga's PSV cannot both be correct, with the thinly veiled corollary that so much the worse for realism. In short:

(a) If the realist view were correct, Dignāga would not be right in asserting that *acandraḥ śaśī sattvād* is an *asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu*.

(b) Dignāga is right on this matter.

(c) Therefore, the realist view is not correct.

(115) *asādhāraṇatā tatra hetūnāṃ yatra nānvayi* |
sattvam ity abhyudāhāro[569] *hetor evaṃphalo*[570] *mataḥ* ||[571]

[Dignāga] thought that the example of the reason [*sattva*] would have the following type of effect: where 'existence' (*sattva*) has no co-presence (*anvaya*), there [all] reasons will be over-exclusive.

Kārikā 115 also presupposes the Dharmakīrtian interpretation of the fallacy of over-exclusiveness (*asādhāraṇatā*) incurred in *acandraḥ śaśī sattvād*. However, it might be wondered whether Dignāga's use of *sattva* (existence) is an isolated case of an improper reason, so that there might be still be some other reason which could prove *acandraḥ śaśī* but which would not incur the fallacy of over-exclusiveness. Dharmakīrti argues that in fact *sattva* is not an isolated case: if a reason such as *sattva* is over-exclusive, then any other reason must also suffer the

[569] PV-k(I/II) *asyodāhāro*; PV-k(II) ed. DS *sattvam ity apy udāhāro*.

[570] PV-k(I/II/III) *kuto*; Miy. *evaṃ phalo*. *phalo* = PV Tib. *'bras bu daṅ ldan pa*; *evaṃphalo* is also supported by PVP 349a2: ... *rgyu dpe ni* | *slob dpon de ltar 'bras ldan 'dod* |.

[571] Cf. PVin 296b7–8: *gaṅ la yod pa ñid rjes su 'gro ba med pa de la ni gtan tshigs thams cad thun moṅ ma yin pa yin no* || *źes bya ba 'di ni dper*[a] *brjod pa'i 'bras bu'o* || ([a] P. *dper na* [D. 199a2]).

same fate. The logic is as follows: if a reason *x*, whose extension includes that of a reason *y*, is over-exclusive when proving a property *P*, then *y* must also be over-exclusive with regard to *P*. Now, in the case of *sattva*—which is the most general reason possible — its extension includes that of any and every other reason. Hence if *sattva* is over-exclusive when we are proving *acandratva*, so must be *all* other reasons. In k. 115 itself, the argument is phrased in terms of the idea of *anvaya* (co-presence): a reason, to be valid, must be co-present with the property to be proved; both must be co-present in some specific similar instances.[572] Now since no such instances of the property to be proved (viz., being unfit to be termed *candra*) are ever to be found, then *sattva*, and hence *whatever else we might take as a reason*, will always lack *anvaya*; no logical reason can ever be co-present with this property to be proved in any instance.[573]

[572]See p.55 and n. 195.

[573]See PVinṬ 64b3–5: *yod pa gcig pu thun moṅ ma yin par bśad pa ma yin nam* | *gtan tshigs thams cad ni ma yin no źe na* | *bśad pa* | *bsgrub par bya ba gaṅ la yod pa ñid rjes su 'gro ba med pa'i*[a] *bsgrub par bya ba de la* | *gtan tshigs thams cad thun moṅ ma yin pa ñid yin no* || *yod pa ñid*[b] *de thams cad khyab pa yin yaṅ bsgrub bya daṅ rjes su 'gro ba med pa des na gźan gtan tshigs gaṅ źig bsgrub bya daṅ rjes su 'gro bar 'gyur źes bya ba 'di ni yod pa'i phyir źes gtan tshigs dper brjod pa'i 'bras bu yin no* || ([a] P. D. *med pa'i*, but the construction would seem to demand *med pa*—[b] P. *yod pa thams cad ñid*; D. *yod pa ñid* = *sattva* [D. 55a3–4]) "[Objection:] But surely it is just *sattva* alone which is asserted to be over-exclusive, and not all reasons. [Dharmakīrti] replies: Whatever be the *sādhya* with regard to which *sattva* lacks co-presence (*anvaya*), all reasons will be over-exclusive (*asādhāraṇa*) with regard to that *sādhya*. Although existence (*sattva*) pervades everything, still it lacks co-presence with the *sādhya*. Therefore, which other reason would have co-presence with the *sādhya*! Such was the effect of stating the example of the reason *sattvāt*." Cf. PVV 452, 23–26: *tatra yogyatāpratiṣedhe kartavye sarveṣāṃ hetūnāṃ sapakṣābhāvāt asādhāraṇatā katham etad ity āha* | *yatra sādhye sattvam api liṅgaṃ sarvavastuvyāpi nānvayi sādhāraṇaṃ bhavati tatrānyasya kā katheti hetoḥ kṛtakatvasyodāhāra ācāryasyaivaṃphalaḥ sarvahetvasādhāraṇatvapratipādanaprayojano mataḥ* | "All reasons are over-exclusive (*asādhāraṇa*) with regard to this [property], i.e., when *yogyatā* is to be negated, because there are no similar instances (*sapakṣa*). How so? [Dharmakīrti] explains: When, i.e., with regard to a *sādhya*, even the reason *sattva*, which pervades all entities, does not have co-presence, i.e., is not common, then why speak of other [reasons] with regard to this [*sādhya*]? In this way the Ācārya [Dignāga] thought that the example of the reason *kṛtakatva** would have this type of effect, i.e., would serve to show that all reasons are over-exclusive." *Note that Manorathanandin inexplicably glossed *hetoḥ* in k. 115c by *kṛtakatvasya*; Dharmottara glossed it by *sattva*, which makes better sense.

3.3.4 More on the interpretation of the term *śābdaprasiddha* in PSV: avoidance of antinomic reasons (*viruddhāvyabhicāra*)

PVV's introduction to k. 116: "How should we understand the fact that all words are established everywhere for any object? Here [Dharmakīrti replies] as follows:"[574]

(116) *saṃketasaṃśrayāḥ śabdāḥ sa cecchāmātrasaṃśrayaḥ* |
nāsiddhiḥ[575] *śabdasiddhānām iti śābdaprasiddhavāk*[576] ||[577]

Words depend on agreement (*saṃketa*), and this [agreement] depends upon mere intentions (*icchāmātra*). [So] the [designations] established by words are never unestablished. Hence [Dignāga used] the locution *śābdaprasiddha*.[578]

Dharmakīrti now tries to reconcile his own theory of meaning , i.e., that any word has an absolutely unlimited fitness to designate anything whatsoever depending purely on intentions, with the usual meaning of *śābdaprasiddha*, where the term signifies the conventional agreements and common intentions among speakers to use language in certain specific ways. As in k. 113, he effectuates this rather difficult harmonization by maintaining that *śābdaprasiddha* does not just concern present linguistic usage, i.e. the designations which are commonly intended or agreed upon *now*, but also the infinite varieties of designation which do exist (albeit unintended and unrecognized now), because they *could* be intended or agreed upon at some other time. Note that Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation of *prasiddha*

[574]PVV 453, 1: *kathaṃ gamyate sarveṣāṃ śabdānāṃ sarvatrārthe siddhir ity āha.* Cf. PVP 349a3: *gal te gaṅ las sgra thams cad don thams cad grub pa yin na | gaṅ gis na sgra las byuṅ ba'i grags pa źes brjod ce na* | (D. 292a6–7) "Why are all words established for all objects so that [Dignāga] said *śābdaprasiddha* (*sgra las byuṅ ba'i grags pa*)?"

[575]PV-k(I) *vāsiddhiḥ.*

[576]PV-k(II) *śābdaprasiddhivāk.*

[577]Cf. PVin 296b8–297a1: *sgra ni brda la*[a] *brten pa yin la de yaṅ 'dod pa tsam la brten pa yin te | des na sgras grub pa dag ni ma grub pa ma yin no źes bstan pa'i phyir sgra las byuṅ ba'i grags pa daṅ źes gsuṅs so* || ([a] P. *las* [D. 199a2–3]).

[578]PVV 453, 4–6: *saṃketam antareṇa vācakādṛṣṭeḥ saṃketasaṃśrayāḥ śabdāḥ sa ca saṃketaḥ puruṣecchāmātrasaṃśrayaḥ tadatiriktasyāpekṣaṇīyasyābhāvāt | tasmāc chabdasiddhānām abhidheyatvādīnāṃ kvacid apy arthe nāsiddhiḥ | iti hetoḥ śābdaprasiddhir ācāryasya* || "Since designators (*vācaka*) are not found apart from agreements, words are dependent upon agreements. And this agreement depends solely on the intentions of people, for there is nothing to be depended upon beyond that [intention]. So, those things which are established by words, viz., designations and so forth, are not unestablished with regard to any objects. Thus, for [this] reason, the Ācārya's [use of the phrase] *śābdaprasiddhi*."

as *mchog tu grub pa*, "thoroughly established," i.e., "established everywhere," is quite appropriate here (see Appendix A). See also our introductory remarks to this section of PV IV, s.v. *śābdaprasiddha*.

(117) *anumānaprasādhyeṣu*[579] *viruddhāvyabhicāriṇaḥ* |
abhāvaṃ darśayaty evaṃpratīter[580] *anumātvataḥ*[581] ||[582]

Since this sort of an acknowledgment (*pratīti*) is an inference,[583] [the phrase *śābdaprasiddha*] shows that there will not be an [other logical reason which will be] antinomic (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*) in the case of [propositions] which are being established by means of inferences [functioning due to real entities (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*)].[584]

There might be a doubt as to whether a conclusion proven by an inference whose validity is based on objective states of affairs, such as a *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*, could ever be contradicted by juxtaposing another reason which would rely solely upon uses of language. Such a purely conventional reason would prove the opposite of what is proved by *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*, or in more technical terms, it would be *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, i.e., an "antinomic reason." See our remarks to k. 65 on *viruddhāvyabhicāra*. Prajñākaragupa gives the following concrete case. Given the usual *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*, namely, "This place has fire because it has smoke," someone might then add the contradicting inference, "This place has

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[579]PV-k(II) °*prasiddheṣu*; cf. PV Tib *bsgrub rnams la*.

[580]PV-(I/II/III), MIY. *evaṃ pratīter*; cf. PV Tib (*de lta bu'i grags pa*) and PVV's gloss *evam īdṛśyāḥ śabdasiddhāyā yogyatāyāḥ pratīteḥ*.

[581]MIY. *anumā tv ataḥ*; PV-k(III) *anumā tvataḥ*.

[582]Cf. PVin 297a2: *des na tshad mas ṅes par brjod pa'i phyir don gyis go bas rjes su dpag pa'i yul la 'gal ba la mi 'khrul ba can med par ston pa yin no* || (D. 199a4).

[583]I.e., the inference is a *grags pa'i rjes dpag*, *pratītyākhyānumāna*, which establishes that any object is fit to be designated by any word, because the object is "an object of a conceptual cognition (*vikalpavijñānaviṣaya*)." The reason here is a *svabhāvahetu*. See our introductory remarks to this section (p. 160) and our remarks to k. 92, as well as n. 447 and p. 186.

[584]PVV 453, 7–12: *etac ca śābdaprasiddhivacanam ... vastubalapravṛttenānumānena prasiddheṣv artheṣu viparītadharmopasthāpakasya viruddhāvyabhicāriṇaḥ sādhanāntarasyābhāvaṃ darśayati* | *kasmād ity āha* | *evam īdṛśyāḥ śabdasiddhāyā yogyatāyāḥ pratīteḥ svabhāvaliṅgasamutthatvāt anumātvataḥ* | "Now this phrase *śābdaprasiddhi* shows that there is no other means of proof (*sādhana*) which would be *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, i.e., which would establish the opposite property, in the case of propositions recognized by means of inferences functioning due to real entities (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*). Why? [Dharmakīrti] answers: It is because this sort of acknowledgment, i.e., of the *yogyatā* established by words, is an inference, as it stems from a *svabhāvaliṅga*."

no fire [i.e., it cannot be said to have fire], because it exists, just like a place free of fire."[585] However, in fact, there is no danger of such an antinomic reason ever occurring. As pointed out in PV IV, k. 92, (see our remarks *ad* k. 92), "being an object of a conceptual cognition" (*vikalpavijñānaviṣayatva*) is a *svabhāvahetu* for proving unrestricted acknowledgments (*pratīti*) of fitness (*yogyatā*), i.e., that any entity is fit to be designated by any given word. This is, in a nutshell, k. 117's point in saying that *pratīti* is an inference. Hence, *śābdaprasiddha*, which Dharmakīrti interprets as being an inference of unrestricted *yogyatā* of words, would eliminate this potential *viruddhāvyabhicārin* reason. The argument that this place does *not* have fire (or cannot be said to have fire) is not valid, just as *acandraḥ śaśī sattvād* is also not valid, for any place or thing can be designated by the terms "having fire," *candra*, etc. As Prajñākaragupta points out, there can never be a proof of the opposing argument (*pratipakṣa*) to the effect that *A* cannot be designated by the word "fire": the reason in such a pseudo-proof would be over-exclusive (*asādhāraṇa*).

3.3.5 A second interpretation of *asādhāraṇatva* in PSV: any inference which the Buddhist might make to prove to the realist that words *are* used in such and such a way will be over-exclusive

(118) *atha vā bruvato lokasyānumābhāva*[586] *ucyate |*
kiṃ tena bhinnaviṣayā pratītir anumānataḥ ||[587]

Alternatively [the point of the passage from PSV is as follows:] It was said [by Dignāga] that with regard to the world's speakers there is no inference. Why? Due to this [phrase *śābdaprasiddha*, which expresses that there is no inference], acknowledgments (*pratīti*) [established from words were said to] have as their scope

[585] See PVBh 536, 2–4: *tatas tasyāpy asādhāraṇatvāt pratipakṣasyāsādhanatā*[a] *| yathāgnir atra dhūmāt | nāgnir atra sattvāt | agnirahitapradeśavat |* ([a] RS read *pratipakṣasya sādhanatā*; but cf. PVBh Tib. 219b5: *des na de yaṅ mi mthun pa'i phyogs thun moṅ ma yin pa ñid kyi phyir sgrub par byed pa* ma *yin te |*) "Thus since the opposing argument would be *asādhāraṇa*, this too would not be a [valid] means of proof (*sādhana*), as for example [when one argues] 'This [place] has fire because it has smoke [and] this place has no fire because it exists, just like a place free of fire."

[586] MIY. *lokasyānumā 'bhāva*.

[587] Cf. PVin 297b1–2: *yaṅ na 'jig rten gyi brjod*[a] *pa la rjes su dpag pa med par brjod*[a] *pa yin no || des ni grags pa rjes su dpag pa las yul tha dad pa yin no źes brjod*[a] *par 'gyur ro ||* ([a] D. *rjod* [D. 199b4–5]).

different [types of] things from [those of] inference [functioning due to real entities (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*)].[588]

(119) *tenānumānād vastūnāṃ sadasattānurodhinaḥ* |
bhinnasyātadvaśā[589] *vṛttis tadicchājeti*[590] *sūcitam* ||[591]

In this way the following was shown: The occurrence of that [conceptually created entity, *śabdayogyatva*,] which is different[592] from [an object of] an inference that conforms to the existence and nonexistence of real entities, is not due to those [entities], but stems from the wishes of [people].

Kārikā 118 and the related passage in the PVin (see n. 587) introduce another interpretation of the key passage from the PSV by means of the phrase *atha vā* (alternatively); see p. 161 above.

In the previous *kārikās* Dharmakīrti had interpreted *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve* (though there is no [valid] inference since [the latter] would be over-exclusive) to mean that when an opponent argues that *śaśin* is *not* the moon because it exists, then this reasoning itself does not constitute an inference because

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[588]PVV 453, 21–23: *evaṃ darśite kiṃ bhavatīti cet* | *tenānumānābhāvābhidhāyinā śābdaprasiddhābhidhānena śābdasiddhā pratītir vastubalapravṛttānumānato bhinnaviṣayoktā bhavati* | *vastuviṣayaṃ hy anumānaṃ kalpitagocarāntarā śābdī pratītir ity arthaḥ* ||. See n. 596 for the full text of PVV *ad* k. 118. Cf. PVP 349a8–349b3: *yaṅ na thun moṅ ma yin pa ñid yin pa'i phyir rjes su dpag pa med pa na źes bya ba 'di ni don gźan ni 'di yin te* | *ri boṅ can ni zla ba ma yin no źes log par źugs pa dam bca' ba gaṅ yin pa de la de bstan par bya ba'i phyir 'jig rten smra ñid la* | *rjes dpag med pa* | *slob dpon gyis*[a] *brjod pa ci* | *de skad du brjod pa'i 'bras bu ci yin źe na* | *bśad pa dṅos su ri boṅ can zla ba ñid du śes pa ma yin gyi* | *'on kyaṅ sgra'i stobs las yin pa des na* | *de ltar na sgra las byuṅ ba'i grags pa la rjes dpag med pa la*[b] *bstan pas dṅos po'i stobs las byuṅ ba'i rjes su dpag pa las grags pa tha dad yul can yin źes bya bas yul thad par bstan par 'gyur ro* || ([a] P. *gyi*—[b] P. om. *la* [D. 292b3–5]) "Alternatively, *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve* is of another meaning: For him who falsely holds that *śaśin* is not the moon, there is no inference pertaining to the world's speakers [which can be used] to show him that [convention]. [Question:] Why was this said by the Master [Dignāga]? What was the effect of saying this? Reply: We do not know that *śaśin* is the moon in reality (*dṅos su*). Rather, it is due to words. Thus, by showing in this way that there were no inferences for [proving] *śābdaprasiddha*, [Dignāga] showed that [conventional] acknowledgments (*pratīti*) had as their scope different [types of] things from those of inferences which arose due to real entities."

[589]PV-k(I/III), MIY. °*vaśād*.

[590]MIY. *tad icchājeti*.

[591]Cf. PVin 297b2–3: *des na dṅos po yod pa daṅ med pa'i rjes su byed pa'i rjes su dpag pa las grags pa yul tha dad pa can ñid yin pa'i phyir* | *de dṅos po'i dbaṅ gis 'jug pa ma yin no źes bstan pa yin no* || (D. 199b5–6).

[592]Manorathanandin glosses *bhinnasya* as *kalpitasyārthasya śabdayogyatvasya*.

it is over-exclusive. Now the interpretation of *anumānābhāva* changes. Instead of the opponent's own reasoning not being an inference, the point is now that *when arguing with a semantic realist* there can be no inference to prove that *śaśin* is the moon, or is called "the moon," because any such inference will be over-exclusive for him. Given his realist semantic theory, the opponent will not be able to ascertain presence in *sapakṣa* (i.e., amongst things having the purely conceptually created property of being fit to be called 'the moon'); neither will he ascertain presence amongst the *vipakṣa* (i.e., the things which do not have this purely conceptually created property), because there simply are no such *vipakṣa*. The result is that the realist's argument cannot be refuted by an inference which would prove the opposite, but only by invoking what is commonly recognized through verbal knowledge (*śābdaprasiddha*). *Kārikā*s 118cd and 119 stress that such an interpretation of the PSV passage turns on the fact that acknowledgments concerning use of language are not founded upon or provable by any objective facts, i.e., they are not established by the *vastubala*-type of inference: designation is a conceptually created property with nothing corresponding in reality.[593]

(120) *candratāṃ śaśino 'nicchan kāṃ pratītiṃ sa vāñchati* |
iti taṃ praty adṛṣṭāntaṃ tad asādhāraṇaṃ[594] *matam* ||[595]

What [conventional] acknowledgment (*pratīti*) does he accept when he does not agree that *śaśin* is the moon? Therefore, the [reason], which would lack an example, was thought [by Dignāga] to be over-exclusive for this [type of person].

Kārikā 120 and the corresponding passage in the PVin (see n. 595) give more details as to why we cannot inferentially prove to the realist that *śaśin* is the moon. If someone seriously holds that *śaśin* is not simply conventionally designated as "the moon" (as the realist opponent apparently does in maintaining *acandraḥ śaśī*), then *ipso facto* he refuses to accept a convention which is, as Manorathanandin says, "established for all" (*sarvajanasiddha*). In other words, *śaśino candratā* is so obviously a paradigm case of a verbal convention accepted by all who know Sanskrit that if someone did not accept it, then he could not reasonably acknowledge *anything* based on verbal usage at all, and hence could not accept that anything could be purely conventionally termed "the moon." The result is that there

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[593] Cf. PVV *ad* k. 118, in n.596.

[594] MIY. *pratyadṛṣṭāntaṃ tadasādhāraṇaṃ*.

[595] Cf. PVin 297b3–4: *ri boṅ can*[a] *zla bar mi 'dod pa de grags pa gźan gaṅ źig 'dod par 'gyur te* | *de'i phyir de la rjes su dpag pa'i dpe med pa yin no* | *des na thun moṅ ma yin par bśad do* || ([a] P. om. *can* [D. 199b6–7]).

would be over-exclusiveness (*asādhāraṇatva*). Dharmakīrti speaks of "examples" (*dṛṣṭānta*) while his commentators speak of *sapakṣa*, but the point is the same: when proving a convention like *śaśin* is the moon to a realist opponent, there can be nothing which he ascertains to have both the property of the reason and that of what is to be proved (*sādhya*).[596]

[596]Jinendrabuddhi's PSṬ (see Appendix A, §h) and Dharmottara's PVinṬ give the clearest account of the arguments in k. 118–120. PVinṬ 68b3–69b6: *de ltar gaṅ la thun moṅ ma yin pa'i rjes su dpag pa med la źes bya ba'i gźuṅ 'di'i don bśad nas | gźan du bśad par bya ba'i phyir yaṅ na źes smos so || gaṅ du pha rol gyis*[a] *'gal ba'i don dam bcas pa na gtan tshigs thams cad thun moṅ ma yin pa'i phyir te | rjes su 'gro ba med pa'i phyir zlog par byed pa cig śos la phyin ci log tu sgrub pa'i rjes su dpag pa med pa na | tshad ma med par de ci ltar zlog par byed ce na bśad pa | sgra las byuṅ ba'i grags pas bsal ba yin gyi*[b] *rjes su dpag pas ni ma yin no || de ltar gaṅ la thun moṅ ma yin pa'i phyir rjes su dpag pa med la źes bya ba'i gźuṅ 'dis 'jig rten gyi 'dod pa'i sgras brjod par bya ba ñid du brjod pa la rjes su dpag pa med par bśad pa yin no || 'dod pa'i sgras brjod par bya ba la rjes su dpag pa med pas cir*[c] *'gyur źe na | rjes su dpag pa med par brjod pa 'dis ni rjes su dpag pas rtogs*[b] *par bya ba'i don gźan yin la | grags pas rtogs par bya ba'i yul yaṅ gźan yin no || de skad brjod pas kyaṅ ci źig bya źe na | bśad pa | de skad brjod pa des na dṅos po yod pa daṅ med pa'i rjes su byed pa'i rjes su dpag pa gaṅ yin pa de las grags pa yul tha dad pa can ñid yin pa'i phyir dṅos po'i dbaṅ gis 'jug pa ma yin no źes śugs kyis brjod pa yin no || rjes su dpag pa ni dṅos po la 'jug pa'i phyir daṅ | grags pa'i rtags ni sgro btags kyi raṅ bźin gyi don la 'jug pa'i phyir dṅos po la mi bltos pa yin no || ci ltar na rjes su dpag pa med ce na | ri boṅ can zla bar mi 'dod pa des źes smos so || gaṅ gi phyir ri boṅ can zla ba ste zla ba'i sgras brjod par bya ba ñid du śin tu grags pa yaṅ bsñon pa ni grags pa 'ga' la yaṅ mi bsñon pa ma yin no || 'di ltar ri boṅ can zla ba'i sgras brjod par bya ba dṅos po ma yin pa spoṅ ba ni khyad par med pa'i phyir dṅos po pa*[e] *sgras brjod par bya ba gźan gyi grags pa thams cad spoṅ ba yin no || des na dṅos po pa'i grags pa thams cad spoṅ ba la dṅos po pa'i zla ba'i sgras brjod par bya ba daṅ ldan pa'i chos gaṅ du yaṅ grub*[f] *pa med do || de'i phyir dṅos po pa'i zla ba'i sgras brjod par bya ba ñid la rjes su dpag pa dpe med pa yin no || des na rtags thun moṅ ma yin par bśad do źes bya ba'i don to ||* ([a] P. *gyi*—[b] P. *gyis*—[c] P. *ci*—[d] P. *rtog*—[e] P. om. *pa*—[f] D. *sgrub* [D. 58a7–59a1]) "Having explained in this way the meaning of the [PSV] passage *yatrāpy asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve*, [Dharmakīrti] then says 'Alternatively...' (*yaṅ na* = *vā*) in order to explain it differently. Suppose an opponent holds a proposition which contradicts [conventions], then because all logical reasons will be over-exclusive [and] since there is no *anvaya*, there will be no inference which will prove the other negation [i.e., the opponent's thesis] to be erroneous. In that case, when there is no *pramāṇa*, how does one negate [this thesis]? We answer as follows. It is opposed by *śābdaprasiddha*, but not by an inference. Thus the passage *yatrāpy asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve* affirms that there is no inference for asserting that [something] is the designatum of a word which is intended by the world. What results from there being no inference of an intended designatum of a word? By asserting that there is no inference, the object which is to be understood by means of an inference is one thing and the object understood through *pratīti* is another. What is the upshot if things are explained in this way? We answer as follows. When explained in this way [the PSV passage] implicitly (*śugs kyis*) affirms that *pratīti* has as its scope different things from inference which conforms to the existence and nonexistence of real entities, and that it therefore does not occur due to real entities. Since an inference applies to real entities and since

3.3.6 Against a rival Buddhist interpretation of *asādhāraṇatva*

PVBh's introduction to k.121: "[Objection:] But surely there is over-exclusiveness because the moon is [just] one thing. So how could it follow that this inference is thought to be over-exclusive for him who rejects all [conventional] acknowledgments (*pratīti*). [Dharmakīrti:] This is not so at all, for ..."[597]

(121) *nodāharaṇam evedam*[598] *adhikṛtyedam ucyate |*
lakṣaṇatvāt tathā 'vṛkṣo dhātrīty[599] *uktau ca bādhanāt ||*[600]

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a reason which is a *pratīti* applies to something whose nature is superimposed (*sgro btags*) [the latter] does not depend upon real entities. How is it that there is no inference? [Dharmakīrti] states [in PVin] 'One who does not agree that *śaśin* is the moon...' It is because when one refuses even something so extremely well acknowledged such as *śaśin* being the moon, or [in other words] *śaśin* being the designatum of the word *candra*, then one cannot fail to refuse *pratīti* everywhere. Because his rejection of the fact that *śaśin* is an unreal (*dṅos po ma yin pa*) designatum of the word *candra* will admit of no differences [for other cases too], then the realist (*dṅos po pa*) will reject all *pratīti* for other designata of words. Therefore, when for the realist all *pratīti* are rejected, then for the realist there will not be established any *dharma* whatsoever which has [the character of being] the designatum of the word *candra*. Thus, concerning the designatum of the word *candra* for the realist, an inference will have no example. And so all reasons [which would establish this designatum for the realist] are said to be over-exclusive." Manorathanandin, however, is much less clear in finding a second argument for *asādhāraṇatva* in k. 118f. It appears that he thought that the essential point was again that there were no *acandra*, i.e., things which were not fit to be called "moon," and that hence, as before, *acandraḥ śaśī sattvād* would be over-exclusive because of there being no *sapakṣa*. PVV 453, 17–24: *atha vā 'candraḥ śaśī sattvād iti vipratipadyamānaṃ pratipatpratipādanārthaṃ lokasya bruvataḥ śābdaprasiddhenāsādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāva ācāryeṇocyate | pāramārthikasya bādhyatvasyābhāvāt | kalpitaṃ niṣedhyaṃ | tac ca puruṣecchāmātrādhīnatvāt sarvatra sambhavatīti sarvasya candraśabdayogyatāyogyān na kaścid acandraḥ pakṣo 'sti yatra vartamānasattvam asādhāraṇatām jahyāt*[a] *| evaṃ darśite kiṃ bhavatīti cet | tenānumānābhāvābhidhāyinā śābdaprasiddhābhidhānena śābdasiddhā pratītir vastubalapravṛttānumānato bhinnaviṣayoktā bhavati | vastuviṣayaṃ hy anumānaṃ kalpitagocarāntarā śābdī pratītir ity arthaḥ ||* ([a] RS seems to read *jahyā*; we follow DS's *jahyāt*).

[597]PVBh 540, 29–31: *nanu candrasyekatvād asādhāranatā (|) tat kathaṃ etal labhyaṃ sakalapratītipratikṣepavādinaṃ praty etad anumānam asādhāraṇam abhipretam | na kiṃcid etat | yataḥ ....*

[598]PV-k(II), Miy. *evedam*: PV-k(I), (III) *evaikam*. PV Tib. also reads *dpe 'di ñid = udāharaṇam evedam*. Note however that other Tibetan versions of the *kārikā* support the reading in PV-k(III), notably PVBh Tib. 225a5 (*dpe gcig ñid dbaṅ byas nas ni*) and PVP 350a3 (*dpe gcig ñid dbaṅ byas nas ni źes bya ba la...*). PVin (see n. 600) also supports this latter reading.

[599]PV-k(II): *vṛkṣo 'dhātrīty*. Cf. PV Tib., which supports *avṛkṣo*: *da trig śiṅ min źes*.

[600]Cf. PVin 297b4–5: *gaṅ gi phyir dpe gcig po de ñid kyi dbaṅ du byas nas*[a] *de skad bśad pa ni ma yin te | mtshan ñid yin pa'i phyir ro || 'di ltar śiṅ śa pa śiṅ ma yin no źes bya ba la yaṅ gnod pa'i phyir ro ||* ([a] P. *de ñid kyi dbaṅ po de ñid kyi dbaṅ du byas nas* [D. 199b7–200a1]).

> It was not from the point of view of this example alone that this [over-exclusiveness] was asserted, since it is a [general] characteristic. For there would similarly be invalidation if one said that a *dhātrī* was not a tree.

At this point, according to Śākyabuddhi, the minor Buddhist commentator on Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha* referred to as the Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra once again makes an appearance in PV IV, this time in a more significant fashion than in k. 27.[601] He offers a different explanation of *asādhāraṇatva*: it is not because of general problems stemming from the semantic realist's theory of meaning that the logical reason proving *śaśin* is the moon would be over-exclusive; it is because of the rather banal fact that there is only one moon. This alternative explanation would have it that since the words *śaśin* and *candra* are both coextensive (in that they both refer to the one and only moon), it would be impossible to give a similar instance (*sapakṣa*), viz., an example of *candra* which is *different* from the subject, *śaśin*. Hence the fault of over-exclusiveness. (It should be noted that several contemporary writers have also taken this to be the position of the NM and the PSV. It is certainly not an implausible interpretation.[602]) For Dharmakīrti, however, this explanation of Dignāga's thought is impossible, as it is not the *specific* thesis *acandraḥ śaśī sattvād* which will lead to over-exclusiveness: the problem is rather of a general nature[603] and turns on the realist's philosophical theory of

[601] PVṬ 329b5–6: *zla ba gcig yod pa ñid kyi źes bya ba la sogs pa ni Rigs pa'i sgo'i ṭīkā byed pa'i gźuṅ 'god pa yin no* || "When it is said 'there is only one moon' and so forth, this is a quotation of the text by the Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra." Śākyabuddhi is refering to a quotation given in PVP *ad* k. 121. PVP 349b7–8: *zla ba gcig yod pa ñid kyi phyir dpe med pa ñid kyi phyir | gtan tshigs thun moṅ ma yin pa ñid yin no źes bya ba gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ de ltar ma yin no* || "It is also not correct when it is said, 'Because there is only one moon, there is no example. Hence the reason is over-exclusive.'" See also n. 608 for Vibhūticandra's identification of the opponent in k. 122. This commentator on NM had made an earlier appearance in connection with k. 27, and in that context he was named by Śākyabuddhi as *Maṅ po len pa'i bu*—the possible Sanskrit equivalent is hopelessly obscure. See n. 156 above.

[602] See TUCCI 1930, 7, n. 10; KITAGAWA 1973, 130; KATSURA 1977, 114–115. As we have argued elsewhere (see Appendix B), this relatively uncomplicated interpretation of *asādhāraṇatva* by the Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra may harmonize better with Dignāga's own idea of *prasiddhabādhā* as being the mere prohibition of solecism. Dharmakīrti's highly philosophical interpretation of *prasiddhabādhā* as concerning unrestricted *yogyatā* leads him to a correspondingly complex view on *asādhāraṇatva*.

[603] See PVinṬ 69b2: *ji sñed sgra'i brjod par bya ba spoṅ ba phyin ci log tu sgrub pa thams cad la gtan tshigs thun moṅ ma yin pa'i phyir rjes su dpag pa med par bstan par bya ba yin no* || "In all cases where one erroneously proves that a designatum of a word is to be rejected, the reason will be over-exclusive. Thus, it was to be shown that there would be no inference (*anumānābhāva*)."

meaning. The same problem would also arise if the thesis to be refuted was that a *dhātrī* was not a tree, for here too there would be no similar instances (*sapakṣa*) acceptable to a realist when a Buddhist sought to prove to him that a *dhātrī* was a tree (or could be designated by 'tree').

Dharmakīrti seems to have deliberately chosen the term *dhātrī* (= *āmalaka*, i.e., the tree called 'Emblic Myrobalan' or 'Emblica Officinalis') because, like the case of *śaśin*, the reasoning turns on a nonliteral use of the word, the literal sense being "supporter", i.e., "nurse," "mother." Thus, the semantic realist, who rejects this type of polysemy, would also have to accept a reasoning like *avṛkṣo dhātrī sattvāt* (A *dhātrī* is not a tree, because it exists) if he was to remain consistent with his view that *acandraḥ śaśī sattvāt* (*śaśin* is not the moon because it exists). If, however, as the Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra claims, the over-exclusiveness in proving that *śaśin* is *candra* stems from the uniqueness of the moon, then it would be impossible for this same over-exclusiveness to occur when one proves that *dhātrī* is a tree: there are numerous other kinds of trees besides *dhātrī*. Prajñākaragupta comments on the PV passage in this way, but formulates the parallel argument as *avṛkṣaḥ śiṃśapā sattvād*, changing from *dhātrī* to another well-known tree, *śiṃśapā*. (Note that PVin also phrases the parallel in terms of *śiṃśapā*; see n. 600.) The metaphorical aspect of the term *dhātrī* (as opposed to *śiṃśapā*) is not crucial: in this revised version too, the Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra's explanation of over-exclusiveness will fail given that there are trees other than *śiṃśapā*.[604]

(122) *atrāpi loke dṛṣṭatvāt karpūrarajatādiṣu* |
samayād varttamānasya kā 'sādhāraṇatāpi vā[605] ||[606]

What over-exclusiveness could there ever possibly be here either [i.e., in the case of the reasoning *acandraḥ śaśī sattvād*], because

[604]PVBh 541, 12–13: *tathā hi* | *na vṛkṣaḥ śiṃśapā sattvād ity atrāpi pratītibādhā vaktavyā* (|) *sā katham paroditanyāyād avataret* | *na hi vṛkṣa ekaḥ plakṣāder api bhāvāt* | "Suppose it is said that a *śiṃśapā* is not a tree, because it exists (*sattvād*). Then here, too, one ought to say that there is invalidation by a [conventional] acknowledgment (*pratītibādhā*). But how could this [invalidation] occur, following the logic stated by the opponent [i.e., the Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra]? Indeed, there is not [just] one tree, for there are also fig trees (*plakṣa*) and others."

[605]PV-k(I), (III), MIY.: *kā 'sādhāraṇatābhidhā*. PV-k(II) reads *kā 'sādhāraṇatāpi vā*, which is supported by PV Tib. (*thun moṅ min pa ñid kyaṅ ci*) and the earlier Tibetan translation found in PVP 350a7. The word *vā* does not express an alternative, but simply reinforces *kā*, i.e., "what ... possibly."

[606]Cf. PVin 297b5: *'jig rten na ga pur daṅ dṅul la sogs pa la mthoṅ ba'i phyir 'dir yaṅ thun moṅ ma yin pa ñid du mi 'gyur ro* || *brda la 'jug pa la ni thun moṅ ma yin pa 'ga'*[a] *yaṅ med do* | ([a] P. *'gal* [D. 200a 1]).

in the world [the word *candra*], which functions by agreement, is seen [to be used] for camphor, silver and so forth?[607]

The opposing position (*pūrvapakṣa*) in k. 122 is once again the view that there is over-exclusiveness simply because there is no second moon—Vibhūticandra goes further saying, *nyāyamukhaṭīkākāram upakṣipati*, "He is referring to the Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra."[608] Dharmakīrti continues his refutation of this mysterious commentator by saying that even taking the *śaśin* / *candra* example, there is, at any rate, here too more than one thing which is the designatum of *candra*. In the terminology used to describe perfumes (*gāndhikavācikādi*), the word *candra* is also used in polysemic fashion for camphor (*karpūra*) and silver (*rajata*). Thus, Dharmakīrti can refute the argument that the over-exclusiveness stems from there being only one thing which is referred to by *candra*, for when one refutes *acandraḥ śaśī sattvād* by proving *candraḥ śaśī*, there would be no shortage of things other than *śaśin* which could be called *candra*. The absurd consequence is that not only would it be impossible for the Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra to explain Dignāga's charge of *asādhāraṇatva* with regard to the *dhātrī* / *śiṃśapā* reasoning, but he could not even explain why the reasoning that *śaśin* is the moon would incur *asādhāraṇatva*.

Prajñākaragupta has a quite closely reasoned interpretation of the argument in k. 122, one which can be outlined as follows:

(a) The opponent continues to maintain his position that a proof that *śaśin* is the moon would incur *asādhāraṇatva* because there is only one moon.

(b) In answer to Dharmakīrti's argument in k. 121, the opponent replies that a thesis like *śiṃśapā* is not a tree would in fact be invalidated by an inference, because there is no problem of *asādhāraṇatva* when we infer that *śiṃśapā* is in fact a tree: treeness is in common (*sādhāraṇa*) to several things besides *śiṃśapā*s.

(c) Dharmakīrti then supposedly retorts that even the word *candra* applies to many different things. Hence, if we took the opponent's position, there would never be any *asādhāraṇatva* at all and all theses like *acandraḥ śaśī* would simply be refuted by inferences: *pratītibādhā* would be perfectly useless.[609]

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[607]See PVV 455, 7–8: *loke karpūrarajatādiṣu gandhikavācikādīnāṃ samayād varttamānasya dṛṣṭatvād atrācandraḥ śaśī sattvād ity udāharaṇe hetor asādhāraṇatāpi kā vā* |. For PVBh *ad* k. 122, see n. 609.

[608]See PVV 455, 4: *yad apy ucyate dvitīyasya candrasyābhāvād asādhāraṇateti tatrāha* | and PVV-n, n. 1 to *yad apy ucyate*: *nyāyamukhaṭīkākāram upakṣipati*.

[609]PVBh 541, 13–19: *atha sādhāraṇatayānumānam asty eva tena bādhā bhaviṣyatīti cet* | *atrāha* |...[k. 122] | *candraśabdābhidhānam api karpūrādiṣu dṛṣṭam eva* | *tataḥ katham ekatā*

PVBh's introduction to k. 123: "[Objection:] But [to hold that] silver and the like are the designata of the word *candra* does not at all partake of any common acknowledgment (*prasiddhi*) and is just something thought up arbitrarily by people who explain such things as how to prepare perfumes (*gandhayuktyādivādin*); this does not pertain to real entities (*vastuvṛtta*)."[610]

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candramasaḥ | na ca samayamātravṛttayaḥ śabdāḥ kvāpi na pravartante | tatas tatrāpy anumānabādhaiva | tad iyaṃ pratītibādhā nāma nāsty evety āpatitaṃ | "[Objection:] But there is in fact an inference [to prove that a *śiṃśapā* is a tree] because of the commonness (*sādhāraṇatā*) [of the property tree to many different sub-species]. There will be invalidation [of *śiṃśapā* not being a tree] by this [inference]. To this [Dharmakīrti] replies: ...[k. 122]. The term *candra* is also indeed seen [to be used] for camphor and so forth. So how would the moon be unique? Now, it is not so that words, which function purely by agreement, fail to apply anywhere. Therefore, there [i.e., with regard to *acandraḥ śaśī sattvād*], too, there would just be invalidation by inference, and so it would follow that this invalidation by means of [conventional] acknowledgments (*pratītibādhā*) of which [Dignāga] spoke would not exist at all." Cf. Yamāri's *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyaṭīkā* (PVAṬ) *Supariśuddhī* D. *tse* 85a2–5: *'on te źes bya ba la sogs pas ni 'di sñam du śa pa ni śiṅ ma yin te yod pa'i phyir źes bya ba ni grags pas bsal ba ma yin no || 'o na ci źe na | thun moṅ ba ñid kyis 'di ni śiṅ yin te | yod pa'i phyir śiṅ gźan bźin no źes bya ba'i rjes du dpag pa yod pa ñid do | des na śiṅ ma yin pa ñid ni rjes su dpag pa des gnod par 'gyur ro sñam du bsams pa'o || rtsod pa 'di la brjod pa ni | 'dir yaṅ źes bya ba ste | śiṅ ma yin no źes bya ba 'ba' źig tu ni ma zad de | ri boṅ can ni zla ba ma yin te yod pa'i phyir źes bya ba 'dir yaṅ thun moṅ ba ñid kyis rjes su dpag pas gnod pa yod pa yin no | ci ltar źe na | ga pur daṅ dṅul la sogs pa la | zla ba'i sgras brjod par bya ba ñid mthoṅ ba'i phyir ro | des na thun moṅ ba ñid kyis yod pa zla ba ma yin pa la gnod par byed pa ma yin te des na grags pas bsal bas ci yaṅ byar med do źes dgoṅs pa'o ||* "When [Prajñākaragupta] says *atha* ... and so forth, he meant that the following might be thought: The [argument] 'A *śiṃśapā* is not a tree because it exists' is not opposed by a [conventional] acknowledgment (*pratīti*). Why? Because of the commonness [of treeness amongst several things], there is in fact an inference such as 'It is a tree because it exists, like other trees.' Therefore, the property of not being a tree would be invalidated by that inference. To this objection [k. 122] says, '*atrāpi* and so forth.' The following was meant: Not just in the case of [the thesis] '*śiṃśapā* is not a tree,' but here too, i.e., in the case of *acandraḥ śaśī sattvād*, would there be invalidations by means of inferences, because of the commonness [of properties like treeness and being the moon in other things]. How so? It is because camphor, silver and so forth are seen to be the designata of the word *candra*. Thus, because of commonness [of the term *candra* to several things], [the reason] *sattva* would not invalidate [the thesis that *śaśin*] is not the moon. Hence, opposition by acknowledgments would be completely useless."

[610]PVBh 541, 20–21: *atha rajatādiṣu candraśabdavācyatvaṃ naiva prasiddhibhāk kevalaṃ yathākathaṃcid gandhayuktyādivādibhiḥ kalpitaṃ na vastuvṛttaṃ tat |*.

(123) *yadi tasya kvacit sidhyet siddham vastubalena tat* |
pratītisiddhopagame śaśiny apy[611] *anivāraṇāt*[612] ||[613]

If for him [i.e., the opponent], [designation] were established in [only] certain cases, then it would be by the force of real entities (*vastubalena*) that it was established. For, if it were accepted that [designation] was established through [conventional] acknowledgment (*pratīti*), then it would not be prohibited, even in the case of *śaśin*.

The adversary seeks to preserve his interpretation of the phrase *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve* in PSV, so that over-exclusiveness turns on there being no similar instances (*sapakṣa*) because of the fact that there is just one moon. He thus tries to eliminate camphor and silver by saying that there is no actual common acknowledgment of the word *candra* being applicable to such things, apart from some arbitrary, and hence ungrounded, isolated uses in treatises on perfumes. The idea, then, is that camphor, etc., contrary to the moon itself, do not objectively or in themselves possess the required grounds (*nimitta*) to be designated by the word *candra*, and thus do not count against the idea of there being only one designatum of *candra*. In that case, retorts Dharmakīrti (k. 123cd), this is tantamount to accepting a realist theory of meaning, rather than the Buddhist theory, in that the selectiveness of reference would be due to objective facts, i.e., "by the force of entities" (*vastubalena*), for on a Buddhist theory, where words apply only due to our conventional acknowledgments, *candra* will unrestrictedly designate anything, be it camphor, silver, or even *śaśin*.

Although the commentaries give no explicit indications as to who the opponent is, we can reasonably hypothesize that he continues to be the Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra, or at the very least a Buddhist much like him. And if this is right, there would seem to be some surprising additional information to be gleaned

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[611] PV-k(I/II/III), MIY. *'śaśiny apy*. The editors were influenced by PV Tib., but not by PVin and PVinṬ which clearly read *ri boṅ can la yaṅ* = *śaśiny apy*. PVP 350b3 also reads *ri boṅ can*. Finally, it is to be noted that Manorathanandin comments upon *śaśiny apy*. Note that the second *kārikā* given as PV Tib. k. 125 would correspond to this understanding of the Sanskrit. The easiest rationale is thus to say that PV Tib. k. 123 as given in Miyasaka is a corruption (upon which indigenous Tibetan writers nonetheless commented) and should be replaced with that found in k. 125.

[612] PV-k(II) *anivāraṇam*. Cf. Tib. *bzlog med phyir*.

[613] Cf. PVin 297b5–6: *gal te de la 'ga' źig tu grub na dṅos po'i dbaṅ gis grub pa yin te* | *grags pas grub par khas len na ni ri boṅ can la yaṅ mi bzlog pa'i phyir ro* | (D. 200a2). Note that PVin seems to support *śaśiny api* (PVin *ri boṅ can la yaṅ*), whereas PV Tib. supports *aśaśiny api* (PV Tib. *ri boṅ can ma yin pa la'aṅ*). See n. 611 above.

concerning the Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra's views and arguments. To summarize: this mysterious individual begins with the position that *asādhāraṇatva* is due to there being just one moon. He then has to rebut the argument that the word *candra* in any case applies to several other things, such as camphor and silver, and this he does by saying that camphor is not *really* or fully justifiably called *candra*—this is a position, as Dharmakīrti shows, which is very close to semantic realism. Thus it seems that, interestingly enough, there may have been Buddhist interpretations of Dignāga which not only differed from Dharmakīrti on the technical point of *asādhāraṇatva*, but also proposed a set of quite different semantic views. On this scenario, then, one of the major innovations which Dharmakīrti would make relative to his predecessor's interpretation of Dignāga would be to stress that *no* words have grounds (*nimitta*) consisting in real entities (*vastu*). Unfortunately, however, our information is too scanty to say how far these differences go or how explicitly they were formulated by pre-Dharmakīrti commentators. It is not clear whether this Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra willingly and clearly espoused a form of semantic realism, or whether this attribution was a position which Dharmakīrti attributed to him as a consequence to which he would be led if he remained coherent with his other views.

(124) *tasya vastuni siddhasya śaśiny apy anivāraṇam |*
tadvastvabhāve[614] *śaśini vāraṇe 'pi na duṣyati ||*[615]

> When established on the basis of the entity [whiteness, etc. which is the ground (*nimitta*) for the designation], this [property, 'being the designatum of the word *candra*' (*candraśabdābhidheyatva*),] would not be prohibited in the case of *śaśin* either.[616] If this entity were absent, then no fault would ensue even if there were prohibition in the case of *śaśin*.

PVBh explains: "If an assertion of the word *candra* were to be made due to grounds (*nimitta*) in the case of camphor and the like, then it should not be prohibited either in the case of *śaśin*, for the grounds for it are there. But if it were prohibited because that entity [constituting the ground] was not there, then there would be no fault even if there were prohibition in the case of *śaśin*. A [word]

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[614]PV-k(I) *tadvat svabhāve*.

[615]Cf. PVin 297b6–7: *dṅos po la de grub na ri boṅ can la bzlog tu med pa yin la | dṅos po la de med na ri boṅ can la bzlog kyaṅ skyon 'ga' yaṅ med do |* (D. 200a2–3).

[616]Cf. PVV 455, 24–26: *śuklatādike nimittabhūte vastuni | tasya candraśabdābhidheyatvasya siddhasya śaśiny api nimittasadbhāvād anivāraṇam.*

which is connected to an entity (*vastupratibaddha*) will not occur when the entity is not there—this latter [principle] is one which will not be unrecognized [by you]."[617]

Kārikā 124 and PVin continue the argument of k. 123 and present a dilemma for the Buddhist opponent who is leaning towards semantic realism and who holds that the word *candra* is applied depending only upon whether the object itself has the required properties, like whiteness, which are the grounds for the application (*pravṛttinimitta*) of the term.[618] We can present the two lemmas as follows:

(a) If camphor and the like had the requisite properties (whiteness, etc.) constituting the grounds (*nimitta*) for applying the term *candra*, then *śaśin* would too. Hence there would be absolutely no reason for anyone (realists included) to deny that *śaśin* is *candra*.

(b) If on the other hand camphor did not have the relevant necessary grounds, then nor would *śaśin*, and then, following the realist theory, the opponent would have

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[617]PVBh 542, 3–6: *yadi karpūrādau nimittaprayuktaṃ candraśabdābhidhānaṃ śaśiny api tasya nimittasya bhāvād avāryam eva | atha tadvastvabhāvān*[a] *nivāraṇaṃ tadā śaśini vāraṇe 'pi na doṣaḥ | vastupratibaddhaṃ vastvabhāve na*[b] *bhavatīti nāprasiddham etat |* ([a] RS. *tadvatsvabhāvān*, but PVBh Tib. 226b6 reads *dṅos po de ma grub pa'i phyir*, which supports *tadvastvabhāvān*; [b] RS. *vastvabhāvena*, but cf. PVBh Tib. *dṅos po daṅ 'brel pa dṅos po med na med par 'gyur ro źes bya ba 'di ni ma grub pa ma yin no ||*). Cf. PVP 350b4–7: *de bas na de dṅos su grub pa yin ri boṅ can la yaṅ zla ba ñid yod pa de'i tshe*[a] *| de'i dṅos po ñid las grub pas | dṅos la*[b] *grub pa la | ri boṅ can la'aṅ bzlog pa med | ci ste yaṅ la lar dṅos su zla ba ñid du smra ba de'i tshe | ri boṅ can la zla ba'i rgyu mtshan gyi dṅos po yod pa ma yin pa de'i tshe de dṅos med na ri boṅ can la zla ba ñid | bzlog pa la yaṅ grags pas gnod pa'i ñes pa cuṅ zad med pa yin te | sgra rgyu mtshan can la rgyu mtshan med pa'i phyir | grags pa spoṅ bar byed pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro || de ltar yaṅ ma yin pa de'i phyir ri boṅ can zla ba ñid du mi 'dod pa'i grags pa cuṅ zad kyaṅ grub pa ma yin źiṅ | de ñid spaṅ bar bya ba ñid du 'dod do ||*([a] P. *de*—[b] P. *dṅos ma* [D. 293b3–6]). "So 'it is established on the basis of the entity' [means that] when the property *candratva* pertains to *śaśin*, then this would be established on account of the entity alone. And thus, if it were established on the basis of the entity, there would be no prohibition of it in the case of *śaśin* either. But should one say that on the basis of the entity only some things are *candra*, then if the entity constituting the ground (*rgyu mtshan* = *nimitta*) for [applying] *candra* were absent in *śaśin*, i.e., if this entity were absent, then even if we prohibited *candratva* in the case of *śaśin*, there would ensue absolutely no fault of being invalidated by [conventional] acknowledgments (*pratīti*); for a word which needed grounds (*rgyu mtshan can* = *naimittika*) would have [in fact] lacked the [necessary] grounds, [and this thesis *acandraḥ śaśī*] would not be eliminated by means of *pratīti*. But this is not the case. So there is no [conventional] acknowledgment (*pratīti*) at all of *śaśin* not being accepted to be *candra*, and this [thesis, viz., *acandraḥ śaśī*] is held to be something which should be eliminated [by *pratīti*]."

[618]On the grammarians' basic use of the term *pravṛttinimitta*, see FILLIOZAT 1988, 65–66.

to accept that there is no fault in a thesis like *śaśin* is not *candra*. In that case, the Buddhist opponent would obviously contradict Dignāga: how could he then continue to maintain, as does Dignāga, that *śaśin* is not *candra* is an example of a thesis which is to be refuted by what is commonly recognized?

(125) *tasmād avastuniyatasaṃketadhvanibhāvinām*[619] |
yogyāḥ padārthā dharmāṇām icchāyā anirodhanāt ||[620]

Therefore, things are fit for [conceptual] properties (*dharma*) which derive from words for which the agreement [as to their use] is not restricted by the entities [themselves]. This is because there is no obstacle to [speakers'] intentions.

Devendrabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta take k. 125 as a direct continuation of the second lemma in k. 124.[621] Although the commentators are all brief on the actual content of k. 125, the point is that to make sense of Dignāga's rejection of *acandraḥ śaśī*, it is necessary to see PSV as advocating a purely intentional theory of meaning, one where words apply only through agreements (i.e., common intentions) to use words as we wish, without there being any objective constraints. If words applied because of the presence real entities which served as *pravṛttinimitta*, and *śaśin* did not have such grounds, one could not explain why *acandraḥ śaśī* had to be a faulty thesis refutable by *prasiddha*.

Prajñākaragupta, in a long and philosophically interesting excursus following k. 125, proceeds to take up and refute several positions on *pravṛttinimitta*. One of his principal arguments is that there can be no means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) establishing that a word applies to what has the grounds in question (*nimittavat*), since there would need to be grounds for the grounds, and so on *ad infinitum*.[622] The point would seem to be that if "moon" were applied to something

[619]PV-k(II) *avastuniyatasaṃketabalabhāvinām*.

[620]Cf. PVin 297b7: *de'i phyir dṅos po la ṅes pa ma yin pa'i brda daṅ ldan pa'i sgra las byuṅ ba'i chos rnams kyi ruṅ ba ni don thams cad yin te | 'dod pa la gegs byed pa med pa'i phyir ro |* (D. 200a3–4).

[621]Cf. Devendrabuddhi's introduction to k. 125, PVP 350b7–8: *gaṅ gi phyir 'di ltar raṅ rgyu mtshan ñid kyi dṅos po med pas sgra rgyu mtshan can 'gog par byed pa ñes pa la brten*[a] *pa ma yin pa de'i phyir...*([a] P. *rten* [D. 293b6]) "Since one would not commit a fault in negating [the application of] a word which would need grounds (*naimittika*) because the entity constituting its ground would be absent, ... [k. 125]."

[622]See PVBh 542, 12–14: *nanu nimittaprayuktaḥ śabdaḥ sakala eva | ḍavitthādiśabdānām api kiṃ cin nimittaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣarūpam eva na prasiddhamātrakam eva | tad etad asat | na pravṛttinimittam upādāya śabdas tannimittavati pravarttata iti pramāṇam | nimitte 'pi nimittāntarāpekṣāyām anavasthā |* "[Objection:] But surely absolutely all words are used according

which has the grounds, whiteness, etc., then we would also need grounds for applying the term "whiteness," and so on and so forth—it could never be validly ascertained that the word "moon" applied in virtue of grounds without us performing an infinite number of other such ascertainments. Further on, Prajñākaragupta's excursus on *pravṛttinimitta* also brings in several of the themes in the Dharmakīrtian anti-Vedic polemic, notably the refutation of the Mīmāṃsaka's attempt to give a realist justification of Vedic injunctions by maintaining that the *Veda*s were unmade by human beings (*apauruṣeya*).

3.3.7 Conventional acknowledgment (*pratīti*) is a type of inference and establishes unrestricted use of words

(126) *tāṃ yogyatāṃ nirundhānaṃ*[623] *saṃketāpratiṣedhajā* |
pratihanti pratītyākhyā[624] *yogyatāviṣayā*[625] *'numā* ||

The inference known as '[conventional] acknowledgment' (*pratītyākhyānumā*), which concerns fitness (*yogyatā*) [and] which stems from there being no restrictions upon [conventional] agreements (*saṃketa*), refutes him who would deny this fitness.

(127) *śabdānām arthaniyamaḥ saṃketānuvidhāyinām* |
nety anenoktam atraiṣāṃ pratiṣedho virudhyate ||[626]

By that [which was just stated][627] it was asserted that words, which conform to agreement, have no restrictions as to their objects. Any interdiction upon them here [because of logical reasons such as *sattva*] is opposed.

to grounds. Even words like [the name] *ḍavitthā* have some ground in the form of a universal or particularity, and not just what is commonly recognized. [Reply:] This is not right. There is no means of valid cognition for [the statement that] a word applies, depending on a ground, to that which has that ground. If for the ground too one must rely on another ground, then there would be an infinite regress."

[623] PV-k(II) *virundhānaṃ*.

[624] PV-k(I/III), MIY. *pratītākhyā*.

[625] PV-k(II) °*viṣaye*; MIY. *yogyatā viṣayā*.

[626] Cf. PVin 297b7–8: *'di ni sgra rnams ni brda'i rjes su byed pas don la ṅes pa 'ga' yaṅ med la* | *'di dag de la 'gog na yaṅ 'gal ba yin no źes bśad pa yin no* || (D. 200a4).

[627] PVP 351a5: *bśad ma thag pa 'dis.* Cf. PVV 456, 17: *anena ceṣṭaśabdābhidheyatvayogyatāpratiṣedhabādhanena darśitena* "By this above-explained invalidation of any interdiction of a thing's fitness to be the intended designatum of a word … ."

(128) *naimittikyāḥ śruter artham arthaṃ vā pāramārthikam* |
śabdānāṃ pratirundhāno na bādhyas tena varṇitaḥ[628] ||[629]

Thus, it is shown that one should not invalidate him who rejects that a word, needing [real] grounds, has a [respective] object [i.e., a quality or universal and so forth] or that words have any real object.[630]

Dharmakīrti explains in k. 126–127 that establishing that a word is fit to designate such and such a thing is itself a type of inference, one which proves universal fitness and hence serves to refute all the realist's attempts to restrict designation. The inference in question, the *pratītyākhyānumāna* (inference known as 'a [conventional] acknowledgment [of fitness]'), is that which was explained in connection with k. 92.[631] In k. 128 Dharmakīrti once again takes up the idea of *pravṛttinimitta*. His adversary seems to hold that only certain words (i.e., probably the 'arbitrary terms' or *yadṛcchāśabda*) depend purely for their application on conventions which are commonly recognized, but that others, in particular substantives and adjectives, are applied in virtue of grounds. The result of accepting that words apply unrestrictedly is that none will be accepted to have any real grounds for their application.

3.3.8 Why this inference received a separate treatment in PS III, k. 2cd

(129) *tasmād viṣayabhedasya darśanāya pṛthakkṛtā* |
anumānābahirbhūtā pratītir api pūrvavat ||[632]

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[628]PV-k(II) *abādhanārho hi varṇitaḥ*; PV-k(III) *na vācyas tena varṇitaḥ*. PV Tib. *des ni ... gnod pa med par bstan pa yin* supports the reading in PV-k(I) *na bādhyas tena varṇitaḥ*.

[629]PV IV, k. 128 = PVin III, k. 28; 297b8–298a1.

[630]See PVV 457, 1–3: *naimittikyā vastubhūtaguṇādinimittavatyāḥ śruter arthaṃ guṇādikaṃ pāramārthikam arthaṃ guṇiguṇādisambandhaṃ śabdānāṃ guṇyādivācināṃ pratirundhāno 'bādhanārho bādhām nārhatīty ukto bhavati* |. Devendrabuddhi's interpretation differs somewhat, speaking of kinds (*jāti*) rather than qualities (*guṇa*). It is clear however that the *ādi* in the PVV passage includes *jāti*. Indeed Vibhūticandra's PVV-n, n. 2 on PVV 456, glosses *guṇādi* as *jātyādi*.

[631]See our introductory remarks to *anumānābhāva* (p. 160), our remarks to k. 92 (p. 128) and n. 447. We see in k. 126–7 a confirmation of the appropriateness of Devendrabuddhi's and Śākyabuddhi's division of Dharmakīrtian inferences into three sorts (*rjes su dpag pa rnam pa gsum*). *Prasiddha/pratīti* figures clearly as an inference along with *vastubalapravṛttānumāna* and *āpta/abhyupāya*. The triple classification is taken over by the Tibetan scholastics; see n. 446 for the Indian and Tibetan references.

[632]PV IV, k. 129 = PVin III, k. 29; 298a1.

So, [conventional] acknowledgment (*pratīti*), which is not outside [the category of] inference, was also treated separately [by Dignāga in PS III, k. 2] in order to show a difference of scope, just as in the previous case [i.e., authoritative words (*āptavacana*)].

In k. 129–130 Dharmakīrti argues that just as in the case of *āptavacana*, which is also classifiable as an inference, the separate specification of *prasiddha* (=*pratīti*) in PS III, k. 2cd does not indicate an additional means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) over and above perception and inference. Dignāga's purpose in separately mentioning *prasiddha* in the four kinds of opposition to theses was to indicate that *prasiddha* is an inference treating of a special type of object.

Kārikā 129 is a deliberate mirroring of k. 102, which had spoke of *abhyupāya* / *abhyupagama* (acceptance), i.e., *āptavacana*, as being "not outside [the category of] inference" (*anumānābahirbhūta*), but nonetheless "treated separately in order to show a difference of scope" (*viṣayabhedasya darśanāya*). See our explanatory remarks to k. 102–103, 118 and also our n. 495, 588. Commentators on k. 129 stress that what is "commonly recognized through mere acknowledgment" (*pratītimātraprasiddha*) concerns *purely* conceptual matters, unconnected with reality, while inference (i.e., *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*) can at least indirectly pertain to real entities (*vastu*).[633]

[633]Cf. PVV 457, 8–9: ... *kim artham ity āha* | *viṣayasya bhedaḥ kalpitākalpitatvaṃ tasya darśanāya* | *kalpitārthaviṣayā pratītiḥ* | *vastuviṣayaṃ tv anumānam ity arthaḥ* |. Cf. PVinṬ 71a7: *grags pa'i yul ni brda las byuṅ ba'i don yin la* | *rjes su dpag pa'i yul ni dṅos po yin no źes bya ba 'di ni yul gyi dbye ba'o* | "The difference of scope is as follows: the scope of *pratīti* is things which are derived from agreements, whereas the scope of inference is real entities (*dṅos po* = *vastu*)." Interestingly, Prajñākaragupta, echoing his explanations of k. 102 (see n. 495), seems to once again put the emphasis on authoritative words (*āptavacana*) not being a full-fledged invalidator (*bādhaka*), but rather more like an impediment (*pratibandhaka*) to their opposing theses; he then suggests a parallel in this respect with *pratīti*. On the difference between *bādhaka* and *pratibandhaka*, see p. 133. PVBh 545, 1–4: *yathā śāstraṃ svavacanaṃ ca prastāvāśrayatvenābhyupagataṃ bādhakaṃ bhavati* | *nānyathā* | *pratijñātasyārthasya bādhanāt* | *na sarvathā viparyayasya bādhanam eva* | *dvayos tulyakakṣatvāt* | *tathā pratītir api na pāramārthikārthasya bādhikāpi tu pratītimātrakaprasiddhasya pratikṣepasya bādhiketi na paramārthaḥ*[a] | ([a] RS *bādhiketi paramārthaḥ*, but cf. PVBh Tib. 230b3: *des na don dam par ni ma yin te* |) "A treatise and one's own words are invalidators when accepted as the basis for the discussion but not otherwise, for they [only] invalidate something which has been accepted.* They do not actually completely invalidate an opposite [statement], for the two [i.e., the authoritative statement and its opposite] are of the same force. So too, a [conventional] acknowledgment is not an invalidator of anything fully real (*pāramārthikārtha*) either, but rather invalidates rejections of what has been commonly recognized through mere acknowledgment (*pratītimātraprasiddha*). Hence it is not fully real." *Yamāri's PVAṬ *Supariśuddhī* D. *tse* 90b4

(130) *siddhayoḥ pṛthagākhyāne darśayaṃś ca prayojanam |*
ete sahetuke prāha nānumādhyakṣabādhane ||

And showing the need for separate explanations of the two proofs [i.e., those by *āptavacana* and those by *pratīti/prasiddha*], he mentioned the two [in PSV *ad* PS III, k. 2cd] along with their causes [viz., *pratijñāmātreṇa* and *śābdaprasiddhena*], but not the two invalidations by inference and by perception [for he just stated the propositions 'sound is not audible' and 'vases are permanent'].[634]

In the PSV passage which we translated at the beginning of this section (see p. 154), Dignāga gave examples of the first two sorts of bogus theses, viz., "sound is not audible" and "vases are permanent." But in that passage (viz., *aśrāvaṇaḥ śabdo nityo ghaṭa iti*), Dignāga did not explicitly mention the causes for these two theses being bogus. In the passage concerning *āpta/svavacana* and *prasiddha* (viz., *na santi pramāṇāni prameyārthānīti pratijñāmātreṇa | yatrāpy asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve śābdaprasiddhena viruddhenārthāpohyate yathā 'candraḥ śaśī sattvād*), he not only gave the examples, but explicitly stated that these theses were respectively refuted because of mere acceptance (*pratijñāmātra*) and because of what is commonly recognized through verbal knowledge (*śābdaprasiddha*). Thus he also gave the causes, and not just the examples. This seemingly rather minor point in Dignāga's text was magnified by Dharmakīrti in k. 130 to show that Dignāga thought that separate explanations of *āpta* and *prasiddha* were necessary to show special scope, even though strictly speaking both were included in the category of inference.[635]

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comments on this phrase as follows: *gal te rjes su dpag pa bźin du khas ma blaṅs par yaṅ gnod par byed pa yin nam źe na | dam bcas pa'i źes smos so |* "If it is objected that [treatises and own words] also invalidate things which had not been believed [by the adversary], just as do inferences, then [Prajñākaragupta] replies *pratijñāta*[*syārthasya bādhanāt*]." The point is that treatises can be taken as an invalidation of propositions that have been accepted by the adversary, but they do not invalidate objectively, i.e., irrespective of whether or not the contrary thesis was accepted. In that respect treatises differ from *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*, which proves and invalidates objectively.

[634]Cf. PVP 352a5: *sgra mñan par bya ba ma yin źiṅ bum pa rtag pa yin no źes bya ba 'ba' źig de ltar brjod pa'i phyir.*

[635]See PVBh 545, 7–11: *tatrācāryeṇedam uktam | svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ pakṣaḥ | yadi pratyakṣānumānāgamaprasiddhena | tadyathā | aśrāvaṇaḥ śabdo nityo ghaṭa iti | na santi pramāṇāni prameyārthāniti pratijñāmātreṇa | yatrāpy asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve śābdaprasiddhena viruddhenā[rthenā]podyate na sa pakṣa iti | anumādhyakṣabādhane | muktvāgamaprasiddhibādhane sahetuke prāha | pratijñāmātreṇa śābdaprasiddheneti |*. Note that we have followed Prajñākaragupta *et al.* in reading *nānumādhyakṣabādhane* in k. 130d as a dual, rather than as a locative. PV Tib. leans towards a loca-

Kārikā 130 constitutes the end of the section on *pratītibādhā*. It should be noted that Miyasaka's classification of k. 126–132 as constituting *pratyakṣabādhā* (invalidation by perception) is an error, as that section begins at k. 131 and continues until k. 135. Manorathanandin states *uktā pratītibādhā* (invalidation by *pratīti* has been explained) immediately after his commentary on k. 130, and it is clear from his PVV *ad* k. 131 (see below) and the other Indian and Tibetan commentaries that *pratyakṣabādhā* begins at k. 131.[636]

3.4 The thesis is unopposed by perceptible objects (*pratyakṣārtha*)

Kārikās 131–135 will now take up the term *pratyakṣārtha* occurring in the context of the four ways a thesis can be opposed which were specified in PS III, 2cd. Just as a valid thesis should not be opposed (*anirākṛta*) by inference (*anumāna*), authorities (*āpta*) or by what is commonly recognized (*prasiddha*), so too it should not be opposed by "perceptible objects"/"perceptible states of affairs." The passage from the PSV commenting upon the words *pratyakṣārtha* in PS III, 2cd, has been translated in our introductory remarks to the section in PV IV on *prasiddha*; see p. 154 and n. 530. Recall that Dignāga's example of a bogus thesis which is opposed by a perceptible object was *aśrāvaṇaḥ śabdaḥ*, "sound is not audible," a proposition which is obviously immediately refuted by the perception of sound.

3.4.1 The word *artha* in *pratyakṣārtha*

PVV's introduction to k. 131: "Invalidation by perception (*pratyakṣabādhā*) should [now] be explained. It is not just in the case of *śābdaprasiddha*, i.e., when there is common recognition of a conventional property, that [a thesis] which is in opposition with some [criterion] is invalidated. Rather,"[637]

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tive: *mṅon sum rjes dpag gnod la min.* PVV 457, 21–23: *tasmād viṣayabhedopalakṣaṇārthaṃ sahetutvāhetutvadarśanam | pratyakṣānumānabādhe sarvaviṣaye | abhyupagamapratītibādhe tu niyataviṣaye ity arthaḥ |* "Thus in order to show a difference of scope he presented [the theses] with or without their causes. Invalidations by perception and inference are of a universal scope, but invalidations by acceptance or by [conventional] acknowledgment (*pratīti*) are limited in scope."

[636]Cf. the first line of PVBh *ad* k. 131: *adhyakṣabādhāyām api vaktavyam asty eva |*.

[637]PVV 458, 3–4: *pratyakṣabādhā vaktavyā | na kevalaṃ śābdaprasiddhe vyavahāradharmaprasiddhau tatpratiroddhā bādhyate | kiṃ tu.*

(131) *tatrāpy*[638] *adhyakṣabādhāyāṃ nānārūpatayā dhvaneḥ*[639] |
prasiddhasya śrutau rūpaṃ yad eva pratibhāsate ||
(132) *advayaṃ śabalābhāsasyādṛṣṭer buddhijanmanaḥ* |
tadarthārthoktir asyaiva kṣepe 'dhyakṣeṇa bādhanam ||[640]

There too, to take the case of invalidation by perception, when one hears sound, which is commonly recognized as having various natures, then the actual nature [of the sound] appears as nondual [i.e., without distinctions between *dharmin* and *dharma*, etc.], for we do not see that there arises any awareness of differentiated appearances. The word 'object' (*artha*) [in PS III, k.2cd] has this purpose. [It shows that] it is when there is a rejection of this very [nature established by perception, i.e., the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*)][641] that there is invalidation by perception.

(133) *tad eva rūpaṃ tatrārthaḥ śeṣaṃ vyāvṛttilakṣaṇam* |
avasturūpaṃ[642] *sāmānyam atas tan nākṣagocaraḥ* ||[643]

It is just that [particular] nature which is the object for the [auditive consciousness]; the rest have the character of exclusions (*vyāvṛttilakṣaṇa*). A universal is not a real nature, and thus it is not an object of the senses.

Dharmakīrti focuses largely on the term *artha*, taking it as being the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) itself, rather than various universal properties, such as impermanence, etc. These universals are, following the *apoha* theory, to be taken as exclusions of their contraries (*vyāvṛtti*) and are mind-invented. More generally, the fundamental position in this section of PV IV is that conceptual thought understands various universal properties of a thing (e.g., its impermanence, its being

[638]PV-(II) *atrāpy*.

[639]PV-(II), MIY. *dhvanau*.

[640]Cf. PVin 298a2–3: *mṅon sum daṅ 'gal ba yaṅ ran bźin sna tshogs can gyi*[a] *raṅ bźin gaṅ źig 'dres par snaṅ ba'i blo mthoṅ ba med pa'i phyir 'brel pa can gźan med pas ñan pa la gñis med par snaṅ ba de ñid*[b] *spoṅ na 'gal ba yin*[c] *de* | *dper na sgra ni mñan par bya ba ma yin no*[d] *źes bya ba lta bu'o* || *de'i phyir yaṅ don źes bśad pa yin no* || ([a] P. *gyis*—[b] P. *gñis*—[c] P. *yod*—[d] P. D. *mñan par mi bya ba ma yin no*; Ego *sgra ni mñan par bya ba ma yin no* = *aśrāvaṇaḥ śabdaḥ* [D. 200a6–7]).

[641]See PVV 458, 15: *asyādhyakṣasiddhasyaiva rūpasya kṣepe*. See also PVV-n 458, n. 2 which glosses *asyādhyakṣasiddhasyaiva* by *svalakṣaṇāsyaiva*.

[642]PV-k(II) *avastubhūtaṃ*.

[643]PV IV, k. 133 = PVin III, k. 30; 298a3–4.

produced, etc.) and is propositional in form, making a distinction between subjects (*dharmin*) and their properties (*dharma*). Thus thought grasps a subject *S* as qualified by a predicate-property *P*. Perception, on the other hand, grasps the mere *svalakṣaṇa* without singling out any specific property, and hence is not an understanding of a proposition like *S* is *P*. How then can it invalidate a false proposition such as *aśrāvaṇaḥ śabdaḥ* (sound is not audible)? The answer which emerges (see, e.g., k. 135) seems to presuppose the basic Abhidharmic position that sense objects like sound, form, etc. are defined in terms of their respective sense consciousnesses—thus the audible (i.e., sound) is that which is perceived by the auditory consciousness, the visible (i.e., form) is that which is perceived by vision, etc. A specific type of sensory perception is a *pramāṇa* establishing that there is a corresponding particular object, one which has as its specific (*asādhāraṇa*) nature its accessibility to the appropriate senses. This does not mean that perception itself understands the *propositions* that sound is audible or that sound is not inaudible, but seems rather to mean that the fact that one hears a particular sound at all establishes the particular object, sound (i.e., that which is audible), and hence falsifies the sound's being inaudible. A sense perception establishes and falsifies, not because it is in itself propositional knowledge, but because of the simple fact that it exists and does actually apprehend its corresponding particular.

3.4.2 The choice of the word "audible" (*śrāvaṇa*) in PSV III's example

(134) *tena sāmānyadharmāṇām apratyakṣatvasiddhitaḥ |*
pratikṣepe 'py abādheti śrāvaṇoktyā prakāśitam ||

> So, by saying 'audible' (*śrāvaṇa*) [in PSV *ad* PS III, k. 2] the following was shown: Because universal properties [like being an object of a means of valid cognition, etc.] are established as not being [objects] of perception,[644] then even if they are rejected, this does not lead to invalidation [by perception].

Theses such as "sound is not an object of a means of valid cognition" or "sound is permanent" can only be refuted by conceptual cognitions having the form *S* is *P*, where a universal property is attributed to a subject. As universals are not themselves perceptible, refutation of universal properties is not by means of perception. Thus, this type of thesis could not be taken as an example of what is invalidated

[644]Cf. PVV *ad* k. 134: ... *sāmānyadharmāṇāṃ prameyatvādīnām apratyakṣatvasya siddhitaḥ |*.

by *pratyakṣārtha*. On the other hand, as sound *is* just simply that which is audible, rejecting the latter is to deny the manifest particular object which appears to perception and thus the existence of the perception itself. Hence the rationale for choosing "sound is not audible" as the example in PSV III of what is invalidated by perception: the simple fact that we hear something at all establishes that there are sounds (i.e., audible particulars) and thus refutes the opposing thesis. Indeed, the opposing thesis could have been formulated as just simply "There is no sound" (*śabdo nāsti*), as this too would have been refuted by the mere fact of hearing. As k. 135 will show, however, there are some potential ambiguities in such a thesis (all be they minor) which can be avoided by choosing instead "Sound is not audible."

(135) *sarvathāvācyarūpatvāt siddhyā*[645] *tasya samāśrayāt* |
bādhanāt tadbalenoktaḥ śrāvaṇenākṣagocaraḥ ||[646]

> [The word 'audible' was stated] because in no way is the [specific nature of sound, i.e., its audible nature] something which can be verbally expressed. Due to the establishment [of the sound-qua-particular] owing to the [auditory consciousness], there can be invalidation by means of this [auditory *pramāṇa*]. Hence [the word] 'audible' (*śrāvaṇa*) expresses the sensorial object.[647]

Dharmottara explains the corresponding *kārikā* in PVin: "Equally, if [Dignāga] had stated, 'There is no sound (*śabdo nāsti*),' there would also be a contradiction with perception. But there are several ways to negate objects [i.e., qualities] pertaining to sound, e.g., saying that sound does not exist as something momentary, all-pervasive or permanent, etc. If the word 'audible' had not been used there [in Dignāga's example], then it might have been suspected that for negating them all there would [only] be invalidations by perception. The word 'audible' shows that the negation of that nature which is apprehended by hearing is invalidated by perception, but that there is no [invalidation by perception] in the case of negations of qualities which are universals (*sāmānya*). [Objection:] But doesn't the word 'audible' also express a universal? Then how can it express

[645] PV-k(I) *siddhā*.

[646] PV IV, k. 135 = PVin III, k. 32; 298a4–5.

[647] Additions follow PVinṬ; see text and translation below. Cf. PVV 459, 11–19. We have taken *samāśrayāt* in k. 135b in its sense of "owing to" (See Monier-Monier Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* s.v. *samāśraya*). PV Tib., however, reads *de la brten phyir daṅ*, as if *tasya samāśrayāt* provided an additional reason for Dignāga's using the word "audible." This *daṅ* (= *ca*) is however not found in the Sanskrit of k. 135, nor is it borne out by the commentaries.

something which is an object of the senses. [Reply:] The word 'audible' was stated because the specific (*asādhāraṇa*) nature of sounds [i.e., their audible nature] is in no way something which can be verbally expressed. As for the mere word 'sound' [i.e., if Dignāga had just stated *śabdo nāsti*], one might wonder about all [the various qualities attributed to sound]. By the additional word 'audible' we would indirectly (*śugs kyis*) understand a specific restriction, although not because the [word] has as its object the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*). [Objection:] Then it might be wondered as to why [Dignāga] didn't state [the thesis 'There is no sound'] with the specific restriction 'sound-qua-particular' (*śabdasvalakṣaṇa*) [i.e., *śabdasvalakṣaṇaṃ nāsti*]. [Reply:] We shall explain the need for the word 'audible.' The establishment of a sound-qua-particular (*śabdasvalakṣaṇa*) is owing to the auditory consciousness; due to this establishment there can be invalidation of [the thesis *aśrāvaṇaḥ śabdaḥ*] by means of this (*tadbalena*), i.e., by means of the auditory *pramāṇa*. Hence the word 'audible' expresses the sensorial object."[648]

This *kārikā* is somewhat difficult to interpret. We have followed Dharmottara's commentary to the exact same verse in PVin, an interpretation which, in the main, is also found in Manorathanandin and Devendrabuddhi. The first ablative in k. 135 seems to provide a further reason for k. 134's explanation of Dignāga's point in citing *aśrāvaṇaḥ śabdaḥ* as a case of a *pratyakṣabādhā*, rather than just something like "There is no sound." The logic here is that "audible" indicates unambiguously that what is at stake is not a thesis attributing to sound a univer-

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[648]PVinṬ 72a4–72b3: *'di ltar sgra med do źes de skad smras pa la yaṅ mṅon sum daṅ 'gal ba ni yod mod kyi | 'on kyaṅ sgra'i yul 'gog pa la ni lam du ma yod de | skad cig ma ñid dam khyab pa ñid dam rtag pa ñid du sgra yod pa ma yin no źes bya ba la sogs pa'o || de la mñan bya'i sgra med na thams cad 'gog pa la mṅon sum gyis gnod par dogs par 'gyur ro || mñan bya'i sgras ni ñan pa'i gzuṅ ba gaṅ yin pa'i raṅ bźin de ñid 'gog pa*[a] *mṅon sum gyis gnod kyi | spyi'i chos 'gog pa la ni ma yin no źes bstan par 'gyur ro || gal te mñan bya'i sgra yaṅ spyi brjod pa ma yin nam | de ci ltar 'dis dbaṅ po'i spyod yul brjod par 'gyur źe na | bśad pa | rnam kun te rnam pa thams cad kyi* [b] *sgra'i thun moṅ ma yin pa'i raṅ bźin de*[b] *brjod par bya ba'i dṅos po ma yin pa de'i phyir mñan bya'i sgras brjod do || sgra'i sgra 'ba' źig ni thams cad la dogs par 'gyur ro || mñan bya'i sgra lhag pas ni śugs kyis khyad par rtogs par 'gyur ba yin gyi | de raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyi yul can yin pa'i phyir ni ma yin no || gal te de ltar na sgra raṅ gi mtshan ñid ces bya ba la sogs pa'i khyad par gyis ci ste ma brjod ces dogs pa la*[c] *| mñan bya'i sgra'i dgos pa*[d] *bśad pa | sgra raṅ gi mtshan ñid gaṅ yin pa de grub pa ni ñan pa'i śes pa de la brten nas yin te | grub pa'i rgyu des na de'i źes bya ba ñan pa'i tshad ma'i stobs kyis gnod pa'i rgyu'i phyir mñan bya'i sgras dbaṅ po'i yul bśad do ||* ([a] P. *na*—[b] P. *sgra'i thun moṅ ma yin pa'i raṅ bźin gyis sgra'i thun moṅ ma yin pa'i raṅ bźin de*—[c] Cf. PVV's introduction *ad* k. 135 *evaṃ tarhi śabdasvalakṣaṇaṃ nāstīty eva kasmān nocyate kiṃ śrāvaṇatvaṃ mukhyaṃ niṣedhya yuktir ity āha*—[d] P. D. *dogs pa*; but cf. PVV *ad* PV IV, k. 135 *atha vāsty eva śrāvaṇaśabdenābhidhāne prayojanam ity āha* [D. 61a7–61b5]).

sal property, like permanence, which would have to be invalidated inferentially, but rather a denial of the specific perceptible characteristic of all sounds. The phrase *sarvathāvācyarūpatvāt* thus indicates that "audible" unambiguously expresses the perceptible nature of sound, a nature which is not a universal because it is not an object of language and conceptual thought. Note that Dharmottara, Manorathanandin and Devendrabuddhi readily concede that the word *śrāvaṇa*, like any word, cannot directly express a particular either. Nonetheless, following Dharmottara, it does indicate indirectly the perceptible nature of the particular, and as such serves to ensure that the thesis is one which can be falsified by perception.

The rest of the *kārikā* argues that the term *śrāvaṇa* shows clearly and perspicuously that the object at stake is the particular sound, which is defined as that which is audible. There is thus no need to specify "sound" as being the "sound-qua-particular" (*śabdasvalakṣaṇa*). The auditory perception is the *pramāṇa* which establishes that which is audible, i.e., the particular; hence this very same *pramāṇa* also invalidates the denial.

3.5 The specification *svadharmiṇi* in PS III's definition of the thesis

The last specification in Dignāga's k. 2cd to be treated in PV IV is *svadharmiṇi*, which ensures that any potential opposition to the thesis—i.e., by *pratyakṣārtha*, *anumāna, āpta* or *prasiddha*—must pertain "to [the proponent's] own subject" (*svadharmin*), the subject which the proponent (*vādin*) himself actually intends as the bearer of the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*). Again, as in the case of the section of PV IV on opposition by *prasiddha*, some introductory remarks are necessary on our part.[649]

Following the Dharmakīrtian interpretation of PS III, k. 2cd, the problem motivating Dignāga to include this specification is that of the logical fallacy of *āśrayāsiddha*, or the "basis being unestablished." This type of fallacy, which in Buddhist contexts is sometimes considered to be a fallacy of the thesis (*pakṣābhāsa*) and sometimes one of the logical reason (*hetvābhāsa*), is recognized by Buddhists and others to occur when the subject (*dharmin*) of an ar-

[649]Much of our discussion here is based on earlier articles, notably TILLEMANS 1998a, i.e., "A note on *Pramāṇavārttika*, *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and *Nyāyamukha*. What is the *svadharmin* in Buddhist logic?", and TILLEMANS and LOPEZ 1998, i.e., "What can one reasonably say about nonexistence? A Tibetan work on the problem of *āśrayāsiddha*."

gument is nonexistent.[650] In usual cases, this "subject failure" implies that the proposition to be proved, i.e., the thesis, cannot be established: Buddhists such as Dharmakīrti stress that when the subject fails, a debate about its properties will cease (cf. PV IV, k. 76–79). By saying that "what is being proved" (*sādhya*) should not be opposed (*anirākṛta*) "with regard to [the proponent's] own [intended] subject (*svadharmiṇi*),"[651] Dignāga supposedly recognized not only that the *sādhyadharma* should be unopposed by any *pramāṇa*, but also that the proponent's subject had to be existent, for if it were not existent it could not have the property to be proved, and hence the thesis would be invalidated (see PV IV, k. 137–139). Thus, for example, to take an argument which figures in PVin and PVSV, if someone shows that the Primordial Matter (*prakṛti*), or equivalently the Primordial Matter (*pradhāna*) accepted in Sāṃkhya philosophy, does not in fact exist, then the Sāṃkhya proponent's thesis that *prakṛti* / *pradhāna* has such and such properties will thereby be invalidated.

There is a potential problem, however, when one is proving simple nonexistence of some pseudo-entity, for it would obviously be intolerable for a Buddhist if all proofs of nonexistence became self-refuting. A "successful" nonexistence proof should not become fallacious simply because its "success" entailed that the subject would fail to exist! The philosophical question then becomes: "How can we explain why a subject failure will indeed invalidate the thesis in most cases, and yet will be harmless in others, such as in proofs of the nonexistence of certain pseudo-entities?" It is with this problem in mind that Dharmakīrti takes up his interpretation of *svadharmin*. And it is this problem that led his successors—from Indian writers like Devendrabuddhi and Kamalaśīla to Tibetans like Tsoṅ kha pa, lCaṅ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje and A lag śa Ṅag dbaṅ bstan dar—to combine the idea of *svadharmin* with other key themes to develop explanations as to when *āśrayāsiddha* genuinely should occur and when a charge of *āśrayāsiddha* is just simply misplaced.

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[650]On *asiddhahetu*, see NB III, 57 *et sq.*; see in particular NB III, 65 on *dharmyasiddha*. For a usual Tibetan classification see *Yoṅs 'dzin rtags rigs*, p. 57, which speaks of a triple classification of *asiddhahetu*, those due to objective facts (*don la ltos pa*), those due to attitudes (*blo la ltos pa*) such as doubt, and those due to the debaters (*rgol ba la ltos pa*) having incompatible views on the nature of the subject. The "reason that is unestablished (*asiddha*) because of the nonexistence of the entity of the subject" (*chos can gyi ṅo bo med nas ma grub pa'i gtan tshig*) is a subdivision of the first category. The problem of *āśrayāsiddha* is taken up in various Buddhist contexts: e.g., in connection with proofs of momentariness (*kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*), see MIMAKI 1976, 60–61; in connection with later Madhyamaka proofs of the absence of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāvatā*), see KOBAYASHI 1987, TILLEMANS 1984b and LOPEZ 1987, 170–180.

[651]Cf. Vibhūticandra's gloss on *svadharmiṇi*, PVV-n 459, n. 5: *vādineṣṭasya svasya dharmī svadharmī tatra.*

Whereas Dignāga had only spoken of *svadharmin*, Dharmakīrti in PV IV, k. 136–148 introduced the idea of a contrast between *svadharmin* and *kevala-dharmin*, the former being the subject which the proponent actually intends to be qualified by the property to be proved, the latter being a nominal or unrelated subject, one which may be merely stated but which is not actually what is asserted to be qualified by the property to be proved. Prajñākaragupta, in PVBh *ad* k. 143, speaks of this "unrelated subject," or (less literally) "nominal subject," as *tadasambaddhaparaparikalpitadharmin* (a subject imagined by the adversary and unconnected with the [intended *sādhyadharma*]); this understanding of *kevala-dharmin* is also what we find in Tsoṅ kha pa and other Tibetan writers.[652]

Taking Prajñākaragupta's lead, the contrast between *svadharmin* and *kevaladharmin* can be expanded upon as follows. When the proponent intends to assert that a subject S has a property P, he accepts that S serves as the basis (*āśraya*) for that property P which he asserts to depend (*āśrita*) upon S (cf. k. 138 below). In that case S is the *svadharmin* and S and P are connected (*sambaddha*) in a dependence relation: the property depends upon the subject. Given the dependence of P on S, then showing that S does not exist is sufficient to show that there is a genuine fault of *āśrayāsiddha* since the nonexistence of the basis S will ensure that it cannot be qualified by P. On the other hand, it may well be so that the proponent wishes to assert a proposition S is P, but expresses himself in terms somewhat different from what he actually means. The subject which he explicitly mentions may be "borrowed" from the opponent's system and not accepted by him, while the subject which he actually intends and accepts is something else. In effect, the proponent says S' is P but *actually means* that S is P, the difference between S' and S being that the former is the opponent's version of the entity in question and the latter is what the proponent intends. S' is simply "imagined by the adversary" (*paraparikalpita*) and is unconnected with the property P intended by the proponent; it is thus an unrelated subject (*kevaladharmin*). Clearly, in that case, the nonexistence of the *kevaladharmin* S' will not have any consequences whatsoever for the thesis S is P, as P is not asserted to depend upon S', but rather on S. Moreover, we can imagine a situation like that described in k. 140 *et sq.* where a Buddhist proponent might prove a property P which would directly entail the nonexistence of the opponent's subject S'. Here too it would be illogical to hold that because an unrelated subject like S' is negated the thesis would be refuted because of a fault like *āśrayāsiddha*.

[652] Cf. Ṅag dbaṅ bstan dar's formulation in TILLEMANS and LOPEZ 1998, 103: "Now, something's being a 'nominal subject' means that although it might be stated as the subject, it is not the locus of the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*), and is thus an unrelated subject."

The answer to our earlier query as to when *āśryāsiddha* genuinely occurs for a Buddhist logician and when a charge of *āśrayāsiddha* is misplaced should thus be clear: if the *svadharmin S* is shown to be nonexistent, *āśrayasiddha* occurs; if the *kevaladharmin S′* is nonexistent the fault of *āśrayāsiddha* does not occur. In the former case, the thesis will be invalidated, but not in the latter.[653] This general theoretical formulation is relatively straightforward in PV IV and the subsequent literature (see e.g., PV IV, k. 136–137, 143). But how are we to say what the *svadharmin* actually is in specific reasonings, as contrasted with the *kevaladharmin*? In most cases, there will be no difference, and that is why in most cases it is uncontroversial that showing that the subject is nonexistent will invalidate the thesis. The necessity to make a separation between the two arises in the cases where one actually wishes to prove that a certain pseudo-entity, i.e., *S′*, is in fact nonexistent, for it is in this type of case that *āśrayāsiddha* would be an absurd self-refutation. So, to rephrase our question: In proofs of nonexistence, what is the *svadharmin* and what is the *kevaladharmin*? In fact, as we endeavored to show in TILLEMANS 1998a, there are competing scenarios as to what the *svadharmin* is for Dharmakīrti and Dignāga when they deal with Buddhist refutations of the pseudo-entities accepted by their adversaries.

First scenario: The proponent's own intended subject (*svadharmin*) in proofs of nonexistence is taken to be just a conceptual representation of the entity in question and not the entity itself.

[653] An important point to note is that Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, in their explanations of PV IV, k. 141 *et sq.*, emphasize the idea that subjects, like space, taken as real (*dṅos por gyur pa* = *vastubhūta*) by the opponents, are *kevala* in nonexistence proofs where the property to be proved and the reason are "mere exclusions" (*rnam par gcod pa tsam* = *vyavacchedamātra*); in these special cases, the subjects can be negated with impunity. See TILLEMANS and LOPEZ 1998 and TILLEMANS 1998a on this way of avoiding *āśrayāsiddha*. Although Devendrabuddhi himself does not gloss these "mere exclusions" by the notion of non-implicative negations (*prasajyapratiṣedha*) so often invoked in Buddhist philosophy, the transition is very natural and is, indeed, explicitly made by Śākyabuddhi in PVṬ. This position where *āśrayāsiddha* is avoided when one proves a mere exclusion does not figure explictly in PV IV, but seems to have been first developed by Devendrabuddhi. It is widely adopted by later Indian writers such as Prajñākaragupta, Kamalaśīla (in his *Madhyamakāloka*) and by Tibetans such as Tsoṅ kha pa and later writers of the dGe lugs pa school, with a *further* development in the direction of what we have termed the "Principle of Conceptual Subjects." In particular, these later Indian and Tibetan authors argue that when a Buddhist logician proves a mere exclusion, or non-implicative negation (e.g., that such and such a pseudo-entity does not exist), the Buddhist proponent's intended subject, the *svadharmin*, is just the conceptual image of the entity. It seems to us unlikely that Dharmakīrti himself adopted this "Principle of Conceptual Subjects" in connection with the *svadharmin-kevaladharmin* section in PV IV.

Second scenario: The reasoning in question should be paraphrased so that the *svadharmin* and the property to be proved are to be understood in ways acceptable to the Buddhist himself.

We have argued at some length elsewhere that the second scenario ("the Method of Paraphrase") is probably more faithful to Dharmakīrti's treatment of *svadharmin* in PV IV.[654] The first scenario ("the Principle of Conceptual Subjects"), which becomes the received view in later Indian and Tibetan writers, has its support in PVSV and PVin's treatment of a passage in Dignāga's NM: "*prādhana* and so forth do not exist because they are not perceived" (*na santi pradhānādayo 'nupalabdheḥ*), where Dignāga had spoken of "nonperception being a property of an imagined object" (*kalpitasyānupalabdhir dharmaḥ*). Later Indian writers, like Kamalaśīla in his *Madhyamakāloka* (and hence Tibetan writers too, who were heavily indebted to Kamalaśīla on logical matters), made a synthesis between this context, with its clear statement of the Principle of Conceptual Subjects, and the contexts in PS III and PV IV where *svadharmin* is discussed. There is, we have argued, evidence to show that this synthesis is most likely a mistaken portrayal of Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's position on the notion of *svadharmin*.

3.5.1 The thesis is invalidated when the proponent's intended subject fails to exist

PVV's introduction to k. 136: "Now, when [Dignāga] said that with regard to [the proponent's] own subject, [the thesis is not opposed] by perception, inference, authorities or by what is commonly recognized, [Dharmakīrti] stated the following to explain the relevance of the term *svadharmin*:"[655]

(136) *sarvatra vādino dharmo yaḥ svasādhyatayepsitaḥ* |
taddharmavati[656] *bādhā syān nānyadharmeṇa dharmiṇi* ||

Always, invalidation (*bādhā*) [of the thesis] would occur in the case of [an invalidation of] the possessor of that property which the proponent himself intends to prove (*sādhya*), but not in the case of

[654]See TILLEMANS 1998a and TILLEMANS and LOPEZ 1998, n. 13.

[655]PVV 459, 22–23: *idānīṃ pratyakṣānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharmiṇīti svadharmigrahaṇasya sāphalyam ākhyātum āha* |.

[656]Read *taddharmavati* instead of MIY. *tad dharmavati*.

[an invalidation of] a subject (*dharmin*) [qualified] by some other property.[657]

PVV explains the point of k. 136 as follows: "For example, when one invalidates the sound possessing audibility (*śrāvaṇatvavati śabde bādhite*), then there is invalidation of the thesis. But there would be no invalidation of the thesis when one invalidated a possessor of a property, i.e., a *dharmin*, [connected with] a property other than the property intended by the proponent. Hence the need for saying '[the proponent's] own [intended] subject.' For example, when one invalidates the sound which possesses [the *dharma*] 'being a quality of space' (*ākāśaguṇatvavati śabde bādhite*), there is no invalidation of the thesis."[658]

A Buddhist proponent who wishes to prove a thesis such as "Sound is audible" is speaking of a subject (*dharmin*) which is different from the pseudo-entity "sound" which the Vaiśeṣika wishes to prove to be a quality of space. Although the latter does not exist and is not recognized by the proponent, nevertheless, showing that such a Vaiśeṣika-style "sound" does not exist does not put in jeopardy the Buddhist's own thesis that real, impermanent, sound is audible. The Buddhist's thesis would only be invalidated if one could somehow show that there is no such entity as the sound of which the Buddhist asserts the *sādhyadharma*. But the Buddhist proponent is not to be held responsible for a subject in a thesis which he never wished to prove.

(137) *anyathāsyoparodhaḥ ko bādhite 'nyatra dharmiṇi* |
gatārthe lakṣaṇenāsmin[659] *svadharmivacanaṃ punaḥ* ||
(138) *bādhāyāṃ dharmiṇo 'pi syāt bādhety asya prasiddhaye* |
āśrayasya virodhena tadāśritavirodhanāt ||

Otherwise, when a subject is invalidated in respect to some other [property], why should it [viz., the subject which is qualified by the property under discussion][660] then be negated? Although this

[657]Cf. PVBh 549, 14–16: *tathāpi yaḥ svayaṃ vādinā dharmaḥ sādhayitum iṣṭas taddharmavati dharmiṇi bādhyamāne yadi bādhā bhavet tadā doṣo na tv anyadharmaviśiṣṭe dharmiṇi bādhyamāna iti svadharmivacanam* |.

[658]PVV 460, 2–4: *yathā śrāvaṇatvavati śabde bādhite bādhā pakṣasya* | *na tu vādīṣṭād dharmād anyena dharmeṇa dharmavati dharmiṇi bādhite bādhā pakṣasya syād iti (sva?)dharmigrahaprayojanaṃ yathākāśaguṇatvavati śabde bādhite na pakṣabādhā* |.

[659]PV-k(III), MIY.: *gatārthe lakṣaṇe nāsmin*. But cf. PV Tib. *don 'di mtshan ñid kyis rtogs kyaṅ*, where it is clear that the instrumental *lakṣaṇena* is to be read.

[660]PVV 460, 8–9: *anyathā yady evaṃ neṣyate tadānyatra dharme dharmiṇi bādhite asya prakṛtadharmaviśiṣṭasya dharmiṇaḥ ka uparodho bādhā.*

> point has [already] been understood through the definition [of the thesis],[661] nonetheless the words 'his own subject' (*svadharmivacana*) are designed to make us recognize this [fact], namely, that there would be invalidation [of the thesis] also when the subject is invalidated, for by opposing the basis, one [also] opposes that which depends on that [basis].

PVV's conclusion: "Whether it is because of the property [to be proved] or because of the subject, when the whole combined proposition is invalidated, this constitutes invalidation of the thesis."[662]

The phrase *svayam iṣṭa* (intended by [the proponent] himself) in the thesis definition in PS III, k. 2ab had already served to rule out those subjects which would be qualified by unintended properties. PVBh explains: "The subject (*dharmin*) which alone possesses the [proponent's] own property (*dharma*) is intended by [the proponent] himself (*svayam iṣṭa*)."[663] Thus, strictly speaking, the specification *svadharmiṇi* is redundant, but it nonetheless figures in the definition to remind us that the thesis can also be invalidated due to subject failure, i.e., *āśrayāsiddha*.

(139) *anyathaivaṃvidho dharmaḥ sādhya ity abhidhānataḥ |*
tadbādhām[664] *eva manyeta svadharmivacanaṃ tataḥ ||*

> Otherwise, because it is said that such a type of property (*dharma*) [viz., one which is intended to be just a *sādhya*][665] is to be proved (*sādhya*), it might be thought that there was only invalidation of the [property alone and not also of the subject]. Therefore, [to include both, Dignāga stated] the words 'his own subject' (*svadharmivacana*).[666]

Manorathanandin elaborates on the word *anyathā* as follows: "Otherwise, i.e., if the words 'his own subject' were not put forward in order that one might include invalidations of the whole combined proposition on account of the [invalidation of the] subject ... ."[667] *Kārikā* 139 thus anticipates a possible miscon-

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[661] PVV 460, 10: *pakṣasya lakṣaṇena.*

[662] PVV 460, 17: *dharmadvāreṇa dharmidvāreṇa vā samudāyabādhāyāṃ pakṣabādhety arthaḥ |.*

[663] PVBh 549, 22–23: *svadharmayukta eva ca dharmī vādinā svayam iṣṭaḥ |.*

[664] MIY. *tad bādhām*; PV-k(III) *tabdādhām.*

[665] See PVV 460, 21: *tadaivaṃvidhaḥ sādhyatvenaiveṣṭo dharmaḥ sādhya ity abhidhānataḥ |.*

[666] See PVV 460, 21–23: *tasya dharmamātrasyaiva bādhāṃ manyeta pratipattā na tu dharmibādhām api | tataḥ (|) ubhayasaṃgrahārthaṃ svadharmigrahaṇam ācāryasya |.*

[667] PVV 460, 20: *anyathā dharmidvāreṇa samudāyabādhāyāḥ saṃgrahārthaṃ svadharmigrahaṇaṃ yadi na kriyate ...*

strual of the thesis definition, it being taken as speaking about *sādhya* just in the sense of *sādhyadharma*. The result would be that, according to this understanding of the definition, there could be invalidation of only the property to be proved (*sādhyadharmamātra*) and not of the subject. Note that the fundamental idea of the subject also being proved is to be found clearly in Dignāga's NM and PS.[668]

3.5.2 *svadharmin* versus *kevaladharmin*

(140) *nanv etad apy arthasiddhaṃ satyaṃ kecit tu dharmiṇaḥ |*
kevalasyoparodhe 'pi doṣavattām[669] *upāgatāḥ ||*

> [Objection:] But surely this [fact that both are included] is also established by implication. [Reply:] That is true. But some hold [the thesis] to be faulty even when an unrelated (*kevala*) subject is negated.

Up until now Dharmakīrti has emphasized that *svadharmiṇi* serves to show that there can be two ways in which a thesis can be invalidated, i.e., by invalidating the property or the subject. In k. 140 Dharmakīrti, all the while conceding the logical redundancy of the proviso in the thesis, explains the specific meaning of the term *svadharmiṇi* by arguing against rival views (viz., "But some hold ...") which do not explicitly distinguish between the proponent's own subject and other types of subjects. Manorathanandin comments as follows: "[Dharmakīrti] replies, 'That is true. But some proponents hold that when the unrelated subject is negated, then even though the *sādhyadharma* is not invalidated, the thesis will still be faulty.'"[670] The *pūrvapakṣa* is, in effect, that negation of the subject, whatever it might be, intended by the proponent himself or not, will always count as invalidating the thesis. The rival view thus deliberately disregards the distinction between *svadharmin* and *kevaladharmin* and accepts that any and every nonexistence proof will become self-refuting: even the nonexistence of the *kevaladharmin* will lead to *āśrayāsiddha*. As k. 141–2 suggest, the holder of this view would seem to be a Vaiśeṣika. Indeed, this attribution would fit in well with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's strictures against speaking about nonexistent items.[671]

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[668] See e.g., NM, k. 3 = PS III, k. 13; KATSURA 1978, 115; TUCCI 1930, 19.

[669] MIY. *doṣavat tām* should be *doṣavattām*. Cf. PV Tib. *'ga' ẑig chos can ni || 'ba' ẑig bkag pa la yaṅ ni || skyon daṅ ldan par khas len to ||*.

[670] PVV 461, 4–5: *atrāha satyam etat kecit tu vādino dharmiṇaḥ kevalasyoparodhe sādhyadharmasyābādhāyām api pakṣasya doṣavattām upāgatāḥ pratipannāḥ |*.

[671] See MATILAL 1970, 84 *et sq.*.

3.5.3 A thesis showing that the Vaiśeṣika's version of space is nonexistent only proves nonexistence of a *kevaladharmin*, and hence does not incur self-refutation

(141) *yathā parair anutpādyāpūrvarūpaṃ*[672] *na khādikam* |
sakṛc chabdādyahetutvād ity ukte prāha dūṣakaḥ ||
(142) *tadvad vastusvabhāvo 'san dharmī vyomādir ity api* |
naivam iṣṭasya sādhyasya bādhā kācana[673] *vidyate* ||

For example, when [the Buddhist] states that space, etc. do not have a novel nature unproduced by other [conditions] because they are not causes for [producing their qualities such as] sound, etc. all at once, then the [Vaiśeṣika] adversary might say that in a similar way the subject, space, etc., would also not have the nature of a real entity. [Dharmakīrti's position:] In this fashion [even though the subject is invalidated],[674] there is in fact no invalidation of the intended [proposition] to be proved (*sādhya*) at all.

The argument at stake here is a refutation of space (*ākāśa*) taken in the Vaiśeṣika way, viz., as a permanent and causally unproduced real entity of which sound is a quality. "A novel nature unproduced by other conditions" means a permanent but real and intrinsically established nature. The Buddhist thus shows that such a space cannot exist because, if it did, its various qualities like sound would also have to exist causelessly and hence at all times together, just like the space. (In the absence of causal considerations, there would be no reason as to why a certain sound existed at one time and not another.) As it is an obvious fact that all sounds are not produced all together, space does not have a permanent, intrinsically established nature.

Thus the argument just described is a proof of the nonexistence of the Vaiśeṣika *ākāśa*. And the Vaiśeṣika supposedly retorts that the nonexistence of the subject would imply that the thesis would be faulty. Dharmakīrti replies by invoking the difference between *svadharmin* and *kevaladharmin*—the *kevaladharmin* is the Vaiśeṣika space and refuting it is not a fault. There would only be a fault if the *svadharmin* were being refuted, but such is not the case.

What is the *svadharmin* here, and what is the Buddhist actually intending to prove? Prajñākaragupta gives two interpretations, a fact which takes on some

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[672]MIY. *anutpādyā pūrvarūpan* is wrong.
[673]MIY. *kvacana*. Cf. Tib. *'ga' yaṅ*.
[674]PVV: *evaṃ dharmibādhane 'pi*.

importance in being a rather strong indication that there were two quite divergent approaches to the question of the *svadharmin-kevaladharmin* difference.

Here is PVBh *ad* k. 141–142: "Here an opponent might say: 'But this proves that space and the like are not novel natures unproduced [by causal conditions]. In that way, it proves that a subject such as space is not real (*vastvābhāva*) either.' [Reply:] An unrelated invalidation of the subject is not faulty. Indeed, the proponent commits no fault like this. For, precisely what he intends to prove is that space and so forth are not real. Consequently, there is no fault in saying with reference to a subject, unreal space (*avastubhūtākāśadharmiṇi*), that space does not have a novel nature unproduced [by other causal conditions], because it is not a cause [for producing its effects such as sound] all at once. This is because [he] establishes the property to be proved on the basis of a subject which is completely derived from conceptualisation (*vikalpapariniṣṭhite dharmiṇi sādhyasādhanād*). But a real thing is not the subject of that [property]. Therefore, although there is invalidation of this unrelated (*kevala*) [subject], there is [in fact] no fault. This is what is meant by the word *svadharmin* [in the PS]. Indeed, when the opponent's subject is invalidated it is not so that this property [i.e., nonexistence] will be unestablished. So, as there is nothing annulling the establishment of the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*), there is no fault.

"Alternatively, this [reasoning that space] does not have a novel unproduced nature because it is not the cause [for its effects] all at once, has the following meaning: space is impermanent. To this an adversary might say that the subject, permanent space, has been invalidated. But let it be invalidated. Even so the subject will be impermanent space. For, the contrary of the [property] to be proved will definitely be invalidated by the logical reason. And indeed a permanent subject is not the locus for the property to be proved under discussion, so when it is invalidated how could there be any fault at all!"[675]

[675]PVBh 550, 9–19: *atra prativādy āha | athaivāyam anutpādyāpūrvarūpatābhāvaṃ sādhayati vyomādīnāṃ (|) tathā vyomādidharmiṇo 'pi vastutvābhāvaṃ sādhayati | na dharmibādhanaṃ kevalaṃ doṣavat | na hy evaṃ vādino doṣaḥ | tena hi vastubhūtam ākāśādikaṃ na bhavatīty etad eva sādhayitum iṣṭam | tato 'vastubhūtākāśadharmiṇy anutpādyāpūrvarūpam ākāśādikaṃ na bhavati sakṛd ahetutvād iti na doṣaḥ | vikalpapariniṣṭhite dharmiṇi sādhyasādhanād vastubhūtas tu dharmī na tasya | tena tasya kevalasya bādhāyām api na doṣa iti svadharmivacanam | na hi paradharmiṇi bādhyamāne sa dharmo na sidhyati | tataḥ sādhyadharmasiddher*[a] *avyāghātād adoṣaḥ | atha vānutpādyāpūrvarūpaṃ na bhavati sakṛd ahetutvāt | asyāyam arthaḥ | anityam ākāśam (|) tatra paraḥ | nityam ākāśaṃ dharmī bādhitaṃ bhavati | bādhyatāṃ tathāpy anityam ākāśaṃ dharmī bhaviṣyati | avaśyaṃ hi hetunā sādhyaviparyayo bādhitavyaḥ | nityo hi dharmī na prakṛtasādhyadharmādhāras*[b] *tatas tadbādhane ka iva doṣaḥ* |. [a] RS reads *sādhyadharmisiddher*, but see PVBh Tib. 236a5: *des na* bsgrub bya'i chos *'grub pa la gnod pa med pa'i phyir ñes pa*

Prajñākaragupta's explanations of PV IV, k. 141–142 in effect show the two scenarios which we spoke about above in our introduction to this section. The first interpretation of these *kārikā*s turns on what we have termed the "the Principle of Conceptual Subjects": the *svadharmin* is not the space which the Vaiśeṣika takes to be a real external entity (*vastubhūta*)—that is only the *kevaladharmin*, the one which is spoken about, but is not what possesses the properties to be proved or the reason: the *svadharmin* is rather the conceptual representation of space. Thus, according to this first scenario described in PVBh, the *svadharmin* (i.e., that *dharmin* on the basis of which the proponent proves that space does not have "a novel nature unproduced [by causal conditions]"[676]), is unreal (*avastubhūta*) and is completely derived from conceptualisation.

The other interpretation of PV IV, k. 141–142 mentioned by Prajñākaragupta—an interpretation which turns on the Method of Paraphrase—is that the *svadharmin* is not the Vaiśeṣika's permanent unitary space, nor the conceptual representation, but rather the impermanent space which the Buddhist himself accepts. The argument in k. 141–142 thus has to be paraphrased and actually means that space is impermanent because it produces effects sequentially. The *dharmin*, *sādhyadharma* and reason are thus all reformulated in the way in which the Buddhist actually accepts them himself, and the *svadharmin* is therefore the *dharmin* in this reformulated reasoning.[677]

(143) *dvayasyāpi hi sādhyatve sādhyadharmoparodhi yat* |
bādhanaṃ dharmiṇas tatra bādhety etena varṇitam ||

Indeed, given that both [i.e., the combination of the subject and the property (*dharmidharmasamudāya*)] constitute that which is being proved (*sādhyatva*), then when invalidating the subject negates the property to be proved, in that case there will be an invalidation [of the thesis]. Such is what is expressed by the [words 'his own subject'].[678]

PVV elaborates: "No one seeks a means of proof (*sādhana*) in order to prove just the mere *sādhyadharma*, for in the world there are no debates about any existence

ma yin no ||; [b] we read *prakṛtasādhyadharmādhāras* following B (=Danaśīla's ms) instead of RS's *prakṛtasādhyadharmākāras*.

[676] *na anutpādyāpūrvarūpa*. Saying this is a backhanded way of saying that space is not a permanent unity.

[677] See TILLEMANS 1998a, 121–123 for an attempt at explaining why the Principle of Conceptual Subjects became the established interpretation of the *svadharmin* section in PV IV, as well as a brief sketch of the philosophical consequences of this approach.

[678] Additions follow PVV.

of that [mere *sādhyadharma*], and practical application on the basis of ascertainment would be inappropriate in that way. Rather, the *sādhya* is intended to be grounded upon some specific subject."[679]

The same theme as figured in k. 139 is found once again in k. 143. What the proponent intends to prove is never a mere property alone, without a subject, but always one pertaining to a specific subject. Hence, failure of the proponent's intended subject leads to invalidation of the thesis.

3.5.4 A parallel case to that of the Vaiśeṣika argument occurs when refuting the Sāṃkhya's notion of *sukhādi*

(144) *tathaiva dharmiṇo 'py atra sādhyatvāt kevalasya na* |
yady evam atra bādhā syāt nānyānutpādyaśaktikaḥ ||
(145) *sakṛc chabdādyahetutvāt sukhādir iti pūrvavat* |
virodhitā bhaved atra hetur aikāntiko yadi ||

In precisely this same way, the subject too is being proved (*sādhyatva*) here, and so what is unrelated is not [being proved]. [Thus, while the unrelated subject is invalidated, the thesis is not invalidated.][680] [Objection:] If that were so, then invalidation would occur here, namely, when [a Buddhist] says [to a Sāṃkhya] that pleasure, etc. (*sukhādi*) [i.e., Primordial Matter (*prakṛti*; *pradhāna*) composed of the three qualitative constituents (*guṇa*)] is not something efficient unproduced by other [concomitant conditions], because it does not cause [its effects] such as sound, etc. all at once, just as [argued] earlier. [Reply:] There would be contradiction here, if the reason ['not causing effects such as sound, etc. all at once' (*sakṛc chabdādyahetutva*)] were conclusive [for proving the property 'permanence,' but such is not the case].[681]

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[679] PVV 462, 4–7: *na hi sādhyadharmamātrasādhanārthaṃ kaścit sādhanam anveṣate* | *tasya jagati kvacit sattāyāṃ vivādābhāvāt* | *tathā niścaye pravṛttyayogāc ca* | *kiṃ tu dharmiviśeṣaniṣṭhaṃ sādhyam iṣṭam* ||.

[680] PVV 462, 11–12: *tato na kevalasya dharmiṇo bādhane pakṣabādhā.* Cf. PVBh 551, 6: *tataḥ kevalabādhane na doṣa eva* |.

[681] PVV 462, 10–25: *tatra yathā dharmiviśiṣṭasya sādhyatvaṃ dharmasya tathaiva sādhyatvaviśiṣṭatvena dharmiṇo 'pi sādhyatvāt kevalasya dharmasya na kvacit sādhyatā* | *tato na kevalasya dharmiṇo bādhane pakṣabādhā* | *yadi sādhyadharmoparodhini dharmiṇi bādhite pakṣabādheṣyate* | *evaṃ saty atra hetau sāṃkhyaṃ prati bauddhenokte dharmibādhādvareṇa dharmabādhā syāt* | *tadyathā sukhādiḥ sukhaduḥkhamohātmakaṃ pradhānaṃ nānyena saha-*

In k. 144cd–145, Dharmakīrti is confronted with the objection that if his refutation of the Vaiśeṣika's permanent space was correct, then a certain Buddhist argument against the Sāṃkhya would fail, for the Buddhist would have to face the charge that refuting the subject would lead to invalidation of the whole thesis and hence to *viruddhahetu*, or in other words, to the reason proving the opposite of the proposition in question. Briefly said, the negative existential proof would turn out to be self-refuting. The stated subject of the anti-Sāṃkhya argument is "pleasure, etc." (*sukhādi*), that is to say, "pleasure, pain and bewilderment," understood in the light of Sāṃkhya philosophy where each of these three feelings is correlated with one of the three qualitative constituents (*guṇa*), these in turn being of the essence of Primordial Matter. The Buddhist then argues that pleasure, etc., i.e., *pradhāna / prakṛti*, is not the permanent nature of the various effects or transfor-

kāriṇā 'nutpādya śaktiko 'nādheyasāmarthyaḥ sakṛc chabdādīnāṃ kāryāṇām ahetutvād iti | atra pūrvavat parair anutpādyetyādiprayogatvāc ca | sukhādyātmakasya nityatvasya bādhanāt sukhādau dharmiṇi bādhite taddharmasya nityatvasya virodhane viparyayasādhane bādhā syāt | anityasvabhāvo hi sukhādiḥ sādhayitum iṣṭaḥ | sukhādisvabhāvabhūtanityatvabādhane ca sukhādir eva bādhita iti dharmoparodhini dharmiṇi bādhite pakṣabādhā syāt | atrāha | bhaved atra hetau pakṣabādhā | yadi na sakṛc chabdādyanutpādād iti hetuḥ sādhyasya vastubhūtasukhādyanityatvasya viparyaye sukhādidharmyabhāvād anityatvābhāvenaikāntiko 'vyabhicāri bhavet |."In this context, just as the property which is qualified by the subject is being proved, in precisely this way the subject too is being proved due to being qualified by what is being proved. So an unrelated (*kevala*) property is not being proved of anything. Thus, when the unrelated subject is invalidated, there is no invalidation of the thesis. [Objection:] If you accept that there is invalidation of the thesis when the subject which is negated by the property being proved is invalidated, then in that case, here when the Buddhist states his logical reason to the Sāṃkhya, the property would be invalidated because the subject would be invalidated. Specifically, [the Buddhist] states that pleasure, i.e., the Primordial Matter (*pradhāna*) which is of the nature of pleasure, pain and bewilderment, is not something efficient unproduced by other concomitant conditions, i.e., [it has no] inherent power, because it does not cause its effects such as sound, etc. all at once. Here, it is just as [argued] earlier on account of the argument of [space] being unproduced by other [conditions] and so on and so forth. Because one invalidates the permanence of the [*pradhāna*] which is of the nature of pleasure, etc., the subject, pleasure, etc. would be invalidated. And then the proof of the contrary of its property, permanence, [i.e., the proof of 'not being permanent'] would be invalidated. Indeed, what [the Buddhist] intended to prove was that pleasure, etc. were by nature impermanent. Now if the permanence which is the nature of pleasure, etc. were invalidated, then pleasure, etc. would be invalidated. And thus, when the subject negated by the property is invalidated, there would be invalidation of the thesis. To this [Dharmakīrti] replies: There would be invalidation of the thesis here, i.e., with regard to the reason, if the reason 'due to not producing [its effects] such as sound, etc. all at once' (*na sakṛc chabdādyanutpādād*) were conclusive (*aikāntika* = *avyabhicārin*) for [proving] the opposite of the *sādhya*, i.e., [if it were conclusive for the opposite of] the impermanence of really existent pleasure, etc., because of there being no impermanence [of the subject] on account of the nonexistence of pleasure, etc."

mations (*vikṛti*) making up the world, because if it were, then all effects such as sound and the like would be have to be produced simultaneously, and such is not in fact the case. Here the Sāṃkhya retorts that refuting the permanence of pleasure, etc., i.e., *prakṛti*, is tantamount to refuting the subject itself; hence the thesis that *sukhādi* is *not* permanent would be invalidated. Dharmakīrti then uses the Method of Paraphrase, to maintain that what the proponent is actually proving is that ordinary (and real) pleasure, etc., which are acknowledged by all, are impermanent, because they produce their effects sequentially (*kramakriyā*)—thus one does not refute the proponent's actual subject, which is pleasure, etc. taken as the ordinary, impermanent and fully real entity (*vastubhūta*) accepted by Buddhists and others alike, and not the theoretical pseudo-entity "pleasure, etc." as accepted only by Sāṃkhya philosophers.

In the last half of k. 145, Dharmakīrti has rejected the sophistical Sāṃkhya objection about subject failure and now argues that the Sāṃkhya opponent could invalidate the Buddhist's thesis that *sukhādi* is not permanent only if he could correctly demonstrate that the logical reason *sakṛc chabdādyahetutva* actually entailed permanence. In other terms, the opponent would merit being taken seriously if it could be shown that the Buddhist's reason was actually a *viruddhahetu*, a valid reason for the opposite of what the Buddhist sought to prove. In such case, if it could be shown that the reason implied permanence, then the Buddhist's own subject, i.e., impermanent, real pleasure, etc., would be shown to be nonexistent and the Buddhist's thesis that pleasure is impermanent would be invalidated. But clearly there is no risk of this being the case, for the reason is not conclusive (*aikāntika*) for proving permanence.

(146) *kramakriyānityatayor avirodhād vipakṣataḥ* |
vyāvṛtteḥ saṃśayād eṣa[682] *śeṣavadbheda*[683] *iṣyate* ||

Action by stages and impermanence are not contradictory, and therefore, as there is doubt as to whether [the reason, 'not causing its effects such as sound etc. all at once' = 'action by stages'] is excluded from the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*) [i.e., impermanent things],[684] this [reason] is held to have the quality 'with remainder' (*śeṣavat*).

[682]PV-k(II) *saṃśayān nāyaṃ śeṣavad.*

[683]MIY. *śeṣavad bheda* should be a compound. Cf. PVV's gloss *anaikāntikaviśeṣas.*

[684]Cf. PVV 463, 3–4: *avastubhūtadharmisukhādidharmānityatve viparīte sādhye vastubhūtasukhādidharmānityatvaṃ vipakṣas....* Cf. also Yamāri's PVAṬ *Supariśuddhī* D. *tse* 102a6: *ci'i phyir źe na | gaṅ gi phyir gtan tshigs 'di ni lhag ldan te ma ṅes pa'i khyad par mi mthun pa'i phyogs la ldog pa la the tshom za bar 'dod pa yin no || ci'i phyir źe na | mi mthun phyogs mi rtag pa'i raṅ bźin gyi yod pa las ldog pa la the tshom za bas na'o ||* "Why [is the reason inconclusive]? Because

Kārikā 146 further develops the idea presented in the last half of k. 145, although Dharmakīrti compounds our difficulties somewhat by once again using alternative formulations, so that the reason "not producing its effects all at once" is reformulated as "acting by stages" (*kramakriyā*). The basic logical principle is clear enough: conclusive reasons must be completely excluded from the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*). In particular, if the reason, "acting by stages" (= 'not producing effects all at once'), were conclusive for proving permanence, it would have to be in contradiction with and hence excluded from all the class of dissimilar instances, i.e., from all impermanent things. But such is not the case at all.[685]

At this point a problem would seem to arise in our attempt to understand k. 146: why speak of *śeṣavat* here? The idea of a logical reason being *śeṣavat* means that it is suspected to be present in both similar and dissimilar instances, as in the usual Dharmakīrtian examples of fallacious proofs that someone is (or is not) omniscient because he is seen to use language or that he has desire because he has a body.[686] The obvious corollary of a reason being inconclusive in this way is that there will be no pervasion (*vyāpti*), or in other words, no implication between the reason and the property to be proved. Now, in the particular case at hand, classifying 'action by stages' as being *śeṣavat* would mean that action by stages is suspected to be present in both permanent and impermanent things. However, as Śākyabuddhi points out, action by stages should in fact strictly imply impermanence from the Buddhist point of view. Why then did Dharmakīrti speak of the exclusion from impermanent things as being doubtful given that for a Buddhist, proving permanence by the reason 'action by stages' would not be *śeṣavat* at all? Śākyabuddhi explains that although the implication between action by stages and impermanence does in fact hold, nonetheless, the opponent does not

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this reason [i.e., action by stages] is held to have the quality of inconclusiveness 'with remainder,' namely, that there is doubt as to whether it is excluded from the dissimilar instances. Why [is there such doubt]? Because one doubts whether it is excluded from the dissimilar instances, namely, from entities which are of the nature of impermanence."

[685]Cf. PVBh 551, 20–22: *atra kramakriyā hetur akramapratiṣedhena* | *kramakriyāyāś cānityatayā virodhābhāvāt* | *tato 'nityatābhāvaṃ na gamayatīti kathaṃ dharmibādhā* | *tadbādhayā ca dharmasya bādhā bhavet* | *tasmāt svadharmivacanam* | "Here, action by stages, by negating absence of stages, is the reason. Now, because action by stages is not in contradiction with impermanence, it therefore does not prove absence of impermanence. So how could it be that there would be invalidation of the subject and by its [i.e., the subject's] invalidation, an invalidation of the property? Thus [Dignāga] stipulated the *svadharmin*."

[686]See NB III, 69, 94; STCHERBATSKY 1958, 184, 206; PV I, k. 11–14. Cf. PV I, k. 14cd: *tasya saṃśayahetutvāc cheṣavat tad udāhṛtam* || "Because it is a cause for doubt, it is termed 'with remainder.' "

acknowledge it, and does not recognize that permanence (or non-impermanence) is completely separate from the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*), impermanence. In short, the opponent, following Śākyabuddhi's depiction, seems to have held the position (plausibly attributable to a Sāṃkhya) that action by stages was present in both permanent and impermanent things, and thus the reason would be doubtful, or "with remainder," for proving permanence *to him* and to him alone.[687]

3.5.5 Conclusions and summary

(147) *svayam iṣṭo yato dharmaḥ sādhyas tasmāt tadāśrayaḥ |*
bādhyo na kevalo nānyasaṃśrayo veti sūcitam ||

It was asserted [by means of the word *svayam* in the thesis-definition][688] that as the property which [the proponent] intends himself is what is to be proved (*sādhya*), therefore, the basis of this [property] is what is to be invalidated, and not something unrelated or the basis for a [property] other [than the one being proved].[689]

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[687]PVṬ 332a4–5: *rim gyis 'bras bu byed pa la mi rtag pa ñid kyis khyab pa ñid yin na ldog pa la the tshom za ba źes de ci'i phyir mi brjod | 'di skad du brjod par bya ste | mi rtag pa ñid med pa mi mthun pa'i phyogs su gyur ba ñid kyi mi rtag pa ñid ldog pa ma yin nam źe na | de ni bden te | gźan dag de ltar mi 'dod pa de ltar na de'i ṅor bśad pa yin no ||* "If producing effects by stages is pervaded by impermanence, then why not say 'There is doubt whether [the reason] is excluded'? The following would be said. Isn't non-impermanence [i.e., permanence] excluded from the impermanence which would constitute the dissimilar instances? [We reply:] That is true, but the adversaries do not acknowledge such things to be the case, and accordingly [Dharmakirti] speaks [of this doubtfulness] from their point of view."

[688]PVV: *iti svayaṃśabdena sūcitam.*

[689]PVV 463, 10–14: *yataḥ kāraṇāt svayaṃvādineṣṭo dharmaḥ sādhyas tasmāt sādhyadharmasyāśrayaḥ yaḥ sa eva bādhyaḥ kevalo na bādhyaḥ | yathā vastubhūtākāśabādhāyām api nityaikarūpatvābhāvasya sādhyadharmasya na kṣatiḥ | sādhyadharmād anyasya ca dharmasyāśrayo na bādhya iti svayaṃśabdena sūcitam | yathā 'nityatve sādhye śabde ākāśaguṇatvāśrayatvena bādhāyām api na doṣaḥ |*. "As (*yataḥ* = *kāraṇāt*) the property which the proponent intends himself is what is to be proved, therefore the basis of the property to be proved alone is what is to be invalidated; something unrelated is not to be invalidated. For example, even though one might invalidate the [Vaiśeṣika's] 'space which is a real entity' (*vastubhūtākāśa*), one would not nullify (*kṣati*) the property to be proved, viz., 'not being permanent and unitary by nature' (*nityaikarūpatvābhāva*). Nor is the basis for a property other than the one being proved to be invalidated. All this was asserted by the word *svayam* ('himself') [in Dignāga's definition of the thesis]. E.g., when proving impermanence, even though one might invalidate sound as being the basis for *ākāśaguṇatva* ('the property of being a quality of space'), still there would be no fault [of the thesis]."

(148) *svayaṃśrutyānyadharmāṇāṃ*[690] *bādhā 'bādheti kathyate* |
tathā svadharmiṇānyasya dharmiṇo 'pīti kathyate ||

By the word 'himself' (*svayaṃśruti*) it is asserted that an invalidation of properties other [than the property which is really being proved] is not an invalidation. Similarly, by [the words][691] 'his own subject' (*svadharmin*) it is asserted that [invalidation] of a different subject also [is not an invalidation].

*Kārikā*s 147–148 essentially restate and summarize Dharmakīrti's fundamental ideas concerning *svadharmin*, emphasizing the parallels with the term *svayam* discussed in PV IV, k. 43–83. (Tibetan commentators virtually unanimously classify these two verses as *don bsdu ba*—"summary." See FUKUDA and ISHIHAMA 1986, 68.)

This concludes Dharmakīrti's commentary on the individual components of the definition of the thesis found in k. 2 of Dignāga's PS. The immediately following section of PV IV will still (broadly speaking) continue to treat of the thesis, but will take up the various sorts of fallacies (*pakṣābhāsa*). After this section (i.e., k. 149–188), Dharmakīrti shifts his focus to the question of valid and invalid logical reasons (*hetu*), presenting his interpretation of the ninefold schema, known as the *hetucakra* (cycle of logical reasons), found in Dignāga's PS III, NM and *Hetucakraḍamaru*. Translation of this latter half of PV IV will have to remain for a second volume of the present work: *dge legs 'phel.*

690 MIY. *svayaṃ śrutyanya°* .

691 PVV: *svadharmiṇā svadharmivacanena.*

Part IV

Appendices

Appendix A

An Extract from Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* commenting on PSV's words *śābdaprasiddha* and *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve*

A.1 English Translation[692]

[*śābdaprasiddha* as an instrumental *tatpuruṣa* compound]
§a. The [words] *yatrāpi* ... etc. [in PSV] state an example of invalidation (*gnod pa* = *bādhā*) by means of [conventional] acknowledgment (*grags pa* = *pratīti*). Here, the thesis is that *śaśin* (that which has a rabbit) is not the moon (*zla ba ma yin* = *acandra*). The meaning of this is that *śaśin* (*ri boṅ can*) is not what is designated by the [word] *candra* (*zla ba*; moon). Now, this is opposed by a contradicting proposition (*'gal ba'i don gyis* = *viruddhenārthena*) which is commonly recognized through verbal knowledge (*sgra las byuṅ bas rab tu grub pa* = *śābdaprasiddha*).[693] Verbal knowledge (*sgra las byuṅ ba* = *śābda*) consists in

[692]The translation is done on the basis of the Tibetan. That said, my thanks to the Viennese colleagues for their fully trustworthy aid with the Sanskrit equivalents.

[693]PSṬ Tib. reads *sgra las byuṅ bas rab tu grub pa daṅ 'gal ba'i don gyis sel te* |, which would imply a translation like "... is opposed by a proposition which is in contradiction with *śābdaprasidda*." This, however, would imply a rather queer understanding of the passage, namely, that a bogus thesis like *acandraḥ śaśī* would be opposed by a proposition (like *candraḥ śaśī*?) which would be in contradiction with what is generally recognized. This makes no sense whatsoever. Hence we prefer to understand ...*śābdaprasiddhena viruddhārthena apohyate* as meaning that *acandraḥ śaśī* is opposed by the proposition, *candraḥ śaśī*, which is in contradiction with it and which is established through verbal knowledge. In short, the proposition (*artha*) by which the thesis is opposed is ° *prasiddha*; it is not in contradiction with ° *prasiddha*.

the inference known as "[conventional] acknowledgment" (*grags pa źes bya ba'i rjes dpag = pratītyākhyam anumānam*). Commonly recognized (*rab tu grub pa = prasiddha*) or ascertained (*ṅes pa = niścita*) by means of this [inference] is [the sense of] *śābdaprasiddha*.

[*śābdaprasiddha* as an ablative *tatpuruṣa*]
§b. Or there is the following alternative meaning to this which should be understood. The convention (*tha sñad = vyavahāra*) which is caused by expressions (*śabda*) such as "The moon is called 'moon' " (*zla ba zla ba źes pa = candraś candra iti*) and so forth, constitutes verbal knowledge (*śābda*). What is commonly recognized (*prasiddha*) from that [*śābda*], i.e., the property (*chos = dharma*) the character of which consists in the intended designation of the word (*'dod pa'i sgra'i brjod par bya ba'i mtshan ñid can = iṣṭaśabdābhidheyatvalakṣaṇa*), is *śābdaprasiddha*. One uses the expression *pra* in order to convey the fact of being established thoroughly (*mchog tu = prakarṣa*; *par excellence*; thoroughly).[694] It is thoroughly [established], because it is established for all objects (*don = artha*). Thus the following is asserted: [The thesis] is invalidated by that property (*dharma*) [i.e., fitness] which has arisen from verbal usage (*sgra'i tha sñad las skyes pa = śabdavyavahāraja*), [*dharma*] which is ascertained by means of the inference known as "[conventional] acknowledgment" (*pratītyākhyānumāna*), and which has a nature as just described [i.e., it applies to all objects].

[The first interpretation of *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve*]
§c. When it is said *asādhāraṇatvād...* etc., [what is meant is that] logical reasons which invalidate (*gnod par byed pa = bādhaka*), like "existence" (*yod pa ñid = sattva*) and the like, are over-exclusive (*thun moṅ ma yin pa ñid = asādhāraṇatva*), and therefore that there is no inference (*rjes su dpag pa med = anumānābhāva*). When one rejects intended fitness of words (*ruṅ ba ñid = yogyatā*), then how could other logical reasons have co-presence (*rjes su 'gro ba = anvaya*) [with the property to be proved] there where *sattva*, which has the quality of occurring in all entities, has no co-presence either? Thus, here the effect of stating the logical reason *sattva* as an example was that it was made understood that all logical reasons would be over-exclusive.
§d. [Objection:] But surely *sattva* does have co-presence [with the property to be proved] in similar instances (*mthun phyogs = sapakṣa*), i.e., in things which are

[694]Jinendrabuddhi seems to have felt obliged to take the term *prasiddha* in *śābdaprasiddha* in a somewhat special way. He takes it to mean either "ascertained"/"determined" (*ṅes pa*) or "thoroughly established," "established *par excellence*" (*pra*; *rab tu*; *mchog tu*), i.e., what is established everywhere.

not the moon (*zla ba ma yin pa* = *acandra*), such as vases and so forth. So how could it [i.e., *sattva*] be over-exclusive?

§e. [Reply:] This is not correct. The intended fitness of a word to designate is something which pertains to all objects. Indeed, everything is fit for words, whether they are agreed upon (*brda byas pa* = *kṛtasaṃketa*) or not, for [words] apply simply according to intentions. Precisely in virtue of words' fitness (*sgra'i ruṅ ba ñid kyi stobs kho nas* = *śabdayogyatābalād eva*), every word is connected in this *śabdayogyatā*, that is to say, whenever one wishes to use whatsoever word for whatsoever object, then one can use it for that [object]. It is proven that even such things as vases are in fact commonly recognized (*rab tu grub pa kho na*) as the intended designata of the word, for they are fit (*ruṅ ba ñid kyi phyir*), just as, for example, someone's being a cook (*'tshed pa po ñid* = *pācakatva*) even though he may not [actually] be cooking (*'tshed par byed bźin pa ma yin* = *apacati*). Therefore, vases and such things are also [fit to be designated] *candra* (moons), and so *sattva* has no co-presence (*anvaya*) in any non-moons (*zla ba ma yin pa* = *acandra*). Consequently, this [reason, *sattva*] is indeed over-exclusive (*asādhāraṇa*).

§f. [Objection:] In that case, since the [reason, *sattva*] is present in only (*kho na* = *eva*) the dissimilar instances (*mi mthun phyogs* = *vipakṣa*), it would be a contradicting [reason] (*'gal ba ñid* = *viruddhatā*), but would not be one which is over-exclusive.

§g. [Reply:] This is true [i.e., it is true that *sattva* only occurs amongst things which are fit to be termed *candra*], but what is meant is that the opponent does not accept vases and such things as being the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*) [i.e., he does not accept that they are fit to be termed *candra*]. Hence, it is in virtue of the opponent's ideas (*pha rol po'i bsam pas*) that [*sattva*] does not occur in the dissimilar instances, [and thus that] it is asserted to be over-exclusive.

[The second interpretation of *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve*]

§h. Alternatively, there is this other meaning to [Dignāga's words] *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve* (even though there is no [valid] inference since [the latter] would be over-exclusive). Suppose there is someone mistaken about [conventional] acknowledgments (*pratīti*) [of fitness], who, not accepting [such] acknowledgments (*pratīti*) anywhere, holds or maintains that a conventional (*yoṅs su bśad pa can* = *pāribhāṣika*) sense does not exist, saying [rather] that *śaśin* is not *candra*: [Dignāga] asserted that for this [person] there was no inference, when he [i.e., Dignāga] was establishing the conventional sense belonging to the world. Insofar as this [person] does not accept that *śaśin* is *candra*, then what [else] would he ever accept as established by [conventional] acknowledgment which would be an

example (*gaṅ gi dper 'gyur ba = yasya dṛṣṭāntatā syād*) [in the argument]? Thus, the logical reason which would establish [such conventional senses] (*rab tu 'jug pa po = pravartaka*) would be over-exclusive.

§i. If that is so, then, nonetheless, the thesis proposition as just stated [viz., *acandraḥ śaśī*] would be invalidated by means of the contradicting proposition [viz., *candraḥ śaśī*] which is established by [conventional] acknowledgments (*pratīti*) which apply simply according to intentions. Indeed, all entities are fit for the *dharma*s [i.e., fitness] which come from agreed upon words (*brda can sgra = saṃketaśabda*), which [words] are [in turn] not limited to any entity but are linked to mere intentions; this is because intentions have no restrictions. Therefore, because there are no limitations on the objects for words which conform to agreements, which [agreements] are [themselves] at the disposition of mere intentions alone, it is contradictory that there be any interdiction on the objects which are the domain of purely arbitrary words (*'dod rgyal ba'i sgra = yādṛcchikaśabda*).

A.2 Tibetan Text of the Extract from the *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (PSṬ P. 163a2–164a4; D. 142a5–143a5)

§a. *gaṅ la'aṅ źes pa la sogs pas grags pas gnod pa dper rjod do || 'dir ri boṅ can zla ba ma yin no źes pa dam bca'o || 'di'i don ni ri boṅ can zla ba'i brjod par bya ba ñid du*[a] *med do źes pa'o || de yaṅ sgra las byuṅ bas rab tu grub pa daṅ 'gal ba'i don gyis sel te | sgra las byuṅ ba ni grags pa źes bya ba'i rjes su dpag pa'o || des rab tu grub ciṅ ṅes pa ni sgra las byuṅ bas rab tu grub pa'o ||*

§b. *yaṅ 'di ñid kyi don gźan 'di śes par bya ste | zla ba zla ba źes pa 'di lta bu la sogs pa sgra'i rgyu can gyi tha sñad ni sgra las byuṅ ba yin la | de las rab tu grub ciṅ skyes pa 'dod pa'i sgra'i brjod par bya ba'i mtshan ñid can gyi*[b] *chos ni sgra las byuṅ ba las rab tu grub ste | mchog tu grub pa ñid du śes par byed pa'i don la rab kyi sgra ñe bar blaṅs pa yin no || mchog tu ni*[c] *de don thams cad la grub pa ñid kyi phyir ro || des 'di skad bśad par 'gyur te | gaṅ sgra'i tha sñad las skyes pa'i chos grags pa źes bya ba'i rjes su dpag pas ṅes pa ji skad bśad pa'i ṅo bo can yin źiṅ des gnod do źes pa'o |*

§c. *thun moṅ ma yin pa ñid kyi phyir źes pa la sogs pa ste | yod pa ñid la sogs pa gnod par byed pa'i gtan tshigs ni thun moṅ ma yin pa ñid do || de'i phyir yaṅ rjes su dpag pa med do*[d] *|| 'dod pa'i sgra'i ruṅ ba ñid spoṅ ba*[e] *la yaṅ gaṅ la dṅos po thams cad la 'byuṅ ba'i ṅaṅ tshul can yod pa ñid kyaṅ rjes su 'gro ba med pa der rtags gźan rjes su 'gro bar ga la 'gyur źes pas | 'dir gtan tshigs rnams*[f] *thams cad*

thun moṅ ma yin pa ñid do źes pa 'di rtogs pa ni gtan tshigs la yod pa ñid dper brjod pa'i 'bras bu'o ||

§d. *'o na bum pa sogs pa mthun phyogs zla ba ma yin pa la yod pa ñid*[g] *rjes su 'gro ste | des na 'di ci ltar thun moṅ ma yin pa yin źe na |*

§e. *de ni yod pa ma yin te | 'dod pa'i sgras brjod du ruṅ ba ñid ni don thams cad la 'byuṅ ba can yin no || de ltar ni brda byas pa rnams daṅ brda ma byas pa'i sgra rnams kyi ruṅ ba ni thams cad yin te*[h] *| 'dod pa tsam gyis 'jug pa'i phyir ro || sgra'i ruṅ ba ñid kyi stobs kho na las sgra thams cad sgra'i ruṅ ba ñid la 'brel pa ste | gaṅ gi tshe kho na sgra gaṅ źig don gaṅ la sbyor bar 'dod pa de'i tshe kho na de de la sbyor bar nus so źes pa'o || bum pa la sogs pa rnams la'aṅ 'dod pa'i sgra'i brjod par bya ba ñid rab tu grub pa kho na'o źes rnam par 'jog te | ruṅ ba ñid kyi phyir te | dper na 'tshed par byed bźin pa ma yin yaṅ 'tshed pa po ñid bźin no || de'i phyir bum pa la sogs pa rnams kyaṅ zla ba ste | des na*[i] *zla ba ma yin pa 'ga' źig la yod pa ñid rjes su 'gro ba med do || de'i phyir thun moṅ ma yin pa kho na'o ||*

§f. *de ltar 'gyur mod | 'di mi mthun phyogs kho na la yod pa'i phyir 'gal ba ñid du 'gyur gyi | thun moṅ ma yin pa ñid du ni mi 'gyur ro źe na |*

§g. *'di ni bden te | pha rol pos bum pa la sogs pa rnams mi mthun phyogs ñid du mi 'dod do źes pa 'di'i phyir | pha rol po'i bsam pas*[j] *mi mthun phyogs la 'jug pa ma yin no || thun moṅ ma yin pa ñid du brjod pa 'ga' źig go |*

§h. *yaṅ na thun moṅ ma yin pa'i phyir rjes su dpag pa med pa la źes pa'i 'di don gźan 'di yin te | gaṅ grags pa la log par źugs pa thams cad la grags pa ñid mi 'dod pa ri boṅ can zla ba ma yin źes | yoṅs su bśad pa can gyi don med pa ñid du*[k] *so sor śes pa pa'am dam bcas pa la | de'i ṅor rjes su dpag pa med par gsuṅs te | 'jig rten gyi yoṅs su bsad pa can gyi don sgrub par byed pa'i'o || de ni ri boṅ can ji srid pa'aṅ zla bar mi 'dod na | gaṅ gi dper 'gyur ba grags pas grub ci źig 'dod par 'gyur źes pas rab tu 'jug pa po'i gtan tshigs thun moṅ ma yin pa ñid do ||*

§i. *gal te yaṅ de lta yin pa*[l] *de lta na'aṅ 'dod pa tsam gyis 'jug pa'i grags pas grub pa daṅ 'gal ba'i don gyis ji skad bśad pa'i dam bca'i don la gnod par byed do | 'dod pa tsam daṅ rjes su 'brel pa dṅos po la ṅes pa med pa'i brda can sgra 'byuṅ ba'i chos rnams kyi ruṅ ba ni dṅos po thams cad yin pas te | 'dod pa la 'gog pa med pa'i phyir ro || des na 'dod pa tsam gyi dbaṅ du gyur pa'i brda'i rjes su byed pa'i sgra rnams kyi don ṅes pa med pa'i phyir | 'dod rgyal ba'i sgra'i yul gyi don la 'gog pa 'gal ba yin no ||* ([a] D. om. *du*—[b] P. *gyis*—[c] P. *mi*—[d] D. *de*—[e] D. *spaṅs*—[f] D. *rnam pa*—[g] P. *yod pa la ñid*—[h] D. *no*—[i] D. *dper na*—[j] P. *bsal bas*—[k] P. *med pa ñid med du*—[l] D. *ma yin pa*).

Appendix B

Dharmakīrti on *prasiddha* and *yogyatā*[695]

In the last few years there has been a growing tendency to make a separation between Dignāga's thought and that of Dharmakīrti. This has probably been, on the whole, a good thing, and was arguably long overdue in that for too long we did see the two in an almost interchangeable perspective and thus disregarded virtually all historical evolution. Indeed, in order to understand Dharmakīrti as presenting a particularly sophisticated and profound interpretation of Dignāga, we need to know about the real differences which he introduced in numerous areas of Dignāga's philosophy. Some important points of difference are becoming clearer, such as Dharmakīrti's development of the idea of *svabhāvapratibandha* (natural relations), *niścaya* (certainty; necessity), and in general his significantly transforming the looser, inductive Dignāgean logic into a more rigid deductive system, changes which, at least for some of us, might even seem to be something of an improvement—at any rate, for better or for worse, they eliminate some baroque complexities in Dignāga. There are also some (unconvincing) examples of would-be negative changes, such as Dharmakīrti supposedly misrepresenting Dignāga's scepticism about scripture and perverting the latter's open and neutral philosophy into a Buddhist dogmatic edifice. One area which we personally have begun to investigate is how Dharmakīrti treated Dignāga's definition of the thesis in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS) III and *Nyāyamukha* (NM).[696] In an earlier article,[697] we discussed Dharmakīrti's version of the phrase *svayam iṣṭa* (intended/accepted by the [proponent] himself) in this definition, and tried to show what seems to

[695] This is a trimmed down version of an earlier article, with the same title, published in *Studia Indologiczne*, Volume 4, 1997, Warsaw University. See TILLEMANS 1997.

[696] For PS III, k. 2, see p. 3.

[697] See TILLEMANS 1994.

have been a complex dialectic between Dharmakīrti and Īśvarasena on the question as to whether a proponent was not only bound to accept the thesis which he himself advanced, but also everything which the treatises of his school might have said on the matter in question. We will now turn to Dharmakīrti's treatment of *prasiddha*, viz., the principle that a valid thesis should not be opposed by what is commonly recognized (*prasiddha*). We shall try to show that Dharmakīrti, in PV IV, used this apparently banal idea in Dignāga for quite a different purpose than Dignāga had probably ever intended. In particular, he used the clause about *prasiddha* in PS III, k. 2 and the explanation of this passage in Dignāga's PSV, to show that Dignāga had a certain theory about the fitness (*yogyatā*) of words to designate their objects, the result being that in this way Dharmakīrti was able to create antecedents in Dignāga's philosophy for his own anti-Mīmāṃsaka polemic.

A. The critique of the Mīmāṃsakas and other "realists"

Repeatedly, in the last sections of PV I, in PV IV (k. 109–130) and in PVin II, we find the following semantical principle in Dharmakīrti's logic:

> I. Words do not have any naturally determined signification, or any naturally existent (*svabhāvika*) relation (*sambandha*) with their objects, so that a certain word would designate (*abhi-DHĀ*) a certain object and not another. To put it in another way, words do not have any intrinsic *fitness* (*yogyatā*) to designate just one thing and not another.

This is supplemented by another fundamental principle found throughout Dharmakīrti's philosophy of language:

> II. Words designate primarily mentally created fictions. Real objects (i.e., "particulars," *svalakṣaṇa*) are ineffable.

Corollaries of I and II: The designatum (*abhidheya; vācya*) being a fiction, the relation and fitness between a word and its object are also mentally created fictions. As a result, this relation can be as one wishes: any word can, if one so wishes, designate any thing: the fitness of words (*śabdayogyatā*) is unrestricted by any ontological factors. The relation between word and object is thus established purely by *vivakṣā* (speech intention).

Now, the adversaries being refuted by principle I are various non-Buddhist philosophers who held that words have a permanent relation with their meaning and that this relation is somehow not dependent on anything else (e.g., man, God, etc.) but is an uncreated, inherent fact belonging to the nature of words and things.

As the underlying theme motivating adoption of such a semantic theory was invariably to explain Vedic language as not subject to human creation and hence not subject to human error, it is not suprising, then, that Dharmakīrti and his commentators found it necessary to refute this position *in extenso* in order to be able to trivialize Vedic language as having no special authority whatsoever. Indeed, the polemical anti-Vedic thrust of the debate is brought out in full force when Dharmakīrti and his commentators argue that the words "One who desires heaven should offer the *agnihotra* sacrifice" are equally fit (*yogya*) to mean "One should eat dogmeat, etc." (*śvamāṃsabhakṣaṇādi*), for, following Dharmakīrti, there is nothing innate in the words of the injunction *agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ* which would preclude that it could also very well be a provocative, indeed offensive, anathematism against Vedic religion.[698] The stakes are therefore quite clear, and the debate is by no means insignificant.

In PV I and PVin II, the adversary is portrayed by the commentators and by Dharmakīrti himself as being a Mīmāṃsaka, one whose fundamental position is as found in the well-known formulation of *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* I.1.5: *autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena sambandhaḥ* (The relation between a word and its meaning, however, is innate). True, as Steinkellner has pointed out, the term *yogyatā* which figures in the context of PV I and PVin II does not correspond to the actual terminology of the Mīmāṃsaka himself, who, to take the case of Kumārila, rather speaks of words having an innate or natural power (*śakti*). It is indeed more usual that *yogyatā* would belong to the grammarians' philosophies, and in particular to Bhartṛhari, who clearly does have this notion in the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* of his *Vākyapadīya*.[699] Perhaps certain Mīmāṃsaka currents of the time had themselves made a rapprochement between *śakti* and *yogyatā*. Although we do need more information on this potential synthesis of Mīmāṃsaka and Vyākaraṇa ideas,[700] there is at least a passage in the PVSV *ad* PV I, k. 283 which shows clearly that Dharmakīrti himself had no compunctions about substituting *yogyatā* for the Mīmāṃsaka notion of *śakti*: "The power of a word, which is called *yogya-*

[698]See PVin II, k. 37 (= PV I, 318). See also PVBh *ad* PV IV, k. 112 (530, 26–28): *na khalu bhāvinī bhūtā vā yogyatā pratiṣedhena nivartayituṃ śakyā śabdasyāgnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāma ityādeḥ śvamāṃsabhakṣaṇādau | arthamātrānurodhitvāt | tatrāpy arthe 'pratikūlatā yogyatā |* "Neither future nor past fitness can be blocked by any interdiction, for words such as 'One who desires heaven should offer the *agnihotra*' are in keeping with the mere [conceptual] object in case of [them meaning that one should engage in] eating dogmeat and so forth. There too, there is no opposition with regard to the object, i.e., there is fitness (*yogyatā*)."

[699]See STEINKELLNER 1979, n. 211, 220.

[700]See STEINKELLNER 1979, n. 208.

tā and is said by the Jaiminīyas [i.e., the Mīmāṃsakas] to be the basis for understanding meaning, that [power] does not exist as a separate entity."[701] Commentators on Dharmakīrti's PV I and PVSV did, however, broaden the range of adversaries which would be refuted—Karṇakagomin, for example, cites somewhat later Sphoṭavādins, such as Maṇḍanamiśra, and even Bhartṛhari himself was cited on occasion.[702] For the sake of convenience, let us therefore speak of the general view of a naturally existent *sambandha* and *yogyatā* as being a type of "realism." Realism was, no doubt, the view of the Mīmāṃsakas whom Dharmakīrti was primarily refuting in PV I and PVin II, but it was also the view of quite a number of other philosophers, some of whom, like Bhartṛhari, may have played a role, albeit obscure, in the development of Dharmakīrti's thought. At any rate, the anti-Mīmāṃsaka polemic about *yogyatā* in PV I and PVin II is basically due to Dharmakīrti himself—he is not commenting on Dignāga here and only cites him very occasionally in the PVSV in an incidental way. It seems unlikely that Dignāga himself was particularly concerned with the notion of *yogyatā* at all as it seems to play no prominent role in his own works. The notion of *yogyatā* does, of course, figure prominently in the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* of Bhartṛhari and we know that the *Traikālyaparīkṣā*, attributed (rightly or wrongly) to Dignāga, corresponds to k. 53–85 of this portion of the *Vākyapadīya*. But the *kārikā*s on *yogyatā* in Bhartṛhari occur earlier on (e.g., k. 29), and do not figure in the *Traikālyaparīkṣā*.

Now, what is the logical relation between principle I and II? Intuitively speaking, it seems that accepting the unreality of objects of words advocated in principle II would entail that one rejects realism concerning *sambandha* and *yogyatā*, but that the implication only holds in one direction: principle II implies principle I, but not vice versa. In short, principle II seems to be considerably stronger than principle I. And indeed, historically speaking, Indian philosophers did treat II as stronger than I. In other words, there certainly were philosophers who accepted principle I but not principle II. Some non-Buddhists thought it quite possible to deny that there was a naturally existent, intrinsic *sambandha*, *śakti* or *yogyatā*, but to maintain nonetheless that the meaning of a word was a real entity. This seems to have been the usual Naiyāyika perspective (stemming from

[701] PVSV, ed. GNOLI 150, 5–7: *yā ca śabdhaśaktir yogyatākhyā 'rthapratipattyāśrayo jaiminīyair varṇyate | sārthāntaram eva na bhavati |*.

[702] STEINKELLNER 1979, n. 222 points out that Jñānaśrībhadra, in commenting on PVin II, even cites *kārikā* 29, an important *kārikā* from the *Vākyapadīya*'s *Sambandhasamuddeśa*, as a "Mīmāṃsaka" verse. See HOUBEN 1995, 233 for translation of k. 29.

NS 2.1.55[703]), in that these thinkers accepted that words designated real entities, but maintained that words were simply conventional, or "governed by agreement" (*sāmayika*), and did not possess any natural or innate powers to designate such and such an object and not another.

Dharmakīrti, however, did accept principle II, which is much of what is involved in the Buddhist *apoha* theory of language: words cannot directly designate particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) but only conceptually created fictions, i.e., universals or *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. It is worthwhile to stress that this basic theoretical stance on words designating *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* (and not directly designating *svalakṣaṇa*) is common to both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, in spite of what certain contemporary writers claim. This matter has been taken up elsewhere:[704] suffice it to say that the attempts to make a separation between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on this matter have not been very convincing.

It is clear that Dharmakīrti himself in PV and elsewhere, and certainly his commentators, saw principle II as entailing principle I. He and his commentators give the argument that whatever is an object of a conceptual cognition (and is hence an unreal fiction), can be designated by whatever word one wishes. In short, conceptual objects entail that there is intrinsically unrestricted *yogyatā*. Durvekamiśra, in commenting both on NB III, 51 and Dharmottara's NBṬ, actually gives the formal reasoning (*prayoga*) in all its details.

> The *prayoga* should be regarded as follows: 'Whatever entity is the object of a conceptual cognition, can be designated by an agreed upon word, just like the entity having branches and so forth [can be designated] by the word 'tree'. Now, *śaśin* is the object of a conceptual cognition.' (The conclusion is that *śaśin* can be designated by the agreed upon word *candra*.)[705]

This reasoning is not just a later commentator's invention: it is based on the same logical reason which Dharmakīrti had alluded to in PV IV, k. 92 as being a *svabhāvahetu*, a reason which is an essential property of what is to be proved. Noteworthy too is that Dharmakīrti, in works subsequent to PV, went so far as to significantly change Dignāga's definition of conceptual thought (*kalpanā*) so that it would explicitly include mention of the idea of *yogyatā*. This new definition of

[703]NS 2.1.55: *na sāmayikatvāc chabdārthasampratyayasya* "This is not so [i.e., there is no eternal connection between word and object], because the knowledge of the meaning of a word is governed by agreement."

[704]See e.g., KATSURA 1991, 129–133.

[705]DMP 184, 16–17. See n. 447 for the Sanskrit of the passage and for further information on this *prayoga* and others proving unrestricted *yogyatā*.

kalpanā is to be found in NB I, 5 and PVin: *abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā*: "Conceptual thought is a cognition in which a representation is fit to be associated with a verbal designation."[706] By the time of the NB and PVin, then, it had become integral to Dharmakīrti's explanation of conceptual cognition (*kalpanā, vikalpa*) that any and all conceptual representations were fit to be associated with any and all words (*abhilāpasaṃsargayogya, śabdākārasaṃsargayogya*). It is thus not at all artificial that Dharmottara, in commenting on Dharmakīrti's NB III, 51, where the question of refutation by *prasiddha* is discussed,[707] understood the key points in this discussion as turning on the Dharmakīrtian definition of *kalpanā* with its explicit mention of *yogya / yogyatā*.[708]

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[706] Two variants are possible here, the first (and most probable) being to read °*pratibhāsā* (hence a *bahuvrīhi*), the second being to read ° *pratibhāsapratīti* (i.e., a genitive *tatpuruṣa*). The latter corresponds to PVin 252b, 4: *rtog pa ni brjod pa daṅ 'drer ruṅ ba snaṅ ba'i shes pa*, since *pratibhāsapratītiḥ = snaṅ ba'i śes pa*. This was the reading adopted by HATTORI 1968, n. 1.27, p. 85, who translated as follows: "a cognition of [a] representation which is capable of being associated with a verbal designation." There is, however, important support for the *bahuvrīhi* reading of ° *pratibhāsā* in that Dharmottara's NBṬ explicitly takes the compound in this way. NB Tib. gives no clues, as it does not seem to have the word *śes pa*, but ends with *snaṅ ba = pratibhāsa*. See also TILLEMANS 1990a, p. 274–275, n. 367 and TILLEMANS 1995, n. 22.

[707] NB III, 51: *pratītinirākṛto yathā acandraḥ śaśīti* "It is opposed by a [conventional] acknowledgment, as when one says that 'what has a rabbit' (*śaśin*) is not the moon." Note that Dharmakīrti deliberately changes Dignāga's term *prasiddha* to *pratīti*.

[708] We should note that Dharmottara does have a somewhat unusual explanation of *pratīti*, taking it to be equivalent to *vikalpavijñānaviṣayatva*, and saying that it is the logical reason in the proof that *śaśin* is fit to be dubbed *candra*. See NBṬ *ad* NB III, 51: *pratītyā nirākṛtaḥ acandra iti candraśabdavācyo na bhavati śaśīti pratijñātārthaḥ | ayaṃ ca pratītyā nirākṛtaḥ | pratīto 'rtha ucyate vikalpavijñānaviṣayaḥ | pratītiḥ pratītatvaṃ vikalpavijñānaviṣayatvam ucyate | tena vikalpavijñānaviṣayatvena* pratītirūpeṇa śaśinaś candraśabdavācyatvaṃ siddham eva | tathā hi yad vikalpavijñānagrāhyaṃ tac chabdākārasaṃsargayogyam | yac chabdākārasaṃsargayogyaṃ tat sāṃketikena śabdena vaktum śākyam | ataḥ pratītirupeṇa vikalpavijñānaviśayatvena siddhaṃ candraśabdavācyatvam acandratvasya bādhakam | svabhāvahetuś ca pratītiḥ | yasmād vikalpaviṣayatvamātrānubandhinī sāṅketikaśabdavācyatā tataḥ svabhāvahetusiddhaṃ candraśabdavācyatvam avācyatvasya bādhakam dṛṣṭavyam ||* *Note that MALVANIA read *vikalpajñānena* in keeping with DMP; however the variant *vikalpavijñānaviṣayatvena* occurs in several mss. of NB and is supported by NB Tib. *rnam par rtog pa'i rnam par śes pa'i yul ñid des*. Translation: "The following is [a case of a proposition] being opposed by a [conventional] acknowledgment (*pratīti*): the thesis '*śaśin* is not the moon (*acandra*)' [or in other words] 'it is not the designatum of the word *candra*.' Now this is opposed by a [conventional] acknowledgment. A thing is said to be acknowledged (*pratīta*) when it is an object of conceptual cognition (*vikalpavijñānaviṣaya*); 'acknowledgment' (*pratīti*) or 'the fact of being acknowledged' (*pratītatva*) is said to be 'the fact of being an object of conceptual cognition' (*vikalpavijñānaviṣayatva*). *śaśin*'s being the designatum of the word *candra* is established by this property of being an object of conceptual cognition, i.e., its being in essence a [conventional] acknowledgment. As follows: Whatever is to be grasped by a conceptual consciousness is fit to be

B. Dharmakīrti's sources for *yogyatā* in Dignāga's PS

Dharmakīrti finds sources for the idea of unrestricted *yogyatā* in PS III, k. 2's specification of four sorts of opposition which a valid thesis must avoid: that by perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), authorities (*āpta*) and by what is commonly recognized (*prasiddha*). In particular, it is the PSV, Dignāga's own commentary on k. 2 which forms the basis for Dharmakīrti's commentary on *prasiddha* in PV IV, 109–130. (See p. 153 above for the PSV passage in question and an explanation of the four types of opposition.)

In PSV Dignāga had given the following example of a bogus thesis which would be refuted by *prasiddha* / *śābdaprasiddha*: "That which has a rabbit (*śaśin*) is not the moon (*candra*), because it exists (*sattva*)." The basic idea here is that a thesis should not contradict established verbal usage, in other words, given the verbal conventions of Sanskrit speakers, it just contradicts *prasiddha* to say "That which has a rabbit (*śaśin*) is not the moon (*candra*)"—there is absolutely no conflict with observable or inferable biological facts about rabbits or astronomical facts about the moon, but only with some elementary and generally acknowledged facts about usage of language. Dignāga therefore held that there was no inference functioning objectively, or due to the force of entities (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*), which would be able to prove either *candraḥ śaśī* (that which has a rabbit is the moon) or the contrary, viz., *acandraḥ śaśī*, for logical faults like *asādhāraṇatva* would ensue. This is what is specified in the PSV's words *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve*, viz., "though there is no [valid] inference since [the latter] would be over-exclusive (*asādhāraṇatva*)." We will not, however, go into the details of this fallacy here as it would take us too far afield, especially given that Dharmakīrti himself has a rather particular interpretation of *asādhāraṇatva* in this context (see pp. 160–161).

In Dharmakīrti's hands, in PV IV, k. 109–130, however, the interpretation of the key passage from PSV becomes quite complex. He first of all significantly

combined with the image (*ākāra*, 'image'/'aspect') of a word. Whatever is fit to be associated with the image of a word can be designated by an agreed upon word. Thus, [*śaśin*'s] being the designatum of the word *candra* (*candraśabdavācyatva*), which is established on account of its being an object of conceptual cognition, i.e., in essence a [conventional] acknowledgment, serves to invalidate (*bādhaka*) *acandratva* ('not being the moon'). Now [conventional] acknowledgment is a reason which is an essential property (*svabhāvahetu*). Since the property of being the designatum of an agreed upon word (*sāṅketikaśabdavācyatā*) is necessarily connected with the simple fact of being an object of conceptual cognition (*vikalpaviṣayatvamātra*), therefore *candraśabdavācyatva*, which is established by means of a *svabhāvahetu*, should be seen to invalidate the property of not being a designatum [of the word *candra*]."

reinterprets the bogus thesis in question so that it no longer is just "*śaśin* is not *candra*," but rather "*śaśin* is not the designatum of the word *candra*" (*candraśabdavācya*), or equivalently, "*śaśin* is not fit (*yogya*) to be the designatum of the word '*candra*.' " Following Dharmakīrti, then, the bogus thesis *acandraḥ śaśī* in Dignāga is taken to be that of some type of realist, someone who wants to say that while words designate objects in virtue of naturally existent *yogyatā*, *candra* and *śaśin* are *not* linked by this *yogyatā*. Perhaps, this opponent thought that the word *candra* would only have such fitness for the moon, and not for something like *śaśin*, which is only the moon by conventional agreement. This point was not developed by Dharmakīrti, nor by his commentators—nor was it made clear by anyone whether the thesis *acandraḥ śaśī* was actually advanced by any historical adversary, or whether, as seems more likely, it was purely hypothetical. At any rate, for Dharmakīrti, this thesis is false, because *śaśin*, and for that matter, *everything else*, is intrinsically fit to be the designatum of the word *candra*—in short the thesis is bogus because there are absolutely no restrictions on *yogyatā* inherent in the words themselves: whatever people wish to use a word for, that they *can* use it for. The only factor governing whether something is fit or not to be dubbed by such and such a word is whether we intend the word to be used in that manner.

C. Final remarks: What was Dharmakīrti up to here?

Certainly, introducing the Dharmakīrtian position on *yogyatā* into PS III, k. 2 and PSV yields an interpretation of Dignāga's treatment of theses like *acandraḥ śaśī* which goes far beyond the simple refutation of absurd propositions which contravene speech conventions in Sanskrit. I think, however, that almost inevitably we have a sense that Dharmakīrti was up to something strained and artificial in treating Dignāga's explanations on *prasiddha* in this way. And indeed, it seems that this artificiality was not entirely lost on the Indian commentators either. Vinītadeva in his *Ṭīkā* (NBṬV) on the NB III, 51, alluded to a fairly banal, but more intuitively plausible, interpretation of Dignāga's actual words, one which held that the thesis *acandraḥ śaśī* was false, not because of anything abstruse or philosophical to do with intrinsically unrestricted *yogyatā* of words, but simply because of the commonly known facts about Sanskrit usage.

> If someone maintains that *śaśin* is not the designatum of the word *candra*, he is opposed since it is commonly recognized (*grags pa* = *prasiddha*) by everyone from cowmaids on up that *śaśin* is designated by the word *candra*. Alternatively (*yaṅ na*), he is opposed

> because all objects are fit (*ruṅ ba* = *yogya*) to be the designata of all words, since the relation (*'brel ba* = *sambandha*) between words and objects is marked by agreement (*brda*= *saṃketa*), just as, for example, a vase too is fitting to be the designatum of the word *candra*.[709]

The first interpretation mentioned by Vinītadeva is what we might term the "simple" or "intuitively plausible" interpretation of Dignāga's words; the second interpretation is that of Dharmakīrti. Alas, we do not know who held the "simple interpretation," but it may have been the so-called "commentator on [Dignāga's] Nyāyamukha" (*nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra*) who appeared earlier in PV IV, but whose identity remains a mystery. In PV IV, k. 27, this Nyāymukhaṭīkākāra—whom Śākyabuddhi had named as "Maṅ po len pa'i bu," a name which corresponds to no one at all that we know of in Buddhist logic—was being ridiculed for an inept and inelegant refutation of Naiyāyika arguments proving that the thesis-statement (*pakṣavacana*) was a legitimate means of proof (*sādhana*).[710] Dharmakīrti, in k. 27, had dismissed this refutation as an "irrelevant farce" (*viḍambanā asaṃbaddhā*). Now the same Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra, who seems to be treated as little better than a buffoon in PV IV, reappears in PV's section on *prasiddhabādhā* / *pratītibādhā* and offers a rival and simpler interpretation of Dignāga's idea of over-exclusiveness (*asādhāraṇatva*), one against which Dharmakīrti argues in detail in PV IV, k. 121 *et seq*. For the Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra the over-exclusiveness of a reason used to prove that *śaśin* is *candra* has nothing to do with general principles about philosophy of language and semantics à la Dharmakīrti. What is at stake is a more pedestrian problem, namely, that when one proves that *Y* is *X*, where "*Y*" is a nonliteral designation for *X*, there will be no example possible, for the nonliteral and literal terms will be co-extensive. In short, one cannot cite a case of a *candra* which is not also a *śaśin*. This simpler interpretation of *asādhāraṇatva* harmonizes very naturally with what we are terming the "simpler" or "intuitively plausible" interpretation of Dignāga's words on *prasiddha*, in that it turns only on a technical point which arises in proving linguistic conventions, but in no way on theoretical principles like *yogyatā*. It is logical, then, that the curious *ṭīkākāra*, about whom we know so little, must also have offered a sim-

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[709]NBṬV on NB III, 51, p. 106 (ed. L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN): *la la źig ri boṅ can ni zla ba'i sgrar brjod par bya ba ma yin no źes dam 'cha' bar byed na | de ni ri boṅ can zla ba'i sgrar brjod pa ñid du gnag rdzi mo tshad grags pas sel bar byed do || yaṅ na don thams cad la sgra thams cad kyi brjod par byar ruṅ bas sel bar byed de | sgra daṅ don du 'brel ba ni brda'i rtags pa yin pa'i phyir | dper na bum pa la yaṅ zla ba'i sgrar brjod par bya ba ñid du ruṅ ṅo ||*.

[710]See p. 41 *et sq*.

pler interpretation of Dignāga's use of *prasiddha*, one which would have been at least along the same general lines, if not identical, to the "intuitively plausible" interpretation alluded to in passing by Vinītadeva. What is supremely ironic is that the Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra, if indeed it was he, might very well have gotten Dignāga dead right. The inescapable impression is that the Dharmakīrtian version is a philosophically interesting, but overly complex tangent on what was a fairly trivial subject for Dignāga. In short, Dharmakīrti needed to legitimize an anti-Vedic polemic by finding sources in Dignāga, and he "found" them in a very unlikely place. The much-maligned *ṭīkākāra*, or whoever it was that took things more simply, was probably more accurate in reflecting Dignāga's thought.

Appendix C

Corrections to Y. MIYASAKA's edition of the Tibetan text of *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, k. 1–148

k. 6 Read *rigs pa* (= *yukti*) following P. and N., instead of MIY., D. *rig pa*.

k. 11 Read *raṅ bźin* instead of *raṅ bźiṅ*.

k. 14 Read *brtags pa* (= *kalpitā*) following P. and N., instead of MIY., D. *btags*.

k. 15 In MIY. n. 1 read P. *phyed pa* instead of *'byed pa*.

k. 21 Better to read *grub par* (intransitive) following P. and N., instead of MIY., D. *sgrub par* (transitive).

k. 21 Read *yul bstan pa dag* instead of MIY. *yul bstan pa dad*.

k. 22 P., D. and N. all read *sṅon can la*.

k. 23 P. and N. both read *bsgrub bya brjod pa dam bca' na'aṅ / smra de la*, which is preferable to D., MIY. *bsgrub bya brjod par dam bcas na'aṅ* as a translation of *sādhyoktiṃ vā pratijñāṃ sa vadan*, and is also the reading commented upon by dGe 292, 5 and rGyal 250.

k. 27 Read *lan ni 'brel med* (*lan* = *parihāra* and cf. PVBh Tib. P. 173b4: *lan*). MIY., P., D. and N. all have *gźan* (= *anya!*), which makes no sense at all, but dGe 293 and rGyal 251 comment on *lan*. See n. 154.

k. 44b Read *dri sa'i yon tan* instead of *dri za'i yon tan*. See n. 247.

k. 50a Read *rnam dag na*. MIYASAKA 1974 wrongly corrects *rnam dag na* (= *viśuddhe*) to *rnam ṅag na*.

k. 54a Read *reṅ bur* instead of MIY.'s *riṅ por* (long). Contrary to MIY.'s note, P. and N. do not read *riṅ bur*, but *reṅ bur*, as does PVBh Tib. 187a7. *reṅ bur*

would mean "separately"; "alone." Cf. TANG Chi an *et al.*, *Bod rgya tshig mzdod chen mo* s.v. *reṅ bu* which gives *rkyaṅ pa* and *gcig pu* as synonyms. See also H. JÄSCHKE, *Tibetan-English Dictionary*, s.v. *reṅ bu.*

k. 57c Read *dud* (smoke) instead of *duṅ*. MIY.'s own subsequent correction to *du* is an unnecessary change in the text, as *du ba* and *dud* both mean "smoke."

k. 62a, n. 1 P. and N. read *gźan dag las* instead of *bźan dag las.*

k. 70a Read *sgrub byed* (= *sādhana*) as in P., D. and N, instead of MIY.'s *grub byed.*

k. 70c Read *rigs pas* (= *nyāya*) with P., instead of D. and MIY. *rig pas.*

k. 74a, n. 1 Both P. and N. (and not just N.) read *slar.*

k. 76a, n. 1 N. does *not* read *bźuṅ*, but rather *gźuṅ*, like P. and D.

k. 76, n. 2 P., D. and N. all read *grags pa'i.*

k. 77c MIY. wrongly changes *khyad par can* to *khyad par na* invoking N.'s reading. P. and D. read *khyad par can.* (It is clear that a scribe added the *ca* in N. underneath the *na.*) Skt. supports *khyad par can* as does dGe 308, 1.

k. 78a MIY. wrongly changes *grub par* to *sgrub par*, invoking N. But the intransitive *grub par* is found in P., D. and N.

k. 80c, n. 1 P. does *not* read *di*, but *de.*

k. 87c MIY. *'drel pa'i phyir.* Read *'brel pa'i phyir* following P., D. and N.

k. 93b, n. 1 P., D. and N. *all* read *yid.*

k. 97a D.'s reading *gsal ba'i dpe* is correct. P. and N. read *bsal ba'i dpe.*

k. 97d MIY. *bde pa mi 'grug.* Read *bde ba mi 'grub* following P. and D. (N. has *bde ba ma 'grub*).

k. 101b, n. 1 P. and N. read *sṅar ni.*

k. 105c, n. 2 P., D. and N *all* read *'dod pas.*

k. 107d, n. 1 D. reads *chos dag 'gyur ba'o* rather than *chos daṅ 'gyur ba'o.*

k. 108c Read *de* (= *tad*) instead of MIY.'s *te*; P., D. and N. all read *de.*

k. 109c Read *gnod med ṅag* (*ṅag* = *vāg*) with P. and N., instead of D. and MIY.'s *gnod med dag.*

k. 109d Better to read *'dir* (= *atra*) than P., D., N. and MIY.'s *'dod.* See n. 540.

k. 112d, n. 2 P., D. and N. *all* read *gnod. gdod* does not occur.

k. 115a Read *der* (= *tatra*) with P. and N., instead of D. and MIY.'s *de.*

k. 116b Read *tsam* with P., D. and N., instead of MIY.'s *tsham.*

k. 127c Read *źes* with P. and N., instead of D. and MIY.'s *ces.* (After the *na* of

min it is *źes* which is grammatically correct. Cf. k. 134c.)

k. 128a Read *sgra yi* (= *śruter*) with D., instead of P., N. and MIY.'s *sgra yis*.

k. 134b Read *mṅon sum min par* instead of *mṅon sum miṅ par*. (Corrected in MIYASAKA 1974.)

k. 135, n. 1 The variant *bstan* is not found.

k. 138d Better to read *der brten pa* (= *tadāśrita*), as in P. and N, instead of D. and MIY.'s *de brten pa*. (The variant *bsten pa* is not found here in P., D. and N.)

k. 144, n. 1 P., D. and N. *all* read *de ltar na*.

Part V

Indices

Sanskrit terms

References are to page numbers. Certain extremely frequent terms are deliberately not included.

Tibetan terms

References are to page numbers.

Za

’a

Ya

Ra

La

Śa

Sa

Index locorum

References are to the notes in which the quotations figure